Whither Institutionalizing of Cooperation in Northeast Asia?

( Georgy D. Toloraya ) 국방대학교 안보문제연구소 2007 The Korean Journal of Security Affairs Vol.12 No.2

From the end of 20th century the global and regional tendencies are on the increase to establishmultilateral security and cooperation arrangements in North East Asia. The Six-Party Talks, formally started over the North Korean nuclear problem, gradually encompass wider security issues, without agreeing on which even the nuclear problem can`t be solved. Six-party structure wouldalso have to become a mechanism to monitor any agreements if reached between the opponents. A potential is gaining momentum for eventual transformation of this structure into a multilateral regional organization -North East Asia Security and Cooperation Forum. The process cannot but be very slow, multi-staged and non-confrontational. However there is obvious support to it from China, Russia, South Korea, current US administration. Such an organization could have a mandate including: ·finding common ground for traditional security issues, promoting confidence-building measures ·agreeing on common response to new non-traditional challenges and threats and providing a framework for coordinated efforts in this area; ·being instrumental in joint research of modalities of region-wide economic cooperation (including FTAs) ·coordinating economic assistance to DPRK ·making multilateral arrangements for inter-civilizational communications and cultural exchange.

North Korean Energy Problems and Solutions: A Russian Perspective

Georgy Toloraya,Marina Trigubenko 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2008 Pacific Focus Vol.23 No.1

The Energy situation in DPRK remains very difficult and could prevent economic progress of the country even if large foreign assistance and investment would be at hand. Analysis of the country’s energy supply and demand patterns shows that the energy-hungry outdated industries and wastefulness in the use of energy due to lack of incentives lead to a much higher energy per unit of GDP use than in comparable economies. On the other side the domestic supply is limited, while the lack of financing sources limits the external supply. DPRK cannot attain energy security on its own: this is the priority task for international assistance, especially in the context of the 6-party peace process. Suggested measures include modernization of energy sector management, introducing internationally-funded system of training of personnel, energy sector facilities modernization, new objects construction and innovation (including nuclear energy generation development, interconnection of Russian Far East power grid with North and South Korea, projected gas pipelines). South Korean role is very important and its assistance should be coordinated with broader international aid in the framework of 6 party talks. Multilateral energy assistance arrangements, including a possible consortium should be considered. Such a body could draw a comprehensive plan of DPRK’s energy production and consumption patterns and the needed investment correlated with the overall prognosis of DPRK’s economic development.

Russian policy in Korea in a time of change

Georgy Toloraya 한국국방연구원 2009 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.21 No.1

The Korean Peninsula

Georgy Toloraya 동아시아재단 2012 Global Asia Vol.7 No.2

Neither Peace, Nor War in Korea: A Russian Assessment of Past, Present and Future

Georgy Toloraya 통일연구원 2010 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.19 No.1

The lessons of history show that the situation in Korea remains a security threat for Russia. Although the nuclear/missile programs of North Korea (seen in Russia as a response by Pyongyang to the threats its the very regime’s existence) are causing concern in Russia, they cannot be solved separately without addressing the broader security regime issues in Korea. The multilateral diplomatic process, when and if it is resumed in the aftermath of the tragic “Cheonan” incident, should have on its agenda not only denuclearization, but also security guarantees for the DPRK, as well as a regional security regime as a mechanism to manage these guarantees. The US is to play a pivotal role in such a change of approaches as well as in engaging Pyongyang. The North Korean regime shows no signs of imminent collapse and should be dealt with as a long-term actor in Korea. As pressure and sanctions do not help obtain the goals of denuclearization, peace, stability and development, an engagement policy with the North to bring about transformation and modernization of the regime is the only answer. Much will depend on South Korea’s ability to recognize this reality and act accordingly,which could bring its partnership with Russia to a truly strategic level.

Russia’s “Turn to the East” Policy: Role of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula

Georgy Toloraya,Vorontsov A. V. 통일연구원 2015 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.24 No.3

Russia’'s “turn to the East” was not only the reaction to the rift with the West, but a long-term policy started since the turn of the century. Northeast Asia is the gate for Russia to Asia and the Pacific while Korean Peninsula can be the key to Northeast Asia for Russia. Russia is a stakeholder in the unification issue, which is far from solution because of different concepts of the two parties. Moscow does not support pressure or sanctions, but the multilateral political process. In 2014-2015, the considerable upsurge in political contacts and economic interaction with North Korea took place. North Korea approves of Russia's strong anti-dominance stance in world affairs and would like to avoid overdependence on China. However, the discussed economic projects are yet to be materialized. Russia sees trilateral and multilateral projects with the participation of both Koreas as the most effective tool for a breakthrough in economic cooperation for prosperity in Korean Peninsula.

The Security Crisis in Korea and its International Context: Sources and Lessons from a Russian Perspective

( Georgy Toloraya ) 한국국방연구원 2011 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.23 No.3

Despite constant fluctuations between tensions and detente on the Korean peninsula, the crisis in 2010, including the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyong Island shelling has proved to become the most dangerous in decades―without obvious new reasons or new contradictions to justify it. After President Lee Myung Bak`s coming to power in South Korea, Pyongyang developed suspicions over his new hard-line stance and demands for denuclearization. North Korea thought that Seoul`s call for reforms were merely a cover to undermine their regime and it took seriously the desire by Southern conservatives for "early reunification" and thus resorted to military provocations. Meanwhile, the U.S. Obama administration chose to abstain from any meaningful policy toward North Korea, while China played a more active role in supporting Pyongyang and Russian policy, which is based on the priority of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. All issues should be decided by political and diplomatic means without the use of force, threats, pressure, or isolation. Improvements in North-South relations, DPRK dialogue with the West, and a multilateral format are essential prerequisites for realizing a new security system in Korea that takes into account the interests of all parties. Only this can avert a new crisis. The author suggests a return to engagement and the promotion of slow evolutionary changes in North Korea by giving the current ruling elite tangible guarantees of security on the condition that the North would change its domestic and international behavior.

OVERCOMING THE KOREAN CRISIS: SHORT- AND LONG-TERM OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS BY A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

Georgy Toloraya 통일연구원 2003 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.12 No.2

A military solution to North Korean nuclear crisis is now widely regarded as unacceptable. The US administration’s new policy was seen by Kim Jong Il as aiming at regime change. The failure to address this concerns in October 2002 led to North Korean creating the “nuclear deterrent.” Even short of a war the collapse of Pyongyang regime would mean the disappearance of the country itself.absorption of North by South. The occupation won’t be peaceful, given the differences between Northerners and Southerners. “Slow-burning” conflict can continue for decades as a far-eastern edition of Israel-Palestinian conflict. The change in paradigm of the regime could instead ease not only WMD but other concerns. Kim Jong Il’s state differs from that of his father, it can no longer be described as Stalinist. The economy has already changed from a centrally planned one to a mixed type, combining state, capitalist, semiprivate and “shadow” sectors. Further transformation could include main power bodies (military, party, local, secret services) creating economic conglomerates resembling South Korean “chaebols.” Nationalistic ideology becomes a basis for legitimacy of Kim Jong Il’s clan power and for deeper integra- tion with South Korea. But Pyongyang would probably try to keep its nuclear weapons at all costs, even if in the course of 6- party talks which could agree to forego the nuclear program as well as other WMD production and exports (Indian model). Sanctions and isolation cannot be a final option, and provided the conditions for regime transformation would be secured, such a solution could be better than any other. A military solution to North Korean nuclear crisis is now widely regarded as unacceptable. The US administration’s new policy was seen by Kim Jong Il as aiming at regime change. The failure to address this concerns in October 2002 led to North Korean creating the “nuclear deterrent.” Even short of a war the collapse of Pyongyang regime would mean the disappearance of the country itself.absorption of North by South. The occupation won’t be peaceful, given the differences between Northerners and Southerners. “Slow-burning” conflict can continue for decades as a far-eastern edition of Israel-Palestinian conflict. The change in paradigm of the regime could instead ease not only WMD but other concerns. Kim Jong Il’s state differs from that of his father, it can no longer be described as Stalinist. The economy has already changed from a centrally planned one to a mixed type, combining state, capitalist, semiprivate and “shadow” sectors. Further transformation could include main power bodies (military, party, local, secret services) creating economic conglomerates resembling South Korean “chaebols.” Nationalistic ideology becomes a basis for legitimacy of Kim Jong Il’s clan power and for deeper integra- tion with South Korea. But Pyongyang would probably try to keep its nuclear weapons at all costs, even if in the course of 6- party talks which could agree to forego the nuclear program as well as other WMD production and exports (Indian model). Sanctions and isolation cannot be a final option, and provided the conditions for regime transformation would be secured, such a solution could be better than any other.

"A Turn to the Right?" A Russian Comment on the North Korean Policy of ROK Conservative Government

Georgy Toloraya 통일연구원 2008 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.17 No.1

Since the election of a conservative government in Seoul in 2008, the situation on the Korean peninsula has deteriorated considerably. President Lee Myung bak’s hard-line policy toward the North provoked a Northern backlash and inter Korean relations have nosedived. As a result, the ROK has sidelined itself from the diplomatic process of searching for a solution to the North Korean security problem which does not bring such a solution any closer, which in turn causes concern. The ROK international position and its leverage in North Korea seem to have deteriorated. Russia supports North South Korean reconciliation and cooperation as a prerequisite for promoting peace and security in the neighboring area, which is the chief goal of Russian strategy on the Korean peninsula. A deterioration in the situation is not in line with Russian policies on Korea and Russian concepts of the desired state of affairs in this region. The US conservative administration similarly started with a hard line policy toward Pyongyang but had to turn to dialogue and search for a compromise. In line with policy coordination with the US, the Lee Myung bak’s government should study this lesson and hopefully turn to more pragmatic policy sooner than the former did. That would create the necessary prerequisites for a broader degree of cooperation between Moscow and Seoul in Korean affairs and would benefit Russia, South and North Korea alike. Since the election of a conservative government in Seoul in 2008, the situation on the Korean peninsula has deteriorated considerably. President Lee Myung bak’s hard-line policy toward the North provoked a Northern backlash and inter Korean relations have nosedived. As a result, the ROK has sidelined itself from the diplomatic process of searching for a solution to the North Korean security problem which does not bring such a solution any closer, which in turn causes concern. The ROK international position and its leverage in North Korea seem to have deteriorated. Russia supports North South Korean reconciliation and cooperation as a prerequisite for promoting peace and security in the neighboring area, which is the chief goal of Russian strategy on the Korean peninsula. A deterioration in the situation is not in line with Russian policies on Korea and Russian concepts of the desired state of affairs in this region. The US conservative administration similarly started with a hard line policy toward Pyongyang but had to turn to dialogue and search for a compromise. In line with policy coordination with the US, the Lee Myung bak’s government should study this lesson and hopefully turn to more pragmatic policy sooner than the former did. That would create the necessary prerequisites for a broader degree of cooperation between Moscow and Seoul in Korean affairs and would benefit Russia, South and North Korea alike.

Solving the Korean Conundrum: Russia’s Interaction with Major Actors in the Trump-Moon Era

Georgy Toloraya,Vassily Gabets 통일연구원 2017 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.26 No.1

Russia seeing peace, stability and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula as priorities, will try to play the role of peacemaker and more or less neutral observer in a situation which has shifted due to the new leadership in Seoul and Washington. The authors argue that Russia should pay special attention the role of Moon Jae In. If he can implement a new policy, this could be a game-changer and Seoul could become the principal partner for Russia in solving the Korean conundrum. If the Trump administration would turn from pressure to diplomacy, possibilities for US-Russia cooperation could increase. Russia would mostly support Chinese positions but keep its own line. Understanding such tactics in this strategic triangle is the key to understanding Moscow’s efforts regarding the Korean problem, including multilateral aspects. At the same time, Russia cannot ignore North Korea being one of the few neighboring countries maintaining good relations with Pyongyang. The authors suggest the options for a start of a diplomatic process between the two Koreas and between North Korea and the U.S., as well as in multilateral format and analyze the role Russia might play.