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이동복 한국음악사학회 2004 韓國音樂史學報 Vol.32 No.-
In this paper both old musical manuscripts and the study of old musical MSS were examined. The study of old musical MSS seems to be an appropriate title for all subjects with relations to the old musical MSS and researches that use old musical MSS as source materials for research. In order to grow out or escape the phase of simply researching old musical MSS and move towards the development of studying old musical MSS, the author believes that all historico-musicologists need to work together to make this possible. Korean old musical MSS are music source materials that have been written by the ancestors in the history of Chosŏn dynasty. Currently, there are over 130 kinds of old musical MSS that have been passed down and preserved till this day. These excellent records of cultural reference were created over the span of 500 years, between the middle of fifteenth century to the beginning of the early twentieth century. Through the studies of the old musical MSS, not only we will be able to discover the roots of Korean traditional music, we will also be able to foresee the proper future of our music by understanding how the music was born, grew and disappeared.
이동복 신아시아연구소 2012 신아세아 Vol.19 No.4
The Northern Limit Line(NLL) was drawn unilaterally by the United Nations Command(UNC) on August 30, 1953, 34 days after the armistice of the Korean War that had gone into effect on July 27 without military demarcation lines(MDLs) drawn on the seas east and west of the peninsula. However, substituting the MDL in the militarily sensitive zone of the West Sea of the Korean Peninsula, the unilateral UNC measure quickly secured its relevance as an integral element of the Korean War armistice regime as it effectively filled up the critical vacuum created by the failure of the Armistice Agreement of 1953 to draw MDLs separating the two belligerent parties on the seas east and west of the peninsula. For twenty years, between 1953 and 1973, North Korea did not take any action challenging the efficacy of the NLL. Instead, North Korea left numerous footprints during the twenty-year period that showed Pyongyang not only acknowledging but also recognizing, if not accepting as well, the existence and validity of the NLL, allowing it effectively to function as a boundary line dividing the seas east and west of the peninsula into two zones controlled respectively by the two sides of Korea. It was in 1973, however, when North Korea began mounting concerted diplomatic as well as military moves challenging the validity of the NLL. The NLL was raised by Pyongyang as one of the main issues for negotiation at the inter-Korean prime ministerial talks, the ‘North-South High-level Talks’ by calling, in the early years of 1990s, as North Korea, holding that the NLL allegedly lacked in legitimacy having been drawn unilaterally by the UNC without North Korea’s consent, demanded that a “new maritime demarcation line” of North Korea’s own drawing be accepted by South Korea in the West Sea to replace the NLL. North Korea failed, however, to prevail at the inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks on this issue as the two sides agreed in Article 11 of the “North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchange and Cooperation” (“North-South Basic Agreement” by abbreviation) that had gone into effect as of February 19, 1992, that the two sides would “continue to honor the military demarcation line stipulated by the Armistice Agreement of July 27, 1953, and the zones controlled heretofore by the two sides respectively as the boundary line and zones of non-aggression.” By accepting this article in the Basic Agreement, North Korea has left it indisputable that, at least for the time being, Pyongyang was accepting the NLL as the line that divided the seas into two “zones.” North Korea renewed, at the ensuing round of the inter-Korean prime ministers’ talks held later in September 1992, its attempt to draw a new maritime military demarcation line to replace the NLL through agreement between the two Koreas. However, the renewed North Korean attempt was thwarted again as it was found to be grossly in conflict with Article 5 of the Basic Agreement under which the two sides were bound by agreement that, while they would “jointly endeavor to have the current state of armistice replaced by a state of permanent peace,” they would “continue to abide by the current Armistice Agreement until the time when such a state of permanent peace is realized.” As the Northern demand that a “new maritime MDL” be drawn on the West Sea was tantamount to amending the Armistice Agreement of 1953, it was expressly not an issue that, under Article 61 of the Armistice Agreement, the two Koreas were authorized to deal with between them. With the two Koreas having agreed in the Basic Agreement(Article 5) to “continue to abide by the current Armistice Agreement until it was replaced by a state of permanent peace,”
Characterization of Oxide Scales Formed on HVOF-Sprayed NiCoCrAlY+(Re, Ta) Coatings
이동복,고재황,이정혁 대한금속·재료학회 2004 METALS AND MATERIALS International Vol.10 No.3
High velocity oxy-fuel sprayed NiCoCrAlY+(Re or Ta) coatings were oxidized between 1000 and 1200 oC in air, and the oxide scales were examined by XRD, SEM/EDS, and EPMA. The unoxidized NiCoCrAlY+Re coating consisted mainly of Ni3Al with some Ni, Cr3Ni2, and Cr3O2, while the unoxidized NiCoCrAlY+Ta coating consisted of Ni3Al with some Ni, Ni3Ta, and Cr3Ni2. During oxidation, α-Al2O3, CoAl2O4, CoCr2O4, and Al5Y3O12 formed on NiCoCrAlY+Re, while α-Al2O3, CoAl2O4, Al5Y3O12, Ta2O5, and Ta2O2.2 formed on NiCoCrAlY+Ta. For both coatings, α-Al2O3 formed easily from the initial oxidation stage. Beneath the oxide layer, an Al-depleted zone existed owing to the significant consumption of Al in the oxide layer.