셰르바토프의 『러시아의 도덕적 타락에 대하여』에 나타난 18세기 상류층 생활양식 변화에 대한 인식

송준서 ( Joon Seo Song ) 서울대학교 러시아연구소 2011 러시아연구 Vol.21 No.1

This paper examines the ways that Mikhail M. Shcherbatov(1733-1790), historian, man of letter and public servant, criticized daily life of the 18th century Russian nobility by analyzing his monograph, On the Corruption of Morals in Russia. The main goal of this study is to explore the social, cultural, and economic implications imbedded in Shcherbatov`s criticisms of Russian nobles` daily life, which had been heavily influenced by the importation of western culture and customs during the reign of Peter the Great in the early eighteenth century. Shcherbatov showed that daily life of the Russian nobility radically transformed due to Peter I`s policy of westernization. Many Russian nobles came to blindly imitate western culture, such as following French fashions, manners, and language, while some nobles pursued extravagant life by consuming luxurious foreign goods and exotic food. Shcherbatov also strongly criticized the decline of religiosity and the pursuit of a decadent private life by the noble class. He argued that adulterous and unlawful marriages as well as divorces increased among members of high society during the eighteenth century. Although Shcherbatov categorized these post-Petrine reform phenomena as the examples of "corruption of morals," it should be noted that his categorization was based heavily on personal views of ethic and moral. Despite Shcherbatov`s subjective and personal approach to Russian society, his descriptions of the corruption of morals still give us very useful insight into the social, cultural, and economic life of the period. Shcherbatov`s strong criticism of Russian nobles` thoughtless imitation of western culture indicates that Russian national consciousness began to emerge as a result of westernization during the eighteenth century. Luxurious and extravagant life of the nobility indicates that material life became much prosperous during the period while the decline of religiosity and increase in decadent private life implies the emancipation of the individuals from the domination of trladition and religious rituals. In this sense, therefore, Shcherbatov`s On the Corruption of Morals is a valuable historical source which helps us understand the social and cultural characteristics of the post-Petrine reform era of the eighteenth century.

제2차 세계대전 이후 스탈린 정권의 소비에트 정체성 재정립 노력

송준서 ( Joon Seo Song ) 한국서양사학회 2008 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.99

우랄 지역의 고려인 커뮤니티와 한국학 연구, 1991-2003

송준서 ( Song Joon-seo ) 배재대학교 한국-시베리아센터 2004 한국시베리아연구 Vol.7 No.-

소련방이 붕괴한 이후 우랄 지역 고려인 커뮤니티는 급격한 변화를 경험하고 있다. 커뮤니티 규모의 확대와 한국학의 발전이 그 주요 변화 이다. 우랄 지역 고려인 커뮤니티는 중앙아시아, 러시아의 극동지방이 나 모스크바, 쌍뜨뻬쩨르부르그 등지에 비해 상대적으로 규모가 작아 그 동안 우리의 관심이 적었다. 그러나 1990년대 중반 이후 중앙아시아로부터 보다 나은 경제 여건을 찾아 우랄 지방으로 들어오는 고려인 들이 급증해 기존의 이 지역 고려인 커뮤니티가 급속히 확장되고 있다. 최근에는 중국으로부터의 조선족의 이주도 증가하여 이 지역 한인 커뮤니티는 점차 다양성을 더해가고 있다. 중앙아시아로부터 이주한 고려 인들은 조선족들에 비해 러시아어도 능통하고 러시아화된 생활 습관 및 의식 등 기존의 고려인 커뮤니티와 공유점이 많아 융합이 잘 되고 있는 편이지만, 조선족들의 경우 언어, 생활 배경 등의 상이점으로 인해 고려인 커뮤니티와는 큰 교류가 없는 상황이다. 한국학의 태동 및 발전은 소련방 체제의 몰락이후 우랄 지역 고려인 커뮤니티가 겪고 있는 또 하나의 커다란 변화이다. 러시아내 여타 지역의 주요 고려인 커뮤니티와 마찬가지로 1980년대 말 90년대 초반 당 시 소련내의 소수민족 독립운동과 한-러 외교관계 수립에 영향받은 우랄 지역 고려인 지식인들은 소비에트 시기 동안 잊혀졌던 민족 정체성을 되찾기 위해 1991-93년 사이 예까쩨린부르그, 첼야빈스크 등지에 고려인 협회들이 결성되어 한국 문화, 풍습을 함께 모여 기리기 시작했다. 또한 첼야빈스크의 경우 1990년대 중반부터 고려인 대상으로 한국어 수업이 시작되고, 예까쩨린부르그에서는 2001년부터 우랄국립대학교에 서 한국어 강의가 시작되었으며, 2002년에는 우랄 지역 최초로 대학교 에 한국문화센터가 문을 열었다. 더욱 인상적인 것은 고려인 커뮤니티 가 거의 형성되어있지 않은 마그니또고르스크에서 한국미술사를 전공한 러시아인 교수에 의해 한국미술사와 한국문화 전반이 러시아 대학생들 에게 소개되고 있다는 점이다. 그러나 모스크바, 쌍뜨뻬쩨르부르그, 중앙아시아 등 한국학 연구의 오랜 역사와 풍부한 인력을 지닌 지역에 비하면 우랄 지역의 한국학 연구는 이제 시작단계에 있다 하겠다. 우랄 지역의 한국학 연구자들이 가지고 있는 가장 큰 문제점은 첫째, 한국학 입문의 기본 요건인 한국어를 가르칠 교사가 없다는 점, 그리고 한국의 문화, 역사 등에 관심을 가지고 있는 젊은 고려인 세대나 러시아 학생들의 호기심을 유인하고 깊이 있는 연구를 자극할 수 있는 한국학 관련 자료가 극히 부족하다는 것이다. 현재 이러한 문제에 대한 현실적인 해결책은 우랄 지역 내에 서로 연관 없이 흩어져 있는 한국 학 연구 관련자들이 정기적으로 모여 한국학 연구의 성과에 대한 토론은 물론 자료, 정보, 그리고 인력을 교환 할 수 있는 “장”을 마련하는 것이다. 또한 우랄 지역 고려인 커뮤니티에 대해 앞으로 더 연구되어야 할 부분은 기존의 고려인 커뮤니티와 중앙아시아 지역에서 이주한 고려인들과의 관계, 그리고 문화, 언어, 생활환경의 차이로 서로 다른 상황에서 살아가고 있는 조선족 커뮤니티와 고려인 커뮤니티와의 관계 도 이 지역 고려인 커뮤니티의 성격을 더 깊이 이해하기 위해 수행되어져야 할 것이다. This paper examines changes that Korean communities in the Urals have experienced during the first decade after the Soviet Union collapsed. The most prominent changes in the communities were a demographic expansion caused by the migration of Russian-Koreans from Central Asia from the early and mid 1990s and the rise of Korean studies prompted by the awakening of ethnic identity among Russian-Koreans, especially the older generation. Unfortunately, such noticeable changes in Korean communities in the Urals have received little attention until now, because of their relatively small size, compared to those in Central Asia, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Far East. A lack of prominent Korean studies programs in the Ural region has also contributed to our negligence of Korean communities in this region. My research shows that Korean communities in the Urals have gradually changed during the last decade. The size of the communities has doubled and become more diverse and heterogeneous due to the increasing number of both Russian-Koreans from Central Asia and Chinese-Koreans from China, the former seeking a more stable life in the booming Russian economy and the latter drawn to Russia's businesses in market. Thus, the Korean communities in the region can now be categorized by three major groups: firstly, second and third generations of Russian-Koreans who were sent to the Urals as factory workers by the Stalin regime during World War II and those who moved onto receive a higher education mainly from Central Asia after the mid 1950s; secondly, "new" Russian-Koreans who migrated from Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet system; and thirdly, the Chinese-Koreans, who recently migrated from China. My research indicates that Koreans from Central Asia who share the same Russified (and Sovietized) culture and language with the Russian-Koreans in the Urals have successfully integrated into the Ural Korean communities. In contrast, the Chinese-Koreans who do not speak Russian fluently and have heterogeneous, non-Russian culture have not developed strong relationships with Russian-Korean communities in the region. The separation--intentional or unintentional--of these Chinese-Koreans from Russian-Korean communities has resulted in their involvement in small religious meetings led by South Korean missionaries. The rise of Korean studies is another key change in the communities. Provoked both by nationalist movement of the non-Russian nationalities in the late 1980s and by the establishment of the diplomatic relationship between Russian and South Korean governments in the early 1990s, some local Russian-Korean elites sought to reconstruct their own ethnic identities by creating Korean studies programs. In major cities in the Urals, like Ekaterinburg and Cheliabinsk, Korean Culture Centers were opened by the efforts of the local Korean elites in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Also, Ekaterinburg State University, a major university in the Urals, started Korean language courses in 2001. In addition to the local Russian-Korean elites, some Russian scholars and students have also contributed to the development of Korean studies in the region. For example, in Magnitogorsk, Korean art history and culture have been taught in a university by a local Russian Koreanist. Yet, despite the recent rise of Korean studies, it is still in the beginning stage. No institutes in the Urals offer a comprehensive Korean studies program that includes language, literature, history, and politics and economy, etc. Further, a lack of human and material resources, such as language teachers and published materials on Korean studies are key obstacles to the development of Korean studies in this region. My research suggests that given conditions, the most effective way to promote Korean studies in this region is to organize regular meetings among the regional Koreanists. Further studies on the relationship among three groups in Korean communities will provide us with more nuanced understandings of the complicated nature of Korean communities in the Urals.

대중잡지『불꽃(Огонёк)』에 나타난 소비에트 병사 이미지의 정치적 함의, 1944-1953

송준서(Song Joon Seo) 한국노어노문학회 2009 노어노문학 Vol.21 No.3

본 연구는 전후 스탈린 정권이 예술을 통해 어떻게 인민들의 전쟁에 대한 기억을 통제하고 조종하려 했는지를 소련의 대표적 대중잡지『불꽃』에 실린 소비에트 병사 이미지와 그에 담긴 정치, 사회적 의미의 분석을 통해 밝히고자 하였다. 제2차 세계대전 직후 스탈린 정권은 전쟁동안 엄청난 인적, 물적 희생을 당하고 육체적, 정신적 고통을 겪은 소련 인민들의 전쟁 기억을 정권에 유리한 방향으로 재구성하기 위해 노력하였다. 스탈린 정권이 두려워했던 것은 인민들이 전쟁의 아픔을 되새기면서 전쟁 초기 나치 독일의 공세에 적절한 대응을 하지 못했던 정부를 비난하게 되는 것이었다. 또한 스탈린은 전쟁의 승리가 인민들의 영웅적이고 희생적인 헌신보다는 자신의 뛰어난 지도력의 결과로 인식되기를 바랐다. 1946년 중반을 기점으로『불꽃』지에서 병사의 영웅적인 모습, 부상당한 모습이 평온하고 낙관적이며, 스탈린에 종속된 병사의 이미지로 대체된 것은 스탈린 지도부의 전쟁 기억 재구성 의도가 반영된 결과인 것이었다. After World War II, the images of Soviet soldiers presented in Ogonek, a Soviet popular magazine, began to change. During the war and immediately after, that is, up to the mid 1946 soldiers were frequently portrayed as heroic warriors in intense battlefields, or liberators who saved Soviet citizens from German occupation. At the same time, the hardship of the soldiers during the war was to be expressed in the magazine. Ogonek presented paintings portraying wounded war heroes. However, the images of the soldiers as war heroes, or as war victims gradually disappeared from the magazine from mid 1946 and replaced with those of soldiers with new images-i.e., peaceful, happy, humane new and warm images of soldiers who were loyal to Stalin. Examining the reason why those images of soldiers changed and what the political and social implications in the new images were, this article explores the ways that the Stalin leadership manipulated the popular memories of the war. Because Stalin wanted to be the only postwar hero after the war, he attempted to play down the status of war heroes. In addition, he did not want Soviet citizens to remember the tragic wartime episodes which could remind them of the Soviet government's mistake especially during the first stage of the war that caused a great loss of Soviet people. Reenforcement of socialist realism from the mid-1946 was another reason that the grime images of soldiers, such as those of wounded or dead soldiers, were to disappear in Ogonek. According to socialist realism, the hardship of the present day was not allowed to be presented; only a bright, conflict-free, optimistic future was to be presented.

기억과 망각 사이에서 -현대 러시아의 1917년 10월 혁명 기억 -

송준서 ( Song Joon-seo ) 한국서양사학회 2018 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.137

2017년 러시아혁명 100주년을 맞이한 푸틴 정부는 공식 기념행사를 일절 치르지 않았다. 사실 푸틴 정부는 최근 10월 혁명에 대해 일관되게 부정적 평가를 내려왔다. 즉, 10월 혁명은 국론을 분열시키고 곧 이어진 내전으로 수많은 러시아 국민의 희생을 가져온 불미스러운 사건으로 묘사했고 혁명 직후 볼셰비키 지도부의 무자비한 살상을 비난함과 동시에 초기 실책이 훗날 러시아 영토의 분열을 초래했다고 비난했다. 이러한 소위 혁명에 대한 ‘망각 정치’는 1990년대 공산주의 세력을 억누르기 위해 노력했던 옐친 정부시기부터 체계적으로 시작된 것이었다. 하지만 일반 시민들의 혁명에 대한 기억과 평가는 정치 지도부의 견해와는 달랐다. 정권 유지와 안정을 추구하는 정치 지도자에게 혁명은 망각되어야할 사건이었지만 민중들에게 10월 혁명은 현재적 의미를 지닌 사건으로 국가 발전에 긍정적 영향과 부정적 영향 모두를 끼쳤던 아직은 기억되어야할 역사적 사건으로 남아있다. The contemporary Russian government led by President Putin did not officially celebrate the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution by claiming that the revolution mostly produced negative impact on the country and its people, including collapse of the old regime, division of the nation, and enormous human losses from civil war. Indeed, this practice of “forgetting” memories of the October Revolution is a continuing one. It started from the previous government under Yeltsin leadership (1992-1999), which tried to remove ideological symbols of socialist past that could be used by supporters of the Communist party, the Yeltsin government’s key political rival. Thus, the Yeltsin government shortened the holiday of the October Revolution and changed the name of the holiday from ‘Day of Great October Socialist Revolution’ to ‘Day of Accord and Reconciliation’ to redefine the meaning of the anniversary. The Putin government, pursuing social and political stability and unity of the nation, has continued to follow the so-called forgetting-policy of the previous government while criticizing the Bolshevik leadership, especially Lenin, as the force that conducted meaningless slaughter and laid a seed of future disunion of Russia. In contrast, citizens of contemporary Russia do not fully agree with the historical perspective ‘from above.’ Rather, ordinary Russian citizens still remember the October Revolution as a historical event that has contributed to socio-economic development of Russia while recognizing its negative impact on culture and religion. Unlike the political leadership, the ordinary people in Russia not only recognize damages, but also benefits brought by the revolution because they believe in the usefulness of historic lesson of the revolution in contemporary Russia.

제2차 세계대전과 소련 젊은이들의 반체제 운동

송준서 ( Joon Seo Song ) 한국서양사학회 2009 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.103

This paper investigates the way in which World War II affected the behaviors and attitudes of Soviet youth who were teenagers during the war period. The experiences of the war made the cohort a unique generation, distinctive for a number of reasons from their predecessors who grew up in peace time. First of all, like members of the older generation who fought for victory in the war, the youth gained a strong sense of entitlement from their contributions to the war effort. During the war, Soviet youth fought against the Nazis on the front or in the occupied territories as soldiers or partisans, while on the home front they labored in the deteriorating working and living conditions of the industrial complexes and construction sites. Secondly, the hardship of the war turned them into more autonomous and independent citizens. During the war, young people faced situations that forced them to make decisions by themselves. Although the older generation shared similar wartime experiences, their political attitudes differed largely from those of the teenagers. Many members of the older generation who had firsthand experiences of Stalin`s terror during the late 1930s either remained silent or conformed to the official ideology. But the generation of students who grew up during the war proved to be more independent in their thinking and behavior than the older generation. Disillusioned at the gap between political propaganda and the reality of postwar hardship, the young people opposed the authorities` suppression of the pursuit of values youth believed were important. Criticizing Stalin`s deviation from Marxism and Leninism, these students organized dissident political organizations that pursued the construction of a true socialist society. The existence of dissident youth groups in the late Stalin era indicates that both de-Stalinization and the dissident movement started not during the Khrushchev era, but even before Stalin died in 1953.

1920∼30년대 경제정책을 통해 본 소련의 중앙-지방 관계

송준서 ( Joon Seo Song ) 한국서양사학회 2014 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.123

Analyzing the decision-making processes of the Soviet economic policies during the 1920s and 1930s, this paper explores not only the ways that the central leadership governed the regional authorities, but also the strategies that the local leadership used against the central government in order to pursue local interests. Focusing on the Ukrainian, Karelian, and Ural regions, which represent industrial centers or borderland areas, this paper examines how the relationship between the central and local governments changed as Stalin consolidated his power in the party in the late 1920s. It considers to what extent the administrative-command system, characterized by the center`s strong control of decision making, failed. This study indicates that, despite the increased control of the Stalinist leadership over the region from the late 1920s, the local authorities continued their practice of negotiating with the center. They did this by lobbying key figures, such as Stalin and other top party-leaders, to persuade and push the central authorities to make decisions favoring local economies. Although the Stalinist leadership increased its capacity to control local authorities by restricting their autonomy and purging local leaders who built strong local networks based on the patronage system, the central leadership could not fully control them. The central government, which suffered from an insufficient number of officials in the central economic organizations, was unable to control the local authorities. It also had to depend on these authorities to obtain necessary information on local economies and industries to establish and carry out centralized economic plans.

포스트소비에트 시기 러시아 지역 정체성 변화

송준서(Song Joon-Seo) 한국슬라브유라시아학회 2010 슬라브학보 Vol.25 No.4

This paper seeks to explore the local identities of the industrial towns dominated by a single industry or factory (monogorods) in the Ural region by examining the social, economic, and historical experiences of the towns during the Soviet and Post-Soviet years. Although many Russian scholars believe that regional identity did not develop in Russia due to its strong tradition of centralism, this study shows that “imagined communities” developed among the urban residents of the monogorods in the Ural region. Analysis of rhetoric during the postwar Stalin years demonstrates that the locals developed a strong sense of pride in their hometowns by internalizing official propaganda portraying those towns as hero cities contributing to the victory of World War II. Some of the most noticeable changes occurring in those towns during the post-Soviet era include local residents' increasing sense of integration into a globalized world and growing efforts of both regional governments and elites to create “new” regional symbols. Many local residents whose hometowns remained closed to the outside world until the end of the Soviet era now realize that their towns inevitably became a part of the globalized world as their towns came under the direct impact of global finance, economics, and culture. In addition, local governments began to change cities’ coats-of-arms in order to redefine the identities of their cities after the fall of the Soviet Union. They invented new symbols by adopting historical and traditional elements of the local towns, both in those cities’ coats-of-arms and in the public spaces.

The Impact of World War 2 on the Formation of the Home-Front Identities

송준서 ( Joon Seo Song ) 한국외국어대학교 외국학종합연구센터 러시아연구소 2008 슬라브연구 Vol.24 No.2

탈소비에트 러시아 국경지방의 상징 만들기 -프스코프의 상징, 알렉산드르 네프스키-

송준서 ( Joon Seo Song ) 한국서양사학회 2012 西洋史論 Vol.0 No.112

This paper examines the ways in which the local authorities and elite invented a new symbol of Pskov, a Russian borderland located in the northwest region, by redefining Alexander Nevsky, 1220-1263,, the Prince of Novgorod. Prince Nevsky rose to legendary status after his military victories against foreign invaders, such as Germans, Swedes, and Poles, who tried to occupy the Pskov region. The Russian Orthodox Church also canonized Nevsky as a saint in the mid sixteenth century. During the Soviet period, Prince Nevsky was a national hero rather than a local hero of Pskov. While the Stalin regime used Nevsky as a tool for Soviet propaganda mainly for a military purpose during the Great Patriotic War, the local authorities of Pskov did not have the right to utilize him for local interests and the formation of local identity because the center often controlled and intervened the process of forging local identities. This situation changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For the local authorities and elite of the borderland called a fortress of Russia, Prince Nevsky, who defeated foreign invaders and saved Russian territories and the Orthodox faith, is indeed a right figure to propagate as a symbol of Pskov. The local government began to localize Nevsky as a townsman by emphasizing the relations between the Pskov region and Nevsky. Unlike the Soviet period, the Pskov media and religious leaders also began to portray him in a religious manner as they presented him as a saint in response to the increasing influences of the Orthodox Church in local society and politics. This indicates that the local authorities and elite redefined a national hero for local interests.