Ⅶ. 기업재무구조 개선

위정범,김동순,김세진 한국경제연구원 2000 한국경제연구원 연구보고서 Vol.97-99 No.-

기업의 자산매각 동기와 위기대응-IMF 경제위기를 중심으로-

위정범,한경동 한국증권학회 2002 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.30 No.1

Motivations of Sell-off and Crisis Control of Korean Firms - Focusing on the Economic Crisis in 1997 - 이 논문은 1995∼96년 기간 우리나라 기업의 자산매각(sell-off) 동기를 분석하고, 이런 축소 구조조정(divestiture)이 뒤이은 1997년의 경제위기 하에서 경영실적으로 측정된 위기대응능력 제고에 기여하였는지 살펴본다. 논문의 시사점은 다음과 같다. 첫째, 우리 나라 기업의 자산매각은 외형성장의 결과로 나타나는 규모/범위의 비경제 완화, 외형성장이 부진할 때 구조조정 추진, 활용도가 낮은 자산의 처분 수단으로 이용되고 있다. 한편, 기업들은 수익성이 높아 고평가되어 있을 때 이익을 실현하기 위해 자산을 매각할 유인을 갖게 되나, 자본구조 개선 수단으로는 그다지 활용하지 않고 있다. 이런 결과는 기업들이 수익성이나 재무적 안정성보다 외형성장에 주력하였고, 의도하는 고속성장을 달성하지 못할 때 자산매각을 통해 구조조정을 시도하였음을 시사한다. 한편, 대주주 경영자의 통제권이 안정적이고 많은 자산매각이 동일 기업집단 내에서 이루어지는 상황을 반영하여, 소유.지배구조는 자산매각에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않는다. 둘째, 자산매각 기업은 동일 산업의 평균적 기업과 비교하여 매각 이전 성장성 측면에서는 큰 차이를 보이지 않으나, 수익성, 안정성, 활동성 등에서는 현저하게 열등하다. 그리고 매각 이후에는 성장성, 수익성, 안정성, 활동성 등 논문에서 고려된 모든 영역에서 (경제 전반의 변화추세를 조정한 이후에도) 열등한 성과를 보이고 있다. 즉 평균 수준 이하의 경영성과를 낸 기업들이 자산매각이라는 축소 구조조정을 선택하였고, 이들은 매각 이후 제위기 하에서도 개선된 위기대응능력을 보이지 못하고 있다.

기업의 지배구조가 기부금지출에 미치는 영향

위정범,김영식,김효재 한국재무학회 2011 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2011 No.08

CSR 지출은 기업가치의 극대화를 위한 목적으로 이루어져야 하지만 기업의 내부자(경영 자와 대주주)는 자신의 명성을 향상시키기 위해 사적인 목적으로 CSR에 과잉투자 할 유인 이 존재한다. 본 연구에서는 이 가정을 검증하기 위해 CSR 지출과 기업의 지배구조 사이의 관계를 2001년부터 2010년까지 상장된 국내기업을 대상으로 실증분석을 수행하였다. 기업 지배구조 변수로는 내부자지분, 기관투자자지분, 외국인투자자지분을 사용하였으며 CSR 지 출의 대용변수로 기부금지출을 사용하였다. 분석 결과 내부자지분과 기부금지출로 대용된 CSR 지출 사이에 U자형의 비선형관계가 존재함을 확인하였다. 즉, 내부자의 소유지분이 낮을 때는 CSR 지출과 역의 관계가 성립하 지만 내부자의 소유지분이 높을 경우 CSR 지출과 정(+)의 관계를 나타냈다. 그리고 기관투 자자지분과 CSR 지출은 부(-)의 관계를 확인하였고, 외국인투자자지분은 CSR 지출과 정(+) 의 관계를 갖는 것으로 나타났다. 이 결과는 CSR 지출에 내부자의 사적인 이득을 위한 동 기가 작용한다는 가설을 지지하고 있으며 내부자지분과 외부감시에 의해 내부자의 사적 유 인은 규율되는 것임을 시사한다.

한국기업의 해외주식연계증권 발행에 의한 자금조달비용 분석 3

위정범 한국경제연구원 1996 한국경제연구원 연구보고서 Vol.1996 No.12

Does National Culture Influence the Firm’s Choice of Debt Maturity?

위정범,장기영,이하진 한국증권학회 2012 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.41 No.4

Debt is an effective mechanism to mitigate agency costs in relieving manager–shareholder conflicts. Similarly, debt maturity choice allows the firm to discipline entrenched managers. In this paper we show cross-country evidence that national culture, along with corporate governance factors, influences the lender’s (or the borrower’s) debt maturity choice. Uncertainty avoidance index, masculinity, and long-term orientation indices are negatively related to overall debt maturity in a country. This implies that the risk-averse lenders offer (or, borrowing firms use) short-term debt when the surrounding economic environment becomes more uncertain and ambiguous. This is consistent with the extant literature that national culture plays a critical role in determining financing decisions in the presence of uncertainty and ambiguity. We argue that national culture is one of the last factors to influence the significant variation of debt maturities across firms in different countries. The relative effect of national culture and corporate governance on firms’ debt maturity selection depends on whether a country’s financial system is a bank-based economy (e.g. Japan and Germany) or a market-based economy (e.g. the US and the UK).

Pyramidal Structures and Competitive Strategies of Business Groups

위정범 한국증권학회 2011 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.40 No.6

A theoretical model is built to explore the organizational form of a diversified conglomerate, which depends on the competitive structure of the product market. The conglomerate may choose the form of either a business group, which consists of plural legally independent firms, or a multi-division firm. The analysis shows that, because of larger outside financing capacity, a business group generally needs less internal capital and invests more than a multidivision firm. However, the expanded outside financing of the business group might intensify competition and reduce the payoffs to both the conglomerate and a competing stand-alone firm. If the controlling shareholder can extract large private benefit, he or she is better off organizing as a business group than as a multi-division firm. If the controlling shareholder organizes as a business group, the value of the conglomerate increases. The value of the stand-alone rival to the business group is less than its value when it competes with a multidivision firm. With respect to strategic behavior, because of the controlling shareholder’s entrenchment, a business group is less sensitive than is a multi-division firm to the standalone rival firm’s action. The analysis provides a feasible explanation for why business groups prevail in the regions where capital is scarce and ⁄ or investor protection is poor. It is concluded that the choice of business organizational form of a diversified conglomerate depends on market size, the scarcity of capital and the agency problem.

Effect of Controlling Shareholder's Private Guarantee on Ownership Structure and Business Portfolio of Business Group

위정범 한국경영교육학회 2009 경영교육연구 Vol.58 No.-

This paper is the first to show the existence of equilibrium where the practice of private guarantee mitigate the incentive problem of the controlling shareholder, and to explain why such practice is viable in the financial market. In a business group, the controlling shareholder may have incentive to extract private benefit, due to the discrepancy of the cashflow rights and the control rights. However, such behavior increases his/her liability if the controlling shareholder provides private guarantee for the affiliated firm. Thus, the controlling shareholder may trade off their private benefit and liability. Also, the controlling shareholder has an increased need for risk management because he/she has expanded liability. This affects the operation of the business group. This paper explores how the ownership and business structures are chosen, depending on the extent of private benefit and guarantee. The ownership structure is represented by the cross-equity holdings. As for the business structure, this paper focuses on the correlation(diversification) of the business group's project portfolio. It implies that the agency problem of outside equity can be mitigated by providing the controlling shareholder with adequate incentives. It is not sufficient to either eliminate private benefit or impose direct regulation on cross-equity holdings. Rather, private benefit helps mitigate the agency problem because it facilitates the aligning of the controlling shareholder's interests with firm-value maximization. Additionally, it is necessary to expand the controlling shareholder's liability. The practice of private guarantee accomplishes this job. It is viable in the market because it not only protects the lenders but also benefits the controlling shareholder him/herself. This paper is the first to show the existence of equilibrium where the practice of private guarantee mitigate the incentive problem of the controlling shareholder, and to explain why such practice is viable in the financial market. In a business group, the controlling shareholder may have incentive to extract private benefit, due to the discrepancy of the cashflow rights and the control rights. However, such behavior increases his/her liability if the controlling shareholder provides private guarantee for the affiliated firm. Thus, the controlling shareholder may trade off their private benefit and liability. Also, the controlling shareholder has an increased need for risk management because he/she has expanded liability. This affects the operation of the business group. This paper explores how the ownership and business structures are chosen, depending on the extent of private benefit and guarantee. The ownership structure is represented by the cross-equity holdings. As for the business structure, this paper focuses on the correlation(diversification) of the business group's project portfolio. It implies that the agency problem of outside equity can be mitigated by providing the controlling shareholder with adequate incentives. It is not sufficient to either eliminate private benefit or impose direct regulation on cross-equity holdings. Rather, private benefit helps mitigate the agency problem because it facilitates the aligning of the controlling shareholder's interests with firm-value maximization. Additionally, it is necessary to expand the controlling shareholder's liability. The practice of private guarantee accomplishes this job. It is viable in the market because it not only protects the lenders but also benefits the controlling shareholder him/herself.

Pyramidal Structures and Competitive Strategies of Business Groups*

위정범 WILEY-BLACKWELL 2011 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.40 No.6

제1차 금융 구조조정의 평가와 향후과제

위정범 한국경제연구원 1999 한국경제연구원 연구보고서 Vol.1999 No.-

금융기관 · 기업 구조조정의 정책방향과 과제

위정범 한국경제연구원 1999 한국경제연구원 연구보고서 Vol.1999 No.-