상호연계성에 기초한 한국군 군사교리 발전방안에 관한 연구

전정배 ( Jeon Jeong-bae ),박효선 ( Park Hyo-sun ) 한국군사학회 2021 군사논단 Vol.108 No.-

The objective of this study was to examine military doctrine which occupies a crucial portion in the innovation of ROK armed forces from the perspective of concept, and then present an effective developmental plan of military doctrine. For this, In order to verify the interconnectivity of military doctrine, this study concentrated upon the examination of 『Joint Operation』 of Joint Manual and ‘Operational Principles’ contained in the basic doctrine of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps from the perspective of joint operation. Regarding the interconnectivity of military doctrine for the execution of combined operation, this study comparatively analyzed ‘warfighting functions’ which are contained in US Army’s 『Operation』and ROK Army’s 『Ground Operation』and most frequently and commonly used in the execution of operation. Based on above study findings, the developmental plans of military doctrine of ROK armed forces from interconnectivity is as follows: First, it is necessary for the research institutes of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps of ROK armed forces to establish a system to increase the interconnectivity of military doctrine for an effective joint operation. For this, it is necessary to organize institutes and experts in the research of military doctrine, establish a joint research system, and prepare a system for smooth control, adjustment and cooperation. Second, it is necessary to work out a combined doctrine for the execution of effective combined operation. When considering future war in the Korean Peninsula, the importance of combined operation will increase all the more in the future and an effective combined operation, on the other hand, needs to increase the interconnectivity of military doctrine. This study seems to be significant in that it proposed a practical research plan of military doctrine based on interconnectivity which could function as the base of military power use, when researches on military doctrine of ROK armed forces are at primary level. However, this study could not what is a proper level of maintaining interconnectivity of military doctrine. In addition, this study has limitations in proposing what contents must be included in combined doctrine and what level must be maintained for proper interconnectivity. Therefore, the author hopes follow-up studies will active discussions and researches on the level of interconnectivity, the scope of manuals, and the contents of concept paper will be carried out in the future, together with many discussions on combined doctrine.

군사교리 발전에 영향을 주는 지배적인 요소에 관한 연구

안재봉 ( Jea Bong An ) 미래군사학회 2016 한국군사학논총 Vol.5 No.1

The purpose of this study is to review the essential nature of war, the level of war and ``Military Art`` that are collectively viewed as the core of ``Military Theory``, to undertake in -depth analysis on the concept and role of military doctrines, and ``Levels of Doctrine``, with an ultimate goal of deducing defining elements that are exerting dominant influence on the development of military doctrine. In analyzing the factors affecting the development of military doctrines, this study is focused on the works of prominent scholars in and outside Korea, official documents of military doctrines and research papers. A significant difference has been identified in the process of comparing the differing arguments of scholars and the contents of the sources. While scholars mainly focus on grand strategy, national finance and historical traditions, military doctrines and research papers of Korea focus on the military area and operational levels including enemy threats, military capabilities and concepts related to the conduct of future warfare. The author attempts to generalize and standardize the dominant factors of the development of military doctrines including national goals and policies, war experience and history, science technology, military thought and theory, enemy threat, military capabilities, and the concepts of future warfare. It is the author``s wish that research outcomes of this study contribute to the discourse on the development of military doctrines

1960년대 후반 한국군 시위 진압 교리의 특성 연구 —1969년 육군본부 발간 『야전교범 19-15 폭동진압』 분석을 중심으로

권혁은 한국국학진흥원 2023 국학연구 Vol.- No.50

This article analyzes Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control, published by the Army Headquarters of Korea in 1969, to examine the nature of the ROK military’s doctrine on riot control in the late 1960s and to explore the origins of the state violence in Buma Uprising and the May 18th Uprising. Under the overwhelming influence of the U.S. military since the U.S. military regime, the ROK military’s doctrine for riot control was based on U.S. military doctrine. The fact that Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea was a translation of FM 19-15 Civil Disturbances and Disasters (1964) shows that the doctrine developed after the April Revolution was also based on US military doctrine. However, Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea contained ROK military developments that did not exist in FM 19-15 Civil Disturbances and Disasters (1964). It included a description of the requirements for military interventions and a method of riot control that used a combination of bayonets and baton. As of 1969, the law allowed the military to be mobilized to control riot in “wartime, national, or similar emergencies” or when “social order was extremely disturbed due to enemy siege.” However, Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea developed a much broader interpretation of the military intervention requirement and developed the logic that “rioting“ alone met the emergency requirement. Like U.S. military doctrine, Field Manual 19-15 Riot Control (1969) of Korea’s primary weapon was the bayonet. Under the doctrine, the bayonet was a weapon used for direct “contact” with protesters, not just for a “show of force,” so it was likely to be sufficiently violent in a real-world situation. However, riot control also included a method of riot control that combined bayonets and batons to attack protesters. This “bayonet combined with baton technique” was unique to the Korean military, developed by the gendarmerie unit of the Capital Security Command. It is likely that the tactics demonstrated by the military during the Buma Uprising and the May 18th Uprising were derived from the “offensive” protest tactics developed in the late 1960s. These offensive riot control techniques were a result of the unique situation in South Korea, where firing was an extremely sensitive issue following the April Revolution and the fall of the Syngman Rhee government.

중국 인민해방군의 현대화와 전문화 추진

성인모(Sung, Inmo) 한국전략문제연구소 2014 전략연구 Vol.- No.62

본 연구의 목적은 인민해방군의 현대화와 전문화 추진에 대해 알아보는 것이다. 이에 본 연구는 인민해방군의 군사교리 변화를 중심으로 군 현대화와 전문화를 분석하였다. 이를 위해 군사교리를 인민전쟁 교리 시기와 국부전쟁 교리 시기로 나누어 인민해방군의 현대화와 전문화를 각각 살펴보았다. 인민해방군의 군사교리가 인민전쟁에서 국부전쟁 교리로 변화하면서 군 현대화와 전문화는 적극적으로 추진되었다. 혁명전쟁 시기부터 이어온 인민전쟁 교리는 중월전쟁의 교훈과 걸프전쟁의 영향으로 국부전쟁 교리로 변화되었다. 이에 인민해방군은 국부전쟁 교리에 따라 첨단무기와 장비를 확충해 나가면서 군 현대화를 적극 추진하였다. 그리고 현대전에 적합한 인재양성을 위해 군사분야의 법제화와 군사 전문교육을 통해 군 전문화를 강화하였다. 이와 같이 국부전쟁 교리 등장 이후 인민해방군은 적극적으로 군 현대화와 전문화를 추진하였다. 즉, 1980년대 중반 이후 중국은 국제정세와 외부위협의 변화, 경제 및 과학기술의 발달 등에 따라 군사교리 변화를 모색하였고, 첨단전과 정보전에 적합한 군사력을 건설하고 있다. The purpose of this study is to learn about the modernization and professionalization of the People’s Liberation of Army(PLA). This study focused in analyzing changes in the military doctrines of the PLA with military modernization and professionalization. For this research, this paper has divided the military doctrine of the PLA in to two parts(the people’s war era and the local war doctrine era). The paper investigates the military modernization and professionalization of the PLA in these eras. With the transition of people’s war doctrine to local war doctrine, military modernization and professionalization of the PLA had been actively progressed. The people’s war doctrine was changed to local war doctrine due to the impact of the Sino-Vietnamese war and The Gulf war. The PLA expanded high-tech weapons and equipments in accordance with the local war doctrine. In addition, the PLA reinforced military education of the army and enacted a law to cultivate soldiers of the talent. Thus, the PLA had progressed military modernization and professionalization in the local war doctrine era. Since the mid-1980s, the PLA started to change military doctrines due to international threats, economic developments, and up-to-date technologies. Till today, it strives to develop an army suitable for high-technology and information warfare.

크림반도 병합 이후 러시아의 군사안보전략: ‘국가안보전략’과 ‘군사독트린’ 분석을 중심으로

제성훈 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2020 평화학연구 Vol.21 No.4

The purpose of this study is to analyze Russia’s military security strategy after the annexation of the Crimea in March 2014, focusing on the “National Security Strategy” and the “Military Doctrine”. In comparison with that in “2009 National Security Strategy” and “2010 Military Doctrine”, Russia's military security strategy shown in the “2015 National Security Strategy” and “2014 Military Doctrine” has the following characteristics. First, it is based on the consolidation of the position as a great power and strengthening the “conservative” policy. Second, the strategic objectives of the national defense are expanded and the direction of the military policy is systematized. Third, it seeks to reorganize strategic partnerships in accordance with changes in the international situation and expand the spatial scope of the military policy. Fourth, the attention is paid to the nontraditional security. Fifth, it criticizes the military activities of the West and shows Russia’s will to respond actively. Sixth, it emphasizes the development and innovation of weapons and military/special equipments. Seventh, it demands a substantial state of the readiness for war. 이 연구의 목적은 2014년 3월 크림반도 병합 이후 러시아의 군사안보전략을 ‘2015년 국가안보전략’과 ‘2014년 군사독트린’을 중심으로 분석하는 데 있다. ‘2009년 국가안보전략’, ‘2010년 군사독트린’과 비교할 때, ‘2015년 국가안보전략’과 ‘2014년 군사독트린’에 나타난 러시아의 군사안보전략은 다음과 같은 특징을 가지고 있다. 첫째, 강대국 지위의 공고화와 ‘보수주의적’ 정책 강화에 기반을 둔다. 둘째, 국방의 전략적 목표를 확대하고 군사정책의 방향을 체계화하고 있다. 셋째, 국제정세의 변화에 따라 전략적 파트너십의 재구성을 모색하고 군사정책의 공간적 범위를 확대하고 있다. 넷째, 비전통안보(nontraditional security)에 관심을 기울인다. 다섯째, 서방의 군사 활동을 비판하면서 이에 적극적으로 대응하려는 의지를 보여준다. 여섯째, 무기 및 군사·특수장비의 개발·혁신을 강조한다. 일곱째, 실질적인 전쟁 준비태세를 주문한다.

양심적 병역거부와 병역법 제88조 제1항의 정당한 사유

배상원 사법발전재단 2019 사법 Vol.1 No.47

이른바 ‘양심적 병역거부’란 종교적·윤리적·도덕적·철학적 또는 이와 유사한 동기로부터 형성된 양심상의 결정을 이유로 집총 또는 군사훈련을 수반하는 병역의무의 이행을 거부하는 행위를 말한다. 병역법 제88조 제1항은 ‘정당한 사유’가 없는 입영기피를 처벌하고 있는바, 양심적 병역거부가 위 정당한 사유에 해당하는지 문제된다. 종래 대법원은 병역법 제88조 제1항의 정당한 사유란 원칙적으로 질병 등 병역의무 불이행자의 책임으로 돌릴 수 없는 사유에 한하는 것이고, 다만 병역법이 추구하는 국가안전보장보다 우월한 헌법적 가치를 이유로 병역을 거부하는 경우라면 이를 처벌하는 것은 위헌이므로 예외적으로 정당한 사유가 인정될 수 있는데, 양심의 자유가 국가안전보장보다 우월한 것은 아니므로 양심적 병역거부는 정당한 사유가 될 수 없다고 판시하였다. 헌법재판소 역시 양심적 병역거부자에게 형사처벌을 가할지 대체복무를 허용할지 여부는 광범위한 입법재량의 문제로서, 우리나라의 안보현실과 병역의무의 형평성에 관한 사회적 요청 등을 감안할 때 대체복무제가 도입되지 않았다 하더라도 과잉금지원칙에 위반하여 양심의 자유를 침해하는 것은 아니라는 이유로 양심적 병역거부에 대한 형사처벌을 긍정해 왔다. 위와 같은 논의구조는 과잉금지원칙에 의한 국방의 의무와 양심의 자유의 형량을 통하여 대체복무제의 도입 가능성을 검토하고 이에 기초하여 정당한 사유의 존부를 판단하는 것인바, 이러한 접근방법에서는 양심적 병역거부에 대한 형사처벌 여부와 대체복무제의 존부가 직접 연계되어 있다. 즉 양심적 병역거부를 인정하기 위하여는 대체복무제가 도입되어야 하고, 대체복무제가 도입되지 않은 이상 양심적 병역거부에 대한 형사처벌은 불가피하다는 것이다. 이에 양심적 병역거부를 인정하고자 하는 견해에서도 그 요지는 결국 대체복무제를 도입하여야 한다는 것으로 귀결되었다. 최근 헌법재판소가 양심적 병역거부자에게 대체복무를 허용하여야 한다는 취지로 헌법불합치결정을 선고하였는바, 조만간 대체복무제가 도입될 것이므로 이로써 양심적 병역거부 문제는 근본적으로 해결되었다고 보는 시각도 있다. 그러나 양심적 병역거부의 허용성은 대체복무제의 도입에 선행한다. 양심적 병역거부에 대한 형사처벌 여부는 양심적 병역거부의 허용성에 관한 문제로서 병역법 제88조 제1항이 규정하는 정당한 사유의 해석 문제 그 자체이다. 그리고 양심의 자유의 특성과 양심적 병역거부의 발현형태 등을 고려하면 위 정당한 사유의 존부를 판단하기 위하여는 양심의 자유의 본질과 그 제한 문제를 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 대상판결은 위와 같은 인식하에 병역법 제88조 제1항의 정당한 사유에 관한 직접적 해석을 통하여 양심적 병역거부 문제를 해결하고 있다. 우선 대상판결은 처벌조항이 정당한 사유를 규정하고 있는 경우 위법성조각사유나 책임조각사유와 달리 피고인이 처한 구체적이고 개별적인 사정을 피고인의 입장에서 고려함으로써 구체적 타당성을 실현하여야 한다는 취지를 밝혔다. 또한 대상판결은 병역법 제88조 제1항의 정당한 사유는 단순히 질병 등의 사정에 한정되지 않고 병역의무자가 처한 구체적이고 개별적인 사정이 그로 하여금 병역의무의 이행을 감당하지 못하도록 한다면 그러한 사정 역시 포함될 수 있다고 하였다. 위와 같... In countries with a compulsory conscription system, the so-called “conscientious objection” refers to an act of refusal to perform the duty of military service on the ground of a conscientious decision that was formed by a religious, ethical, moral, and philosophical motive or other motives similar thereto. Article 88 of the Military Service Act of Korea punishes the avoidance of enlistment without “justifiable cause” and the issue here is whether the aforementioned conscientious objection constitutes “justifiable cause” under the foregoing Article 88. Previously, the Supreme Court of Korea and the Constitutional Court of Korea have acknowledged criminal punishment of conscientious objectors on the grounds delineated as follows: (i) in principle, “justifiable cause” as prescribed by Article 88(1) of the Military Service Act (hereinafter “instant penal provision”) is confined to causes that cannot be attributable to a non-performer of military service duty, such as illness; (ii) the freedom of conscience propounded by a conscientious objector is not superior than the duty of national defense; (iii) whether to impose criminal punishment against a conscientious objector or permit alternative military service of the same is a matter of broad legislative discretion; and (iv) in view of our nation’s security atmosphere, the non-existence of an alternative military service system cannot be deemed as infringing the freedom of conscience in contravention of the over-breadth doctrine. Discourse regarding the issue of conscientious objection had been replaced with the issue of alternative military service. In other words, the alternative military service system needs to be introduced to recognize conscientious objection, and criminal punishment of conscientious objectors is inevitable insofar as the same is not in place. Moreover, those in favor of recognizing conscientious objection is premised on the introduction of the alternative military service system. Recently, the Constitutional Court handed down a constitutional nonconformity decision to the effect that alternative military service ought to be permissible for conscientious objectors, which in turn may be regarded as the issue of conscientious objection having been fundamentally resolved. However, inasmuch as the issue of conscientious objection precedes that of alternative military service, whether to criminally punish conscientious objectors is a matter of permitting conscientious objection, and thus, pertains to the construction of “justifiable cause” as defined by the instant penal provision. The subject case is clear on this point and tackles the issue of conscientious objection through a direct interpretation of “justifiable cause” under Article 88(1) thereof. In the subject case, the Supreme Court held that, unlike grounds for exclusion of illegality or exclusion of responsibility, “justifiable cause” under the instant penal provision should be construed by factoring in a defendant (conscientious objector)’s individual and personal circumstances so as to realize well-grounded reasonableness. Furthermore, the subject case deemed that a military obligor’s individual and personal circumstances making it improbable for the same to cope with the performance of military service may be included under “justifiable cause” as stipulated by the instant penal provision, not just confined to causes (such as illness) that a non-performer of military service duty cannot be held liable. Based on the foregoing interpretation, the subject case, in deeming that forcing a conscientious objector to perform military service that involves participation in military exercise and bearing arms may either excessively restrain the freedom of conscience or undermine the inherent substance of the same, determined that “genuine” conscientious objection may constitute “justifiable cause” under Article 88(1), supra, thereby overruling all preceden...

한국군의 베트남 파병과 미군 유격교리의 수용 과정

신상구 육군군사연구소 2020 군사연구 Vol.- No.149

This thesis is to confirm the background of how the ranger training became the specialty of ROK(Republic of Korea) Military by analysing the process of receiving the US ranger doctrine in the 1960s. To this end, it tried to navigate the concept that the ROK Military deployment to Vietnam is the main factor of making ranger training in South Korea general. It opens new horizon with regard to analysing ranger training in a historical perspective unlike the training has been only analyzed in a military spectrum. This research hereby has been dealt with mainly 3 perspectives. First, the ROK Military began introducing the US ranger doctrine by sending its solders to the US to study the US forces' doctrine after experiencing ranger battles during the Korean War in the 1950s. The time in 1950s, however, was the period when the US was still developing its own ranger warfare as well, so was there not much difference in their doctrines when the Korean soldiers arrived at the US compared to the Korean War period. At the end of the 1950s, the ROK forces faced a sequestration in accordance with the change of the US strategy of the Cold War, and the ROK and US activated the 1st Air Assault Brigade, the first of the ROK ranger unit, as they hurdled to clear the challenges induced by the sequestration. Secondly, Creating Vietnam Contingencies of the government led by the miliary in the early 1960s was a major variation on how South Korea received the ranger doctrines. The government dispatched a military envoy team twice to the US in 1962 to discuss the deployment. As a result, the ROK government recognized the necessity to activate a ranger combat unit for the deployment and pushed multiple polices to garner and retain superb rangers. The military government, however, faced lots of challenges at home and abroad and withdrew the plan to deploy forces to Vietnam. Thirdly, in the middle of the 1960s the Korean deployment to the Vietnam War causes major changes to expand the scope of ranger training in Korea. Park Jeung Hee Administration introduced a number of policies with the initiation of actual deployment to the Vietnam War. As it experienced this process, the ranger training became very general in the military and with a broader perspective the training became a general characteristic of the Korean society. 본 논문은 1960년대 한국군이 미 유격교리를 수용하는 과정을 분석함으로써, 유격훈련이 한국군의 특수성이 된 배경을 규명하고자 했다. 이를 위해 한국군의 베트남 파병이 유격훈련의 보편화에 중요한 요인이었음을 밝히고자 했다. 이는 그동안 군사훈련적인 측면에서만 분석했던 유격훈련을 역사적 차원에서 재해석하려는 시도였다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 크게 세 가지 측면에서 접근했다. 첫째, 1950년 유격전을 경험했던 한국군은 1950년대 6.25전쟁을 통해 유격전을 경험했던 한국군은 전후, 도미유학을 통해, 미군의 유격교리를 간접적으로 수용하기 시작했다. 하지만 1950년대 미군이 유격교리를 발전시키던 시기였기 때문에, 도미유학 시기의 유격교리는 6·25전쟁 시기와 큰 차이가 없었다. 1950년대 말, 미국의 냉전전략 변화에 따라 한국은 군 감축의 문제에 봉착했고, 한-미는 이를 해결하는 과정 속에서 한국군 최초의 유격부대인 제1공수단을 창설했다. 둘째, 1960년대 초 군사정부의 베트남 파병 추진은 미 유격교리 수용에 중요한 변수로 작용했다. 1962년 군사정부는 베트남 파병을 위해, 두 차례의 군사사절단을 베트남에 파견했다. 이를 계기로, 군사정부는 베트남 파병을 위한 유격전투단 창설의 필요성을 인식했다. 이 때문에 군사정부는 우수한 유격대원 확보를 위해 여러 가지 정책을 추진했다. 하지만 군사정부는 국내·외 다양한 문제에 봉착하여 베트남 파병계획을 보류했다. 셋째, 1960년대 중순 한국군의 베트남 파병은 유격훈련 확대에 중요한 변수로 작용했다. 1964년부터 베트남 파병이 본격화됨에 따라, 박정희 정부는 유격훈련의 확대를 위해 다양한 정책을 추진했다. 이 과정 속에서, 유격훈련은 전군의 보편성이라는 특성을 넘어, 한국사회의 보편화라는 의미를 가지게 되었다.

닉슨 행정부 시기의 데탕트와 한미관계

문순보 고려대학교 일민국제관계연구원 2008 국제관계연구 Vol.13 No.2

This article examines the meanings and limits of détente and international idea which temporarily appeared in Nixon-era, and analyzes the aftermaths of détente to the relationship between Korea and the United States. It argues that the rising détente as an U.S. policy was unable to harmonize with strong anticommunism in Korea, therefore Korea and U.S. had different views on the degree of anti-communism. During that time, détente directly affected Korea-U.S. relations and, strictly speaking, the essence of détente was the continuations of containment policy through restricted cooperation and relaxations of tensions with communist countries such as Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, etc. Even though détente was unable to compatible with strong anti-communism in Korean peninsula, détente as well as containment did not escape from the scope of anti-communism, due to the extreme security crisis in Korea in 1968. The balmy winds of détente were unable to arrive at Korean peninsula. U.S. had planned and tried the reduction of United States Forces Korea and military aids to Korea, also investigating the reduction of the level of Korean military power. The USFK and military aids to Korea were the strategies which revealed the changes of U.S. financial funds along with Nixon Doctrine, but the reduction of the level of Korean military power did not match the keynote of Nixon Doctrine. In fact, the examination of the reduction of Korean military power was the problem of Korean Sovereignty. It was a quiet different issue from U.S. military problem or financial needs. Regarding that issue, U.S. forced Korea to participate in the general trend of détente. In conclusion, Korea and U.S. had differed in ideas about the degree of anticommunism in Nixon-era. This article examines the meanings and limits of détente and international idea which temporarily appeared in Nixon-era, and analyzes the aftermaths of détente to the relationship between Korea and the United States. It argues that the rising détente as an U.S. policy was unable to harmonize with strong anticommunism in Korea, therefore Korea and U.S. had different views on the degree of anti-communism. During that time, détente directly affected Korea-U.S. relations and, strictly speaking, the essence of détente was the continuations of containment policy through restricted cooperation and relaxations of tensions with communist countries such as Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, etc. Even though détente was unable to compatible with strong anti-communism in Korean peninsula, détente as well as containment did not escape from the scope of anti-communism, due to the extreme security crisis in Korea in 1968. The balmy winds of détente were unable to arrive at Korean peninsula. U.S. had planned and tried the reduction of United States Forces Korea and military aids to Korea, also investigating the reduction of the level of Korean military power. The USFK and military aids to Korea were the strategies which revealed the changes of U.S. financial funds along with Nixon Doctrine, but the reduction of the level of Korean military power did not match the keynote of Nixon Doctrine. In fact, the examination of the reduction of Korean military power was the problem of Korean Sovereignty. It was a quiet different issue from U.S. military problem or financial needs. Regarding that issue, U.S. forced Korea to participate in the general trend of détente. In conclusion, Korea and U.S. had differed in ideas about the degree of anticommunism in Nixon-era.

일본 아베 정부의 보수 우경화 원인 분석: 동아시아 정책을 중심으로

홍성후 한국동북아학회 2014 한국동북아논총 Vol.19 No.1

This thesis is to analyse the right-wing foreign policy of Japan Abe regime through Abe personal factors of his family and Japanese international surroundings. The military build-up strengthening phenomenon by Abe government derived from changing situation of China military pressure in South-chinese Sea recently. Prime minister Abe tries to utilize this right-wing doctrine to heighten his political popularity, and he enjoyed that at a some degree. China succeeded long in building up her national capability to super-Power rank in this world. Japanese people and government have been threatened by Chinese military demonstration lately. Japan takes counter-strategy toward Chinese pressure through U.S-Japan allies treaty and domestic solidarity of right-wing doctrine. Abe premier’s family produced many key elite who were right-wing nationalists such as Guici and Sato after World war. In fact, these key elite shaped national style of modern Japan as right-wing doctrine country. Abe wishes that Japan complete self-defence military set-up and military armed Japan be good partner to U.S in future. Abe thinks North Korea’ nuclear armament is very dangerous reality, so that Japan will be military strong state from now on to weakening North Korea threat. Abe strongly went on officially bowing to the war criminal shrines area, such Shinsa. Japan has criminal past on World War II, so Japan must clean her criminality through enough apology to satisfy her neighbor states. Unfortunately Japan failed in apologizing and satisfying her neighbor countries such as Korea and China. This papers concluded that Abe regime’s right wing doctrine execution will not be advantageous and be not a justice on moral base in the future. 본 연구는 우리나라와 중국을 비롯한 주변국과의 관계 악화가 명약관화한 데도 불구하고 일본의 아베 정부가 왜 보수 우경화 정책에 박차를 가하고 있는지에 대한 의문에서 출발했다. 이는 일본 정치권과 국민들의 보수 우경화 경향을 주요원인으로 꼽을 수 있겠지만, 본 연구는 일본의 국제환경과 아베총리의 개인적 우경화 성향에서 그 원인들을 찾아보고자 했다. 특히 필자는 일본의 보수 우경화를 가장 우려하는 우리나라와 중국이 속한 동아시아의 국제관계 속에서 아베정부의 대외정책을 분석함으로써 원인을 찾는다. 두 가지 분석 초점을 바탕으로 아베 정부의 동아시아 대외정책을 중국, 한국, 북한, ASEAN 순으로 분석하였다. 일본은 중국의 급속한 성장과 군사력 증강을 일본 안보에 대한 위협으로 인식했다. 즉 중국은 경제적인 측면에서는 ‘호혜관계’를 맺어야 할 동반자지만, 영토분쟁지역인 센카쿠열도와 관련하여 보여준 위협적인 행동들처럼 지속적으로 일본을 위협할 수 있는 존재로 본다. 따라서 일본은 중국의 위협에 대비해 자국의 군사력을 증강할 필요가 있고, 이를 위해서는 헌법 개정을 통해 군대를 보유한 보통국가가 돼야 한다. 즉, 지난 날 미일동맹에만 의지하던 안보를 한 차원 발전시켜 일본의 자주국방을 실현 시켜야 한다. 이에 아베 정부는 미일동맹을 바탕으로 군사력을 강화하고, 미국의 아시아 회귀 정책에 편승하여 미국과 함께 중국을 견제 및 봉쇄하려 한다. 또한 동시에 북한의 핵위협과 중국의 위협을 구실로 군대를 보유하는 보통국가가 되려고 한다. 무장된 ‘보통국가’가 되기 위해서는 헌법을 개정해야 한다. 따라서 아베정부의 보수 우경화 정책은 헌법 개정을 위한 국내 정치적 분위기를 만드는 핵심적 정책으로 보인다. 결국, 아베 정부의 동아시아 정책의 핵심은 중국의 패권주의적 팽창을 억제 및 봉쇄하는 것으로 이를 위해 북한의 위협을 명분으로 삼아 미일동맹과 군사력을 강화하고, ASEAN 국가들과 연대하여 중국을 억제하는 전략을 구사하고 있다. 결과적으로 현재 일본의 보수 우경화 정책은 아베 정부의 현실주의적 국제인식에서 비롯된 정치적 수단으로 결론 내릴 수 있다. 필자는 아베정부의 의도적 보수우경화 정책이 장차 일본을 위해서도, 또한 국제 정의로도 옳지 않다고 판단한다.

江戶儒者五井蘭洲『兵論』中的軍事觀 ― “以儒攝兵”與“儒表兵裡”

王超 ( Wang Chao ) 한국중국학회 2023 중국학보 Vol.106 No.-

江戶時代懷德堂學派的代表人物五井蘭洲在其軍事著作『兵論』中, 通過以孔孟的“臨事而懼、好謀而成”與“人和”爲“兵要”, 將兵學歸攝於儒學體系之中, 並強調文武一途, 不可偏廢。在用兵方法上, 五井蘭洲崇尚智謀, 認爲戰前的廟算是戰爭勝負的決定性因素;主張認清廟算、機變、人和才是用兵之本, 而佈陣、兵械不過是用兵之末, 不可捨本逐末。在用兵倫理上, 他堅持義謀並重, 反對只著眼於正義性而忽視可行性的作法, 甚至認爲只要是爲了達成正義的戰略目標, 也可以使用詭詐的戰術手段。雖然五井蘭洲以朱子學傳人自居, 但其“儒表兵裡”的軍事觀以結果爲導向, 努力抬高智謀的地位而淡化道義的色彩, 嚴重偏離了朱子學“以義爲先”的原則, 具有鮮明的江戶時代特色。 Goi Ransyuu is the representative personage in Kaitokudou School. In his On Military, he treated Confucius’s saying “proceeding to action full of solicitude, adjusting plans and carrying them into execution” and Mencius’s saying “unity of the people” as the key of military, incorporating military science into the system of Confucianism, and insisting the uniformity of pen and sword, neither of which could be neglected. In regard to military methods, Goi Ransyuu advocated resourcefulness, and considered court calculation prior to war as the decisive factor in winning a war. In his opinion, recognizing court calculation prior to war, flexibility in dealing with exceptional situations, unity of the people are fundamental, while military array and weaponry are trivial, and it’s wrong to attend to the trivials and neglect the fundamentals. As to military ethics, he laid equal stress on morality and resourcefulness, objecting to one-sidely stress on morality and neglect feasibility. He even agreed with achieving a justicial strategic goal by cunning tactical means. Although Goi Ransyuu consider himself as a follower of the doctrines of Zhu Xi, he underlined the importance of resourcefulness and downplayed the importance of morality, which deviates the moral principle of Zhu Xi. With Confucianism in appearance while Military Strategist in nature, his result-oriented view of military is of distinguishing Edo Era characteristics.