EU 사법재판소의 인텔 사건 판결

윤신승,황진우 한국공정경쟁연합회 2017 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.193

자기 소유 부동산의 시효취득 인정 여부- 대법원 2022. 7. 28. 선고 2017다204629 판결을 중심으로 -

윤신승 부산대학교 법학연구소 2023 법학연구 Vol.64 No.4

There is a view that the purpose of the acquisitive prescription system focuses on the system to allow occupiers, not rights holders, to acquire ownership of real estate, given that it is a system to increase the facts formed by long-term occupation, but it is reasonable to see it as a system that relieves the difficulty of proof if it is highly likely to be a real owner. In this regard, it is reasonable to admit the acquisitive prescription for one's own real estate in principle, and this interpretation is considered to be a faithful interpretation of the text of Article 245 of the Civil Code. Given that there will be many cases of legal and valid registration in the name of the occupant in the case of registration acquisitive prescription, if the acquisitive prescription is denied in principle, the acquisitive prescription can be recognized only if the registration of ownership is completed, which is illegal or invalid, greatly hinders the function of the registration acquisitive prescription. It is reasonable to understand that the retroactive effect of the acquisitive prescription is not applied indefinitely, but to the extent that the occupant does not bear the obligation to return unfair gains or compensation for damages caused by illegal activities to the original owner (owner) during the prescription period, and it is reasonable to assume that material burdens such as mortgage rights, provisional registration, and seizure are not naturally extinguished by the retroactive effect of the acquisitive prescription. From this point of view, it is regrettable that the Supreme Court Case decided on July 28, 2022, 2017Da204629, in principle, did not correspond to the occupation for the acquisitive prescription, but rather, it was more appropriate to draw a conclusion with specific validity by interpreting the retroactive effect of the acquisitive prescription in a limited way and saying that the seizure in this case did not expire by acquisitive prescription.

Information Exchange as a Type of Agreement?

윤신승,Kenneth T.Kim,김미정 서울대학교 아시아태평양법연구소 2015 Journal of Korean Law Vol.15 No.1

Article 19(1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prescribes that an anticompetitive “agreement” among enterprisers exists as a requirement for establishing an unreasonable col-laborative act. The requirements and standards that are necessary for finding the existence of an “agreement” based on information exchange as evidentiary grounds when there is an in-formation exchange without any explicit agreement or direct evidence has become a critical legal issue in Korea While lower courts previously provided legal standards in regard to such issue, in July 2014, for the first time the Korean Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision regarding the re-quirements and determination standards for finding information exchange among competitors as an agreement in the case concerning information exchange by sixteen life insurance compa-nies. In the above case, the Korean Supreme Court held that (i) under the MRFTA the existence of an unreasonable collaborative act was not directly established based solely on the existence of information exchange, although information exchange can be used as compelling evidence in finding reciprocity in meeting of the minds among enterprisers and (ii) in such case, the exist-ence of an agreement has to be established by comprehensively considering the totality of cir-cumstances, such as the structure and special characteristics of the relevant market and the na-ture and details of the exchanged information, etc. In sum, it may be viewed that courts in Korea continue to develop an autonomous theory of interpretation in order to regulate information exchange as an unreasonable collaborative act, while not damaging the significance of the existence of an “agreement” under the current MRFTA regime. Article 19(1) of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prescribes that an anticompetitive “agreement” among enterprisers exists as a requirement for establishing an unreasonable col-laborative act. The requirements and standards that are necessary for finding the existence of an “agreement” based on information exchange as evidentiary grounds when there is an in-formation exchange without any explicit agreement or direct evidence has become a critical legal issue in Korea While lower courts previously provided legal standards in regard to such issue, in July 2014, for the first time the Korean Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision regarding the re-quirements and determination standards for finding information exchange among competitors as an agreement in the case concerning information exchange by sixteen life insurance compa-nies. In the above case, the Korean Supreme Court held that (i) under the MRFTA the existence of an unreasonable collaborative act was not directly established based solely on the existence of information exchange, although information exchange can be used as compelling evidence in finding reciprocity in meeting of the minds among enterprisers and (ii) in such case, the exist-ence of an agreement has to be established by comprehensively considering the totality of cir-cumstances, such as the structure and special characteristics of the relevant market and the na-ture and details of the exchanged information, etc. In sum, it may be viewed that courts in Korea continue to develop an autonomous theory of interpretation in order to regulate information exchange as an unreasonable collaborative act, while not damaging the significance of the existence of an “agreement” under the current MRFTA regime.

하도급거래 공정화에 관한 법률 상 하도급대금 지급의무 위반에 관한 소고

윤신승 한국경쟁법학회 2020 競爭法硏究 Vol.41 No.-

The Fair Transactions in Subcontracting Act (“FTSA”) requires the principal contractor to pay subcontract consideration to the subcontractors within a period designated by the FTSA, and it provides for various administrative sanctions upon violation of Article 13 of the FTSA (“Article 13”) and other relevant provisions of the FTSA. Since Article 13 does not expressly provide for exceptions to the principal contractor’s non-payment or delayed payment, there have been court decisions which took the position that the Korea Fair Trade Commission(“KFTC”), in applying Article 13, has only to confirm the fact of non-payment of subcontract consideration but does not need to review justifiable reasons for such non-payment presented by the principal contractor, and the KFTC and some commentators have supported the stance of such court decisions. However, considering the purpose of the FTSA and its legislative background, it is difficult to justify such interpretation of Article 13 that the principal contractor is not allowed to present valid legal defenses based upon its civil law rights. Conversely, Article 13 should be interpreted to require the KFTC to consider the principal contractor’s legal arguments based upon its civil law rights. Further such interpretation of Article 13 should be applied not only to the context of the KFTC’s payment order but also to the context of other corrective orders only confirming the violation of Article 13 itself. In this regard, the principal contractor should be allowed to present various justifiable reasons including the factors regarding non-accrual of the subcontractor’s receivables like non-fulfillment of the subcontracted work, settlement or extinguishment of the subcontractor’s receivables like full payment, set-off etc, and other refusal rights to payment like defense of simultaneous fulfillment among others. Lastly, it is recommended that Article 13 should be amended to clarify legal uncertainties arising from the lack of express language allowing justifiable exceptions to the non-payment of subcontract consideration.

유럽사법재판소의 Huawei v. ZTE 사건 판결

윤신승 한국공정경쟁연합회 2015 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.182

FRAND 확약에 위반되는 실시료에 대한 경쟁법상의 규제

윤신승 사법발전재단 2017 사법 Vol.1 No.39

Standardization is beneficial for its contribution to promoting consumer welfare by providing interoperability between different products. Yet, it is also true that it gives rise to antitrust concerns over the formation and reinforcement of market dominant power by proprietors of Standard-Essential Patent (SEP), which may lead to patent hold-up or royalty stacking. As a means to address these concerns associated with standardization, most Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) request SEP-holders to commit to licensing their SEPs on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” terms, namely, to making FRAND commitment. Problems have emerged as some of these FRAND-encumbered SEP-proprietors, after the standardization, tend to subsequently demand apparently unreasonable royalty rates contrary to their FRAND commitment. It is reasonable to deem that an SEP-holder’s demand for royalty rates beyond FRAND terms in violation of FRAND commitment is subject to regulation under competition law. This is because such an act not only constitutes a mere breach of contract but also obstructs the spread of standardization and materializes the risk that standardization might undermine competitive market order. It appears that, thanks to the body of economic research, the respective positions of EU and U.S. competition authorities, and the latest U.S. federal court precedents including the Microsoft v. Motorola case, a certain level of consensus is being reached on the major principles of determining FRAND royalty rates grounded in the rationale behind FRAND commitment. Notwithstanding some disparities in methodological details, this author is hopeful that further accumulation of case law may well contribute to further developing an objective, reasonable set of standards for determining FRAND royalty rates. Debate continues over whether Article 3-2(1)1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act of Korea on unreasonable pricing may be applicable to SEP-holder’s demand for royalty rates in excess of FRAND terms. It is this author’s view that, from the perspective of statutory construction, it should be possible to apply the said provision. This article specifically examines the factors to be considered in applying the said provision to royalty beyond FRAND terms, by inter alia utilizing the standard for determining FRAND royalty rates. This article also examines whether other provisions, such as Article 3-2(1)3 on unreasonable business interference and/or subparagraph 5 of the same Article on unreasonable harm to consumer interest, may be applicable to royalty beyond FRAND terms. 표준화는 제품 간의 호환성을 확보함으로써 소비자의 편리성을 향상시키는 순기능을 가지고 있으나, 표준특허 보유자의 시장지배력을 형성·강화함으로써 특허위협 또는 실시료 누적과 같은 경쟁상의 우려를 야기하는 것도 사실이다. 대부분의 표준화기구는 표준화로 인한 경쟁상의 우려를 방지하기 위하여 표준특허 보유자들에게 자신의 표준특허를 ‘공정하고 합리적이며 비차별적인’ 조건으로 실시허락 하겠다는 확약, 즉 FRAND 확약을 하도록 요청하는데, 이러한 FRAND 확약을 한 표준특허 보유자가 표준 선정 이후에 FRAND 확약을 위반하여 불합리한 수준으로 보이는 실시료를 요구하는 사례들이 발생하고 있어 문제가 되고 있다. 표준특허 보유자가 FRAND 확약을 위반하여 FRAND 실시료 수준을 넘어서는 실시료를 요구하는 행위는 단순한 계약 위반의 문제를 넘어서 표준의 확산을 방해하고 표준화로 인한 경쟁질서 침해의 우려를 현실화하는 행위라는 점에서 경쟁법적 규제의 대상이 된다고 보는 것이 타당하다. FRAND 실시료의 산정기준에 관하여는 기존의 경제학적 연구, 유럽 및 미국의 경쟁당국의 입장, Microsoft v. Motorola 판결 등 최근의 미국 연방법원 판결 등을 통하여 FRAND 확약의 취지에 터잡은 주요 원칙에 관해서는 어느 정도 의견이 좁혀져 가고 있다고 할 수 있으며, 세부적인 방법론에서 차이점이 발견되기도 하지만 향후 사례의 축적을 통해서 객관적이고 합리적인 FRAND 실시료 산정기준의 발전을 기대해 볼 수 있다고 생각한다. 표준특허 보유자가 FRAND 수준을 초과하는 실시료를 요구하는 행위에 대하여 우리나라 「독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률」 제3조의2 제1항 제1호(부당한 가격결정)를 적용할 수 있는지에 관해 논란이 있으나 법 해석론적 관점에서 동 조항을 적용하는 것이 가능하다는 것이 필자의 견해이며, 이에 터잡아 FRAND 실시료 산정기준의 활용 등 FRAND 수준을 초과하는 실시료에 대하여 부당한 가격결정 조항을 적용함에 있어서 고려해야 할 사항들에 관하여 구체적으로 살펴본다. 부당한 가격결정 조항 이외에 동법 제3조의2 제1항 제3호(부당한 사업활동 방해) 및 같은 항 제5호(부당한 소비자이익 저해)를 FRAND 확약 위반 실시료에 적용하는 것도 가능하다고 할 수 있는바, 이에 관해서도 구체적으로 검토한다.

「전자상거래 등에서의 소비자보호에 관한 법률」 상 중개플랫폼 책임 조항의 개선방안

윤신승 한국경쟁법학회 2022 競爭法硏究 Vol.46 No.-

Considering recent trends of product suppliers’ growing dependence on online platforms, consumers’ expectations for online platforms’ monitoring of suppliers, and EU’s legislative trends, the approach to consumer protection through online platform brokerage may still be effective, provided that the application of liability theory based upon platform operators’ influence on suppliers and reliance by consumers is desirable. From this point of view, it is regrettable that the Korea Fair Trade Commission’s revised bill mainly stipulates in terms of appearance liability, and it is necessary to reconsider that certain indemnity provisions stipulated in the clauses based upon the appearance liability are not well harmonized with the theory of appearance liability. However, further research is needed on whether to recognize the liability for all intermediary platforms in terms of guardianship or trust, or whether a provision should be established to recognize the liability only for certain business forms (e.g., open market) or platforms which is larger than certain size or holding certain market share or more that can be seen as particularly strong influence over suppliers.

同調的 價格設定의 規制

윤신승 空軍士官學校 1996 論文集 Vol.38 No.-

온라인 플랫폼의 자사우대(Self-preferencing) 규제에 관한 일고(一考) - 공정거래법상 시장지배적 지위 남용행위해당 여부를 중심으로 -

윤신승 이화여자대학교 법학연구소 2023 法學論集 Vol.27 No.3

The self-preferencing behavior of online platforms may not be without the potential to abuse their dominant position in a market where they hold market power, by gaining competitive advantages in adjacent markets or creating new market dominance, thereby limiting competition. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a reasonable standard for regulating dominant platforms’ self-preferencing behavior as an abuse of market dominance. This should be based on the unreasonableness criteria presented in the POSCO ruling rather than the so-called monopoly leveraging theory which has been applied and developed in the US and EU, but which is of little help. However, there is a question of whether self-preferencing behavior can be recognized as unreasonable even if it does not lead to the formation of market dominance in the second market, as the POSCO ruling does not provide specific proof targets or methods related to proving the restrictive effects of competition. In such a problematic situation, the efficiency-based competition criteria discussed in EU and domestic competition laws can be consulted along with the criteria presented in the POSCO ruling. Especially for self-preferencing in search services, it is necessary to approach carefully whether the increase in traffic for dominant platforms and the decrease in traffic for competitors prove the risk of competition restriction, or whether it is just a specific disadvantage for the trading partner. Finally, even if self-preferencing appears in the form of discrimination, it is not necessary to require ‘equal treatment obligations’ or ‘essential facility element’ to be proved. 온라인 플랫폼의 자사우대 행위는 그 플랫폼이 시장지배적 지위를 가진 시장에서의 지배력을 남용하여 그 인접시장에서 경쟁상 이득을 취하거나 새로운 시장지배력을 형성하여 경쟁을 제한할 가능성이 없지 않다. 따라서 지배적 플랫폼의 자사우대 행위를 시장지배적 지위 남용으로 규제할 수 있는 합리적인 기준의 적용이 필요할 것인데, 이는 포스코 판결에서 제시된 부당성 판단기준을 기초로 하는 것이 타당하며, 미국이나 EU 등에서 적용, 발전되어 온 이른바 시장지배력 전이 이론은 별 도움이 되지 못하는 것으로 보인다. 다만 포스코 판결에서 경쟁제한효과의 증명과 관련하여 구체적인 증명 대상이나 방법을 제시하지 않고 있는 관계로 자사우대 행위가 제2시장에서 시장지배력을 형성하는 정도에 이르지 못하는 경우에도 부당성을 인정할 수 있는지 문제된다. 이와 같은 문제 상황에 대해서는 포스코 판결에서 제시한 기준과 함께, EU 및 국내 경쟁법에서 논의되어 온 능률경쟁 기준을 참고할 수 있으며, 특히 자사우대 행위로 인하여 지배적 플랫폼이 얻게 되는 경쟁상 이득과 경쟁사업자가 입게 되는 불이익의 정도, 자사우대의 정당화 사유 등을 함께 고려하여 부당성 여부를 판단하는 것이 타당하다. 그리고 특히 검색서비스 관련 자사우대에 대해서는 지배적 플랫폼의 트래픽 증가와 경쟁자의 트래픽 감소가 경쟁제한의 우려를 증명하는 사정인지, 아니면 거래상대방이 입게 되는 구체적인 불이익에 불과한 것인지에 관하여 신중하게 접근할 필요가 있을 것으로 본다. 마지막으로 자사우대가 차별취급의 형태로 나타나는 경우라 하더라도 반드시 동등대우 의무가 전제되어야 한다거나 관련된 상품 또는 서비스가 필수설비일 것을 요건으로 할 필요는 없다고 생각한다.

2023년 하도급법 관련 주요 판결의 회고

윤신승 한국공정경쟁연합회 2024 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.220