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        西學의 영혼론과 조선후기 유학의 쟁점

        금장태 이화여자대학교 한국문화연구원 2001 한국문화연구 Vol.1 No.-

        Although Catholic missionaries in China used the term ‘soul’ as the Chinese equivalent of ‘anima’ since the sixteenth century, there exists a sharp difference between the ‘soul’ of Catholicism and the ‘soul’ of Confucianism. The issue of the soul was one of the most critical issues in the history of Korean philosophy for more than 150 years in the later Chosun society. The clash between Catholicism and Confucianism in the interpretation of the soul stemmed from their different epistemological approaches toward the relationship between the soul and the energy in the body (xingqi). Catholicism viewed the soul as an immortal and autonomous entity distinct from the body, whereas Confucianism viewed the human soul (the spiritual being) and God (disembodied spirit) as Ki, the Omnipresent Energy. Catholicism recognized the human soul as the creation of God as well as acknowledging the two dimensions of time, eternal and secular. In the eyes of Neo-Confucian scholars, God is the mysterious combination of the Yin and Yang, which remains within the definition of the omnipresent energy Ki. In short, the Catholic notion of the transcendence of God over all creation is quite different from the Confucian notion of God. Unlike the Catholic perception of the soul being similar to God in dignity, Confucian scholar Sin Hu Dam refuted Catholicism’s elevated status of the soul by putting forward the mind of the human being as most akin to God (Sangje) as seen from the Confucian perspective. Even in Catholicism, anima is not always translated into the soul. Rather, the soul is sometimes acknowledged in connection with the mind and human nature. While the tenets of the immortality of the soul and heaven and hell are central to Catholicism’s argument for life after death, representative Confucian scholarly critics of Catholicism such as Sin Hu Dam, An Jung Bok and Lee Ki either criticized the doctrine of heaven and hell or categorically denied their existence. More importantly, Catholicism and Confucianism had widely differing views on the concept of religious rites. While Catholicism believes in one God and dictates that God alone be worshipped and obeyed, Confucianism values worship of God (Sangje), heaven and earth as well as the human spirits of ancestors and Confucian notables. Within this framework of Catholic versus Confucian confrontation, Catholic proscription against ancestor worship, a central Confucian value, was bound to spark off vehement opposition and uncompromising rejection of Catholicism by the Confucian society. This clash between Catholicism and Confucianism over the soul indicates that, notwithstanding the two belief systems using the same term for the soul, Catholicism and Confucianism understood the soul on the basis of different systems of thought. In relation to Korean thoughts during the late Chosun dynasty, this type of mutual criticism for a better understanding of Catholicism and Confucianism has great significance to intellectual exchanges between the Eastern tradition and Western studies.

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      • 退溪와 南冥의 學風과 學問體系 : Their Different Traditions of Learning

        琴章泰 慶尙大學校 南冥學硏究所 2002 남명학연구 Vol.13 No.-

        To speak most broadly about the two representative Neo-Confucians of the mid-sixteenth century Choson, Toegye(Yi Hwang, 1501-1570) focused on the theories of nature and principle and self-cultivation, whereas Nammyung(Cho Shik, 1501-1572) focused on those of self-cultivation and righteousness. One may explain such difference by their opposite personalities: the one had a mild temper with sympathy and tolerance, while the other a strong temper with strictness and critical power. Basically, however, these two had a common ground in the system of Neo-Confucianism(Tohak), and their difference occurred in the course of searching for a more rational and efficient way of achieving the same goal. Therefore, the difference is significant in that it presented the complementary models of Neo-Confucian learning as could be realized in that period, and that it diversified, thereby, the mode of understanding and responding to the times as well as the method of learning. So in comparing Toegye and Nammyung's traditions of learning, I aim at drawing attention to the diversifying and complementary meaning of the difference rather than to the contradictory and rivalrous meaning of it. The difference between Toegye and Nammyung in their traditions of learning can be summarized in three points. Firstly, by carrying the question fo attentiveness(jing) through his methodology of learning, Toegye established a tradition centering around the self-cultivation theory. Nammyung, in his part, emphasized the coherence of attentiveness and righteousness(yi) and thereby established a tradition which, though based on the self-cultivation theory, took the righteousness theory seriously to confirm the standard of value necessary for the social practices of self-cultivation. Secondly, Toegye's program proceeds from intellectual activities of deliberation and distinction to self-cultivation, whereas Nammyung's starts from self-cultivation and ends at the social practice of the rule of right(wang-dao). Thirdly, it was a progressive way of reformation aiming at preparing the foundation for the peaceful future that Toegye endeavored to educate the young intellectuals with an intense focus on the self-cultivation theory. On the other hand, it was a radical way toleration no injustice that Nammyung demanded the government a drastic reformation criticizing its contradictory operations directly. Such points of difference provide us the background for understanding the facts that Toegye, having resigned from his official position, exerted himself on learning and self-cultivation and that Nammyung, though never acception an official position, kept raising social issues in a vigorous and strong voice. Different academic traditions of Toegye and Nammyung were closely connected with different attitudes toward the social realities of the times: endeavoring at self-cultivation vs. trying to save the world; providing education for the future vs. trying to realize the ideals in the present. Although the mild and moderate attitude and the strong and radical one are contrary, neither of them are subject to judgement of right and wrong. Rather, both are necessary, for well-balanced solutions can derived only from the harmony and compromise between the two most typical ways of response. By providing the universal truths to their times, the traditions of Toegye and Nammyung could establish themselves as the two main axes of the Neo-Confucian tradition of Choson and exercise extensive influence throughout the late Choson Choson dynasty. Their wisdom needs be re-appreciated as one of the most fundamental insights in our times: the wisdom of understanding the essence of the human hature, devising methods of cultivating human virtues, and seeing that the social order is possible only when founded on the human morality and managing a society only when those in ruling position are moral.

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