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      • KCI등재

        현대사의 기점으로서의 러시아 혁명

        노경덕(盧璟德) 한국역사연구회 2020 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.115

        This paper is an academic attempt to set the starting point of contemporary history in the world. In defining the concept of contemporary history, the paper follows the position of Geoffrey Barraclough that it begins with the emergence of the institutions, systems and phenomena that have been making direct impacts on our present time. Based on the widely embraced notion that globalization and its challenge constitute the major contour of our era, the paper argues that they became world history phenomena after the Russian Revolution. The Revolution has generally not occupied such a crucial place in the modern historiography, as it has been treated not as a global but Russia’s event for a long time. However, the contemporaries like Lenin and other intellectuals, especially in the colonial world, had never failed to see the event as one with strong global implications. By revealing their views and perceptions of the Russian Revolution, this paper posits that the Revolution was made possible by their understanding of the global contradictions often called imperialism and spawned the world-wide anti-imperialist movements. Given that the present days are still defined by globalization and its challenges, the Russian Revolution marked the beginning of our time, that is, contemporary history.

      • KCI등재

        구식 냉전연구와 신식 냉전사 ―세르히 플로히의 『얄타』와 오드 아르네 베스타의 『냉전의 지구사』

        노경덕(Kyung Deok Roh) 역사비평사 2021 역사비평 Vol.- No.134

        This paper is a review essay on Serhii Plokhy’s Yalta and Odd Arne Westad’s Global Cold War, translated into Korean in 2020. These two books provide an useful opportunity to find out the continuities and discontinuities between old Cold War studies and new Cold War history. Plokhy’s Yalta largely stays within the boundary of the old scholarship in terms that it retains strong anti-Russian/Soviet sentiment, politicized agenda and narrowed focus on the Western-Soviet relations. On the other hand, Westad’s book is an excellent example displaying the strong points that new Cold War history could bring to academia: combination of the Cold War and decolonization, inclusion of the Third World as main players in the Cold War arena, sophisticated understanding of ideologies, and finally multilateral and complex representation of Cold War politics. However, Westad’s work still falls short of a top-notch Cold War history monograph because of its old political history methodology.

      • KCI등재

        서기국과 스탈린의 권력 장악 문제-비판적 재검토, 1922-1927-

        노경덕 ( Roh Kyung Deok ) 고려대학교 역사연구소(구 역사학연구회) 2017 사총 Vol.90 No.-

        많은 학자들은 1920년대 스탈린의 권력 장악 원인을 그의 직위, 즉 그가 소련 공산당 중앙위원회 서기국의 서기장이었다는 사실에서 찾으려 했다. 그들에 의하면, 스탈린은 당내 인사 문제를 관할하는 서기국을 1922년에 장악한 이후, 이 관료제 조직을 이용해 중앙과 지방 당 간부들에 대한 인적 정보를 손에 쥐었다. 이 정보를 통해 스탈린은 당 간부들, 특히 당 대회에서 투표권이 있었던 지방 당 서기들을 조종할 수 있었고, 그 결과 대회 현장에서 그들의 압도적 지지를 확보하며 권좌에 오를 수 있었다는 것이다. 동시대 스탈린의 정적들이 처음 제기했고, 그 후 일부 서양 학자들, 특히 다니엘스에 의해 정식화된 이 테제는 실상 몇 가지 현재까지도 실증적으로 검증되지 않은 전제들에 기초하고 있다. 첫째, 스탈린이 서기장이 된 후, 서기국은 스탈린의 개인적 목적, 즉 권력 투쟁에서의 승리를 위해 그 과제, 목표와 기능이 급격히 달라졌다. 둘째, 스탈린은 서기국 체제를 통해 지방의 상황 및 인적 정보를 정확히 파악할 수 있었다. 마지막으로, 이 정보를 기초로 스탈린은 당 간부들, 특히 지방당 서기들을 움직일 수 있었으며, 이것이 여의치 않을 때는 자기 사람들로 교체할 수 있었다. 러시아 문서고에 소장된 당 중앙위원회 문서들과 일부 간행 문서들을 분석한 본고는 스탈린이 서기장이 되던 1922년부터 그가 이른 바 통합반대파를 몰아냈던 시기인 1927년까지 서기국의 지방당 관료 통제 시도와 그 결과들을 추적한다. 본고는 이 과정에서 위의 전제들을 흔들만한 몇몇 사실을 발견했다. 일부 지방 당 서기들에 대한 숙청, 노멘클라투라 체제 설치, 지방 분쟁에 대한 직접적 개입, 그리고 지방 시찰단 파견 등의 스탈린이 추진했던 일련의 정책들은 그가 서기장에 취임하기 이전부터 대다수의 당 지도부가 서기국에 요구했던 바를 실천 했던 것에 불과했으며, 그가 서기국 조직을 자신의 권력투쟁에 이용했다는 증거는 발견되지 않는다. 더해서, 스탈린의 정책들은 중앙당에 의한 지방 당, 특히 당 서기 장악이라는 결과를 빚어내지 못했으며, 따라서 서기들은 특히 인사 문제에 관해서는 중앙에 대해 자율성을 견지할 수 있었다. 따라서 그들은 당 대회 등에서 스탈린을 지지해야 할 외압을 느낄 이유가 없었다. Many scholars have directly linked the rise of Stalin in Soviet high politics in the 1920s to the power of Secretariat in the Central Committee of the Communist Party where he became “General Secretary” in 1922. According to them, Stalin, as the chief of Secretariat, was able to use its bureaucratic organizations and functions to his advantage in the power struggle with his rivals. As Secretariat was a main organ to deal with the personnel matters of the party members, he had under his thumb many of them, especially, provincial party secretaries, who had the right to vote in major political meetings like Party Congress where Stalin`s opponents were defeated and his power was virtually ratified. Such thesis, firstly advanced by Stalin`s contemporary rivals and elaborated by Western scholars like R. Daniels and T. H. Rigby, has been relying on several unwarranted assumptions. First, it believes that Secretariat had been drastically changed after Stalin became General Secretary in terms of its tasks, objectives and functions. Second, Secretariat had precise and concrete information on regional situations and party personnel. Finally, Secretariat was capable to control regional party members based on the information and, if not, replace them with Stalin`s own people. This paper, based on unpublished Central Committee documents and other printed materials, tracks the policies that Stalin had pursued as General Secretary, namely, the partial purge of regional party secretaries, the installation of nomenklatura system, the direct intervention to regional squabbles, and the support for travelling inspectorates, and describes the results of those policies up to 1927 when he convincingly defeated the United Opposition. In doing so, the paper reveals critical findings: Stalin`s policies were just reactions to the general demands of the Bolshevik leaders at that time, and there is no evidence that Stalin used the apparatus of Secretariat for his own purpose in the power struggle; his policies had never made the situations where Stalin could control regional party members. Consequently, they remained “autonomous” from the center in the area of personnel matters, and felt no external pressure to support Stalin in party meetings at least until 1927.

      • KCI등재

        탈이념화된 기억

        노경덕(Kyung Deok Roh) 역사비평사 2018 역사비평 Vol.- No.122

        This paper examines how the centenary of the Russian Revolution was celebrated in Russia, the Western world and Korea during the year of 2017. Its main argument is that the way the revolution was remembered both in Russian and the West was “de-ideologized”. The ideological messages that the event had delivered to the world and humanity in 1917, namely, popular democracy, reform of capitalism and anti-imperialism, were largely forgotten. In Russia, the Russian Revolution was reconceptualized as one of domestic events in which Russian statehood was restored. Recent Western scholars, who found more diversities and complexities of the revolution than the previous ones, contributed to a “deconstruction” of the Russian Revolution and, consequently, paid little attention to its original messages. The case of Korea was a notable exception to such tendency. Thanks to Candle Revolution in late 2016 and early 2017, Korean intellectual circles rediscovered the messages of the Russian Revolution and were able to remember the event in terms of democracy and criticism against capitalism.

      • KCI등재
      • KCI등재

        냉전사와 소련 연구

        노경덕(Kyung Deok Roh) 역사비평사 2012 역사비평 Vol.- No.101

        This paper is an attempt to examine the current state of Cold War history field, focusing on the Soviet studies one. Three discernible tendencies are witnessed in the present Soviet Cold War historiography. The first is engaged in the old questions raised by the previous Cold War studies with new sources that have been declassified in the former Soviet archives for the last two decades. While it reveals some hidden stories of the Soviet foreign policy, it is still far from resolving the old controversy between the Orthodox scholars and Revisionists. Second, the Soviet Cold War historiography pays an attention to the relations between the Soviet Union and the Third World countries. Understanding the Cold War not just as two superpowers’ military and diplomatic rivalry but as multi-polar relations in the world, it shows the constructive roles of the Third World countries in forging the Soviet-Third World relations and, ultimately, the “global Cold War.” The final tendency takes a cultural approach and explores the cultural Cold War phenomena, including Soviet-American rivalry in the arena of mass and high culture, Soviet reactions to American and Western cultural impacts on the Soviet society, and cultural Sovietization of Eastern Europe.

      • KCI등재

        스탈린 외교를 바라보는 한 시각, 1927~1953

        노경덕(Kyung Deok Roh) 역사비평사 2017 역사비평 Vol.- No.121

        Stalin’s diplomacy has been often associated with its aggressiveness and expansionism. However, the main goal of his diplomacy was just the survival of the Soviet Union in their imagined hostile international atmosphere. Most of his actual policies throughout his era can be characterized as defensive and cautious. Stalin had been quite open to negotiations with, and willing to make concessions to, his enemies like Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and later Truman’s America, if he thought that those could contribute to the survival of his country. Sometimes Stalin and other Soviet policy-makers made some adventurous moves in the arena of international relations like the occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939, the partial provocations in Iran and Turkey in 1946, and the support of North Korean leaders’ plan to invade the South in 1950. However, when those turned out to be unfavorable to the Soviet interest and become a security threat factor, he immediately backed off and chose for the minimal gains. Such defensive diplomacy had its origins in the time of Lenin who set the survival of Soviet state as the top priority of the international socialist movement over any others.

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