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정원봉,이민호,강신원 경북대학교 센서기술연구소 1998 센서技術學術大會論文集 Vol.9 No.1
A LAPS (Light Addressable Potentiometric Sensor) system using a neural network was proposed for the sensing a hydrogen ion concentration. A multilayer neural network is used for enhancing a resolution of LAPS which is limited by a hardware device including a AD converter, low-pass filter etc. Also, an experimental results is compared and analyzed with an analytic result.
Existence and Characterization of Incentive Efficient Bargaining Mechanisms
Shin, Minho THE KOREAN ECONOMIC SOCIETY 1997 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS Vol.3 No.1
We examine the environments in which there exist (Bayesian) incentive compatible, individually rational, (ex post) efficient, and ex post budget-balancing mechanisms-incentive efficient mechanisms for short. It is shown that incentive efficient mechanisms exist if there are some disagreements on beliefs between individuals in terms of relative probability ratios and the beliefs of at least one player are monotone. And it is shown that if the seller's (buyer's) beliefs are independent of valuations then there exist incentive efficient mechanisms if and only if the buyer's (seller's) beliefs are not independent of valuations.
A Way to Show Unique Perfect Equilibrium in a Three Person Bargaining Game
Shin, Minho 韓國産業經濟硏究所 2005 産業硏究 Vol.18 No.-
The method of proof developed by Shaked and Sutton (1984) on the unique and efficient P.E. in two person bargaining games is easy to apply. But it has serious limitations in that it can only be applied to games in which the structures of games contain infinite horizon iterating sequence of offers and in which there exists unique and efficient P.E.. One of the main differences between two person bargaining and three person bargaining games lies in the difference in the structures of games in which players can form two player coalitions against the other in three person games, while players directly compete each other in two person games. So the existing method of proof in Shaked in Sutton (1984) on the unique and efficient P.E. in two person bargaining games cannot be applied to some three person bargaining games and needs significant modification even for three person games that is applicable. We consider a three person infinite horizon, discrete time, alternating-offer bargaining game of complete information with common discount factor. And we present the three person modification and extension of the method of proof developed by Shaked and Sutton (1984) in two person games of infinite horizon, discrete time, alternating-offer bargaining game of complete information with common discount factor. By examining this three person modification, we can better understand the structure of three person bargaining games and the difference between bargaining and coalitional form games
Unique Perfect Equilibrium in a Three Person Bargaining Game with Complete Information
Shin, Minho 京畿大學校 韓國産業經濟硏究所 2002 産業硏究 Vol.15 No.-
We consider a three person infinite horizon, discrete time, alternating-offer bargaining game of complete information with common discount factor. We show that there exists unique efficient P.E. in which the players make an agreement on the division of pie in the first state without any delay. We also compare our result in this paper with appropriately modified version of the marginal product mechanism in static double auction models in Ostroy (1984) and Ostroy and Makowski (1992) to sho that in the unique P.E. each player receives his marginal product which is represented by the surplus he generates to the others throughout the game. By examining a three person bargaining game with unique efficient P.E., we can better understand the structure of three person bargaining games. And by comparing the P.E. outcome with the marginal product, we can provide intuitive rationale for the existence of unique efficient P.E..
SHIN, MINHO 韓國計量經濟學會 1992 계량경제학보 Vol.3 No.-
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms normally require a third party (the mechanism coordinator) to process information and to enforce the terms of trade. However, casual observation shows that there are many instances in which bargaining occurs without third party involvement. We consider a bargaining problem with two-sided incomplete information in which the number of possible valuations for each trader is two. We examine ex post efficient mechanisms that can be implemented in the absence of mechanism coordinator-“efficient self-enforcing”mechanisms for short. We show that among ex post incentive efficient mechanisms that are ex post individually rational, only the take-it-or-leave-it mechanisms in which the seller(buyer) with high valuation offers higher price than the seller (buyer) with low valuation are self-enforcing [Characterization and Uniqueness]. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions on the set of valuations and beliefs for which “efficient self-enforcing”mechanisms exist [Existence].
Catalysts for composite cathodes of protonic ceramic fuel cells
Shin, EunKyong,Shin, Minho,Lee, Hanjin,Park, Jong-Sung Elsevier 2018 Ceramics international Vol.44 No.7
<P><B>Abstract</B></P> <P>Unlike oxygen ion-conducting fuel cells (OCFCs), protonic ceramic fuel cells (PCFCs) generate steam at the cathodes. Many different catalysts have been developed for OCFC anodes; therefore, in this work, potential catalysts for steam-generating cathodes of PCFCs were investigated. The steam generation reaction at the PCFC cathode can be enhanced by the use of suitable cathodic catalysts. PCFCs with composite cathodes comprising (La,Sr)FeO<SUB>3</SUB> and Y-doped Ba(Ce,Zr)O<SUB>3</SUB> were fabricated by infiltrating small amounts of alkali oxides into the composite as cathodic reaction catalysts. The results obtained from symmetric half-cells demonstrated that lithium oxide catalysts significantly improve the cathodic performance. A plausible mechanism for the enhancement in the cathode reaction is also proposed.</P>