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      • KCI등재
      • 論理的 類推에 의한 論駁의 方法

        蘇興烈 이화여자대학교 한국문화연구원 1976 韓國文化硏究院 論叢 Vol.27 No.-

        Any two arguments that have the same argument form are logically analogous. Since the validity of an argument depends on the validity of its arguments form, by showing that an argument which is logically analogous to the given argument can have true premisses and an obviously false conclusion, the invalidity of the given argument can be shown. This is called the method of refutation by logical analogy. What is attempted is a methodology for constructing a logically analogous argument for the purpose of refuting an invalid argument. The method in brief is as follows: 1. Translate the given argument into a schematic form using S, P, and M for the three terms of a syllogism. 2. Draw a diagram representing the class relations among the classes of the three terms on the basis of the two premisses and the contradictory or the contrary of the conclusion. 3. Find three class concepts that satisfy the class relations. 4. Substitute the three concepts into the schematic form of the given argument to attain a new argument.

      • KCI등재후보
      • KCI등재
      • KCI등재
      • KCI등재
      • 과학적 회의주의

        蘇興烈 이화여자대학교 한국문화연구원 1983 韓國文化硏究院 論叢 Vol.42 No.-

        The point of this paper is to clarify and develop the main tenet of a philosophical trend known as "positivism". Positivism, like any other philosophical belief, has changed its claims along with the progress in philosophy itself, as well as in science, for positivism is basically a philosophical trend that places its trust in the methodology of modern science. For instance, logical positivism is no longer a living issue among philosophers. But the death of logical positivism awakened a new interest in scientific methodology, which in turn brought about a new field in philosophy called "philosophy of science". Modern positivists are those philosophers who maintain the importance of scientific method as understood through the development in the "philosophy of science". Philosophy of science what we need to doubt about it, this doubt, however, is to be methodology of science, but also what we need to doubt about it, this doubt, however, is to be distinguished from the traditional epistemological doubt, of which the objective was to seek after absolute certainty in human knowledge. Positivistic doubt, which is characterized here as "scientific skepticism", is meant to be "methodologically productive". The major part of the paper, then, is given to the analysis of various in the scientific method as understood through the development in the "philosophy of science". Philosophy of science teaches us not only what we may believe in the methodology of science, but also what we need to doubt about it, this doubt, however, is to be distinguished from the traditional epistemological doubt, of which the objective was to seek after absolute certainty in human knowledge. Positivistic doubt, which is characterized here as "scientific skepticism", is concerned with the limits of scientific method. It raises questions about the limits of existing scientific knowledge, and by so doing it helps us to re-examine what we can believe on the scientific ground. Thus, it is a productive kind of doubt. "Scientific" in "scientific skepticism" is meant to be "methodologically productive". The major part of the paper, then, is given to the analysis of various aspects in the scientific method that might be subjected to this kind of productive doubt. They are: the inductive nature of the verification and confirmation of scientific hypothesis; the problem of circularity among the concepts, "explanation", "natural law" and "causation"; the problem of analogy and disanalogy in scientific theory-making; the problem of distinguishing "science" from "pseudo-science"; the problem of the paradigm effect; and the problem of value involved in the scientific method. Positivism as a philosophical trend seems tenable when we are aware of what we may believe and what we may doubt about the methodology of science.

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      • 人間의 合理性

        蘇興烈 연세대학교 대학원 1971 延世論叢 Vol.8 No.1

        When we say that man is a rational animal, we mean to distinguish man from brute animal. And we pride ourselves being a rational animal and have never suspected our superiority among all creatures in this respect. But now we have the computer, a creature of man, and some think that it can think better and more rationally than its master, man. But what do they mean when they say that the computer can think more rationally than human beings? What do we mean by rational thinking anyway? What is the nature of human rationality? Certainly we do not always think or act rationally. Sometimes we choose deliberately to act irrationally, and sometimes we judge something rational, only to discover later how unsound our judgment has been. Furthermore, when we are faced with an uncomfortable situation forced upon us by logic or counter evidences we tend to rationalize our mistakes instead of correcting them. Human rationality seems to have two distinctive functions: reasoning and rational judgment. The one is our ability to judge things rational or irrational. The other is our ability to infer, to deduce, or to imply logically. Man's judgment as to rational and irrational often brings about controversies. But the rules of reasoning are universal. Though individuals do make mistakes in reasoning, there seems to be only one and the same set of rules for reasoning, which every one ought to follow if he is to reason cor-rectly. But when we come to the problem of judging things rational or irrational controversies seem inevitable. But is it really inevitable? Reasoning, according to Peirce, is a means that enables us to get better knowledge of the real world. It is a tool for us to use to get better acquainted with the strange world in which we live, act and have our being. But if by reasoning we mean deductive reasoning only, our reasoning cannot bring us the satisfactory result, for deductive reasoning can only give us logically possible hypothetical worlds. It can give us various logical models of the world. And it is up to us to choose among the models and test it to see whether it fits to the structure of the real world. This process of choosing and testing involves, what Peirce calls, abduction and induction. When human reasoning is understood to include abduction and induction, as well as deduction, the most extensive application of it is found in the method of scientific inquiry, which, in turn, has been proved to be most efficient in revealing the secrets of nature and making them comprehensible to us. Science, indeed, is the pride of human rationality. Whence, then, did man's rational power come from? As for the origin of such a power we are not certain. But we all know that somehow man's intelligence becomes matured very early in are as he grows up physically. Piaget, however, tells us that a child's intellectual development passes through several qualitatively different stapes of thinking ability. For example, he uses a new expression "transduction" to describe a typical pattern of thinking in a certain stage of a child's mental development, which is quite different from either deduction or induction. But, then, the question is whether or not there is any inherent limit to a man's intellectual maturity. And various indications seem to suggest that there is no such inherent limit to man's thinking ability. Just as individuals grow up intellectually through different stages of development, so it seems that mankind as a whole becomes more rational through the continuing process of intellectual evloution. For instance, Russell thinks that even man's deductive reasoning, which is the most certain and universal form of thinking, is a late product of such an envolutionary development, for it was a Greek innovation. And for us who live in a scientific age, it seems quite apparent that ever since scientific thinking became effective in man's life, it became also the major influence for man's rational growth. As science extends the scope of human knowledge, it does, too, help man to broaden his capacity to think rationally. In other words, the radius of man's understanding and concern is becoming ever greater, as man acquires more of scientific knowledge. Now, we believe that the greater the radius of man's rationality becomes, the less chance will there be for controversies over rational and irrational, for the cause of such a controversy lies in the difference in man's understanding and concern for the reality. Thus, we can reasonably hope that when all men become sufficiently rational, that is, their radii of rationality become great enough, most of the controversies regarding rational and irrational will be resolved through rational ways, provided that all men are willing to think rationally without rationalizing, and without becoming stubborn about their beliefs. And we think our hope could be reasonable because, after all, man is a rational animal, which means not only that man is born with the capacity for a rational mind, but also that man is a creature that is becoming ever more rational, and so it is right and fitting that he tries to become more rational in his thinking and acting.

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