냉전 시 소련의 해양전략과 미국의 대응

정광호(Jung, Gwang-ho) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2013 군사 Vol.- No.89

Although the Soviet’s military strategy was continent oriented in the 1920~1930, the Soviet Union had two maritime strategies. The first was ‘the old school ’that pursued the traditional maritime strategy, contending that it had to strengthen nuclear powered battleships and cruises to command the sea despite the limitations of the geopolitics and sufficient forces and this is in the same vein as the classical theory of maritime strategy by Colomb and Mahan. The second was ‘the young school’ that pursued small navy with patrol killers, destroyers, submarines and land based naval aircraft, contending that it could deny enemy’s command of the sea, which is better than to defeat the enemy and command the sea. Following the two schools, the soviet school emerged which emphasized the limited sea power, focusing on the equal force strategy and current aggressive fleet in 1949. On the other hand, the Soviet Union in 1956 had made use of a naval power as a means of national policy with the advent of Gorshkov. Since 1970, sea denial strategy was adopted by the Soviet’s maritime strategy of the Soviet Union and started to expand the Soviet Union’s interest in the Asia-Pacific region. As the Soviet navy increased his powerin the Pacific region, the U.S. Navy changed to active maritime strategy. in the past the U.S. navy was forced to play a passive role with a ground oriented forces in the Atlantic region after World War-Ⅱ. The concept of ‘aggressive maritime strategy,’ ‘Sea Plan 2000,’and ‘600 Navy Ships’ had strengthened U.S. navy’s doctrine and these became the specific and clear maritime strategy of the U.S. Therefore, this article will find out the changes in maritime strategy of the U.S. in response to the Soviet maritime strategy during the Cold War.

미국 해양전략의 변화가 한국 해군에 주는 전략적 함의: 해양 기동전으로의 변화를 중심으로

정광호(Gwang-ho Jung),김동은(Dong-eun Kim) 육군사관학교 화랑대연구소 2022 한국군사학논집 Vol.78 No.3

Strategic competition between the United States and China, which has been in full swing since the mid-2010s, is getting stronger day by day, and the competition is gradually intensifying in the form of armed demonstrations using naval power in the western pacific. To counter the threat of the rapidly growing Chinese Peoples Liberation Army Navy, the U.S. Navy is preparing for a new naval warfare pattern that may occur in the western pacific region in the not-too-distant future. To this end, they are developing concepts such as distritbuted lethality, distributed maritime operation, and ghost fleet, and gradually increasing maritime control in the ocean and ‘big fleet’. It is changing the center of its maritime strategy from a strategy centered on maritime attrition warfare to a maritime maneuver warfare to ensure the survivability of friendly forces in the coastal waters of the western pacific. Repuplic of Korea Navy is also watching the changes in the U.S. Navys maritime strategy. However, beyond the inertia that has been influenced by material and institutional influences from the U.S. Navy since the establishment of the Navy, what kind of strategic implications can a new maritime strategy that fits Koreas maritime geopolitical situation get from the change in the U.S. maritime strategy? This study intends to present its own blueprint focusing on more specific battlefield situations as to how the R.O.K. navy can sublimate the strategic change of the United States into a new maritime strategy suitable for the Korean penninsula situation, above the level of a middle power state. In the future, the coastal waters of the Korean Peninsula are highly likely to become the hottest seas in the world. In this geopolitical situation, the R.O.K. Navy must pay personnel, material, and institutional attention to the unmanned maritime warfare system, which is expected to become a game changer for future maritime warfare, and transform the vague imagination of the present into reality 30 years later.

중국의 해양강국 구상과 ‘동방서공(東防西攻)’ 전략: 해양지정학적 관점에서

정광호(Jung, Gwang-ho),백주현(Baek, Joo-hyun) 한국전략문제연구소 2021 전략연구 Vol.28 No.1

이 논문은 해양지정학과 전략적 포위의 두려움이라는 군사적 이론의 관점에서 중국의 해양전략을 거시적으로 조망해 보는 것을 목적으로 한다. 중국은 최근 경제발전과 동아시아 지역 패권을 추구하기 위해 해양강국을 국가발전전략의 주요 추진전략으로 설정하였다. 이 논문은 해양지정학의 관점에서 중국의 해양전략이 ‘동방서공(東防西攻)’ 전략으로 나타나고 있다고 주장한다. 동방서공 전략은 중국이 서쪽인 인도양으로 진출하기 위하여 동쪽인 태평양에서 접근해오는 미국의 해군력을 거부하는 전략이다. 중국이 안정적인 경제 성장을 지속하고 해양강국을 추진하기 위해서는 에너지 및 상품 교역의 주요한 수송로인 인도양이라는 공간에 대한 접근이 안정적으로 보장되어야 한다. 그리고 지정학의 측면에서 인도양에 대한 접근을 방해받지 않고 전략적으로 포위되는 상황을 방지하기 위해 전략적 후방에 대한 안보가 보장되어야 한다. 21세기 중국의 해양전략은 전략적 후방인 태평양지역에서 접근하는 미국을 하드파워(A2/AD) 로 거부하고, 전략적 전방인 인도양지역으로 스마트파워(一帶一路)를 통해 진출하는 것으로 체현된다. This paper aims to take a macroscopic view of China"s maritime strategy in terms of the maritime geopolitics and the military theory dealing with the fear of military blockade. China recently designated a maritime power as its major driving strategy for its national development strategy in pursue of economic development and hegemony in the East Asian region. This paper argues that China"s maritime strategy is emerging as an "East Denial, West Advance" strategy in terms of the maritime geopolitics. The "East Denial, West Advance" strategy is to reject U.S. naval power approaching from the Pacific Ocean in order to advance into the Indian Ocean, west of China. In geopolitical terms, what China fears most is strategic siege. Access to the space of the Indian Ocean, a major transportation route for energy and commodity trading, must be reliably guaranteed in order for China to sustain its stable economic growth and become a maritime power. And to achieve this, security against the strategic rear must be guaranteed. China"s maritime strategy in the 21st century is embodied by rejecting the U.S. approaching from the Pacific Ocean region, the strategic rear, with hard power, whereas, by advancing into the Indian Ocean region, the strategic front, with smart power.

간접접근전략으로서 해상봉쇄의 전략적 가치에 관한 연구 - 미국의 해상봉쇄 경험 사례를 중심으로

정광호(Jung Gwang-ho),임경한(Lim Kyung-han) 해군사관학교 해양연구소 2020 海洋硏究論叢 Vol.53 No.-

This study is a paper on application of military theory to the maritime blockade strategy. If there is a strategy to win the war without fighting rather than fighting for victory, the choice of this strategy would be a reasonable and higher level strategy. Sun Tzu said that hence to fight and conquer in all tour battle is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. Riddell Hart insisted on the superiority of the indirect approach strategy that the best strategy is to win the war through the least amount of combat. On the other hand, if you move the battlefield to the sea, if there is a strategy to win without fighting in the sea, it is a naval blockade strategy. if it is possible to apply a naval blockade strategy to the military theory of indirect approach strategy, the understanding and strategic value of a naval blockade strategy will increase. Therefore, it is thought that the application of military theory to the aspects of naval warfare is well worth the research. First of all, this article examines the characteristics of military theories of indirect approach strategy through theoretical discussions, and analyzes the concept of a naval blockade strategy to analyze the military theoretical mechanisms of a naval blockade strategy. In order to add the theoretical depth, through the experience of the United States(a anaconda plan during American Civil War, a Cuba blockade during American-Spanish War, a orange plan during the Pacific War, a Cuba blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis, a Iraq blockade during the Gulf War), we can confirm that the United States is the country that can best establish and implement the naval blockade strategy as a means to achieve its political goals(national interest).

냉전기 太平洋지역 美·蘇간 해군력 경쟁

정광호(Jung, Gwang-Ho) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2017 군사 Vol.- No.104

In the Pacific region, the mechanism of the power between inter-nation is acted on a maritime geopolitical principle through a crucial maritime sphere. In other words, the mechanism have been operated according to the principles such as the action-reaction, the balance of offense-defense, resulted in the occupying of new challenging power at the vacancies of other power in the pacific region. Since the mid 1970s, the dominance of the naval forces between the two countries has been reversed due to the arrival of detente according to the reconciliation of the U.S. and China, the rising of a reversal atmosphere following the defeat of the Vietnam War, and the construction of the Soviet navy. In the pacific region, such an U.S. defensive strategy gives the Soviet Union a blank of power recognition in the Asia-Pacific ocean. Based on this recognition, the Soviet Union navy has reinforced a naval power. The U.S. navy has converted defensive maritime strategy into offensive maritime strategy(sea strike strategy, sea plan 2000) against the Soviet navy’s challenge. The U.S. navy argued that a naval force of 600-ships would be needed to maintain a balance with the Soviet navy, take maritime control and have military power projection capability through its forward deployment in the peacetime. the U.S. navy has planed a offensive plan the ‘maritime strike strategy’ and the ‘maritime plan 2000’ that denied access to the Soviet navy. In other words, in the pacific region, the mechanism of the physical force of offense and defense in the U.S. and Soviet navy was developed as follows. The Soviet perception of U.S. powerlessness in the Cold War has brought the Soviet Union to the pacific fleet’s increase to defend the crucial maritime sphere in Sea of Okhotsk Sea, and as a result, the U.S. navy has converted defensive maritime strategy into offensive maritime strategy.

戰間期 太平洋지역 美·日간 해군력 경쟁

정광호(Jung, Gwang-ho) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2021 군사 Vol.- No.119

This article analyzes the competition of naval power between the U.S. and Japan before the outbreak of the Pacific War in the early 20th century. Japan, which emerged as a new maritime power in Asia in the early 20th century, began to seek hegemony in the Pacific region, whereas the United States, which sought to maintain the status quo in the Pacific region, recognized Japan"s move as a challenge to the United States. The U.S.-Japan competition, which took place in the Pacific region, developed into a naval superiority competition, and eventually the Pacific War broke out in 1941. The naval power competition between the two countries raised the question of how to operate naval forces in Asia-Pacific, which developed into a maritime strategy competition between Japan"s “interception-attrition strategy” and the U.S. war plan “Orange” -> war plan “Rainbow" against Japan. After the end of World War I, Japan became the first Asian maritime power and advanced to the South Pacific ocean. Japan joined the Washington regime in 1922, but considered the U.S. as the first virtual enemy and continued to build submarines, landing ships, and auxiliary ships which were exceptional maritime arsenals from the treaty. After terminating from the Treaty of Washington in 1936, Japan continued to strengthen its naval capabilities and developing a maritime strategy(interception-attrition strategy). Meanwhile, the U.S. began to recognize Japan as an official potential enemy in the 20th century, and developed an orange plan against Japan. The real perception of Japan"s threat came as Japan"s withdraw from Washington Treaty(1936). In 1938, the U.S. began building up its naval capabilities through the Vinson-Tramel Act to enhance its naval power, and responded to Japan"s naval capabilities. The U.S. won over Japan in the maritime strategic level.

국방개혁의 법제화 성공요인

김대성(KIM Dae Sung, 金大成),정광호(JUNG Gwang Ho, 鄭光晧) 신아시아연구소(구 신아세아질서연구회) 2013 신아세아 Vol.20 No.4

본 연구의 목적은 국방개혁 법제화 성공요인들을 도출하고 미국의 G-N법안과 한국의 국방개혁 2011-2030법안에 적용하여 분석해 봄으로써 현재 추진 중인 국방개혁 2012-2030이 법제화되기 위한 정책적 함의를 찾아보는데 있다. 미 국방개혁의 법제화 성공요인들은 군사적 사건의 영향력, 개혁의 주체, 지배적 정책패러다임의 존재, 의회내 지배적 행위자들의 가능을 들 수 있다. 구체적으로 언급하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 1983년 10월의 베이루트 테러와 그레나다 침공은 본격적인 국방개혁 논의의 계기가 되었다. 둘째, 행정부 주도였던 기존 국방개혁과 달리, G-N법안은 의회의 주도로 진행됨으로써 핵심사안(합참의 권한 및 역할 강화)에 대한 각 군 및 의회의 반대를 극복할 수 있었다. 셋째, G-N법안은 군사적 효과성의 증대라는 지배적 정책패러다임을 통해 반대자들을 설득, 타협안 도출이 가능했다. 넷째, G-N법안에 있어 골드워터, 니콜스, 샘 넌, 로처 등과 같은 국방개혁 지자자들이 입법과정 전반에 걸쳐서 지배적 행위지로서 가능하여 법안 통과를 이끌어낼 수 있었다. 본 논문은 상기 미국의사례를 한국의 국방개혁 2011-2013 법안 추진과정에 대입하여 다음과 같은 결과를 도출했다. 첫째, 천안함 폭침과 연평도 포격 도발은 국방개혁의 필요성과 당위성에 대한 대중적 지지 도출의 계기가 되었다. 둘째, 국방개혁 2011-2030은 정부주도의 개혁안으로 사안의 긴급성으로 인해 신속하게 추진되어 대정부 견제기관인 국회의 반발에 부딪치게 되었다. 셋째, 동 법안 심의 초기의 지배적인 정책패러다임은 군사적 효율성의 증대였으나 이후 문민통제 위협, 위헌논쟁, 군 구조 불균형, 예산문제 등의 다양한 패러다임이 등장함으로써 그 추진력을 상실하고 말았다. 넷째, 국회 국방위원회 내 전문성을 보유한 다수의 의원의 존재가 오히려 심의과정에서 지배적 행위자의 출현을 제한하였다. 따라서 국방개혁 2011-2030법안 법제화 과정에서 확인된 문제점들을 보완한다면 국방개혁 2012-2030의 법제화 가능성은 더욱 높아질 수 있을 것으로 기대된다. This study aims to seek political implications for the legislation of Korean National Defense Reform 2012-2030 by identifying success factors for the legislation of national defense reforms and analyzing and applying the factors to the U.S. G-N Act and Korean National Defense Reform 2011-2030 Bill. Success factors for the legislation of national defense reforms are influence of military incidents, main agents of reforms, the existence of a dominant political paradigm and dominant actors, and the success factors for U.S. G-N Act can be summarized as follows; Firstly, the Beirut Terror Incident and Grenada Invasion in Oct. 1983 served as a momentum to bring about a full-scale discussion on national defense reforms in the U.S. Secondly, while the U.S. national defense reforms were led by the U. S. administration before, the G-N Act was led by the U.S. Congress, which thus combined authorities and roles of the core parts of the U.S. G-N Act, could be reinforced without much opposition from all of the branches of the armed forces and the congress. Thirdly, since a dominant political paradigm called, 'increase of Military Effectiveness,' existed in the G-N Act, it was possible to make a compromise by persuading opponents against national defense reforms more easily. Lastly, advocates for national defense reforms, such as Goldwater, Nichols, Sam Nunn and Rochor, functioned as dominant actors all over the process of legislation, further leading the passage of G-N Bill. The process of the Korean National Defense Reform 2011-2030 Bill can be summarized as follows; Firstly, North Korea's acts of provocation, such as the Sinking of Cheonam Warship and Yeonpyeong Island Bombarding, became a driving force good enough to attract lots of public supports for the necessity and appropriateness of national defense reforms. Secondly, as a reformative proposal led by the government, the National Defense Reform Plan 2011-2030 was rapidly carried out because of the urgency of such incidents, further facing a strong opposition during the process of deliberation led by the National Assembly that functions to hold the government in check. Thirdly, in the beginning of deliberation, the dominant political paradigm of the National Defense Reform 2011-2030 was to increase the military efficiency, but as other various political paradigms appeared, such as a threat against the civilian control, controversies over its violation of the constitution, unbalance of the military structure and budget issues, this proposal lost its driving force at last. Lastly, there were a number of law makers with expertise in the 18th National Assembly Defense Committee, but their existence prevented dominant actors from appearing in the process of deliberation to the contrary. Accordingly, when the problems clarified during the process of legislation of the National Defense Reform 2011-2030 are solved, it is expected there will be a high possibility for the legislation of the National Defense Reform 2011-2030.

Pb(Zr<SUB>0.52</SUB>Ti<SUB>0.48</SUB>)O₃/BFO박막의 초전특성

조서현(Seo-Hyeon Jo),김대영(Dae-Young Kim),정광호(Gwang-Ho Jung),이성갑(Sung-Gap Lee) 대한전기학회 2011 대한전기학회 학술대회 논문집 Vol.2011 No.11