시워드 (William Henry Seward) 의 팽창주의정책 연구 (1861 - 69)

김원모 고대사학회 1976 사총 Vol.20 No.-

영,미,일 3강 제국주의적 동맹체제와 대한제국의 운명

김원모 단국대학교 동양학연구원 2006 東洋學 Vol.39 No.-

서광범 연구(1859∼1897)

김원모 단국대학교동양학연구소 1985 東洋學 Vol.15 No.-

「조선전사 근대편」의 分析 · 批判

金源模 국방부 군사편찬연구소 1991 군사 Vol.- No.23

계란흰자를 대체한 병아리콩 수용액 함량을 달리하여 제조한 마카롱의 특성

김원모,윤기홍,이규희 한국식품영양과학회 2022 한국식품영양과학회지 Vol.51 No.8

The recent environmental sustainability trends and the relatively high percentage of humans with allergies to eggs have given an impetus to efforts to find plant-based alternatives. In this study, chickpea aqueous solution (CAS) was used as a plant-based foaming agent. The solid content of the CAS was 15%. Macarons were prepared by varying the amount of CAS used as a replacement for egg whites. The term ‘Egg’ was used for macarons made with only egg whites, ‘CAS100’ described macarons made by replacing 100% of the egg whites with CAS, and ‘CAS95’ was the name given to macarons made by 95% of CAS100 amount. The correlation between the physical properties of the macarons and the macarons made with various amounts of CAS was analyzed using principal component analysis (PCA) on Python. The correlations between the intensity of the sensory characteristics and the overall preference were displayed as a boxplot graph using Python. CAS95 was most similar to Egg in terms of the appearance of the macarons. In physical properties, the product with the most similar characteristics to Egg was CAS95. In the PCA, Egg and CAS95 mainly belong to the third quadrant and had similar characteristics. The overall acceptance in the sensory evaluation also indicated that CAS100 and CAS95 could replace Egg. In conclusion, the chickpea aqueous solution could be used as a replacement for egg whites to produce macarons. Further, it appears preferable to manufacture by 95% (CAS95) of the egg white amount with the chickpea aqueous solution. 본 연구에서는 식물 기반 거품형성제로 병아리콩 수용액을 고형분이 15%가 되도록 하여 병아리콩 수용액 양을 달리하여 마카롱을 제조하였다. 병아리콩 수용액 양을 달리하여 제조한 마카롱의 두께, 직경, 퍼짐성 및 수분함량, 위 표면의 색도, 수분함량, 물성, 관능 평가 강도 및 전반적인 기호도를 측정하였다. 병아리콩 수용액의 양을 달리하여 제조한 마카롱의 두께, 직경, 퍼짐성, 수분함량, 색도 및 물성 분석 결과와 병아리콩 수용액 양을 달리하여 제조한 마카롱들에 대한 상관관계는 python을 활용하여 주성분 분석을 수행하였고, 관능 평가 결과 관능 특성 강도와 전반적인 기호도 사이의 상관관계는 python을 이용하여 boxplot 그래프로 표시하였다. 외관에서는 계란흰자 양과 동량의 병아리콩 수용액을 이용하여 제조한 마카롱(CAS100) 제조에 사용된 병아리콩 수용액 양의 95%로 제조한 마카롱(CAS95)이 계란흰자만을 이용하여 제조한 마카롱(Egg)과 가장 유사한 것을 알 수 있었다. 퍼짐성은 CAS90으로 제조했을 때 Egg와 유사한 퍼짐성을 갖는 것을 알 수 있었다. 색도 L 값은 CAS100에서 가장 높은 값을 나타내었고 병아리콩 수용액 함량이 감소할수록 감소하는 경향을 나타내었다. 수분함량은 Egg와 CAS 100 시료 사이에 통계적으로 유의차를 나타내지 않았으나 병아리콩 수용액의 함량이 증가할수록 통계적으로 감소하는 경향을 나타내었다. 물성 측정 결과 Egg와 가장 유사한 특성을 가진 제품은 CAS 95임을 알 수 있었다. 주성분 분석 결과 Egg와 CAS95는 주로 3사분면에 속하여 특성이 유사함을 알 수 있어서 병아리콩 수용액을 달리하여 제조한 마카롱 제조 방법으로 CAS95를 선택한다면 계란흰자를 대체하여 병아리콩 수용액으로만 마카롱의 제조가 가능할 것으로 판단된다. 관능 평가에서 전반적인 기호도가 Egg를 대체할 수 있는 것으로는 CAS100과 CAS95가 가능할 것으로 판단된다. 결론적으로 병아리콩 수용액은 계란흰자를 대체하여 마카롱을 제조할 수 있으며, 병아리콩 수용액을 계란흰자 양 100% 대체한 양의 95%만을 첨가하여 마카롱을 제조하는 것(CAS95)이 바람직할 것으로 판단된다.

미국 재건기에 있어서의 해방흑인국 설치방안(1865~66)

김원모 단국대사학회 1984 史學志 Vol.18 No.1

乾淸宮 멕케電燈所와 韓國 初期의 電氣 點燈(1887)

金源模 단국사학회 1988 史學志 Vol.21 No.-

페비거의 탐문항행(探問航行)과 미국의 대한포함외교(1868)

김원모 단국사학회 1982 史學志 Vol.16 No.1

太極旗 起源문제를 중심으로 : 太極旗 起源문제를 중심으로 based on the origin of T'aeguk flag

金源模 韓國 暻園大學校 아시아文化硏究所 中國 中央民族大學 韓國文化硏究所 2000 亞細亞文化硏究 Vol.4 No.-

During the reign of Youngjo, in 1755, the Qing envoy to Chosun used a flag adorned with triangular yellow dragon pattern which symbolized the Qing emperor. Chosun, on the other hand, used triangular T'aeguk pattern which symbolized the Chosun royal family. In this pattern, the bright moon and T'aeguk represents the king. This pattern also implies that when the T'aeguk is split into countless number it in fact represents the people of the country. It was through the flag that Youngjo showed his ideology that the king and its people belong to one. The T'aeguk pattern has been widely respected and used from the time of the three kingdoms - Koguryo, Shilla. Paekche - as the nation's characteristic symbol of nationalism. The Chinese T'aeguk pattern is round, however, Korean T'aeguk paatern is 'Chosun-style T'aeguk pattern which has its origin in Kameun Temple (682). Korean T'aeguk pattern has gone through the following metamorphoses: Kameun Temple pattern (682) - pattern found on Huh, Jae's stone casket during Koryo Dynasty (1144) - pattern found at Yehsung, Chungju (1277) - the pattern found in the shrine of the Chosun kings and queens (1608) - the pattern found in Changduk Palace (1610) - the pattern found during the Great Han Empire (1901). Chosun used a flag with T'aeguk pattern when it signed a treaty with the United States in 1882 for it carried a great historical importance. The modern Korean flag has its origin in the flag used by Youngjo, a king during the late-Chosun era.

美國의 親日政策이 日本의 韓國侵略에 미친 影響

金源模 단국대학교 미소연구소 1987 미소연구 Vol.1 No.-

To sum up, if the Asia policies of the European and American Powers are to be divided into two patterns, one was leaving or further degenerating the Asian continent in a weak condition thereby to pursue commercial concessions for their own benefit and to gain territorial conquest, and the other was helping he Asian countries to establish strong sovereign states in their native lands. The former was pursued by the West European powers and the latter by the United States. In order to drive back the aggression of the West European powers in Asia the United States wished for the births of strong indigenous governments while opposing the control of Asia by the European powers. Thus the United states blocked the Chinese claim of suzerainty over Korea and gave full recognition to Korean independence by signing the American Korean Treaty of Amity and Commerce, based upon its political ideology. On the other hand, Britain and other West European powers wished for a “weak Asia”up to the termination of the Sino-Japanese War as they checked the Japanese advance toward the Asiatic continent, where they promoted their own schemes of political and economic aggression. The Hamilton (komundo)affair and the retrocession to China of the Liaotung Peninsula by the three-power intervention is regarded as restraining Japanese influence in a narrow sense and accelerating a “weak Asia”in a broad sense. With this view on mind, the United States opened doors of Korea by signing a treaty, but the “good offices”stipulated in Article I of this treaty is open to criticism as to its performance. Since the conclusion of the Korean-American Treaty took place in 1882, the unhappy country had expected that the United States would support her independence. The Korean people, including the helpless Emperor, regarded the clause of “good offices” as “intervention” or “alliance”in an emergency. Up to the outbreak of the Sino Japanese War the United States recognized Korean independence as a link in the realization of a “strong Asia” and checked European aggression in Asia. In the meantime the United States Minister and American missionaries in Korea performed their roles of “good offices” for the korean Government. For instance, Minister john M. B. Sill made efforts to see the withdrawal of the troops of both China and Japan from korea and Dr.Horace N.Allen made arrangements for the participation of Korea in the 1893 Chicago Fair Except these and the recognition of Korean independence in the American-Korean Treaty of 1882, signed by Rovert W.Shufeldt, we cannot see any official performance of “good offices”by the united States Govenment The united States made a flat refusal to the appeals of Korea for “good offeces” in the Hamilton Affair and in the withdrawal of the troops of China and japan, because it wanted to avoid military intervention on the Asiatic Continent or the korean peninsula. However, such a policy for a “strong Asia” became promoted the appearance of a “strong Japan” in the Asian theater. With the Sino-Japanese War as a turning point, the United States took the direction of pro-japanese policy and non -intervention in Korean affairs because of the possible danger of military participation in the course of saving Korea. Thus the united States by the State Department Instruction No.64 made a declaration of non-intervention in the political question of Korea. In order to preserve a balance of power in the Far East, President Theodore Roosevelt was ready to sacrifice Korea to Japan. He did not want to see Russia penetrating Manchuria and korea. He guaranteed Japan “a free hand” in Korea, and then expected that japan would be left face to face with Russia. Thus Roosevelt approved japan’s control of Korea at portsmouth, and recognized japan’s suzerainty over Korea in the Taft-Katsura Agreement for the sake of the Philippines. Finally Korea was annexed to the Japanese Empire in 1910. As we look back on the treaty of Portsmouth and America’s secret pact with Japan, we find that they did not provide a solution to the problems of Korea, including the Far Eastern question. We can point out that Roosevelt’s policy regarding East Asia was unsuccessful because of the betrayal of Japanese militarists. First, in the secret pact, Katsura confirmed that “Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the philippines.” But this statement was false, for the Japanese army attacked pearl Harbor in 1941. Second, in order to maintain the general peace in the Far East, the united States was in accord with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. But this policy rather run counter to the all-out war in the Far East, for japan took control of korea and Manchuria, and then escalated the war to mainland China and Southeast Asia in World War Ⅱ. Third, the united States recognized Jpanese suzerainty over Korea. This was based on Roosevelt’s pro-Japanese policy. In maintaining friendly relations with Japan, it was Roosevelt’s good fortune to have Korea for a scapegoat. But japan’s aggressive designs did not stop with the acquisition of korea. And in the yield their interests in the far East and finally would cross swords with the United States and Britain. Then, why did the united States deny Korea’s demand for “good offices”and follow a non-intervention policy toward Korea? first, the United States asserted that it could only exert good offices within the bounds of a common understanding of both interested parties in the dispute, the victim and the assailant, but there could be no interference by hearing one side only. Herein lies America’s basic motive for non-intervention in Korea. Second, should the united States interfere in the Korean question by a combination with the European powers it would fall into their scheme as a fellow-traveler with the policy for a “weak Asia”, which was pursued by the european powers against the political ideals of the was pursued by the European powers against the political ideals of the united States wishing for a “strong Asia”. Hence, even at the cost of all American concessions in Korea and the transfer of the whole of Korea to Japan, absolute aid to the growing strength of Japan was necessary in order to stop European aggression in Asia with that strength, thereby to let Japan play the part of the united States. Third, after the outbreak of Russo-Jananese War the United States recognized that Korea was unable to maintain its independence beyond relief by “good offices” and, if the United States were to interfere in the Korean question, that must be an armed interference, but it did not want to cross swords with Japan on the Asiatic continent, and it refrained from arbitration for Korea against Japan. Fourth, as a result of the Spanish-american War of 1898 the United States acquired the philippines, which it wished to protect from Japanese aggression with a pro-Japanese policy, and for that price it left the national fate of Korea to Japan. Since the United States placed more importance on the security of the Philippines than on the relief of korea it turned down all Korean requests for good offices in order to get japan’s guarantee for the security of the Philippines. After all, we have seen a ruling principle in international relations, which holds that treaties signed between weaker nations and big powers cannot guarantee their just rights of treaty obligations unless they are supported by the national strength of the weaker nations themselves, that is to say, any foreign treaty without the support of national strength is of no more value than a scrap of paper. Of course, the non-reaction of the United States to the appeal of Korea for “good offices” may be pointed out as a plain repudiation of its treaty obligations and a flagrant breach of faith on the part of the United States, but on the other hand, the Korean people, who had not even minimum supporting national strength, ought to subject themselves to criticism and self-reflection for their breach of faith against their breach of faith against their own country-Korea.