[PacNet Corner] The Six Party Talks: Guess Who's in the Catbird Seat

Larry NIKSCH 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2004 신아세아 Vol.11 No.1

THE AGREED FRAMEWORK VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Larry Niksch 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 1996 THE U . S . - ROK ALLIANCE Vol.- No.-

The Park Geun-hye Government’s Role in a Needed New Strategy toward North Korea

Larry Niksch 통일연구원 2013 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.22 No.1

This paper places President Park Geun-hye’s policy of building trust with North Korea in the difficult context of North Korea’s threats against South Korea and the United States, and the prospect that North Korea soon will produce nuclear warheads for its Nodong missiles. Nuclear warheads on the Nodongs will give North Korea a new instrument to pursue provocative acts against South Korea. It signifies the death of denuclearization as a credible policy priority for South Korea and the United States. The paper contends that a new strategy is needed to replace denuclearization. South Korea must take the leading role in developing new issues in its diplomacy toward Pyongyang. President Park could propose multiple negotiations over at least six South-North issues that could yield outcomes favorable to South Korea. The paper also suggests ways for the Park Government to coordinate with the United States over strengthening deterrence against a North Korea with nuclear warheads.

China’s Policies toward North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs

Larry Niksch 통일연구원 2015 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.24 No.2

China’s policies toward North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have been a significant problem for the United States, South Korea, and Japan since the onset of six-party talks in 2003. China’s diplomatic strategy and tactics in six-party talks seldom supported U.S. negotiating positions. China officially supported denuclearization of North Korea; but its negotiating strategy was to influence the talks, especially the Bush administration, into accepting more limited objectives that would allow North Korea to retain secret components of a nuclear weapons program. China opened criticism of North Korea when Pyongyang began to test nuclear warheads, thus unveiling secrets of its program, and long-range missiles. However, China rejected placing overt pressure on North Korea. It acted only in limited ways to enforce United Nations sanctions against North Korea. It allowed North Korea access to Chinese territory and institutions that Pyongyang used to advance its nuclear and missile programs. China has been motivated by core objectives of supporting political stability in North Korea and preserving North Korea as a buffer against South Korea and the United States. China is also motivated by its policy of building relations with Iran, a key partner of North Korea in developing nuclear warheads and long-range missiles. These long-standing Chinese goals and strategies suggest that China will pursue similar strategies and tactics in dealing with future scenarios, such as a continuing of North Korean nuclear and missile testing, a de facto moratorium by North Korea on testing but no negotiations, and a resumption of six-party negotiations

Dealing with North Korea on the Nuclear Weapons Threshold

( Larry Niksch ) 한국국방연구원 1992 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.4 No.1

In the six months from June through November 1992, the govern-ments of South Korea and the United States will face some of the toughest decisions they have experienced in their over 40 years of confrontation with North Korea. Two developments related to North Korea`s apparent nuclear weapons program likely will come to a head in June and July. First, negotiations over outside inspections of suspected North Korean nuclear weapons facilities will probably clarify the extent to which North Korea will allow inspections. Sec-ond, according to US intelligence estimates, North Korea`s plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon could become operational by the summer of 1992. This would be a major step forward towards a nuclear weapons production capability. If a February 1990 Soviet KGB report is correct that North Korea has already manufactured its "first atomic detonation device," North Korea likely will have the components of a bomb or warhead ready to receive reprocessed plutonium when the plant produces enough for a weapon. North Korea has made several policy adjustments on the nuclear weapons issue and on policy towards South Korea since September 1990. These have come mainly in response to pressures from a declining economy, China, and from a series of inducements offered by the United States and South Korea in late 1991, including the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea. These adjust-ments, however, appear to be tactical maneuvering rather than fundamental policy change. North Korea appears to be following a strategy of limiting and delaying IAEA and South Korean inspections of its nuclear facilities. Consequently, if North Korea is able to start up nuclear reprocessing in the summer of 1992, any inspections that

When north Korea Mounts nuclear Warheads on Its MIssIles

LarryA.NIKSCH 국가안보전략연구원 2011 The Journal of East Asian Affairs Vol.25 No.2

Current talk of new U.S.-North Korean official contacts and possible resumption of six party nuclear negotiations ignore a more likely development over the next two to four years: North Korean success in producing nuclear warheads that it would mount on its short and intermediate range missiles and possibly later on longer range missiles. North Korean success would transform Pyongyang into a genuine nuclear weapons state. It would end the value of denuclearization negotiations; North Korea never will give up such a success. The United States and its allies will need to formulate new strategies to deal with North Korea. These should include stepped up measures of military containment, a strategy to manage nuclear crises with North Korea, and a focus on other issues on which Pyongyang might be more vulnerable to outside influence.

Assessing Internal North Korea

( Larry A. Niksch ) 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2007 Pacific Focus Vol.22 No.1

Assessing North Korea`s internal situation is a near impossible task for anyone on the outside. Access to the country is extremely limited for a selected few and is prohibited for a much larger number. Access to classified information appears to be of little help. Witness the key figures of the Clinton Administration who predicted a collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime in 1994 and 1995 and justified the weaknesses of the 1994 Agreed Framework on the assumption of an early collapse that would render the agreement and its weaknesses mute. They were largely in the dark as we are today. My assessments in this paper could be broken down into 10 percent fact, 20 percent analysis, 50 percent speculation, and 20 percent crystal ball gazing. I may be too optimistic on the extent of analysis.

Future Issues in U.S. -ROK Security Cooperation

( Larry A Niksch ) 한국국방연구원 1989 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.1 No.1

North Korea and Terrorism: The Yokota Megumi Factor

( Larry A Niksch ) 한국국방연구원 2002 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.14 No.1

This article describes the emergence in 1997 of the issue of Japanese who are suspected of having been kidnapped by North Korea, when a North Korean defector provided information on Yokota Megumi, who disappeared at the age of 13. It then lays out the manner in which this issue grew into a dominant factor in Japan-North Korean relations over the next five years. The heart of the article`s analysis deals with the factors that brought the kidnapping issue into US and South Korean policies toward North Korea, especially the limitations it progressively placed on the policies of Seoul and Washington and the Perry initiative. The Clinton administration`s decision to place the issue on Secretary Albright`s agenda in Pyongyang sent a message to Pyongyang that terrorism issues would have to be settled with Japan in order to receive any meaningful financial compensation in any agreement with the United States on missiles. It also sent a message to both Seoul and Pyongyang that the United States would not risk damage to its alliance with Japan by removing North Korea from the terrorism list without certainty that removal would bring big, substantial benefits to US policy. Moreover, it interrupted Seoul`s plans to secure Japanese money to help fulfill its promise of large-scale infrastructure aid to North Korea, which i turn blocked aid from the international financial institutions.

The Prospect of Relations Between the U.S and N.K Beyond the 1994 Geneva Nuclear Accord

( Larry A. Niksch ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 1996 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.1 No.-