보건이슈 : 우리나라의 건강정책 방향

황창용 대한보건협회 2008 건강생활 Vol.- No.59

민관협력사업에 있어서 행정주체의 사업위험분담

황창용 원광대학교 법학연구소 2011 圓光法學 Vol.27 No.4

Privately financed infrastructure projects create opportunities for reducing the commitment of public funds and other resources for infrastructure development and operation. They also make it possible to transfer the private sector a number of project risks that would otherwise be borne by Pubic Authority. Adequate project risk allocation between Pubic Authority and the Project Company is essential to reducing project costs and to ensuring the successful implementation of the project. Practical guidance provided to contracting authorities in a number of countries often refers to general principles for the allocation of project risks. One such principle is that specific risks should normally be allocated to the party best able to access, control and manage the risk. The Project Company undertakes to ensure Service Commencement usually by a particular date and to continue to provide the Service for the duration of the Contract. there may, however, be circumstance in which the Project Company should fairly be relieved from liability for failure to commence or provide the Service and should be compensated. This research paper discusses the adequate allocation of project risk which Pubic Authority should bear such as Political risks, Site risks, Change in Law, Alternative facilities risk, Force Majeure risk and so on.

전염병관리 관련법령의 변화 추이분석 및 향후 개정방향에 관한 연구

황창용,오희철,이덕형,박기동,이종구,Whang, Chang-Yong,Ohrr, Hee-Choul,Lee, Duk-Hyoung,Park, Ki-Dong,Lee, Jong-Koo 대한예방의학회 1998 예방의학회지 Vol.31 No.3

This Study has been carried out to make a recommendation for the next amendment of the Infectious Disease Prevention Act with a specific focus on the kind of notifyable disease. Korean, Japanese, German, U.S, English and French acts on infectious diseases prevention were reviewed, compared with and analized in regards of numbers and kinds of notifyable infectious diseases and their tendency of amendments. An criteria was designed to assess the level of validity of diseases to be designated in the act. Four items, the fatality (greater than 10% or not), the possibility to make a big epidemic, the availability of efficient vaccination and the usefulness of isolation, are used in the assessment. This index is applied to the diseases in Korean and other countries' Infectious Disease Prevention Acts. Results are as follows: 1. The Korean Infectious Disease Preventon Act has a unique way of classifying the notifyable infectious disease, that is, the first, the second and the third class. But the author cannot find the basis of classification. No other countries reviewed have the similar classification. 2. The ten diseases, cholera, plague, yellow fever, diphtheria, typhoid fever, poliomyelitis, rabies, tetanus, malaria, and meningococcal meningitis are designated as the notifyable diseases not only in Korea but also in Japan, Germany, United States, England and france. 3. Thirty seven diseases including small pox, Lassa fever, anthrax, influenza, German measles, Legionellosis, infection with E. coli O157:H7, Q-fever, brucellosis, Lyme disease are designated as legal disease at least one of the above mentioned countries. 4. The Korea has been coped with the change of the infectious disease occurrence for last fifty years in amendment of the Infectious Disease Prevention Act. 5. Japan has a special infectious surveillance system composed of 3,880 clinics throughout the whole country. 6. Germany has classified infectious diseases in five categories which are based on seriousness of disease. Any confirmed death, cases and suspected cases in class I should be reported within 24 hours. But only confirmed death and cases in class II, but not suspected cases, are reportable in Germarny. 7. Plague, bacillary dysentery, pertussis, mumps, Japanese encephaltis and Korean hemorrhagic fevers are diseases with high credits validity index among Korean legal disease. 8. German measles, anthrax, E. coli O157 : H7 infection, Lassa fever, Q-fever, brucellosis are high in validity index among those which are not designated in Korea but designated in other countries. In conclusion, the Korean Infectious Disease Prevention Act has well been coped with the changes of infectious disease occurrence for last fifty years, but the classification basis and the validity of diseases to be designated as legal diseases is worth reevaluating.

원형지개발 및 복합개발에 대한 법적 문제점 및 개선방향

황창용 원광대학교 법학연구소 2014 圓光法學 Vol.30 No.4

Urban Development Act provides Development of Raw Land retaining original features and Complex Development as a type of PPPs (Public-Private-Partnerships) development in urban development area. Where it is necessary to develop a city in a nature-friendly manner, or in a complex or multi-level manner, Raw Land may be supplied to persons who: (1) are selected at a competition process for getting concession for complex development, etc; (2) directly uses Raw Land as a site for schools, factories, etc. And, Developed Land may be supplied to person who are selected at a competition process for getting concession for Complex Development. The former is the so-called "Development of Raw Land", The Latter is the so-called "Complex Development". This paper looks into the legal issues on Development of Raw Land and Complex Development, and presents the problems and first-priority tasks. The main conclusions of this paper are as follows. First, The objectives and the requirements of Development of Raw Land and Complex Development should be clearly and sufficiently stipulated in Urban Development Act. Vague and insufficient regulations can cause the issues of unjust advantage for private sector developer and the undue exercise of eminent domain by private entity. Second, Developers of Raw Land and Complex Development may have the benefits to buy the relevant land at the appraised price, not fair market price, without open competition according to the current Urban Development Act. But it requires rational and legitimate link between the relevant land price benefits for private sector developer and achieving objective of Development of Raw Land and Complex Development. Third, In case of complex development, it should be arranged the measures necessary, such as urging for the implementation thereof, to assure the continuity and efficacy of the purpose of complex development. Lastly, Successful PPPs requires the creation of a private sector's financially viable condition. No developer shall sell Raw land within the period prescribed by Urban Development Act. But this rules shall not apply where prior approval is obtained from the authority for such cases as bankrupt of developer, mortgage and other securities for private sector's financing, to an extent not detrimental to the purpose of Development of Raw Land.

민관협력사업에 있어서 행정주체의 사업위험분담

황창용 원광대학교 법학연구소 2011 法學硏究 Vol.27 No.4

Privately financed infrastructure projects create opportunities for reducing the commitment of public funds and other resources for infrastructure development and operation. They also make it possible to transfer the private sector a number of project risks that would otherwise be borne by Pubic Authority. Adequate project risk allocation between Pubic Authority and the Project Company is essential to reducing project costs and to ensuring the successful implementation of the project. Practical guidance provided to contracting authorities in a number of countries often refers to general principles for the allocation of project risks. One such principle is that specific risks should normally be allocated to the party best able to access, control and manage the risk. The Project Company undertakes to ensure Service Commencement usually by a particular date and to continue to provide the Service for the duration of the Contract. there may, however, be circumstance in which the Project Company should fairly be relieved from liability for failure to commence or provide the Service and should be compensated. This research paper discusses the adequate allocation of project risk which Pubic Authority should bear such as Political risks, Site risks, Change in Law, Alternative facilities risk, Force Majeure risk and so on.

한국의 BTO·BTL사업추진방식의 소유권귀속에 관한 개선방안

황창용 전북대학교 동북아법연구소 2012 동북아법연구 Vol.6 No.1

민간투자사업에 있어서 법령변경에 따른 위험과 그 배분

황창용 원광대학교 법학연구소 2010 圓光法學 Vol.26 No.4

일본의 말기 암 환자 관리현황

황창용,Hwang, Chang-Yong 한국호스피스완화의료학회 2006 한국호스피스.완화의료학회지 Vol.9 No.2

기획특집논문 : 민간투자사업 실시협약의 공법적 특수성

황창용 ( Changyong Hwang ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2015 法學硏究 Vol.25 No.3

민간투자사업은 행정주체와 민간사업자가 대등한 위치에서 체결하는 실시협약이란 계약을 통하여 시행하고 있다.계약은 본래 사인간의 이해를 형성하고 조정하기 위하여 전형적인 사법상 법형식으로 발전된 것이다 그래서 민간투자사업의 목적인“사회기반시설의 확충 및 공적 서비스의 지속적 제공”이라는 공적 과제를 실현하는 수단으로서 기능하기 위해서는 공법적 요소의 고려가 불가피하다.이로 인하여 사법적 계약원리가 수정될 수 있다.이로 인하여 나타나는 실시협약에서의 공법적 특징은 아래와 같다. 먼저,실시협약은 급부행정의 수단으로 민간투자법,관계법률,기타 평등의 원칙,비례의 원칙 등 공법적 원칙의 적용을 받는다.실시협약은 이 점에서 계약자유의 원칙이 제한된다. 다음으로,실시협약은 민간부문의 투자와 그 회수를 가능케 하는 쌍무유상계약으로서의 성질을 가지고 있다.쌍무유상계약에서 따른 동시이행의 항변,하자담보책임 등은 공익적 필요성의 범위 내에서 일정하게 수정된다. 셋째로,실시협약은 사법상 계약에 비하여 보다 폭넓게 위험을 다루고 있다.사법상 계약은 급부불능에 따른 위험만을 그 대상으로 하나,실시협약은 급부불능에 대한위험 뿐만 아니라 급부불능에 이르지 못한 외부적 사유에 의한 위험도 포함하고 있고,사법상 계약은 위험을 양당사자 중 일방이 부담하나,실시협약은 위험에 대한부담을 행정부문과 민간부문이 공유한다.또한 사업위험의 배분은 해당위험을 가장 관리,대응할 수 있는 자가 부담하는 기준으로 배분되고 있다. 마지막으로,민간투자법은 민간투자사업을 시행하는 수단으로 실시협약을 정하고 있다.하지만 민간투자법은 실시협약 이외에 공익적 이익을 보호하기 위하여 사업시행자 지정철회 등 행정행위도 개입시키고 있다 그러나 이렇게 중복적으로 법적수단을 사용하는 경우 협약당사자의 법률관계나 법적 구제에 혼란을 발생시킬 수있다. 그렇다고 사업시행자나 제3자 등의 보호장치가 충분하지 아니한 상태에서 실시협약만을 민간투자사업의 수단으로 정하는 것도 조심해야 할 것이다.특히 상대방의 동의라는 이름으로 행정주체의 과도한 권리행사가 발생할 우려가 있다.공익보호와 상대방인 사인보호를 모두 충족할 수 있는 실시협약,더 나아가 공법상 계약에 대한 법적 정비가 요구된다. Parties in PPPs(Public-Private-Partnerships), Public Authorities and Private Contractors, enter into PPP‘contract’at arm’s length to carry out PPPs successfully. Contracts have been developed as a typical manner by which mutual interest and balance between the Parties can be pursued in the field of civil law. So, it is required that the public purpose of PPPs, that is, ‘the provision of public infrastructure and the continual delivery of public services.’should be reflected in the contracts. Hence, public legal characters could change the civil legal ones. The distinctive public law elements of PPP contract are as follows. First, PPP contract, as a means of realization of public interest, should be regulated by PPPs Act, related Acts, and general principles of administrative law i.e., rule of equality, proportionality, the principle of the continuous public service. In other words, Liberty of contract should be restricted to that extent. Second, PPP contract has, in essence, the nature of bilateral contract and commutative contract to protect the investment and its reasonable return for the investment to Contractor. But to the extent where pubic interest should be protected, general principles of bilateral contract and commutative contract such as the plea of simultaneous performance, guarantee against defect, should also be modified. Third, PPP contract deals with the risks of PPP project more broadly when compared with private contract. PPP contract includes the risks for increased cost and reduced revenue caused by supervening events, besides the risk of impossibility of performance, whereas private contract deal with only the risk of impossibility of performance. And the risks in PPP contract are shared by contractor and government, whereas the risks in private contract are burdened by contractor or government unilaterally. Also risks are allocated by the criterion that a particular risk should be borne by the party most suited to deal with it, in terms of control or influence and costs. Finally, PPPs Act in Korea requires Authorities and Contractor to make PPP contract as a legal measure to implement PPPs. At the same time, PPPs Act allows Authorities to make necessary administrative dispositions(e.g. revocation of Contractor designation), in order to protect public interest. Both contractual and administrative faces are mingled in PPPs Act. These overlapped legal measures to implement PPPs make legal relation of parties complicated or the choice of legal remedies confused. But, if contract should be provided as the sole legal means to carry out PPPs without sufficient measures to protect Contractor and the third persons concerned, many legal issues would arise. Especially, it is worried that PPP contract will provide Authorities the power which can be exercised unilaterally and excessively in the name of ``agreement`` to which the Parties give the consent. Therefore PPP contract or public contract is required to be set forth as the legal measures which satisfy both public interest and private interest.

민간투자사업의 수익구조의 문제점과 입법적 개선방안

황창용 ( Chang Yong Hwang ) 이화여자대학교 법학연구소 2010 法學論集 Vol.15 No.2

사회기반시설에 대한 민간투자법은 민간부문의 투자를 통하여 사회기반시설을 건설하고 운영하게 함으로써 창의적이고 효율적인 사회기반시설의 확충 및 운영을 도모하는 것이 그 목적이다. 이러한 목적을 달성하기 위해서는 민간투자사업에 참여하는 민간부문에게 적정한 수익을 가질 수 있는 사업적 구조가 법적으로 확보되어야 한다. 본 연구는 민간투자법의 관련규정이 민간부문의 사업시행자에게 적정한 수익적 구조를 법적으로 제공하고 있는지 여부 및 그 개선점을 검토하는 데 있다. 민간투자법 제4조 제1호 사업추진방식(Build-Transfer-Operate), 같은 조 제2호 사업추진방식(Build-Transfer-Lease), 같은 조 제3호 사업추진방식(Build-Operate-Transfer)에 의한 귀속시설사업의 경우, 사업시행자가 준공한 사회기반시설의 소유권을 국가 또는 지방자치단체에 이전하고 그 대가로 무상사용기간을 부여받는데, 이는 대가관계가 분명한 계약이라는 실시협약에 근거한 것이다. 국가 또는 지방자치단체에 해당시설의 소유권을 이전하는 것과 일정기간 해당시설을 사용할 수 있는 권리의 부여, 이양자의 관계는 단절적인 관계가 아니고 그 대가관계가 분명한 것이다. 사업시행자는 투자금 이외에 적정한 사업이윤 또는 사업수익률을 확보할 수 있는 수익적 구조가 확보되어야 한다. 그런데 민간투자법은 이러한 사업이윤이 제외된 총 사업비의 범위 내에서 해당시설의 무상사용권을 부여하는 것으로 정하고 있기 때문에 결국 민간투자법은 사업시행자가 적정한 이윤을 확보할 수 있는 법적 근거를 두고 있지 아니하다. 유료도로법이나 독일의 장거리도로민간투자법은 사업시행자가 투자금을 회수하는 사용료 수준을 정할 때 수익률을 고려하도록 규정하고 있음을 고려할 만하다. 이러한 사업이윤 또는 사업수익률은 주문관청뿐만 아니라 사용료를 지불하는 사용자에게도 밀접한 영향을 미치는 것이어서 법률유보의 관점에서도 사업시행자에게 적정수익률을 보장해 주는 사항을 법률에서 명시적으로 규정하는 것이 바람직하다. Article 1 of the “Act on Private Participation in Infrastructure of Korea” states that the Act aims at contributing to the development of national economy by promoting private investments in public infrastructure in order to establish and operate more creative and effective infrastructure. In order to meet this goal it is an essential prerequisite to legally establish a project structure which ensures some appropriate returns to the private sector participating private investment projects. The main focus of this research paper is to review some relevant provisions of the Act to find out whether such provisions can provide some adequate returns as well as profits to private concessionaires in the private sector and if not what kinds of alternatives can be recommended to promote private investment. Some of controversial issues discussed in this paper are: whether the relationship between the transfer of ownership to the Authority and the free use of infrastructure by the private investor is based on a bilateral contract between the two; and whether the period of free use for the private investor should be measured by the total project profits and costs. In case of revertible projects such as BTO(Build-Transfer-Operate) BTL(Build-Transfer-Lease) and BOT(Build-Operate-Transfer) the ownership of infrastructure completed under the private-public participation projects will be transferred to the authority such as a state or local government while the private investor will be entitled to use such infrastructure free of charge for a specified period. This legal arrangement is a kind of contract between the public and the private sector not a separate legal action. In addition a private investor must be willing to invest if a private investment recovery structure assures its profits and returns on its investment. However the Korean Act permits a private sector to use the infrastructure for a ceratin period of time based on only the total project costs not on the sum of the total project costs plus project profits. Thus the Act fails to provide a legal framework for a private investor to recover adequate returns from its investment for such a limited period. Thus it is worth considering other laws such as the Act on Toll Road in Korea or the German Private Financing Law on Through Roads Construction (Fernstrassenbauprivatfinanzierungsgesetz) which considers the rate of return when the user fees as the recovery of the investment are decided. Since project profits or the rates of return are closely related to the competent authority and the infrastructure user who pays for user fees it is important to specify some provisions which guarantee some adequate returns to the project investors.