이행기 러시아에서의 민족주의의 정치적 역할: 도구주의적 시각에서 그 이념적,실천적 기능을 중심으로

장세호 ( Se Ho Jang ) 한국외국어대학교 러시아연구소 2010 슬라브연구 Vol.26 No.1

바이오디젤 사용과 연료분사시기 변화에 따른 DI 디젤기관 성능 특성(Ⅱ)

장세호(Se-Ho Jang) 한국동력기계공학회 2013 동력시스템공학회지 Vol.17 No.6

푸틴 3기 내각·대통령행정실 인적 구성의 특징과 함의

장세호(JANG SE HO) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2013 슬라브학보 Vol.28 No.4

This paper analyses the features, social backgrounds, and implications in the formation of the executive elite of Putin’s 3 term. This study takes two analytical strategies, based on the positional method. First, Author comprehensively tries to analyze the process of formation and replacement of high-level officials in the Cabinet and the Presidential Executive Office, focusing on the comparison with previous organs of the Executive power. Second, Author tries to analyze their social backgrounds, setting the sex, age, scholastic achievement, career, birthplace as variables. Analytical results show that the rate of men, people from moscow and Central Federal district, Ph.D holders, social science majors, and the rate of entrepreneurs, professors, politicians were relatively high. And It was characteristic that the Cabinet filled by young officials, comparing to the Presidential Executive Office. In this article, Author evaluates the establishment of system with Putin’s close confidants, the formation of balanced, professional, practical Cabinet, the combination of strong Presidential Executive Office and working-level Cabinet as key features and implications in the high-level officials appointments. At last, It is argued that a crack in the control-mechanism of russian political elite, an absence of long term strategy in personnel appointments, a weak basis of human resources, weakened position of Medvedev as important features and implications in the process of some government officials replacement.

체제전환기 러시아연방공산당의 정치적 위상 변화에 대한 소고: 민족주의 담론을 중심으로

장세호 ( Se Ho Jang ) 朝鮮大學校 統一問題硏究所 2011 統一 問題 硏究 Vol.26 No.2

소련 붕괴 후 신생 러시아 사회 내에 만연한 전체주의적 중앙집권체제에 대한 병적인 거부 환경 속에서도, 소련의 전형적 당-국가 체제에서 중핵적 위치를 차지했던 ‘소련공산당(КПСС)’의 후신인 ‘러시아연방공산당(КПРФ)’은 여전히 자신의 질긴 생명력을 증명하고 있다. 본 논문은 “무엇이 러시아연방공산당의 조직적 생존과 대중적 지지의 유지를 가능케 했는가?”, 그리고 “현재 이들이 향유하고 있는 정치적 위상은 지속 가능한 것인가?”에 대한 문제의식의 해결을 목적으로 한다. 1993년부터 2007년까지 신생 러시아 내에서의 선거과정 분석을 통해, 90년대 중반 공산당의 화려한 재기는 무엇보다 ‘공산애국주의(коммунопатриотизм)’로 대변되는 러시아 좌익진영의 민족주의에 바탕을 둔 우향(右向) 기동에서 그 주요 원인을 찾을 수 있겠다. 그리고 2000년대 초반 공산당의 급속한 지지율 저하는, 민족주의 담론의 활용에 상대적으로 소극적이던 집권세력이 푸틴의 등장 이후 적극적으로 자신의 통치담론으로 민족·애국주의를 편입시킴으로써 발생한 민족주의 담론 경쟁의 패배에서 비롯된 것이라 할 수 있다. 탈소비에트 러시아 정치공간 내에서 유일한 실질 야당으로 존재하는 러시아연방공산당은 자신의 생존과 영향력 증대를 위해 당분간 민족주의적 프로그램을 유지하면서도, 본연의 사회주의적 가치를 강화하는 방향으로 나아갈 것으로 보인다. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a feeling of denial in regards to the totalitarian centralized system in Russian society. Yet the Communist party of the Russian Federation(CPRF), the successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU) that had occupied the key position in the Soviet party-state system, still has proved themselves capable of competing with other larger parties. In this paper, following questions will be addressed. What makes the Russian Federation Communist Party`s organizational survival and popular support? Additionally, is their current political status sustainable? Through an analysis of the 1993 to 2007 electoral process, the Communist party`s spectacular resurgence in the mid-90s can be explained by the right turn of Russian leftists based on ``communo-patriotism``. However Putin`s advent, the ruling elite, who had been relatively passive to take advantage of some nationalist discourses, positively included nationalism to their governance discourse. The rapid decrease of the Communist party in the early 2000s was derived from their defeat in the nationalist discourse competition with the ruling elite. The Communist party of the Russian Federation has existed as an real opposition party in post-Soviet political system of Russia. In order to survive and build their political influence, the Communist party of the Russian Federation will not only keep a nationalist program, but also reinforce various traditional socialist values.

2008~2014년 러시아 선거제도 변화 연구

장세호(JANG SE HO) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2014 슬라브학보 Vol.29 No.3

The purpose of this study is to examine main contents of the change of Russian electoral system in 2008-2014, to analyze major causes which led to this change. At this time Russian electoral system has experienced legal changes of Constitution, the law on elections, and the law on political parties in 7 times. Main results of analysis are as follows. First, the most important cause of the institutional reform in this period is the change of voters political preference. Second, the internal and external pressure for deepening democracy is another major cause, and has used as a good reason for the institutional change. Third, the current ruling class of Russia strategically has considered above two factors and has determined the rage of reform in the existing incentive structure. Forth, the process of the institutional change has been implemented through the hegemonic form in which the current ruling class"s strategic intention can be accepted one-sidedly.

러시아 지방선거의 운영 메커니즘과 정치적 함의

장세호(JANG SE HO) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2013 슬라브학보 Vol.28 No.2

This study analyses the dynamics and operating mechanism in russian regional elections and at the same time derives political implications in cases of 2011-2012. The mechanism of russian regional elections can be defined as ‘a system of limited party competition’ established in Putin"s 1-2 terms. In this article the author argues that while regional elections in March 2011 are the case with a crisis signal of russian ‘managed democracy,’ regional elections in October 2012 are the case with a maximization of operating the mechanism mentioned earlier. In addition, two elections give some important political implications in the policy directions of the new government, the limits of partial institution reform in the period of Medvedev, and the future political prospects.

1992~2012년 러시아 정부조직 변화 연구

장세호(JANG SE HO) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2014 슬라브학보 Vol.29 No.4

This study analyses the aspect of government organization changes and its principal factors in post-soviet Russia with diachronic and synchronic viewpoints. Government organization changes in post-soviet Russia occurred quite frequently and the width of changes were comparatively greater. Above all, these results were caused by difficulties of the “dual transition” and the absence of democratic administrative institutions in Russia. In this paper the author argues that these changes are results of the complex interaction of some principal factors such as chaotic economic conditions of the 1990s, the political system of the “super-presidentialism”, the administrative system, which easily allows changes of government organization, and leadership influences under powerful presidents. In the synchronic viewpoint, changes of current government organization are as follows: ① the ministries extension from 18 to 21, ② the partition of the Ministry of health & social development to the Ministry of public health, and the Ministry of labour & social protection, ③ the change of the Ministry of sports, tourism & youth policy to the Ministry of sports, ④ new establishment of Ministry without portfolio, which is responsible for the “open-government” project, ⑤ new establishment of the Ministry of development of the far East. These features show some important implications in policy directions of new russian government.

2010년대 이후 한러관계 평가와 한국 신정부의 러시아발 리스크 대응 전략

장세호 ( Se Ho Jang ) 조선대학교 동북아연구소 2023 동북아연구 Vol.38 No.1

본 연구는 2010년대 이후 한러관계의 주요 성과와 한계를 포괄적으로 살펴본다. 또한 현 시기 러시아로부터 제기되고 있는 다양한 리스크를 도출하고, 이에 대한 대응 전략을 제시한다. 2010년대 이후 한국과 러시아는 상호 전략적 이해와 지향의 수렴을 추구하면서 관계 발전의 동력을 마련했다. 그 과정에서 양국 간 정상회담과 정부, 민관, 민간 차원의 정례·수시 교류, 비자면제협정의 체결 등이 양자관계의 진전을 촉진한 주요 요인으로 기능했다. 그러나 한러관계는 국제·지역질서의 변화와 관련된 외부 요인으로 말미암아 정체·퇴행의 순간을 마주할 수밖에 없었다. 무엇보다 미중전략경쟁의 심화와 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 발발 등의 국제·지역 현안이 양자관계에 여러 리스크를 초래하고 있다. 이에 대응하기 위해 한국은 다음의 몇 가지 사항을 고려할 필요가 있다. 첫째, 글로벌 중추국가 비전의 실현을 위해 한러관계를 안정적으로 관리해야 한다. 둘째, 러시아의 과도한 대북 경사를 방지해야 한다. 셋째, 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁에 대한 균형적 대응정책을 마련해야 한다. 넷째, 양국 간 경제·통상 협력의 회복과 복원을 위한 계기를 창출해야 한다. 다섯째, 양국 간 공식적·비공식적 소통을 지속해야 한다. This study comprehensively examines the main achievements and limitations of the Korea-Russia relationship since the 2010s. It also derives various risks posed by Russia at this time and presents countermeasures. Since the 2010s, Korea and Russia have been seeking the convergence of mutual strategic interests and orientations, providing a driving force for the development of relations. In the process, the summit between the two countries, regular and occasional exchanges at the government, public-private and private levels, and the conclusion of visa waiver agreements served as major factors that promoted the progress of bilateral relations. However, Korea-Russia relations had to face a moment of stagnation and regression due to external factors related to changes in the international and regional order. Above all, international and regional issues, such as the intensification of the US-China strategic competition and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, pose a number of risks to bilateral relations. To respond to this, Korea needs to consider the following points. First, Korea-Russia relations must be managed stably in order to realize the vision of a Korea's “global pivotal state.” Second, Russia's excessive inclination toward North Korea must be prevented. Third, a balanced policy should be prepared on the Russia-Ukraine war. Fourth, it is necessary to create an opportunity for the recovery and restoration of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries. Fifth, formal and informal communication between the two countries should be continued.

러시아 민주주의의 퇴행 극복 가능성에 대한 일고찰

장세호 ( Se Ho Jang ) 서울대학교 러시아연구소 2012 러시아연구 Vol.22 No.1

Discussion on ``crisis of Russian democracy`` which has remained controversial from the establishment of Putin government in 2000 until nowadays has converged into the agreement that Russian democracy has not made a progress but rather went backward or remained stagnant at best. Having stated Putin`s victory to be certain, this paper has analysed and made prospect on Russian`s democracy under Putin`s 3rd term from democratic consolidation perspective. As a result there has been a significant change in political perception and value attitude of Russian public and elite groups. From the public level, a rising discontent with the current governing powers and perceptional change in non-competitive political system were most outstanding. From the elite level, an internal division of governing elite groups was marked as a significant change following differing views with regard to political reformation after the dispute over national development line which was provoked by 2008 global economic crisis. Also, attitudinal change of elite groups was confirmed by the reports made by Russian think tanks in great importance. By analysing Putin`s 3rd term power structure, a clue for the prospect of Russian democracy in attitudinal and behavioral level could be found. Institutional effect, in terms of an alleviation of power concentration phenomenon and actor`s attitudinal change in democracy, was expected with the rising possibility for diarchy to last. Rather, it is expected that directivity of ``improvement`` and ``deepening`` in Russian democracy shown from Medvedev`s transitional government will persist in next government. For the time being the question at issue in Russian democratic consolidation will be ``degree`` and ``depth`` in terms of ``improvement`` and ``deepening``.

체제전환기 러시아연방공산당의 정치적 위상 변화에 대한 소고: 민족주의 담론을 중심으로

장세호 ( Se Ho Jang ) 조선대학교 동북아연구소(구 통일문제연구소) 2011 동북아연구 Vol.26 No.2

소련 붕괴 후 신생 러시아 사회 내에 만연한 전체주의적 중앙집권체제에 대한 병적인 거부 환경 속에서도, 소련의 전형적 당-국가 체제에서 중핵적 위치를 차지했던 ‘소련공산당(КПСС)’의 후신인 ‘러시아연방공산당(КПРФ)’은 여전히 자신의 질긴 생명력을 증명하고 있다. 본 논문은 “무엇이 러시아연방공산당의 조직적 생존과 대중적 지지의 유지를 가능케 했는가?”, 그리고 “현재 이들이 향유하고 있는 정치적 위상은 지속 가능한 것인가?”에 대한 문제의식의 해결을 목적으로 한다. 1993년부터 2007년까지 신생 러시아 내에서의 선거과정 분석을 통해, 90년대 중반 공산당의 화려한 재기는 무엇보다 ‘공산애국주의(коммунопатриотизм)’로 대변되는 러시아 좌익진영의 민족주의에 바탕을 둔 우향(右向) 기동에서 그 주요 원인을 찾을 수 있겠다. 그리고 2000년대 초반 공산당의 급속한 지지율 저하는, 민족주의 담론의 활용에 상대적으로 소극적이던 집권세력이 푸틴의 등장 이후 적극적으로 자신의 통치담론으로 민족·애국주의를 편입시킴으로써 발생한 민족주의 담론 경쟁의 패배에서 비롯된 것이라 할 수 있다. 탈소비에트 러시아 정치공간 내에서 유일한 실질 야당으로 존재하는 러시아연방공산당은 자신의 생존과 영향력 증대를 위해 당분간 민족주의적 프로그램을 유지하면서도, 본연의 사회주의적 가치를 강화하는 방향으로 나아갈 것으로 보인다. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a feeling of denial in regards to the totalitarian centralized system in Russian society. Yet the Communist party of the Russian Federation(CPRF), the successor of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU) that had occupied the key position in the Soviet party-state system, still has proved themselves capable of competing with other larger parties. In this paper, following questions will be addressed. What makes the Russian Federation Communist Party`s organizational survival and popular support? Additionally, is their current political status sustainable? Through an analysis of the 1993 to 2007 electoral process, the Communist party`s spectacular resurgence in the mid-90s can be explained by the right turn of Russian leftists based on ``communo-patriotism``. However Putin`s advent, the ruling elite, who had been relatively passive to take advantage of some nationalist discourses, positively included nationalism to their governance discourse. The rapid decrease of the Communist party in the early 2000s was derived from their defeat in the nationalist discourse competition with the ruling elite. The Communist party of the Russian Federation has existed as an real opposition party in post-Soviet political system of Russia. In order to survive and build their political influence, the Communist party of the Russian Federation will not only keep a nationalist program, but also reinforce various traditional socialist values.