НЭП기 소련의 농민경제와 콘드라티예프의 친(親)농민적 경제발전계획론

한정숙 서울대학교러시아연구소 1992 러시아연구 Vol.1 No.-

Among the economists rehabilitated in July, 1987 was Nicholas Kondrat'ev, known in the West for his theory of the long wave cycle of capitalism but branded in his country since his trial and execution in 1930 as an enemy of the people who had tried to revive capitalism. He is not only cleared of these charges but is becoming a new focus of attention the man whose theory of economic development based on the strengthening of the peasant economy offered a viable alternative to Stalinism. Kondrat'ev's theory of economic development differed from the Stalinist main line on two main points. He argued that socialism could not be built and world revolution could not succeed without paying careful attention to the long wave, as well as the short-range, cycles of capitalism and that Russia as a country which successfully accomplished anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution without a highly developed capitalism had to strengthen its agricultural economy as prerequisite to successful industrialization. Whether Kondrat'ev's alternative would have worked better than Stalin's is a question which cannot be answered simply. Kondrat'ev's insistence on reliance on market mechanism and production incentive to the peasants may not have resulted in any noticeable increase in the income from agricultural exports since the price drop had little to do without policy-making in the Soviet Union. It might have exacerbated the problem of social differentiation in the villages and economic disparity between the city and countryside. On the other hand, the worst consequences of the Stalinist policy of forced collectivization, destruction of agriculture and bureaucratic bulldozing of the peasant life could have been avoided. The purging of the Bolshevik right and Kondrat'ev school meant the end to open-mined search for better road to socialism.

콘스탄틴 레온티예프와 불가리아 교회 독립문제

한정숙 서울대학교 러시아연구소 2001 러시아연구 Vol.11 No.2

Not much has been settled about Konstantin Leont'ev(1831-1891), but he has indeed a unique place n the history of Russian thoughts. He is one of the most popular pre-revolutionary thinkers in post-Soviet Russia trying to come in terms with its own historical development. This article focuses on Leont'ev's critique on the independence of the Bulgarian church during the high tide of Russian Pan-Slavism (1870's), linking it with his critique of nationalism. Leont'ev was deeply convinced of the originality of Russian culture, based on the so-called "Byzantinism". In his typology, the most important criterion of cultural affinities was religion. He was skeptical about the political Pan-Slavism which he thought was senseless without cultural solidarity among the Slav nations. Moreover, as a conservative and reactionary thinker, he was against the progressive and revolutionary character of nationalism. Thus, he was critical of endeavors to obtain national independence or unification. The Bulgarian nation, which was subjected to the Ottoman sultan since 1393, had in his view no specifically Slavic characteristics. When the Bulgarian people insisted on a separatioin from the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople which led to the establishment of their own national autocephalous church-which they had had before the Ottoman rule-and when it caused conflicts among Greeks and Bulgarians, Leont'ev furiously criticized the latter. He declared that the ecumenical() Orthodox Church doesn't have any national characteristics, may it be Greeks or Bulgarian, and that the Bulgarians established their national church only for political aims. He sympathized with the Greeks, though the Bulgarians expected support from Russia, their "elder Slavic brother". Leont'ev eagerly assured the Greeks that Russia won't take side with the Buylgarians. Such attitude is to be understood in the light of Leont'ev's conception of the Orthodox bloc-the solidarity of eastern Orthodox peoples against western culture. He thought that the Orthodox bloc should by no means exclude the Greeks. His suggestion to his Russian compatriots to seizure Constantinople (Istanbul) was also a part of the anti-western strategy. He objected to the nationalist position of the Bulgarian people because it undermined the prospect of solidarity among the Orthodox peoples. Leon'tev's critique of the independence of the Bulgarian church did not change even after this nation was liberated from the Ottoman rule. As for him, the Bulgarian culture did not evince cultural uniqueness in spite of its political autonomy. Leont'ev was in this sense not a Pan-Slavist, but a sort of Pan-Orthodoxy protagonist. But was Leont'ev, a loyal subject of the Russian tsar, not too arrogant in that he brushed of the cultural potentials of a lesser nation which can mature and flower only in favorable conditions?

블라지미르 솔로비요프의 아시아 문명론 : A Theory of Clash of Civilizations at the End of the 19th Century? 19세기 말의 문명충돌론 ?

한정숙 서울대학교 러시아연구소 2000 러시아연구 Vol.10 No.1

Vladimir Sergeevich Solov'ev(1853-1900) is one of the most celebrated Russian philosophers in the prerevolutionary era. From the outset of the Perestroika, Russian intellectuals have been trying to find out a new source of identity for the Russian people, who feel embarrassed in the ideològical vacuum. Many tend to put forth the so-called "Russian idea" as a new mental guideline for the russians. In this context Solov'ev is regarded as one of those thinkers, that articulated the essence of the "Russian idea" in cogent and lucid terms. Further in this trend of reinstation. not a few Western students have joined, appreciating Solov'ev's will to overcome the narrowness of mental horizon of his contemporary Russian intellectuals who adhered to the too specifically Russian situation. In this paper I tried to analyse Solov'ev's view on Eastern civilizations. In a word, his estimation of Eastern civilizations was indissolubly tied with a Chiristianity-centrism, on which his whole system was based on. According to him, only Christianity can have a claim to the absolute and whole truth; other relitions or Weltanschauungs merely speak for a relative truth. In the same vein, he maintained that all the Christian churches and societies should be (re)united. In fact, he was a trailblazer to launch the grand project of building the Christian United States of Europe, transcending the boundary of Russia. My thesis is thus provoked by the question "But what about other civilizations?" As a whole his evaluation of non-Christian civilizations was negative and sometimes even extremely hostile to them. In his article <Three Forces>(1877), written during the period of the Russian Turkish War, Solov'ev criticized the Islamic world as a civilization devoid of any vital forces. According to him this society lacked any capacity to change and develop inself. Judged from his remarks in this article only, one can fairly say that his attitude approximates that of Panslavists. During the 80's of the nineteenth century however he underwent a radical change and turned an ardent critic of Russian nationalism and Panslavism, shaking off the obsolete legacy of his Panslavism. His criticism of Islam was gradually toned down. At this juncture, one should never fail to notice the rhetorical aspect of his transformation. In other words, he vehemently criticized Slavic- and orthodoxy-centrism of the Panslavists only to bring into relief the necessity to unite all the Christian worlds. Vis-a-vis East-Asian civilizations his panic-like fear always seemed to linger over his consciousness to his deathbed. He evaluated the Chinese civilization most severely. Solov'ev regarded china as an archconservative society. Confucianism and ancestor worship were considered to be the main hindrances to social changes and progress. China was in his opinion a past-oriented society, which is very stable but cannot make progress for itself. For Solov'ev Lao-tse was the only Chinese thinker, who was able to think metaphysically, namely beyond the narrow limin of specifically chinese mentality even with his lack of originality and limitation of progressive spirit. Both confucius and Lao-tse were no more than the preachers of the ideology of stagnation. In this view, China was a country that remained ungraspable and thus fearful to this Russian philospher. As regards the Japanese civilization, Solov'ev had at first more favorable attitude to is compared with to the Chinese. Japanese people were approved as a historical and progressive nation. He expected that this nation would become a Christian one, on friendly terms with European countries. This expectation was probably associated with the fact that Japan had opened door to Western powers and pursed a policy of Westernization in her early phase of modernization. But during his last years Solov'ev expressed only fear to all the East-Asian nations. In his imagination the object of this fear had materialized in the guise of Panmongolism. It was a variant of the discourse about the so-called "Gelbe Gefahr". According to him. the danger of the Panmongolism had two dimensions. The one was related with international power politics or military aspect and the other with weltanschauung. In a curious work under the long title <Three Conversations on War, Progress and the End of the World History. Attached with a Short Story about Anti-Christ>(1900), Solov'ev expressed this fear without any hesitation. In this work he predicted that all the Asian countries would be politically united under the leadership of Japan and invade and conquer the whole European, say the Christian world. The Asians with yellow skin are depicted as military invaders, as another Tartars-Destroyers; ultimately Anti-Christ would appear and reign the world. In accordance with the apocalypstic scenario, Christians however would eventually overcome all the problems related with Anti-Christ and be united at the final round, in which the Asians would play no constructive rold. Psychologically, Solov'ev had a great fear of the ever-widening influence of Buddhism and the so-called Neo-Buddhism gaining its forces across Russia and Western European countries. <Three Conversations> reached the pinnacle of his aggressive christianity-centrism. Obviously Solov'ev had no insight into the pains of the Asian people who suffered under the invasions of the Western imperialistic powers. He could not even understand the genuine cause behind the murder case of von Ketteler, the then German ambassador in Peking. Solov'ev only thought that the Boxers were barbarous and savage killers, who would with their Panmongolistic violence precipitate the end of the world. He could not understand the anti-imperialistic aspiration of these Chinese fighters. Despite his severe criticism of imperialism, this theoretical consideration did not have any real substance with regard to concrete events. His view on the Asian civilizations thus constitutes in itself a variant of(disguised) imperialistic discourse, which he might never have dreamt of. The story of Panmongolism inevitably reminds us of Samuel Huntington's theory of the clas of civilizations. At the similar situation of finde-siecle, both Christian theorists warned against the hostilities and invasions of the non-Christian civilizations. One at the end of the 19th century, and the other at the end of the 20th century. Is it only a coincidence? Would the clash of religions really come true? I think that in both cases the discourses on the hostilities of non-Christian worlds to the Christian are nothing more than the wish fulfillment of the Western intellectuals to defend their vested interests in the international politics. It only functions as an offense in disguise, regardless of the initial or naive intention of their authors. Initiators and supporters of the new Solov'ev-Renaissance should not ignore this vital but hidden agenda of these discourses.

인문학 및 사회과학 학술지를 통해본 체제전환기 러시아 인문학·사회과학의 동향 : 1985-2000년대 초

한정숙,박원용,최우익 서울대학교러시아연구소 2002 러시아연구 Vol.12 No.2

This article is a parallel analysis to the database of seven sorts of Russian academic journals for the period of the transformation (from 1985 to the early 2000s.) The database was made by authors of this paper with the aim to offer an easy way to search the title, author and subject of writings (articles, translations, reminiscences, round table talks and dialogues) published in the fields of philosophy, history, politics, sociology and economics. This work gave us the chance to overview the study trends of humanities and social sciences in Russia by examining the changing subjects, theoretical premises and methodological approaches of the intellectuals productions published in the journals. Authors chose the above ` mentioned five academic disciplines as our study object because these are considered (so to say, as ideology-related disciplines) to have experienced the most remarkable transformation since the beginning of Gorbachev's policy of Perestroika and Glasnost. During the Soviet Period, studies and publications in these fields were under strong influence of the official ideology of the Communist Party, which always tried not to lose tight control of intellectual activities in almost all aspects. The gradual manifestation of arguments not subjected to the party line was possible since the middle of the 1980s, when Gorbachev's "reform of socialism" policy allowed critical approach to Stalinist legacy of the Soviet regime and search for alternatives to the existing economic and social (later, also political) system. Though each discipline differs in the degree and depth of change, authors of this paper are of the opinion that a remarkable process of transformation can be found in all the concerned fields especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The period of Perestroika was more devoted to self-criticism and search of alternative within the frame of socialist legacy. In general it was a time of a rather moderate iconoclasm. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the genuine intellectual transformation began. All possible arguments emerged, but the construction of a new intellectual frame of reference for the Russians was not easy. In the early period of rapid system transformation, Russian scholars were rather hastily importing methodologies and perspectives of western scholars and tried to use them as tools for analysing circumstances of their own country as well as of the entire world. On the opposite side of the Westphilism one could also find a rather extreme trend of Russian nationalism (or neo-Slavophilism). It seemed that the Russian intellectuals wanted to compensate intellectual losses caused in the past by the Party control through absorbing every possible argument that stands outside of traditional Soviet intellectual horizon. This phenomenon was in itself understandable enough, but the whole sight of discourses was rather unclear and somewhat confusing too. It was a period of "search of exit in every direction". In recent years however, observers can ascertain a much stabler atmosphere among the Russian researchers in every academic discipline concerned. Authors of this paper share the view that Russian scholars and intellectuals are overcoming their once apparent extremism - whether in the direction to Westphilism or to nationalism. Open-minded to international scholarship and discussion, they are at the same time more self-confident than during the first half of the 1990s. One can hope that it would lead to intellectual works more productive and persuading for the Russians as well as for the entire world.

Between East Asia and Russia: Il`ya Levitov`s Conception of “Yellow Russia” (Zheltaya Rossiya) at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

( Jeong Sook Hahn ) 한국외국어대학교 러시아연구소 2015 슬라브연구 Vol.31 No.4

Il`ya Levitov(1850~1918) was a Russian ethnographer and East Asia specialist. He wrote pamphlets with the titles Yellow Race, Yellow Russia, Yellow Bosporus and Yellow Russia as a Buffer Colony. ‘Yellow’ refers to the skin color of East Asian peoples. Levitov watched in Eastern Siberia (the regions of the Amur Basin and Ussuri Basin) countless Chinese workers immigrating since 1896-97, after the construction of the East Chinese Railroad as the extension of Trans-Siberian Railroad. For Levitov they were excellent labor force demanding low wages, and thus a threat to Russian workers. The great tide of East Asians seemed to be yellow peril. Wanting to use the cheap labor force of East Asians but to prevent their influence on European Russians, he proposed to divide Siberia along natural borderlines. The Eastern Siberia from Ussuri Region to the Lake Baikal would become Yellow Russia, a Free Economic Zone using the labor force of East Asians. Instead their immigration into the regions west of Baikal would be blocked up. After the Russo-Japanese War, Levitov developed the idea of ‘Yellow Russia as a buffer zone’ including Manchuria to restraint the attack of the yellow people against Russia. He thought that Yellow Russia would serve Russian imperialist, racist and industrialist dreams at the same time.

내전기 러시아 농촌주민의 정치적 동향(1918~1920) : 중부 흑토대 보로네슈 주와 땀보프 주를 중심으로

韓貞淑(Hahn Jeong-Sook) 역사교육연구회 2000 역사교육 Vol.74 No.-

The purpose of this article is to illuminate political attitude of the Russian rural population during the Civil War, with special focus on two cases of the provinces of the Central Black Earth Zone - Voronezh Province and Tambov Province. Traditionally, Soviet historians emphasized the friendly attitude of peasants (excluding the so-called Kulaki) towards the Soviet government during the Civil War and maintained that such a harmonious relationship between both sides contributed to the victory of the Red Army in the Civil War. But new source materials from Soviet archives available only after the Perestroika prove that relationships between peasants and the Soviet government were not so clear and simple. These materials rather testify to the fact that besides the Red-White Civil War there was also the Red-Green Civil War, namely, the civil war between peasants and the supporters of the Soviet government. Great tumults among rural population, instigated by the fierce struggle between two parties concerned in the Red-White Civil War, developed into a rebellious attitude toward the Soviet government to reach its pinnacle at the end of the War. It was no exception in the Central Black Earth Zone. After the October Revolution the population of the two provinces accepted the Soviet Power without great resistance; thanks to the policy of the socialization of the land by the Bolsheviks both sides maintained friendly relationships for a while. However, the Red-White Civil War and the War Communism changed political attitude of the population gradually. Living standard of the population declined. The policy of food monopoly on the part of the Bolshevik regime aggravated by scarcity of daily necessaries made life unbearable. Members of non-Bolshevik political parties such as the Socialist Revolutionary Party and clericals of the Russian Orthodox Church resisted the Bolshevik regime while drawing supports from ordinary people in the countryside as well as the rank and file of the White Guards. The magnitude and potential power of their resistance in the countryside were not however threatening enough to undermine the regime. Cossacks in areas adjacent to Voronezh Province, on the other hand, revolted against the Bolshevik government many times after the October Revolution, most population of Voronezh, however, did not join the causes of the Cossacks. What was really at stake was the revolts of peasants themselves, which surfaced as early as in the second half of 1918 and became more vehement in the provinces of the Central Black Earth Zone during the first half of 1919. Mass desertion of soldiers from the Red Army and revolts of those deserters in its wake indicated only one of those miltifaceted aspects of the peasant revolt. Their revolt has something to do with their origin. In other words, they were willing to join the revolt, since many of the Red Army soldiers, recruited from the peasant class, could not but feel angered at the harsh reality of their households in distress. Scale and scope of the Green movement grew more and more extensive. Particularly, Voronezh and Tambov became famous as the hottest battlefields where the peasants and deserters fought fierce battles against the Soviet government during the tumultuous period. In this phase, it was obvious that the rebels were not sympathized with the causes of the Communist Party. On the strength of the rebellious sentiment shared among the peasant class, the peasant war culminated in the battle waged and led by Antonov in Tambov. Peasants did not revolt against the Bolsheviks-Communists in support of the White Army. Nor did they revolt in the name of a specific ideology as urban intellectuals would have readily imposed upon them. Least of all were most participants of the Green movement the so-called Kulaki. Scarcity of food and necessary goods drove ordinary peasants to the way of revolt and let them grab their prim

알렉산드르 차야노프의 농민경제론과 농민협동조합론

한정숙 ( Jeong Sook Hahn ) 한국서양사학회 1995 西洋史論 Vol.47 No.1

체르노빌 원전 사고

한정숙(Hahn, Jeong Sook) 역사비평사 2013 역사비평 Vol.- No.103

This paper surveys the Chernobyl nuclear accident on 26^th April 1986, and reconsiders the effect and impact of the catastrophe. It examines in turn the conceptof “peaceful uses of atomic energy” which has served as the theoretical backbone for the construction of nuclear power plants during the Cold War period, transformations of Soviet energy policy, nuclear accidents in the Soviet Union before Chernobyl, the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, its victims and destruction of nature, governmental management of the crisis and the lessons learned. During the 1960’s~70’s, the Soviet Union, one of the leaders in the development of atomic power, was forced to reexamine its energy policy that was on traditional energy resources such as gas and coal and began an intense program of nuclear power plant construction. Though some nuclear accidents occurred, these did not deter the Soviet government from continuing to promote its message of safe nuclear energy. In Ukraine, where nuclear power plants were particularly abundant, the Chernobyl tragedy happened with the most appalling psychological affects on humans and the environment. As to the causes of the Chernobyl accident, the explanation stressing the errors and mistakes of the power plant operators contrasted with the view that put the main blame on deficiencies on the construction design of the reactor. When one considered the tremendous destruction of life and environment that was caused by human carelessness, errors and mistakes, one is forced to conclude that nuclear power is not astable energy-producing option. The Soviet government was severely criticized for its incompetence and mismanagement in the Chernobyl catastrophe. Some people believed that such a disaster could only have happened under a rigid political system such as the Soviet Union. However, the crisis management of the Japanese government after the Fukusima nuclear accident of 2011 was no more reliable and trustworthy. That being said, the danger of nuclear power is not related with the type of political system is. The study of Chernobyl must not be the ‘chronicle of the future’, as the subtitle of a book by SvetlanaAleksievich about Chernobyl’s victims is called.

농노제폐지후 (農奴制廢止後) 러시아에 있어서 농민차지의 (農民借地) 성격

한정숙 ( Jeong Sook Hahn ) 한국서양사학회 1983 西洋史論 Vol.24 No.1

아버지와 아들, 아들과 아들 -1860년대 러시아의 세대 갈등과 세대 내 갈등

한정숙 ( Jeong Sook Hahn ) 서울대학교 인문학연구원 2007 人文論叢 Vol.58 No.-