A Study on Urgent Technology Transfer System for the License on Technology Export of Nuclear Plant and Current Issues

Su-Hyeon Kim,Han-Sol Ko 한국방사성폐기물학회 2022 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.20 No.1

The License on Technology Export of Nuclear Plant is a system that permits the export of strategic technologies for large-scale NPP projects collectively during the project period. So, an issuance of the export license could be omitted for each transfer of technology, but Post Strategic Items Confirmation must be performed before the transfer as a follow-up obligation. Sometimes, transfers of technology have been urgently required during the project. As Post Strategic Items Confirmation process takes up to 15 working days, it may be difficult to respond to urgent situations timely, which may cause setbacks on the project. Therefore, Urgent Technology Transfer System, which allows to transfer technology without prior Post Strategic Items Confirmation, was established to reduce a burden on licensee and improve the efficiency of regulation. This system applies only to the License on Technology Export of Nuclear Plant. In other words, the technology transferred through Urgent Technology Transfer System (hereinafter referred as Urgent Transfer Technology) does not pose any problem with regard to export control because it is already licensed. In addition, the Urgent Transfer Technology should be considered as a strategic technology until Post Strategic Items Confirmation, which means that the Urgent Transfer Technology is more strictly controlled than the generally transferred technology. Also, the Urgent Technology Transfer System does not apply to intangible technology transfers such as technical support through personnel dispatch. The system could be only used in specific conditions which are stipulated for each licensed project in advance in order to prevent indiscriminate abuse of the system by licensee. Licensees are required to report quarterly the stipulated condition corresponding to each Urgent Technology Transfer case, and it would be checked through post-site inspection whether the actual reason for the transfer meets the consulted condition. Moreover, the deadline of application on Post Strategic Items Confirmation after the Urgent Technology Transfer is stipulated for licensee so as not to omit the classification procedure. This Urgent Technology Transfer System does not apply to dual-use items. If the Urgent Transfer Technology is classified as a non-Trigger List Item through the Post Strategic Items Confirmation, it is outside the scope of the NSSC’s export license. In this case, the technology may be subject to an export license of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE). However, if the technology is classified to be a dual-use item after Urgent Technology Transfer, it may result in unauthorized transfer because it has already been transferred. Licensee must apply to classification of MOTIE before Urgent Technology Transfer if the technology being transferred may be related with Dual-use Items. It is easy for licensee to overlook due to the low awareness about this system. Therefore, outreach activities are necessary to raise licensee’s awareness by explaining the Urgent Technology Transfer System and current issues in detail. Consultation with MOTIE may be needed for the improvement on issues.

전략물자 통제제도의 국제적 변화에 따른 효율적인 수출관리 방안에 관한 연구

이상진(Lee Sang-Jin),윤남권(Yoon Nam-Kwon) 한국관세학회 2005 관세학회지 Vol.6 No.4

The international situation surrounding strategic items export has been rapidly changed as the world has taken new establishment of international treaty and convention on the strategic items. In this regard, Korea is actively trying to control strategic items export for world peace and national security. For example, strategic items information system developed by MOCIE supports to maximize enterprise's convenience and manage enterprise's export self-regulation. However, the advance countries, USA in particular, is strictly controlling the strategic items export through preliminary permission if foreign countries offer a technology export. So the related enterprise needs to manage voluntary export system for recognizing dangers that may happen in strategic items export. Therefore, this study would like to suggest priority tasks for the effective export control of strategic items after the analysis of current status and problems on the strategic items control system in view of business process, improvement of connection with interested parties, self-regulating management and legal revision.

Considerations for Application an Internal Compliance Program (ICP) for Trigger List Items

Su-Hyeon Kim,Chansuh Lee 한국방사성폐기물학회 2023 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.21 No.2

An Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a system through which enterprise internally manage their own export control processes to ensure compliance with domestic export control laws. Around the world, ICPs are actively utilized as a means of export control for strategic items. However, they are not mostly applied to the Trigger List Items. However, advanced countries such as the United States and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have been actively researching the potential application of ICPs to the Trigger List Items recently. This paper suggests additional considerations that should be taken into account when applying an ICP to the Trigger List Items. The key elements of classical ICP include Top-level management commitment to compliance; Risk analysis; Organizational structure/chain of responsibilities; Human and technical resources allocated to the management of exports; Workflow management and operational procedures; Record -keeping and documentation; Selection of staff; training and awareness-raising; Process-/Systemrelated controls (ICP audit)/Corrective Measures; Physical and technical security. An ICP for Trigger List Items must encompass all these core elements. Additionally, as the nuclear industry often involves collaborative projects participating with various companies, the effectiveness of the ICP could be enhanced through the operation of consultation groups among participating companies. Furthermore, enterprises must take into account the unique characteristics of Trigger List Items that differ from other strategic items, when making requirements of the ICP establishment. First, export requirements related to safety measures and physical protection should be reviewed to export the Trigger List Items. The procedure and obligations in aspects of internationally controlled items should also be reviewed. Moreover, active support from enterprises for GTGA procedures should also be included, since the Government to Government Assurance (GTGA) procedure is additionally required for the export of Trigger List Items, in contrast to other strategic items. Additionally, for materials categorized within Trigger List Items, such as deuterium and heavy water, should be controlled based on their end-use and cumulative quantity, which Government cannot effectively manage without enterprise supports. Therefore, enterprises must establish an internal material management system based on the end-use and cumulative quantity of these materials under ICP.

한국과 일본의 전략물자 수출통제제도 비교연구 - 양국 간 무역 갈등과 관련된 주요쟁점을 중심으로 -

최동준(CHOI, DONG-JUN) 동아대학교 법학연구소 2021 國際去來와 法 Vol.- No.34

The conflict between South Korea and Japan over the strategic export control system, which began in July 2019, is still ongoing. The Japanese government converted the three major strategic items which are the core materials of semiconductors and displays from being subjects to comprehensive export permission to subjects to individual export permission, and excluded Korea from the White List Country Group for a reason of Koreas poor operation of strategic items. In response, the South Korean government also responded by excluding Japan from the preferred countries in terms of reciprocity. The conflict between South Korea and Japan, with the fact that these two countries play a leading role and have the Asias longest history in export control systems, by joining four export control systems, the Wassenaar Arrangement(WA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG), the Australian Group(AG), and the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR), and all three non-proliferation treaties, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons(NPT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC), is never desirable for the world peace and the development of the two countries, and should be resolved as soon as possible. In this respect, this study focused on major issues related to conflicts between Korea and Japan, including related laws and export control organizations, the List control, the Catch-all control, the Compliance Program, and sanctions against North Korea. The main points of the analysis are as follows. First of all, Korea enforces four laws, including the Foreign Trade Act, while Japan implements a unified legal system under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act(FEFTA) and regulations thereunder. And while Korea distributes the management of strategic items to various ministries, including the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, in consideration of the matter of an organization, Japan operates the export control system under the general management of the Ministry of Economy and Industry (METI). Both Korea and Japan accept designated items by the international export control systems, and export permissions are more subdivided in Japans comprehensive export permissions in the List control. And, in the Catch-all control, Korea uses more strict control methods with the ‘inform control’, the ‘know control’, and the ‘suspect control’ than Japans methods of the ‘inform control’ and the ‘know control.’ The constituents of the Compliance Program(CP) is almost identical between the two countries, including organization, regulation, education, and audit, but Japan is showing a more active and wider operation. And the sanctions against North Korea are being operated basically in coordination with the United Nations and the United States regarding North Koreas nuclear, missile development and launch. And, despite the conflict with Japan, Korea established a trade security organization in the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy in April 2020, and, in June of the same year, revised the Strategic Goods Import and Export Notice, eliminating the possibility of interpretation that “WMD, etc.” do not include conventional weapons, and clarified the basis for the Catch-all control for conventional weapons(Article 2, No. 15). This study examined issues under international law related to trade conflicts between the two countries through a comparative analysis of the export control system of strategic items between Korea and Japan. According to the analysis, Korea and Japan had little difference in operating the systems at the Asias highest level in terms of managing strategic items and maintaining laws and systems to comply with relevant international laws, and were fulfilling their obligations well in domestic laws. Therefore, it is hard to deny that non-system factors are involved in the conflict between the two countries rather than the strategic items system itself. A more activ

A Review of North Korea’s Major Trading Partners and Items

Han-Sol Ko,Su-Hyeon Kim 한국방사성폐기물학회 2022 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.20 No.1

Investigating major trading partners and items with North Korea is informative in terms that it can predict the path through which North Korea’s strategic items will transfer to non-nuclear-weapon states when North Korea denuclearizes. By analyzing North Korea’s trading partners and the items, it is possible to identify the relevant countries through which items arrive from the first importing country to the end-user in the process of exporting items and to predict the way how North Korea disguise or conceal their strategic items among general items during normal export procedures. As of 2020, North Korea’s major trading partners are China, Russia, Vietnam, India, Nigeria, and Switzerland. Compared to 2019, Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana, and Thailand entered the top 10, while Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and South Africa pushed out of the top 10. North Korea’s trade dependence on China accounts for 88.2%, making it the largest trading partner for years, and it shows that North Korea is mainly conducting trade with Asian and African countries. North Korea’s most important export items are mineral products (HS 25-27) and steel & metal products (HS 72-83) and the most significant import items are mineral products (HS 25-27) and oils & fats & prepared foods (HS 15-24). In 2017, due to UN Security Council sanctions for North Korea’s international ballistic missile (ICBM) test-fire, North Korea’s exports from 3 billion dollars fell by 90% to less than 300 million dollars. This is the result of most of North Korea’s major export items included in the export ban, and changes have occurred in its export items. In 2020, export fell to less than 100 million dollars due to border lockdown measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, which also affected the change of North Korea’s major export items. Although North Korea does not officially publish its foreign trade statistics, in order to review North Korea’s trade information, KOTRA statistics are utilized. KOTRA statistics provide only two digits of HS code number, so it is challenging to identify detailed item classification. Moreover, these statistics are based on the export amount, so it is difficult to determine the exact quantity of export items. It is expected that information on North Korean trading partners and items will be used to predict potential transferable export methods of North Korea’s strategic items when North Korea denuclearizes.

무궁화 3호 인공위성 불법수출 사건의 법적검토 - 대외무역법의 전략물자수출통제 제도를 중심으로 -

박언경,왕상한 경희대학교 법학연구소 2017 경희법학 Vol.42 No.2

The case concerning the illegal export of Mugunghwa Satellite No.3, a strategic item owned by KT, has generated a whirlwind of discussions in terms of unlawful disposal of a national asset and/or the sale of it at giveaway price, and in terms of a loss of Mugunghwa Satellite No.3 orbit, which is at a longitude of 116 degree east. Even though an export license from the Minister of Trade, Industry and Resources, a competent authority, is required for strategic items in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act, KT, the only satellite service provider in Korea, sold off the item without permission by the authority. The case contributed to importance of export control on strategic items felt, and it elicited legal and political downside and challenging issues. When it comes to the case happened already, the government need minimize losses through the due process in the relative regulations. Objective and critical viewpoints which aim the betterment of laws and regulations, furthermore, are required to prevent a relapse from occurring. The article deals with two dimensions. First, the legal consequences of the case are analysed with an investigation of the six legal issues which comes from the Foreign Trade Act, the framework act of Korea for export control upon strategic items. Second, some improvement proposals are drawn via constructive criticisms about the government’s handling of and policies upon the overall export control on strategic items. Export of strategic items is directly linked to national security, and clear-cut principles and standards are material to the security. The case lets us see that the absence of legislation and/or policy-making to the exclusion of the rule of law may cause wasteful internal stand-off and may result in an infringement of national security and trading interest as well as a sink of sovereign ratings. In an increasing menace of proliferation of weapons of mass destructions such as North Korea nuclear threat and terrorism in the international society, there is a growing emphasis on the international export control upon strategic items and there is a increasing possibility of tougher sanctions against violators. A pressing issue is domestic implementing legislation of the international export control system in defense of national security and in response for a changing trade environment. 전략물자인 무궁화 3호 인공위성의 불법수출사건은 국가의 핵심자산인 인공위성의 불법매각 및 헐값매각이라는 측면에서, 그리고 무궁화 3호 위성의 궤도인 동경 116도의 상실이라는 측면에서 국내에서 많은 논란을 야기하였다. 전략물자의 수출은 대외무역법에 따라 적법한 수출허가를 획득하여야 함에도 KT는 산업통상자원부장관의 허가 없이 불법 수출하였다. 동 사건은 전략물자수출통제 제도의 중요성을 인지시키게 된 계기가 되었다는 점에서는 긍정적이지만, 우리 정부의 대응조치가 법적・정책적 측면에서 문제점과 개선과제를 동시에 드러낸 사건이다. 이미 발생한 사건의 경우는 법률을 토대로 적법하게 처리하여 피해를 최소화하여야 한다. 또한 향후 유사 사건의 재발을 방지하기 위한 법과 제도의 개선을 위한 객관적이고 비판적인 시각도 필요하다. 본 논문은 다음의 관점에서 연구를 수행하였다. 먼저 무궁화 3호 위성의 수출사건을 우리나라 전략물자수출관리의 기본법인 대외무역법의 적용과정에서 논의될 수 있는 6가지 법적쟁점들에 대한 검토를 통해 동 사건의 결과에 대한 법리적 분석을 실시하였다. 다음으로 정책적 측면에서 우리정부의 대응조치와 전략물자수출관리 정책에 대한 비판과 함께 입법정책적 측면과 사법정책적 측면에서의 개선방안을 제시하였다. 전략물자의 수출은 국가안보와 직결되는 요소이므로, 명확한 원칙과 기준의 정립이 필요하다. 동 사건에서 보듯 입법의 불비 및 법치주의에 기반하지 않은 정책판단은 대내적으로는 소모적인 정쟁(政爭), 대외적으로는 국가안보이익 및 통상이익의 침해와 국가 신인도 하락을 야기한다. 북핵, 국제테러 등 국제사회에서 대량파괴무기의 확산에 대한 위협이 여전히 증대하고 있는 상황에서 전략물자수출통제 제도의 중요성은 높아지고 있으며, 위반 기업에 대한 강도 높은 제재가능성도 예측된다. 국가안보를 수호하기 위하여, 그리고 변화하는 무역환경에 대응하기 위하여 국내이행체제의 시급한 정비가 요구되는 상황이다.

무궁화 3호 인공위성 불법수출 사건의 법적검토

박언경(Park, Eon-Kyung),왕상한(Wang, Sang-Han) 경희법학연구소 2017 경희법학 Vol.52 No.2

전략물자인 무궁화 3호 인공위성의 불법수출사건은 국가의 핵심자산인 인공위성의 불법매각 및 헐값매각이라는 측면에서, 그리고 무궁화 3호 위성의 궤도인 동경 116도의 상실이라는 측면에서 국내에서 많은 논란을 야기하였다. 전략물자의 수출은 대외무역법에 따라적법한 수출허가를 획득하여야 함에도 KT는 산업통상자원부장관의 허가 없이 불법 수출하였다. 동 사건은 전략물자수출통제 제도의 중요성을 인지시키게 된 계기가 되었다는 점에서는 긍정적이지만, 우리 정부의 대응조치가 법적 정책적 측면에서 문제점과 개선과제를동시에 드러낸 사건이다. 이미 발생한 사건의 경우는 법률을 토대로 적법하게 처리하여 피 해를최소화하여야한다. 또한향후유사사건의재발을방지하기위한법과제도의개선을위한 객관적이고 비판적인 시각도 필요하다. 본논문은다음의관점에서연구를수행하였다. 먼저무궁화3호위성의수출사건을우리나라전략물자수출관리의기본법인대외무역법의적용과정에서논의될수있는6가지법적쟁점들에대한검토를통해동사건의결과에대한법리적분석을실시하였다. 다음으로정책적 측면에서 우리정부의 대응조치와 전략물자수출관리 정책에 대한 비판과 함께 입법정책적 측면과 사법정책적 측면에서의 개선방안을 제시하였다. 전략물자의 수출은 국가안보와 직결되는 요소이므로, 명확한 원칙과 기준의 정립이 필요하다. 동 사건에서 보듯 입법의 불비 및 법치주의에 기반하지 않은 정책판단은 대내적으로는 소모적인 정쟁(政爭), 대외적으로는 국가안보이익 및 통상이익의 침해와 국가 신인도 하락을 야기한다. 북핵, 국제테러 등 국제사회에서 대량파괴무기의 확산에 대한 위협이 여전히 증대하고 있는 상황에서 전략물자수출통제 제도의 중요성은 높아지고 있으며, 위반 기업에 대한 강도 높은 제재가능성도 예측된다. 국가안보를 수호하기 위하여, 그리고 변화하는 무역환경에 대응하기 위하여 국내이행체제의 시급한 정비가 요구되는 상황이다 The case concerning the illegal export of Mugunghwa Satellite No.3, a strategic item owned by KT, has generated a whirlwind of discussions in terms of unlawful disposal of a national asset and/or the sale of it at giveaway price, and in terms of a loss of Mugunghwa Satellite No.3 orbit, which is at a longitude of 116 degree east. Even though an export license from the Minister of Trade, Industry and Resources, a competent authority, is required for strategic items in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act, KT, the only satellite service provider in Korea, sold off the item without permission by the authority. The case contributed to importance of export control on strategic items felt, and it elicited legal and political downside and challenging issues. When it comes to the case happened already, the government need minimize losses through the due process in the relative regulations. Objective and critical viewpoints which aim the betterment of laws and regulations, furthermore, are required to prevent a relapse from occurring. The article deals with two dimensions. First, the legal consequences of the case are analysed with an investigation of the six legal issues which comes from the Foreign Trade Act, the framework act of Korea for export control upon strategic items. Second, some improvement proposals are drawn via constructive criticisms about the government’s handling of and policies upon the overall export control on strategic items. Export of strategic items is directly linked to national security, and clear-cut principles and standards are material to the security. The case lets us see that the absence of legislation and/or policy-making to the exclusion of the rule of law may cause wasteful internal stand-off and may result in an infringement of national security and trading interest as well as a sink of sovereign ratings. In an increasing menace of proliferation of weapons of mass destructions such as North Korea nuclear threat and terrorism in the international society, there is a growing emphasis on the international export control upon strategic items and there is a increasing possibility of tougher sanctions against violators. A pressing issue is domestic implementing legislation of the international export control system in defense of national security and in response for a changing trade environment.

Development of Nuclear Industry Information Gathering and Analysis System and Denied Persons Information Gathering System for Preventing Illegitimate Export of Trigger List Items in Korea

이상준 한국방사성폐기물학회 2023 방사성폐기물학회지 Vol.21 No.3

In South Korea, the exporters of items related to nuclear power generation are diversified. Consequently, there is a risk of illegitimate export by companies failing to recognize the export control system because the awareness about this system for the strategic items among the subcontractors of nuclear power facilities is limited. To prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items, it is necessary to conduct outreach activities regarding the export control system for the related companies. Additionally, the exporters and export license examiners should consider whether an export target is on the Denial List, who may divert the strategic items to weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control developed two systems for controlling illegitimate export of the Trigger List items. The first system, Nuclear Industry Information Collection and Analysis System, can gather information about the key nuclear industries in Korea and analyze the dealing of strategic items. The second system, Denied Persons Information Gathering System, can regularly gather information about the denied persons and provide the updated data to the exporters and regulatory examiners. These two systems can be used for outreach activities and export license examination to prevent illegitimate export of the strategic items.

한국의 전략물자 수출통제제도에 대한 분석 연구

이재영 국제e-비즈니스학회 2006 e-비즈니스 연구 Vol.7 No.4

International export controls on Strategic items have operated by powerful countries in the past, but recently, it is changed multilateral export control regimes. Problems of Strategic items export control have a bad influence not only trade barrier but also national image. This paper analysis that International export controls on Strategic items system, major country tendency and Korea's export controls on Strategic items. As a result Korea's export controls on Strategic items must prepare as follow. First, recognition revitalization of the export controls on Strategic items second, new alternative about effect of strategic items permission rights, and third, incentive spread for enterprise's compliance program. 전략물자 수출통제체제는 과거 군사 강대국들을 중심으로 하여 운영되어 왔으나, 현재 전 세계 모든 국가들이 참여하는 다자간 형태로 추진되어 오고 있다. 최근 들어 국제평화 및 자국의 안전을 위해 전략물자 수출통제제도를 강화함에 따라 전략물자 수출통제제도를 제대로 인식하지 못하고 이에 대한 체계적인 관리 미흡으로 인하여 큰 교역 장애가 되고 있다. 본 연구는 이러한 전략물자 수출통제제도에 대한 국제적 동향과 주요국의 현황을 살펴보고 한국의 전략물자 수출통제제도의 효율성을 제고하기 위한 방안으로 첫째, 전략물자 수출통제에 있어서 인식확산을 위한 중장기적인 방안을 마련해야 하고 둘째, 전략물자와 관련한 허가의 효력에 대한 새로운 대안을 모색해야 하며, 셋째 기업의 자율준수체제의 구축 및 운영을 위한 인센티브 제도를 확대해야 할 것이다.

전략물자수출입고시에서 통제하는 정보보안품목(5A002.a)의 예외사항 적용에 따른 비해당 판정 사례 분석

신기훈,김형중 한국정보통신설비학회 2016 한국정보통신설비학회 학술대회 Vol.2016 No.09

Korea’s “Foreign Trade Act” states that the goods(including technology determined by Presidential Decree) on which restriction, such as export license, is required for maintaining international peace and security as well as national security in accordance with the principles of the International Export Control Regimes, are to be referred to as “Strategic Item” and the list of such goods designated are publicly notified by the “Public Notice on Trade of Strategic Goods(hereinafter, the Public Notice)”. Information security systems, equipment and components above control parameter specified under control number 5A002.a of such list are classified as “Strategic Items”. In fact, this entry covers the majority of the information security equipment such as switch, firewall, server and network equipment. This paper studies negative classification cases of items that meet the control threshold of the list on the Public Notice but nonetheless excluded by the de-control notes available for certain items such as those sold in mass market or those with encryption technology exclusively for authentication. The date of classification results issued through the Information System for Management of Export and Import of Strategic Items(Yestrade) over the past 5 years are used. By Analyzing such data, we try to make recommendations for improvements.