러시아 우랄 지역 이슬람 사회의 변화와 그 시사점

송준서 한국외국어대학교 러시아연구소 2015 Russia & Russian Federation Vol.6 No.4

New Records of Creeping Ctenophores, Genus Coeloplana (Tentaculata: Platyctenida: Coeloplanidae), from Korea

송준임,황성진,이상화,박중기 한국동물분류학회 2011 Animal Systematics, Evolution and Diversity Vol.27 No.1

Creeping ctenophores, Coeloplana species, were collected by SCUBA divers throughout the year (November 2006 to June 2010) from the branches and polyp masses of encrusting dendronephthyas at a depth of 20-32m off Munseom Island (Seogwipo-si, Jeju-do, Korea). A single individual of a newly recorded species in Korea,Coeloplana bocki Komai, 1920, was collected together with C. anthostella from the same location on 16 August 2009. A large number of individuals of each species were subsequently collected from the host Dendronephthya aff. dendritica on 20 June 2010. C. bocki can be distinguished from C. anthostella Song and Hwang, 2010and C. komaii Utinomi, 1963 by its unique blue and orange colored stripes, and/or the branching and anastomosing milky-white stripes encircling the aboral sense organ towards the margin. The detailed morphology and molecular sequence information (nuclear 18S rDNA, internal transcribed spacer 1, and mitochondrial cox1gene sequences) for C. bocki is provided, and C. bocki and C. anthostella are compared.

2017~2018년 러시아사 연구: 양질전화의 도정에서...

송준서 역사학회 2019 역사학보 Vol.0 No.243

During the previous two years (2017~2018), South Korean scholars published a great quantity of studies on Russian history. A total of 102 articles and 60 monographs were published during this period. The centenary of the Russian Revolution (2017), to some extent, affected the enormous number of publications. However, the publications’ absolute number, excluding research on the revolution, is still continuously increasing. South Korean historians keep improving the quality of their research by exploring new topics, producing new research while extensively using primary sources, and publishing their findings in prestigious international journals. Nonetheless, South Korean scholarship should conserve strict peer-review procedures in order to guarantee a high quality of research. The scholarship of Russian history will need to: first, focus more on the “others,” including Russia’s relations with, and perceptions of, foreign encounters; and second, center on the history of Russian science and technology as well as the Russian environment. The goal of these suggested research directions is to understand contemporary Russia’s moves in global geopolitical and geocultural arenas, and to obtain valuable lessons from Russia’s experiences. In addition, other tasks for South Korean historians involve the promotion of collaborations for the publication of a Russian history textbook and a source book. 2017~2018년 동안 국내 러시아사 연구자들은 괄목한 성과를 이루어냈다. 총 102편의 논문과 60권의 단행본 발간으로 국내 러시아사 연구 역사상 2년 동안의 연구업적으로서는 최대의 실적을 올렸다. 러시아혁명 100주년이 부분적으로 연구업적의 양적 팽창에 영향을 주었지만, 혁명 관련 연구 성과물을 제외한다 해도 그 전해와 비교해 뚜렷한 증가세를 보여주었다. 양적 증가에 이어 연구 성과의 질적 향상도 확인된다. 새로운 연구주제 발굴과 심화 연구, 1차 사료를 꼼꼼히 활용한 연구, 국제 저명 출판매체를 통한 연구 성과 출간 등이 그 예이다. 하지만 성공적인 양질전화를 위해서는 보다 엄격한 논문심사를 통해 연구 결과물의 질을 관리할 필요가 있다. 향후 국내 러시아사학계가 더 관심 가져야 할 연구주제는 첫째, 최근 국제무대에서 러시아의 행보와 연관 있는 러시아의 타자 인식과 타자와의 관계, 둘째, 오늘날 일상생활과 밀접히 연관 있는 과학·기술사, 환경사 분야일 것이다. 이에 더해 학문 후속세대를 위한 러시아사 개설서 집필 및 사료집 편찬은 국내 러시아사 연구자가 가까운 시일 내에 수행해야 할 책무일 것이다.

기억과 망각 사이에서 -현대 러시아의 1917년 10월 혁명 기억 -

송준서 ( Song Joon-seo ) 한국서양사학회 2018 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.137

2017년 러시아혁명 100주년을 맞이한 푸틴 정부는 공식 기념행사를 일절 치르지 않았다. 사실 푸틴 정부는 최근 10월 혁명에 대해 일관되게 부정적 평가를 내려왔다. 즉, 10월 혁명은 국론을 분열시키고 곧 이어진 내전으로 수많은 러시아 국민의 희생을 가져온 불미스러운 사건으로 묘사했고 혁명 직후 볼셰비키 지도부의 무자비한 살상을 비난함과 동시에 초기 실책이 훗날 러시아 영토의 분열을 초래했다고 비난했다. 이러한 소위 혁명에 대한 ‘망각 정치’는 1990년대 공산주의 세력을 억누르기 위해 노력했던 옐친 정부시기부터 체계적으로 시작된 것이었다. 하지만 일반 시민들의 혁명에 대한 기억과 평가는 정치 지도부의 견해와는 달랐다. 정권 유지와 안정을 추구하는 정치 지도자에게 혁명은 망각되어야할 사건이었지만 민중들에게 10월 혁명은 현재적 의미를 지닌 사건으로 국가 발전에 긍정적 영향과 부정적 영향 모두를 끼쳤던 아직은 기억되어야할 역사적 사건으로 남아있다. The contemporary Russian government led by President Putin did not officially celebrate the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution by claiming that the revolution mostly produced negative impact on the country and its people, including collapse of the old regime, division of the nation, and enormous human losses from civil war. Indeed, this practice of “forgetting” memories of the October Revolution is a continuing one. It started from the previous government under Yeltsin leadership (1992-1999), which tried to remove ideological symbols of socialist past that could be used by supporters of the Communist party, the Yeltsin government’s key political rival. Thus, the Yeltsin government shortened the holiday of the October Revolution and changed the name of the holiday from ‘Day of Great October Socialist Revolution’ to ‘Day of Accord and Reconciliation’ to redefine the meaning of the anniversary. The Putin government, pursuing social and political stability and unity of the nation, has continued to follow the so-called forgetting-policy of the previous government while criticizing the Bolshevik leadership, especially Lenin, as the force that conducted meaningless slaughter and laid a seed of future disunion of Russia. In contrast, citizens of contemporary Russia do not fully agree with the historical perspective ‘from above.’ Rather, ordinary Russian citizens still remember the October Revolution as a historical event that has contributed to socio-economic development of Russia while recognizing its negative impact on culture and religion. Unlike the political leadership, the ordinary people in Russia not only recognize damages, but also benefits brought by the revolution because they believe in the usefulness of historic lesson of the revolution in contemporary Russia.

전후 스탈린 시기 사회주의적 경쟁의 퇴조와 ‘대협약’의 성립, 1944-1953

송준서(Song Joonseo) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2009 슬라브학보 Vol.24 No.1

Drawing on the experiences of Magnitogorsk, a steel town in the Urals, and other heavy-industry enterprises and factories in the Cheliabinsk oblast of the Ural region, this case study examines Stalin regime's efforts to boost productivity after World War Ⅱ. Socialist competition that valued speed of labor and quantitative achievement was rejuvenated briefly in the early years of the war by the Stalin government; but competition began to lose its momentum again by the end of the war. Although the local party tried to emphasize the significance of competition, the factory officials and the technical personnel in Magnitogorsk depended much less on competition as a tool for raising productivity. Accordingly, workers' wage determination and the provision of incentives came to depend more on the significance of work in production rather than the extent of the achievement of output quotas. Surely these changes began to appear before the war, but came to be more consolidated after the war as the regime relied more on professionalization and rationalization than voluntarism to raise labor productivity. Under this circumstance, industrial managerial personnel's indifference to trainees in vocational schools and young unskilled workers was a very expectable consequence. During the hard times of the immediate postwar years, enterprise management "abandoned" the relatively easily replaceable work force. With the decline of voluntarism in production lines, workers were left with few practical chances to be promoted or to be better paid through governmental supported policies, such as the Stakhanovite movement. Not surprisingly, young and unskilled workers were the greatest victims of the Big Deal, characterized by the regime's preferential treatment of the technical intelligentsia.

학술마당 : 특집기사; 러시아 중앙연방관구를 가다 : 솔로비요바 나루터의 전쟁 기억

송준서 한국외국어대학교 러시아연구소 2013 Russia & Russian Federation Vol.4 No.3

특집기사 1 : “러시아의 방패”, 스몰렌스크를 다녀와서

송준서 한국외국어대학교 러시아연구소 2013 Russia & Russian Federation Vol.4 No.2

학술마당 : 연구노트: 러시아연방 인문공간 연구 ; 스몰렌스크아카이브의 운명이 -한국의 러시아 연구에 주는 시사점

송준서 한국외국어대학교 러시아연구소 2013 Russia & Russian Federation Vol.4 No.1

올가 공후의 부활

송준서 한국노어노문학회 2011 노어노문학 Vol.23 No.3

본고에서는 지난 20년간 탈소비에트 과정에서 프스코프 지역의 역사적 인물 올가 공후의 지역 상징으로서의 부상에 대해 살펴봄으로써 러시아 지방 엘리트들이 새로운 지역 상징을 이용해 어떻게 지역 정체성을 구축해 가고 있는지 고찰하였다. 올가 공후는 러시아 지도자 중 처음으로 기독교를 수용한 인물로 사후 러시아 정교회에 의해 최초의 여성 성인으로 시성된 인물이다. 프스코프 지역 엘리트들은 1990년대 초부터 올가의 고향 마을 복원은 물론 소비에트 시기 반종교정책의 일환으로 파괴되었던 올가 예배당을 재건하는데 주도적 역할을 함으로써 프스코프에서 올가에 대한 기억을 부활시켜왔다. 올가의 부활은 지역 엘리트들의 관심뿐만 아니라 외부, 특히 '중앙'으로부터의 관심과 지원으로 더 공고히 되었다. 정교를러시아 국가 통합 도구로 사용하려는 정치적 의도를 지닌 정부와 교회는 프스코프에 올가 동상의 설립을 적극 지원하였으며 올가 공후를 전러시아의 상징으로도 선전하였다. 이는 지방의 새로운 상징이 중앙의 이해관계와 일치할 경우 중앙이 지방의 상징을 선전하는데 에 적극 지원하고 있음을 보여준다. 이 외에도 종종 올가를 인용하여 정치적 메시지를 발표하는 지방 정치인들의 수사(修辭) 또한 프스코프 주민들이 올가 공후를 지역의 상징으로 인식하게 만듦으로써 지역 정체성 형성에 기여하고 있다. This paper examines the ways that local elites of Pskov have established a new local identity by using local symbols during the last twenty years of the Post-Soviet era. Considering the resurgence of the Russian Orthodox Church and its increasing role in social, cultural, and political spheres in contemporary Russia, the city of Pskov is worthy of attention. Pskov, one of the ancient cities mentioned in the oldest chronicle, is the hometown for Princess Olga, who was the first among the ruling group of Kievan Rus to convert to Christianity, In addition, she was the first woman to be sainted by the Russian Orthodox Church in Russian history. The local elite of Pskov, including employees of local museums, began their activity of rehabilitating historical symbols and memories related to Princess Olga in the early 1990s. They erected a memorial cross for Olga, organized tours to Vybuty, Olga's hometown located near Pskov, restored Olga's birthplace, and reconstructed the Chapel of Princess Olga, which had been demolished during the anti-religious campaign of the early 1960s. The restoration of the local symbol was not always forged by the initiation of the local elites, but by that of "outsiders," especially the central government. When the rehabilitation of local symbols fit the political goals of the central government, the center provided local elites with support for the revival of the symbol. The appearance of Princess Olga as a key symbol of Pskov in the public sphere, such as in streets, Parks and even the official rhetoric of local political and religious leaders, helped local people identify themselves in more religious and historical ways.

중앙-지방 관점에서 바라본 스탈린 시기 전쟁의 기억

송준서(Joonseo Song) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2013 슬라브학보 Vol.28 No.1

This paper focuses two main points. Firstly, the way that Soviet local officials and elites of the front region, especially Leningrad and Sevastopol, commemorated World War II during the postwar Stalin years. Secondly, the way that Stalin regime responded to the practice of commemorating the war. Both Leningrad and Sevastopol located in the wartime front region, experienced a siege by the Nazi German army from the beginning of World War II. While Leningrad was liberated by the Soviet army in 1944, after the 900-day-siege, Sevastopol, a home port of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet located in the Crimean Peninsula, was occupied by the German army after the 250-day-siege for two years. By the end of the war Leningrad party and governmental officials had a strong sense of local patriotism, because of their own sacrifices and ability to survive without military or material support from Moscow during the siege. Based on the local patriotism, the local elites frequently eulogized the effectiveness of their wartime leadership, however remained silent on the role of Stalin and the central government during the siege of Leningrad. The Stalinist leadership, which could not allow such “anti-party” behavior from the local elites, persecuted them by using coercion, such as imprisonment. In contrast, the Stalinist leadership agreed to Sevastopol officials’ reconstruction plan, which was heavily drawn from history and culture, while it criticized a Moscow officials" reconstruction plan that emphasized socialist ideology and the victory of war. Therefore, it has been shown that the Stalinist leadership controlled war memories of local elites not only by using coercion, but also through accommodation, only when the local memories of the war would not undermine the authority of the Stalinist government.