http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.
변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.
無存在(to me on) 개념과 道德的 自我의 存在性문제 : 플라톤의 Euthydemus 283b-d에 대한 하나의 해석
梁承兌 이화여자대학교 한국문화연구원 1993 韓國文化硏究院 論叢 Vol.63 No.2-3
As a literary work, Platos Euthyedemus has long been the object of admirations for its brilliance and ingenuity in the use of comic satire, irony and humor. As a philosophical work, however, it may also be one of the most neglected dialogues of Plato of which the small interpretive essay starts from the conviction that, despite its apparent touch of light-heartedness, it is a dialogue which is full of philosophical implications covering probably Platos philosophy as a whole and therefore deserves serious philosophical as well as literary treatments. In this sense, this essay is basically in line with the efforts of Sprague, one of the few Platonic scholars who saw in Euthyedemus the germ of, or the clues to the understanding of, Platos later ontological dialogues. It appears, however, that Spragues efforts still remain as a skipping running commentary on the dialogue rather than an in-depth interpretation or a thorough going philosophical examination of it. This essay, by focusing an interpretive analysis upon a small but significant passage of the dialogue, purports to be a small contribution to the ultimate task of full explorations of the hidden philosophical meanings underlying its whole dialogical currents. The object of such an analysis is the initial phased of the first round of logomachy among the three in the dialogue. It corresponds to Euthyedemus 283b-d where the young here Clinias gets entrapped into a sophistic net by the sophist brothers Euthyedemus and Dionisodoros. The scene ahs already been interpreted by Sprague as signifying the issue of non-being and becoming. But Spragues main concern was so much with Platos use of logical fallacy that he went hardly any further than relating the scene somewhat mechanically and abstractly to the dialectical triad of being, non-being and nothing in Platos later ontology. He thus failed to touch upon Platos deliberate use of the verb eimi(to be) in the context. The deliberateness here lies in the fact that Plato uses the three functions of the verb, namely identification, predication and existence-confirmation, for his demonstration of the existence of on-being-in this case the existence of the moral-self, but it deals with another aspect of the moral-self of Clinias. When the scene is construed in such a manner, the meaning of the rest of the first round of logomachy seems to become clear. For the rest is not merely, as Sprague thought, a continuation of the discussion about the existence of the moral-self, but it deals with another aspect of the moral-self. The aspect is the paradox of the moral-selfs preservation of its own identity while ever changing the identity itself. But the detailed discussion about this issue must be left to another independent work, and in the present essay only some suggestions for further study are made.