불투명한 기업은 자산유동성을 선호하는가?

임상균 ( Sang Giun Yim ) 한국중소기업학회 2016 기업가정신과 벤처연구 Vol.19 No.1

본 연구에서는 세계 각국의 자료를 이용하여 현금보유와 발생액의 질로 측정한 재무보고의 질의 관계를 연구하였다. 본 연구의 실증분석결과는 미국을 제외한 세계 각국의 시장에서 현금보유가 재무보고의 불투명성과 양의 상관관계가 있음을 발견하였다. 이러한 관계는 투자자보호가 강해짐에 따라 더욱 강하게 나타났는데, 이것은 대리인 동기가 아닌 예방적 동기가 불투명한 기업의 현금보유의 주요 결정요인임을 보여준다. 이러한 양의 상관관계는 재량적 발생액의 질에서 뚜렷하게 나타났다. 투자자보호를 그 속성별로 나누어 본 결과는 규제기관을 통한 투자자보호가 기업 재무보고의 불투명성과 현금보유 사이의 양의 관계를 강화하는 것으로 나타났다. Using an international setting, this study investigates the relation between cash holdings and financial reporting quality, measured by accruals quality. Empirical results show that the balance of cash holdings is positively related to the opacity of financial reporting in non-U.S. international markets. The relation becomes stronger as the strength of investor protection increases, implying that precautionary motives, instead of agency motives, drive the increase of cash holdings of opaque firms. In addition, the positive relation is stronger for discretionary accruals quality. The decomposition of the aspects of investor protection shows that public enforcement through regulation authorities is the main driver of the positive relation between cash holdings and the opacity of financial reporting.

재무적 여력이 판매관리비의 하방경직성에 미치는 영향

임상균 ( Sang Giun Yim ),박진하 ( Jin Ha Park ),황인이 ( In Y Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계학연구 Vol.39 No.3

본 연구에서는 기업의 재무적 여력(financial slack)이 판매관리비 행태에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 재무적 여력은 고정비용으로 인한 재무적 위험을 낮추어 매출감소시에도 수익성 높은 기업자원을 유보하는 경향을 강화할 것이므로 이에 따라 판매관리비의 하방경직성이 강화될 것이다. 또한, 영업현금흐름의 변동성이 큰 기업은 투자재원의 제약으로 인해 자원을 확대하기 어려우므로, 매출감소시의 기업자원 축소는 성장기회를 놓치게 될 가능성을 높인다. 그러므로 영업현금흐름의 변동성이 높으면 판매관리비의 하방경직성은 강화될 것이다. 이상의 추론을 검증하여 다음과 같은 결과를 발견하였다. 첫째, 자산의 수익성이 높은 기업군에서 기초의 현금보유수준이 증가함에 따라 판매관리비의 하방경직성이 강화되었다. 둘째, 영업현금흐름의 변동성이 증가함에 따라 판매관리비의 하방경직성(cost stickiness)이 강화되었으며, 기초의 내부유보현금이 많은 기업군에서 이러한 관계는 더욱 현저하게 나타났다. 본 연구의 추가분석에서는 매출감소시에 기업자원을 처분하는 경향과 기업의 현금성자산 유보경향의 상관관계를 살펴보았다. 분석결과는 원가의 하방탄력성과 내부유보현금의 변화 사이에 양(+)의 상관관계가 있음을 밝혔는데, 자원을 처분하는 기업에서는 미래의 투자를 위해 현금성 자산을 유보하는 경향이 있음을 보여준다. 이러한 경향은 영업현금흐름 뿐만 아니라 재무현금흐름에서도 나타났으며, 기초의 내부유보현금이 적거나 자산의 수익률이 낮은 경우에 더욱 뚜렷하였다. 그간의 원가행태 연구에서는 재무적 의사결정과 기업자원의 관리의 상호연관성이 자세히 연구되지 않았다. 본 연구는 재무적 측면과 기업의 원가행태가 상호연관성을 보임으로써 회계문헌상에 공헌점을 가진다. This study examines the relationship between financial slack (cash holdings in order to make the planned investments) and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) cost behavior. Since Anderson et al. (2003), many studies have found SG&A costs are sticky and investigated possible drivers of the asymmetric SG&A cost behavior. Those studies report that the adjustment cost of resources, managers` expectations of future sales, prior activity changes, and managerial incentives are major drivers of the asymmetric behavior in SG&A costs (Anderson et al. 2003; Banker et al. 2011). In addition, Banker et al. (2013a and 2013b) discuss the importance of managing slack resources from the viewpoint of each sticky cost driver. We extend the literature and examine financial slack as another source of asymmetric behavior in SG&A costs. Firms need capital to acquire and maintain corporate resources for operating activities. Thus, the financial slack of a firm could affect the firm`s decisions on operating resource management and hence its SG&A costs. When firms have a sufficiently large amount of cash holdings, they are less constrained in investment decisions and more capable of maintaining operating resources even in sales-decrease periods. Provided with higher resource productivity in particular, firms disposing of such productive resources in proportion to sales decrease may suffer more from opportunity costs of missing sales as demand rebounds in the next periods. Hence, in firms with large cash holdings, i.e., financial slack, managers are likely to maintain and utilize slack resources and SG&A costs more effectively. In addition to the size of cash holdings, the volatility of cash flow from operations ( CFO) could be another important financial characteristics that affect cost adjustment decisions. Cash flow created from operating activities is the most important source of capital for operating expenditures and investments (Tirole 2006; Mayer 1988). As the volatility of operating cash flow increases, there is a greater chance that a firm cannot timely increase its corporate resources when market demand increases. In other words, firms with high volatility in operating cash flow should be cautious in downward resource adjustment in response to sales decrease because they may not catch up on potential growth opportunities in the future. Based on Banker et al.`s (2012) prediction that allowing more slack resources is optimal when market environment is more uncertain, we examine whether or not firms with large volatility in operating cash flow maintain excess resources in SG&A activities. This study tests these conjectures using firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) or on the Korea Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ). Our final sample consists of 10,747 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2012. We find that SG&A costs become stickier as the beginning balance of cash holdings increases. This result implies that financial slack helps to maintain excess resources in the adverse demand condition. Next, SG&A costs become stickier as the volatility of CFOincreases. The effect of the volatility of CFOis robust after controlling the volatility of revenues in the regression model. Interestingly, the result shows that the effect of the volatility of revenues is subsumed by the effect of the volatility of CFO. We also find that the positive association between the volatility of CFOand cost stickiness is salient when beginning cash holdings are large, which suggests that financial slack is helpful to maintain excess resources in periods of sales decrease. In additional tests, we examine how operating resource adjustment and financial slack management are associated by considering the productivity of slack resources. We first find that the change of cash holdings is positively related to the antistickiness of SG&A costs. When the change of cash holdings is divided into three parts (cash flows from operating, financing, and investing activities), both CFO and cash flow from financing activities ( CFF) are positively related to the antistickiness of SG&A costs. More importantly, we find that this relation is stronger for firms with low cash holdings or low return on assets. The results from our additional tests suggest that firms with low profitability or low financial slack reduce SG&A costs when sales decrease so that they can redirect the cost savings to build more financial slacks. This study has several contributions to the accounting and finance literature. First, extant studies on cost behavior have not studied the relation between financial characteristics and cost behavior. The literature on corporate finance provides evidence that financing activities can make critical impacts on operating decisions. This study fills the void in the accounting literature by documenting the effect of financial slack on cost behavior. Second, studies on financial slack, i.e. cash holdings, generally focus on the impact of cash holdings on future investments (e.g. Almeida et al. 2004; Fresard 2010; Faleye 2004; Campello et al. 2010). This research, in contrast, examines the role of financial slack on resource management decisions and finds the importance of cash holdings for maintaining current resources when sales decrease. Finally, this study shows that managers coordinate financial slack and operating resource slack managements as a whole in organization. We believe these points can help build a bridge among corporate finance and managerial accounting studies.

Individual Blockholders and Corporate Risk-Taking: Korean Evidence

임상균(Sang-Giun Yim) People&Global Business Association 2021 Global Business and Finance Review Vol.26 No.4

Purpose: This study examines the influence of individual blockholders on corporate risk-taking using Korean-listed firm data. Studies on corporate governance argue that non-controlling large shareholders, that is individual blockholders, increase corporate risk-taking by monitor and discipline the controlling shareholder’s self-serving decisions. However, as individual blockholders have limited resources to monitor a controlling shareholder, whether individual blockholders increase corporate risk-taking is an empirical question. Design/methodology/approach: To test research the question, this study examines the influence of individual blockholders on corporate risk-taking by using multivariate regression analysis. Korean individual blockholder data are refined manually to confirm individual blockholders’ independence from the controlling shareholder of the firm. Findings: The regression analysis showed that individual blockholders reduced overall corporate risk and long-term risky investments, while short-term corporate risk-taking related to credit policy increased. Besides, the persistence of risky investment decreases in the presence of individual blockholders. The empirical analysis also finds that the negative relation between individual blockholders presence and corporate risk-taking is strengthened by financial slock. These results contradict previous studies which predict that individual blockholders will increase corporate risk-taking. Research limitations/implications: This study suggests that individual blockholders avoid corporate risk-taking if they have insufficient resources to discipline a controlling shareholder. The results of this study highlight that institutional support is necessary for individual blockholders to perform the corporate governance role, which is applicable for all countries that the concentrated ownership prevails. Originality/value: Using manually collected data, this study reports the empirical results that contradict the expectation of most prior studies on the influence of individual shareholders on corporate risk-taking.

대규모기업집단 소속기업의 투자효율성

임상균 ( Sang Giun Yim ),이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ),황인이 ( In Y Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계학연구 Vol.39 No.3

본 연구에서는 대규모기업집단 소속기업들의 투자효율성에 대해 분석하였다. 과거의 국내외 연구들은 대규모기업집단 소속기업들이 비효율적이고 많은 문제점을 가지고 있다고 보고한 경우가 많았다. 그러나 최근 수행된 다수의 연구들은 오히려 대규모기업집단 소속기업들이 기타 기업들에 비해 우수하다는 증거들을 다수 제시하고 있다. 본 연구에서 대규모기업집단 소속기업들을 기타 기업들과 비교한 결과 투자효율성이 높다는 증거를 발견하였다. 첫째, 대규모기업집단 소속기업들은 과소투자가 이루어질 가능성이 높은 상황에서 다른 기업들 보다 많은 투자를 하고 있었으며, 과대투자가 이루어질 가능성이 높은 상황에서는 다른 기업들보다 적은 투자를 수행하고 있었다. 둘째, 추가적으로 대규모기업집단 소속기업들만을 대상으로 분석해본 결과, 지배주주의 현금흐름 수취권리가 높은 기업이나 기업집단의 중핵기업이 과대투자가능성이 높은 상황에서 그렇지 않은 기업들보다 투자가 적어, 높은 투자효율성을 보였다. 그러나 지배주주의 소유지배괴리 수준, 피라미드식 혹은 순환출자 형태의 소유구조는 투자효율성과 유의한 관계를 보이지 않았다. 마지막으로, 대규모기업집단 소속기업들은 사외이사 비율이 높은 기업이 과대투자가능성이 높을 때 상대적으로 투자가 적어 투자효율성이 높았다. 그 밖에 사외이사의 전문성 혹은 활동성은 투자효율성과 유의한 관계가 없었다. 이런 발견들은 기업집단과 지배구조의 역할에 대해 여러 중요한 시사점들을 제시해 주고 있다. This paper investigates two issues related to investment efficiency: (1) How affiliation with family-controlled large business conglomerates in Korea (Chaebol) influences investment efficiency, and (2) among firms belonging to Chaebol groups, how the governance mechanisms at the conglomerate-level and firm-level influence investment efficiency. There has been a prolonged controversy on the role of business conglomerates. Familycontrolled large business conglomerates are found in many countries, including Asian and European countries. La Porta et al. (1999) report that these firms are mostly controlled by the concentrated ownership of families. Many prior studies criticize that firms belonging to business conglomerates engage in non-value maximizing activities to increase the influence of controlling shareholders. For example, in some cases, firms engage in tunneling activities to transfer wealth from a firm to another firm over which controlling shareholders have more cash flow rights. In other cases, several firms in the conglomerate help another firm that is in financial difficulties. This behavior is called propping. Controlling shareholders of business conglomerates build large empires and try to increase the assets under their control. For this purpose, controlling shareholders engage in tunneling or propping, which results in the sacrifice of the wealth of minority shareholders (Betrand et al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2006; Kim 2008; Jian and Wong 2010; Kwon et al. 2012). For these reasons, firms belonging to business conglomerates may make inefficient investments that result in inferior firm performance. Several studies using Korean data confirm this argument (Choi and Cowing 1999; Chang 2003; Joh 2003: Kim 2011). Studies in accounting also document evidence that confirms this argument. For example, Fan and Wong (2003) find that as the ownership divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights of business conglomerates increases, the earnings response coefficient decreases. In contrast to these criticisms of the business conglomerate, several recent studies have started to report on the beneficial roles of business conglomerates. Using Indian data, Siegel and Choudhury (2012) report that firms in business conglomerates engage in more long-term business strategy and research and development activities. Additionally, Khanna and Palepu (2000) report that business conglomerates more efficiently use internal cash and thus lower information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with those of Korean studies. Lee et al. (2010) document that Korean business conglomerates changed their behaviors after the 1997 financial crisis. Thus, they exhibit higher profitability and less volatility than other firms. Their leverage ratio has also dropped, suggesting that they are less likely to use external debt financing. Similarly, Kim (2012) reports that firms belonging to business conglomerates grow more rapidly, have a higher level of investment with higher profitability. Park and Jung (2011) argue that business conglomerates create synergy effect that help the survival and restructuring process. In summary, the findings of recent studies generally suggest that business conglomerates are not likely to engage in inefficient investments. In addition, prior studies on the issue mostly use naive and descriptive methods. They simply compare the level of investments and future ( ex post) profitability with benchmark firms. Although this analysis is suggestive, it does not control for other factors that may be related to the investment level. Using the sophisticated method developed by Biddle et al. (2009), this study investigates the investment efficiency issue related to business conglomerates. Biddle et al.`s (2009) method classifies firms into two subsamples: the situation in which over-investment is likely to occur and the opposite situation in which under-investment is likely to occur. The samples used in this study are Korean listed firms (excluding firms in the banking and finance industries) over the period from 2001 to 2009. Data on business conglomerates are collected from the website of the Korean Fair Trade Commission. The final sample size is 6,217 firm-year observations from 1,177 firms. Among them, 803 observations belong to firm in family-controlled business conglomerates. Our empirical results are summarized as follows. First, consistent with the findings in most of the recent studies, we find that firms belonging to business conglomerates engage in less over-investment (under-investment) than other firms when they are in situations in which over-investment (under-investment) is likely to occur. Second, among conglomerate-level governance mechanisms, we find that firms with high cash flow rights and firms that play a central role in the conglomerate, respectively, engage in less over-investment than other firms when over-investment is likely to occur. Ownership divergence, firms` position in pyramid-type structures, and circular shareholdings are not related to the investment efficiency. Third, among firm-level governance structures, we find that firms with a high ratio of independent outside directors are likely to engage in less over-investment than other firms when overinvestment is likely to occur. In contrast, the ratio of grey directors, board members with other directorships, existence of accounting experts among outside board members, and ratio of board meeting attendance by outside directors are not significantly related to investment efficiency. These findings, combined together, provide valuable implications to regulators, firms, and other interested parties. We hope future studies investigate related issues further to clarify the role of business conglomerates and their governance mechanisms.

노동조합이 있는 기업에서의 현금할당정책

이우종(Woo-Jong Lee),임상균(Seungbin Oh),오승빈(Sang-Giun Yim),유경화(Kyunghwa Yu) 한국회계정보학회 2016 한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집 Vol.2016 No.1

본 연구는 노동조합의 영향력이 강한 기업들이 한 단위의 현금을 창출할 때 그 현금을 어떻게 사용하는지를 검증한다. 현금흐름의 각 사용처간 상호관련성을 반영하기 위해 Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011)의 연립방정식 방법론을 응용하였다. 1998년부터 2008년까지 대한민국 상장기업을 대상으로 분석한 결과, 노조가 강한 기업들은 한 단위의 현금흐름이 창출될 때, 이를 기업 내에 유보하거나 부채상환에 사용하는 경향이 약하다는 것을 발견하였다. 반면, 노조의 영향이 강한 기업들은 창출된 현금을 투자에 할당하는 경향이 강하게 나타났는데, 이는 기업의 비재무적 투자자들인 종업원들이 기업의 가치를 높이는 투자사업 추진에 긍정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 해석된다. 본 연구 결과는 노동조합이 기업의 자원할당에 미치는 영향을 연구할 때, 현금창출능력과 함께 각 사용처간 상호관련성을 고려하는 것이 중요하다는 것을 시사한다. How do unionized firms use an additional dollar from cash inflows? To answer this hitherto unexplored question, we adopt the system of equations developed by Dasgupta, Noe, and Wang (2011) to explicitly address possible interdependence of cash allocation decisions in unionized firms. Based on comprehensive firm-level unionization data for Korean companies from 1998 to 2008, we document that unionized firms allocate less cash to cash reserves and retirement of external financing than nonunionized firms do. More interestingly, we also find that unionized firms put a greater portion of cash inflows to investment. This unexpected result of greater investment in unionized firms is in fact consistent with the view that employees are an important non-financial stakeholder who naturally cares about the longterm survival of the company; thus, they do not necessarily suppress value-increasing investments. Overall, our findings suggest that researchers need to study cash flow sensitivities when examining interrelated cash allocation decisions.

Basu의 비대칭적 적시성 모형의 추정편의

권세원(Sewon Kwon),임상균(Sang-Giun Yim) 한국경영학회 2015 經營學硏究 Vol.44 No.5

Several researchers point out that the estimation of Basu’s(1997) asymmetric timeliness model suffers from the bias. However, there are not many studies that examine the biases in the estimation of the Basu(1997) model in the Korean environment. Considering the accounting and finance literature that suggests that the informativeness of accounting earnings and stock returns, which are the primary variables of the Basu(1997) model, is influenced by the characteristics of the country, re-examining the problems of the Basu(1997) model with a sample of Korean firms is a necessary process to justify empirical studies on conservatism in Korea. This study finds that a bias exists in the Basu(1997) model when estimated with a sample of Korean firms. However, this bias is resolved for firms listed in the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) when the correlated omitted variables problem is controlled. On the other hand, such controls do not effectively mitigate the bias for the sample of firms listed in the Korean Securities Dealers Automated Quotation(KOSDAQ) market. This result is determined to be from the difference in the informativeness of stock returns between the KSE market and the KOSDAQ market. As an additional analysis, the influence of the bias of the Basu(1997) model on the Khan and Watts(2009) conservatism measure is examined. In the sample of firms listed on KSE, most of the bias in the Basu(1997) model was effectively controlled in the estimation of the Khan and Watts(2009) measure. However, in the KOSDAQ listed firms sample, the Khan and Watts(2009) measure was significantly influenced by the bias.

사례논문 : 관계회사간 합병을 통한 터널링 효과: 우원건설 사례

백복현 ( Bok Baik ),김범준 ( Bum Joon Kim ),김영준 ( Young Jun Kim ),임상균 ( Sang Giun Yim ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계저널 Vol.22 No.2

본 사례는 대주주가 특수관계자인 상장법인과 비상장법인간의 합병에서의 기업가치평가와 관련한 대주주와 소액주주간의 대리인 문제(agency problem)인 tunneling의 한 가지 예를 다룬다. 합병법인인 우원인프라(상장법인)와 피합병법인 우원개발(비상장법인)은 동일한 대주주를 가지는 기업들로써, 우회상장을 통하여 합병을 추진하였다. 합병을 위한 valuation 과정에서 우원인프라의 경우 순자산가액보다 낮은 기준주가로 기업가치를 측정(measure)한 반면, 우원개발의 경우 기업가치가 과대평가 되도록 설계된 평가기법을 이용하여 가치가 평가되었다 (valuation). 또한, 합병에 반대한 우원인프라의 소액주주들의 주식매수청구권 가치가 순자산가치 대신에 그보다 더 낮은 값인 주가로 결정되었다. 그 결과, 합병에 의해 우원인프라의 약 83%의 지분을 가지고 있는 소액주주로부터 우원개발에 많은 지분을 가지고 있던 대주주에게로 부(wealth)의 이전이 일어난 것으로 판단된다. 본 사례의 분석은 우원개발의 valuation model과 input 선택의 문제점 및 주식매수청구권의 가치에 따라 이전된 부의 크기가 큰 폭으로 달라진다는 점을 보여주고 있다. 본 사례는 국내자본시장에서 대주주가 동일한 관계사간 합병시 합병전 피합병법인의 이익 조정을 통하여 터널링이 발생할 수 있음으로 보여주고 있으며, 관계사간 합병시 소액주주 보호를 위한 제도적 장치의 보완이 필요함을 시사하고 있다. This paper examines an example of the tunneling effect between affiliated firms at an M&A. Specifically, the controlling shareholder of WooWon Development, who also controls WooWon Infra, expropriates the wealth of WooWon Infra`s minority shareholders through an opportunistic choice of valuation models at the M&A. The controlling shareholder of both firms chooses to opportunistically use the standard stock price for Woowon Infra`s firm value, which is lower than the net asset value, while he uses a specific valuation model to overestimate the corporate value of Woowon Development In addition, the appraisal rights of WooWon Infra`s minority shareholders, who have opposed the M&A, were valued much lower than the firm`s net asset value. As a result, the wealth of WooWon Infra`s minority shareholders, who owned about 83% of shares following the M&A, was transferred to the majority shareholder of WooWon Development upon the M&A. This paper demonstrates that the choice of WooWon Development`s valuation model, its model inputs, and the value of the appraisal rights can significantly affect the amount of wealth transferred. Moreover, this paper shows that tunneling is more likely to occur by adjusting income of the target firm before the M&A when the acquiring and target firms are owned by the same majority shareholder. This paper sheds light on the debate to improve the relevant laws to protect minority shareholders.

자산재평가 효과: 아시아나항공 사례

백복현 ( Bok Baik ),최선화 ( Sun Hwa Choi ),이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ),임상균 ( Sang Giun Yim ) 한국회계학회 2010 회계저널 Vol.19 No.3