南北韓 統一方案의 比較分析과 實效性檢討 : 「民族和合 民主統一方案」과「高麗民主聯邦共和國」案을 中心으로

유영국 부산대학교 1983 統一論叢 Vol.5 No.-

전문대학 공학계열의 NCS기반 직업기초능력

유영국,Yu, Yeong-Guk 한국전기전자재료학회 2016 전기전자재료 Vol.29 No.1

개인정보보호(Schutz personenbezogener Daten)와 경쟁법 적용 - 연방카르텔청의 Facebook 결정 및 뒤셀도르프 고등법원의 결정(VI-Kart 1/19 (V))을 중심으로 -

유영국 한국경쟁법학회 2019 競爭法硏究 Vol.40 No.-

In diesem Aufsatz handelt es sich um die normative Entscheidung über das Sammeln und Zusammenführen personenbezogener Daten von Facebook. Das Bundeskartellamt hat am 6. Feb. 2019 seine Facebook-Entscheidung erlassen und damit die grenzenlose Nutzer-Datensammlung und Zusammenführung durch das soziale Netwerk maßgeblich beschränkt. Diese Facebook-Entscheidung hat große Aufmerksamkeit erfahren, weil darin eine wesentliche Antwort auf die jüngste umstrittene Frage gegeben wird, ob das bestehande Instrumentarium des Wettbewerbsrechts marktmächtigen Digitalkonzernen normative Grenzen setzen kann. Beim Facebook-Verfahren hat das Bundeskartellamt vor allem die Datensammlung außerhalb der konzerneigenen Dienste von Facebook und ihre Zusammenführung mit dem Facebook-Konto als problematisch angesehen. Zu dem beurteilte er, ob diesem Verhalten, dem Daten-Tracking und der Zusammenführung mit dem Facebook-Konto, eine wirksame Einwilligung der Nutzer vorliegt. Darüber hinaus hat das Bundeskartellamt klar bestätigt, dass Datenschutz, Verbraucherschutz und der Wettbewerbsschutz an der Stelle zusammenkommen , an der Daten, wie bei Facebook, einen wesentlichen Faktor für die wirtschaftliche Dominanz eines Unternehmens darstellen. Mit dieser Facebook-Entscheidung hat das Bundeskartellamt über die Nutzungs- und Datenverarbeitungskonditionen als Konditionenmissbrauch entschieden. Außerdem sieht er an, dass das Ausmaß und die Ausgestaltung dieser Datensammlung gegen zwingende europäische Datenschutzwertungen verstößt. Aber im Eilverfahren hat der OLG Düsseldorf ernsthafte Zweifel an der Rechtmäßigkeit der Entscheidung aufgezeigt und die aufschiebende Wirkung der von Facebook eingelegten Beschwerde angeordnet. Deshalb hat das Bundeskartellamt diese Entscheidung vom OLG Düsseldorf ohne Weiteres vor dem Bundesgerichtshof angefochten.

교육조직에서의 갈등의 원인과 과정에 관한 연구

유영국 단국대대학원 1991 學術論叢 Vol.14 No.1

정치민주화의 쟁점과 현행 지자제 평가

유영국 한국지역사회학회 1993 지역사회연구 Vol.1 No.1

기업집단 공시의 제도적 함의와 그 한계에 대한 개선 방향

유영국 한국경쟁법학회 2023 競爭法硏究 Vol.48 No.-

The structural characteristics of the Korean market, where economic power is concentrated in a small number of companies, were the background of the revision of the Monopoly Regulation And Fair Trade Act (MRAFTA) that was aimed at preparing an institutional mechanism for regulating economic power. This is called the 1986 system for corporate group (business group) regulation. However, despite the changes in the economic environment, the legal regulatory system has been maintained in a way that only some regulatory contents are revised while the basic framework stayed the same for more than 30 years since its introduction. Accordingly, the necessity of preparing effective improvement measures is emphasized along with a fundamental review of whether the existing regulatory framework is still valid. In this context, this paper first outlines the policy implications of the economic power concentration control system and the aspect of enacting and revising the MRAFTA, then reviews the general understanding of disclosure and different properties of disclosure under the MRAFTA, and explains the introduction and contents of major disclosure systems. Under the MRAFTA, the general nature of the disclosure is relatively weak, which is the provision of information or notification for “stakeholders and other ordinary people.” On the other hand, due to the purpose of the disclosure of “market monitoring of corporate groups,” the regulatory nature is relatively strong, and the main target of providing corporate group information is virtually limited to competition authorities. In this context, it would be appropriate to point out that the disclosure under the MRAFTA, and above all, the designation of a group of companies subject to disclosure, is a “regulation for regulation” due to its functional nature, and at the same time, there is a clear difference between competitors and companies. From the perspective of the Fair Trade Commission(FTC), the designation of a corporate group subject to disclosure can have a realistic meaning of inclusion, that is, a change in the regulatory environment, as a different level of market monitoring regulation. The FTC has consistently presented the policy goals of ‘improving the effectiveness of disclosure information’ and ‘reducing the burden of disclosure on companies’ for each attempt of improvement in the disclosure system, but in reality, the disclosure obligation has shown a tendency to expand, and the trend of the number of designated corporate groups increasing continues. Moreover, from the perspective of competitive authorities, it is true that it is not easy to actively initiate fundamental changes to the regulatory framework, as it facilitates the task of determining the scope of the regulatory subject and, at the same time, a temporary regulatory effect can be expected from the designation itself. On the other hand, from the point of view of companies, since the burden of providing extensive enterprise information itself and the burden of regulation by competition authorities due to disclosure violations coexist, continuing fundamental and comprehensive discussions to improve the system is required.

사회체제로서의 교육조직의 성격에 관한 이론적 분석

유영국 단국대학교대학원 1989 學術論叢 Vol.13 No.-

독점규제법상 적용제외 영역으로서의 행정지도

유영국 명지대학교 법학연구소 2008 명지법학 Vol.7 No.-

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국회의원 선거제도의 개선 방향 : 비례대표의석의 대폭 증대

유영국 동의대학교 지방자치연구소 2011 공공정책연구 Vol.28 No.1

본고는 선거의 본질적 기능을 권력에 대한 민중의 선택과 심판에 있다고 보고, 그러한 관점에서 현행 국회의원 선거제도의 문제점과 개선 방향을 논하고자 하였다. 그를 위하여 선거제도의 여러 유형을 검토한 결과 우리나라 국회의원 선거제도의 중심 부분을 이루는 소선거구 단순다수제가 이론상 편파성과 불합리한 점이 많았고 사회적‧역사적 측면에서도 비민주성이 큰 제도임을 논하였다. 결과적으로 한국사회에서 소선거구 단순다수제의 가장 큰 폐단은 민중의 권력선택과 심판기능을 방해하는 지역주의 선거구도를 형성시키고 고착시키는 데 중대한 영향을 미쳤다는 점을 강조하였다. 선거제도 개선의 대안으로 흔히 지지받고 있는 독일식 혼합선거제는 정당지지비례대표를 권역별로 선출하기 때문에 우리나라에서는 오히려 지역주의 투표성향을 더 자극할 우려가 있다고 보았다. 그러므로 전국을 단일 선거구로 하여 정당비례대표를 선출하는 우리나라 현행 선거제도를 당분간 그대로 시행하되, 소선거구 단순다수제로 선출되는 지역구대표 의석을 크게 줄이는 대신 비례대표의석을 현행보다 크게 늘려 100석 정도로 조정하는 것이 바람직할 것으로 제시하였다. 이는 지난 16대 국회의 자문기구인 ‘범국민정치개혁협의회’도 이미 제안했던 방식이다. 그럴 경우 한나라당과 민주당 등 지역패권 정당들이 불이익을 보는 반면, 지역주의와 거리가 먼 민주노동당 등이 상대적으로 가장 큰 이득을 보게 될 것으로 예측된다. 따라서 그런 방향으로 선거제도를 개선하려면 지배적 거대정당들이 반대할 가능성이 높다. 하지만 서구 민주주의국가들의 발전사를 볼 때 진보정당의 발전은 필연적 귀결이다. 20세기 서유럽의 복지체제 성립은 보수정당들의 동의아래 이루어진 것이며, 19세기 영국 선거법 개정의 역사도 보수당이 진보세력에 대한 획기적 양보를 취한 결과였다.그런 점에서 현재 선거제도의 개혁에서 지배적 정당들이 다소의 불이익을 보더라도 그것이 치명적이지 않는 한 군소 진보정당의 성장에 능동적으로 동의하고 협력하는 것이 역사발전의 주체로서 취할 수 있는 합리적 태도라고 제안한다. This paper aims to propose a new model preventing a regionally exclusive representation by a specific political party through enhancing proportional representation of political parties. The two ballot mixed electoral system, stemmed from German, for the Korean National Assembly was adopted in 2004. Under the German system the party's share of seats are determined by the second ballot. However, the party's share of seats in Korea are determined by not the second ballot but the first. The first ballot is, Moreover, the determinant of the party's share of seats. The most prominent change caused by adopting the new mixed electoral system had to do with the remarkable rise of Democratic Labour Party, as the new system lifted institutional barrier for small parties significantly. In contrast, the mixed electoral system did not attain substantial goals in terms of proportionality, regional party system and mixed electral effects. Smaller parties are disadvantaged, certainly small parties which lack geographic concentrations in their support bases. Such result might call for further reform of mixed electoral system. In conclusion, I argue that we should maintain current two ballot mixed system but recommend to increase significantly the number of representatives elected by the national party lists. A new model will enhance proportionality, better chance for small party, and mixed electoral effects, as well as to alleviate regional party system.

공정거래법상 동의의결 절차에 있어서 ‘이행관리제도’의 체계상 지위와 실효적 운영을 위한 보완 방안

유영국 한국경쟁법학회 2022 競爭法硏究 Vol.45 No.-

The consent decree has raised a fundamental question about whether the system can be effective in the enforcement of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) since its introduction. Also, as the system has been implemented for ten years, the assessment for its pros and cons have become more apparent, and the revitalization of the system has been constantly discussed. On the other hand, such assessment for the consent decree has been made not only because of its nature but also of the expansion of skeptical views on the system due to poor implementation management. In fact, existing discussions relating to the system focused mainly on specific steps, including ‘whether or not to initiate the procedure’ or ‘confirmation of the consent decree resolution’ in the procedure of the system. As a result, despite negative views on the effectiveness of the implementation or the effectiveness of the inspection after the consent decree is finalized, it is true that the content related to ‘implementation management’ was either excluded from the discussion itself or treated passively. Looking back critically at such existing situation, ‘implementation management of consent decree’ should be considered to be encompassed in light of nature of the consent decree. The procedures of the implementation management may not be understood as a separate process different from series of steps leading to the confirmation of the proposed consent decree. In April 2021, the partial amendments to the MRFTA was passed by the National Assembly in order to enhance the reliability and transparency of the overall case handling procedure, including investigation and deliberation, as well as to strengthen the due process of Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) investigation. This article reviews the regulation related to the ‘implementation management system of consent decree’ introduced as KFTC can entrust the management task to the Korea Fair Trade Mediation Agency (KOFAIR) and Korea Consumer Agency (KCA), and then suggests the substantive and procedural supplementary measures.