평등의 의미와 우리 사회에서의 분배의 문제

선혜영(Hae-Young Sun) 전남대학교 종교문화연구소 2012 종교문화학보 Vol.9 No.-

The concept of the equality is which distribution lies. Typically, Everyone accepts human is equality. But the proposition is arguing. Really the principle is still under discussion about what that means. The notion of equality for the distribution of wealth is carrying a certain influence is still there is no consensus about. This proposition is the foundation for what lies over the course of checking the racial and gender discrimination on the basis of the legitimacy of the approaching presence and distribution in our society tries to find the most suitable criteria. Today, In Capitalist society distribution is very important problem. The distribution system is relative to whether the distribution should be followed by many comments. In that sense, the concept of equality in various aspects of the relationship and distribution on the basis of what capitalism look and its distribution in the most appropriate way to identify what you want. The equality of all human beings are equal is not a realistic concept but 'what should-be' concept. In fact, the genetic causes or environmental causes on that truth is not easy to maintain. Genetic differences, because nobody is undeniable, and environmental equality is impossible because in real life situations. Even so, it does not means that human beings are not equal. All people are different, but do not unequal. We are equal in institution and in society. Communist equality that all people working according to your needs according to his ability to work are urged to make a society. Because a lack of goods we already failed. It show that limitations of the communist social equality. But its significance should not be disposed of. Furthermore, the utilitarian social welfare for the majority has the problem that sacrifice of a few. In order to overcome these problems, Rawls assumed the contract status of human original position. The principle of justice should be satisfied that total income of the least advantaged is such as to maximize their long run expectations. In this sense, when we consider the distribution, not some direction how to get out towards the particular theory or scheme taking an exclusive attitude, but a the case of a claim should be depend on the case. Therefore each claiming should be applied considering to their meaning and intentions with respect to a implication in our society.

민사집행에 있어서 압류채권자에 대한 평등주의와 우선주의

김경욱 한국민사집행법학회 2012 民事執行法硏究 : 韓國民事執行法學會誌 Vol.8 No.-

금전채권에 기한 강제집행절차에서 압류채권자 이외에 다른 채권자가 강제 집행절차에 참가하는 경우 이들 채권자들을 어떻게 취급할 것인지에 관해 각 국에서는 그 법적 토양과 실체법질서 등과의 관계를 고려하여 다양한 기준이 제시되고 있으며, 이는 크게 독일과 영미제국이 채택하고 있는 우선주의, 우리 나라와 프랑스 민사소송법이 채택하고 있는 평등주의 및 스위스의 군단우선 주의로 나뉘어 발전하였다. 우선주의는 강제집행절차에 참가한 순서에 따라 먼저 강제집행에 착수하여 압류한 채권자에게 우선적으로 그 채권의 전부에 대해 만족을 얻을 수 있는 권리를 주는 것인 반면, 평등주의는 어떤 채권자에 의해 개시된 강제집행절차에 참가한 모든 채권자를 평등하게 취급하는 주의 로서 만약 채권자의 만족에 제공할 수 있는 채무자의 재산이 총채권액에 미치 지 못하는 경우에는 각 채권자의 채권액에 비례하여 배당이 이루어지게 된다. 군단우선주의는 이러한 양자의 중간적 단계에 해당하는 입장을 취하여 채권 자가 집행절차에 참가한 시점을 몇 개의 기간으로 나누어 선순위 기간에 절차 에 참가한 채권자들(군단)에게는 우선주의를 취하여 배당에 우선권을 부여하 고, 각 군단내의 채권자들 사이에는 평등주의를 취하여 평등한 배당이 이루어 지도록 하는 것이다. 본 논문은 현재 우리나라가 취하고 있는 평등주의가 과연 정당한 것인가에 대한 의문에서 출발하여 보다 합리적인 배당순위에 대한 기준을 모색해 보는 것을 목적으로 한다. 이를 위해 우선주의, 평등주의 및 군단우선주의를 취하 고 있는 주요국가들의 입법상황에 대해 살펴보고 각 제도들이 가지는 장점과 단점에 대해 비교분석해 보았다. 나아가 평등주의를 따르고 있는 우리 민사집 행절차의 문제점과 이를 극복하기 위한 지금까지의 우리의 노력에 대해서도 살펴보았다. 나아가 이러한 논의를 바탕으로 우선주의가 가지는 집행절차를 단순화하고 간명하게 할 수 있다는 이점에 터잡아 개별강제집행의 영역에서 우선주의의 채택에 대한 긍정적 의견을 피력해 보았다. In those cases where creditors other than the enforcing creditor participate in the enforcement of a case arising out of a claim for money, different legal systems have presented different standards depending on their legal environment and the relationship to the substantive legal order. These standards have three main branches including the principle of priority distribution seen in the German and Anglo-American legal systems, the principle of equal distribution seen in the Korean and French Civil Procedure Codes, and the principle of group priority distribution as seen in Switzerland. The priority distribution principle depends on the order in which the creditor participated in the enforcement proceedings; the creditor who first started the enforcement and attached the property subject to credit gains the first right to satisfy the entirety of the clam. The equal distribution principle treats all creditors who participated in an enforcement proceeding against a debtor equally; if debtor assets that may be provided toward satisfying the credit is less than the total amount of the debt, the proceeds of the enforcement shall be divided pro rata according to the proportion each creditor is owed in proportion to the entire amount of debt. The group priority distribution principle takes a path between the two, dividing the time period at which the creditor participated in the enforcement proceedings and applying the priority principle to those creditors who participated in the process during the priority period (the group) by giving the group priority in the distribution, while applying the equal distribution principle to creditors within each group by giving them pro rata distribution. This paper begins with the question of whether the equal distribution principle in Korean law is justifiable, and aims to explore standards for a more reasonable distribution priority. To this end, it examines the major legal systems that have elected for the principles of priority distribution, equal distribution, and group priority distribution, and compares and analyzes the strengths and drawbacks of each. Furthermore, it examines the problems in Korean civil enforcement proceedings and its application of the equal distribution principle, and efforts to overcome these problems. Furthermore, based on the foregoing analysis, it puts forward a positive argument for a legislative change to priority distribution principle in individual judicial enforcement proceedings based on the strength of the priority distribution principle in simplifying and clarifying the enforcement process.

根抵當權設定契約이 詐害行爲로 取消되고 原狀回復으로 配當金支給債權에 대한 讓渡가 이루어진 경우 取消債權者가 債權의 滿足을 얻는 方法

김민수 민사판례연구회 2010 民事判例硏究 Vol.- No.32

Pursuant to the Supreme Court case in 1997 (97Da8687)("the 1997 Case"), the Supreme Court held that, when Geun-mortgage is avoided as a fraudulent transfer by an aggrieved creditor ("Initiating Creditor") during the period after completion of the distribution table for foreclosure sale but before distribution of the proceeds from such foreclosure sale (the "Period"), the right to claim for such Geun-mortgage (the "Claim") should be assigned to the concerned debtor. Then, in practice, such Claim was distributed to those creditors (including an Initiating Creditor) who filed a new enforcement action against the Claim. In this regard, under the 1997 Case, it was understood that the entitled creditor for the Claim is not limited to creditors who participate in the foreclosure sale, but may include all the creditors of the concerned debtor ("General Distribution"). Meanwhile, according to another Supreme Court case in 2002 (2002Da33069)("the 2002 Case"), the Supreme Court set forth a direction on how to distribute the Claim among the creditors, holding that the Claim should be only assigned to the creditors who participated in the foreclosure sale. As a result, the 2002 Case has the effect of limiting the scope of creditors who are entitled to the Claim to only those creditors participating in the foreclosure sale ("Limited Distribution") and, as a result, such creditor may enjoy additional distribution. Due to such inconsistent resulting effects from the different rules on distribution of the Claim among the creditors between the 1997 Case and the 2002 Case (i.e., General Distribution in the 1997 Case v. Limited Distribution in the 2002 Case), confusions have arisen among the practitioners In 2009 (7 years after the 2002 Case), the Supreme Court issued a decision, re-affirming the Limited Distribution in the 2002 Case, however, without specifying any statutory basis or legal rationale for such Limited Distribution under civil enforcement laws ("2009 Case"). In fact, the 1997 Case had the effect of exclusively distributing the Claim to an Initiating Creditor, because the Initiating Creditor in most cases was the only party filing a new enforcement action against the Claim. In the meantime, the Limited Distribution may address unfairness of such exclusive distribution, because the Claim is automatically assigned to the pool of creditors participating in the foreclosure sale. However, given that the Limited Distribution lacks for its statutory basis, the author supports for the 1997 Case in that the 1997 Case is more consistent with the "principle of equality among creditors" under Article 407 of the Civil Code, reading, in pertinent part, that "avoidance of a fraudulent transfer should have the effect of giving the benefit to all creditors." 1. 대법원은 1997. 10. 10. 선고 97다8687 판결에서 “수익자가 채무자와의 사해행위로 취득한 근저당권에 기해 경매절차에서 배당에 참가하여 배당표는 확정되었으나 아직 배당금이 현실적으로 지급되지 않은 경우, 채권자취소권의 행사에 따른 원상회복은 수익자가 취득한 배당금지급채권을 채무자에게 반환하는 방법으로 이루어져야 한다.”고 최초로 판시하였다. 위와 같이 배당금지급채권이 채무자에게 반환될 경우 채권자취소권을 행사한 채권자가 자신의 채권의 만족을 얻는 방법에 대하여 위 판결은 따로 설명하지 않았지만, 이와 같은 경우에는 채무자의 모든 채권자들이 채무자에게 반환된 배당금지급채권에 대하여 별도의 강제집행절차를 거쳐 자신들의 채권의 만족을 얻을 수 있는 것으로 위 판결의 취지가 이해되었고, 그에 따른 실무례가 형성되었다. 2. 그러나, 대법원은 2002. 9. 24. 선고 2002다33069 판결에서 “수익자에게 배당하기로 한 금원에 대하여 지급금지가처분결정이 있어 경매법원이 그 배당금을 공탁한 후에 그 근저당권설정계약이 사해행위로 취소된 경우, 그 공탁금은 경매절차에서 배당요구하였던 다른 채권자들에게 추가배당함이 상당하다.”고 판시하였다. 위 판결에 따르면, 위 대법원 97다8687 판결에서 판시한 바와 같이 배당금지급채권이 채무자에게 반환된다고 하더라도 채권자들은 위와 같이 반환된 배당금지급채권에 대한 별도의 강제집행절차를 거쳐 자신들의 채권의 만족을 얻을 수는 없고, 오로지 경매절차에서 적법하게 배당요구하였던 채권자들만이 추가배당을 통하여 자신들의 채권의 만족을 얻게 되는 결과가 되므로, 위 대법원 2002다33069 판결과 위 대법원 97다8687 판결의 관계에 관하여 실무상 많은 혼란이 있어 왔다. 3. 그런데, 대상판결은 위 대법원 2002다33069 판결이 선고된 이후 약 7년이 지난 시점에서 ‘추가배당’을 하여야 한다는 입장을 다시 선언하면서도 민사집행법상 어떠한 규정을 유추적용하여 추가배당을 하게 되는 것인지, 그와 같은 유추적용을 해야 할 필요성은 무엇인지에 관하여 뚜렷한 근거를 밝히지 않았다는 점에서 아쉬움이 있다. 4. 대상판결과 같은 사안에서 ‘추가배당’을 하게 될 경우 취소채권자가 사실상 우선적인 만족을 얻게 되는 결과를 방지할 수 있기 때문에 어느 정도의 장점이 있다고 볼 수도 있다. 그러나, 민사집행법상 명확한 규정이 없는 현재로서는, 채무자의 모든 채권자들이 채무자의 책임재산으로 회복된 배당금지급채권에 대한 강제집행절차를 통하여 채권의 만족을 얻을 수 있게 하는 것이 “사해행위취소와 원상회복은 모든 채권자의 이익을 위하여 그 효력이 있다.”고 규정하고 있는 민법 제407조의 채권자평등주의에 보다 충실한 해석으로서 타당하다고 생각한다.

분배적 평등의 실현형태와 그 평등화의 척도

오병선 한국법철학회 2008 법철학연구 Vol.11 No.2

This paper aims at pursuing a plausible theory of distributive justice based on equality by analyzing several competing theories of egalitarian justice. Each competing theory of equality, namely, equality of welfare, equality of resources, or equality of basic capabilities has its own distinctive justification and its particular collateral form of distributional equality. Equality of welfare espoused by utilitarians is to equalize people in welfare. Equality of resources vindicated by John Rawls and more deeply sophisticated by Ronald Dworkin is treating people equal by equalizing people in possessing resources as a means to access to welfare. Equality of basic capabilities developed by Amatya Sen and refined by Martha Nussbaum is equalizing people in basic functions and capabilities necessary for access to well-being. Although the idea that everybody should be equal in welfare is initially attractive but incurably problematic. Equality of welfare has defect because with respect to welfare to be equalized we will soon encounter that there are too many variety of meaning of welfare to plausibly equalize people in welfare. Also another objection to equality of welfare is that it mandates provision for expensive tastes: the objection is that it is unfair to impose the cost of satisfying a given person’s expensive taste on other people. Equality of basic capabilities has been criticized because it will soon be expanded to include higher level of capabilities, which entails in fusing with the realm of welfare. Equality of resources is regarded as a most powerful explication of the means to equalizing people. But nonetheless equality of resources also has been subject to criticism by G. A. Cohen and Richard Arneson under the slogan of equality of opportunity for welfare. Equality of resources is also criticized from the camp of Sen and Nussbaum since it tends to focus on the material satisfaction on the one hand but on the other hand it neglects a humanistic aspect for people truly in need of the sense of freedom trough the functioning and capabilities. However, on the whole theories of equality of resources can be regarded as an idea of equality which explains best both the principle of liberal choice and personal responsibility. Equality of resources is a means to realize the idea of liberal equality. Notwithstanding this merit on the part of equality of resources, equality of basic functioning capabilities should be taken into serious consideration in order to complement the deficiency of equality of resources. Equality of basic functioning capabilities play a role to provide a humanistic face by adding a basic functioning and basic capabilities which can not be fully realized only by the material satisfaction under the equality of resources. Thus my contention in this paper is that distributional equality would be better realized by the means of equality of resources with a condition that at the threshold level of decent standard of living the basic needs of the least advantaged people should be satisfied by employing the basic capabilities approach. This paper aims at pursuing a plausible theory of distributive justice based on equality by analyzing several competing theories of egalitarian justice. Each competing theory of equality, namely, equality of welfare, equality of resources, or equality of basic capabilities has its own distinctive justification and its particular collateral form of distributional equality. Equality of welfare espoused by utilitarians is to equalize people in welfare. Equality of resources vindicated by John Rawls and more deeply sophisticated by Ronald Dworkin is treating people equal by equalizing people in possessing resources as a means to access to welfare. Equality of basic capabilities developed by Amatya Sen and refined by Martha Nussbaum is equalizing people in basic functions and capabilities necessary for access to well-being. Although the idea that everybody should be equal in welfare is initially attractive but incurably problematic. Equality of welfare has defect because with respect to welfare to be equalized we will soon encounter that there are too many variety of meaning of welfare to plausibly equalize people in welfare. Also another objection to equality of welfare is that it mandates provision for expensive tastes: the objection is that it is unfair to impose the cost of satisfying a given person’s expensive taste on other people. Equality of basic capabilities has been criticized because it will soon be expanded to include higher level of capabilities, which entails in fusing with the realm of welfare. Equality of resources is regarded as a most powerful explication of the means to equalizing people. But nonetheless equality of resources also has been subject to criticism by G. A. Cohen and Richard Arneson under the slogan of equality of opportunity for welfare. Equality of resources is also criticized from the camp of Sen and Nussbaum since it tends to focus on the material satisfaction on the one hand but on the other hand it neglects a humanistic aspect for people truly in need of the sense of freedom trough the functioning and capabilities. However, on the whole theories of equality of resources can be regarded as an idea of equality which explains best both the principle of liberal choice and personal responsibility. Equality of resources is a means to realize the idea of liberal equality. Notwithstanding this merit on the part of equality of resources, equality of basic functioning capabilities should be taken into serious consideration in order to complement the deficiency of equality of resources. Equality of basic functioning capabilities play a role to provide a humanistic face by adding a basic functioning and basic capabilities which can not be fully realized only by the material satisfaction under the equality of resources. Thus my contention in this paper is that distributional equality would be better realized by the means of equality of resources with a condition that at the threshold level of decent standard of living the basic needs of the least advantaged people should be satisfied by employing the basic capabilities approach.

평화실현을 위한 종교의 평등사상 연구:통일사상의 ‘사랑의 평등’을 중심으로

강화명 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2022 평화학연구 Vol.23 No.2

This paper aims to examine the increasing inequality caused by the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic, and to investigate the equality ideology of love proposed by the Unification Thought as the basis of social ethics that can improve it. The Unification Thought maintains the theory of equality of love that all human beings are equally valuable, regardless of their abilities or social status, because they are all beloved children of the same parent, God. However, Unification Thought overlooks the structural dimension of equality since it confines equality to the fullness of love acquired from within. Thus, this study attempts to expand the concept of equality in Unification Thought to the social structural dimension, including equality of distribution, based on the understanding of love’s orientation toward multidimensional equality. The paper further emphasizes that religion should pursue a public character that supports those in the most disadvantaged position and realizes equality by distributing social values equally during this era when there is a prolonged pandemic. 본 논문은 장기화된 코로나19 팬데믹으로 더욱 고착화된 불평등의 현실을 고찰하고, 이를 개선해 나갈 수 있는 사회 윤리적 토대로 통일사상이 제안하는 사랑의 평등이념에 대해 검토해 보는데 목적을 둔다. 통일사상은 천부적 능력의 차이나 사회적 지위의 고하를 막론하고 모든 인간은 부모이신 하나님의 사랑을 받는 자녀로 동등한 인격적 가치를 지닌다는 사랑의 평등론을 주장한다. 그러나 한편으로 통일사상은 평등을 인간의 내면에서 획득되는 사랑의 충만감에 있어서의 평등으로만 한정하여 평등의 구조적 차원을 간과하고 있다. 이에 본 논문은 통일사상의 평등이념을 사랑의 평등 지향성에 관한 이해에 기초하여, 분배의 평등을 포함한 사회 구조적인 차원으로 확장해 보고자 시도하였다. 이와 함께 장기화된 팬데믹으로 고통 받는 이 시대에 가장 불리한 위치에 있는 약자들을 돕고, 사회적 가치들의 공정한 분배를 통해 평등을 실현해 나가는 것이 종교가 담당해야 할 시대적 공공성임을 피력하였다.

조선 초기 노비 상속과 균분의 실상

권내현(Kwon Nae-hyun) 고려사학회 2006 한국사학보 Vol.- No.22

이 연구는 균분 상속이 철저하게 실시되었던 조선 초기 노비 분재의 방식과 실상을 분석한 것이다. 균분 상속은 제사나 결혼의 풍습과 맞물린 조선의 독특한 사회적 관행이었다. 현존하는 15세기의 분재기에서도 적극적으로 균분을 추구하려고 했던 당시인들의 의지가 잘 드러나 있다. 하지만 살아 움직이는 생명체인 노비를 기계적으로 동일하게 나눈다는 것은 원천적으로 불가능하였다. 분재기 상에서 자녀들이 상속받은 노비 수는 균분이라는 개념에 막연하게 동의할 수 있는 수준이었지 실제로 동질적이지는 않았던 것이다. 물론 몇 가지 변수들을 제외하면 수적 균분에 접근하며, 그럼에도 불구하고 차이가 나는 부분은 노비의 연령을 고려한 질적 균분의 과정에서 나타난 것으로 이해할 수 있다. 그러나 자녀들이 상속받은 노비의 연령 분포를 구체적으로 비교해 보면 더 철저한 균분이 실현될 여지가 있었음을 발견하게 된다. 여기에서 균분이란 의식은 물론 그 실현 의지를 제약했던 다양한 조건들이 동시에 존재하였음을 알 수 있다. 무엇보다도 노비의 연령 분포가 고르지 않아 자녀들이 상속받은 노비의 연령대에 불균형이 초래될 수 있었다. 이러한 불균형은 노비 가족을 완전하게 해체하여 균분을 실현하지 않고 그들의 결합 상속을 일부 용인함으로써 발생하기도 하였다. 또한 상속 과정에서 재주인 부모의 의지가 작용할 수 있었고, 일부 분재기에서는 자녀들 간에 합의에 의한 선택이 이루어졌을 가능성도 존재한다. 다분히 의도적이었던 것으로 보이는 상속 노비의 성비나 거주지의 불균형이 그 한 예이다. 이는 분재 방식이 ‘제비뽑기’와 같은 기계적인 균분만을 추구하지는 않았음을 보여 준다. 균분 의식은 철저하였고 이를 실현하려는 노력도 뒤따랐지만 균분이라는 전제를 훼손하지 않는 범위 내에서 질적 균분을 일정 부분 제약했던 다양한 조건들이 존재하였다는 사실 역시 부인할수 없는 것이다. This study analyzed the methods and real aspects of servant equal-division in the early Chos?n dynasty in which equal succession was thoroughly conducted. Equal division succession was a peculiar social practice of the Chos?n dynasty which was linked to ancestral rites and a marriage. Reviewing the heritage document in the 15th century, you will also find the will of the then current people who positively tried to pursue equal division. However, it was basically impossible to mechanically and equally divide servants which are living and moving creatures. The number of servants inherited to children was a level, vaguely similar with but actually not equal to the concept of equal division. Of course, except for several variables, it can be understood that the servants are equally divided in number and unavoidably a few differences occurred in the process of qualitative equal division in consideration of the age of servants. But, concretely comparing age distribution of servants inherited to children shows that there was a little room for realization of more thorough equal division. Here, we can know that there existed consciousness of equal division and various conditions that restricted such will for realization. Above all, the age distribution of servants was not equal, so that imbalance could be brought in a range of age. Such imbalance used to also occur not by realizing equal division through complete dissolution of a servant family but by partly accepting their combination succession. Also, a possibility exists that the will of parents, an owner of servants, could apply to the process of inheritance, and some inheritance documents imply that a possibility of selection by agreement between children being performed. For example, the ratio of gender of inherited servants or imbalance of residential places seeming to have been highly intentional can be given. This shows that a method of dividing property did not pursue mechanical equal division such as ‘deciding by lot’. The consciousness of equal division was thorough and the efforts for realizing such consciousness was made, but it is not deniable that various conditions existed that partly restricted qualitative equal division within the range in which a premise of equal division was not damaged.

장애인에 대한 사회복지서비스와 평등

김희성 한국사회법학회 2020 社會法硏究 Vol.0 No.40

이 글에서는 평등 개념이 장애인에 대한 급부의 적정성을 측정하는 객관적인 지표가 될 수 있는가에 대해 검토한다. 장애인은 자신이 원하는 삶을 추구하고, 그 실현을 위해 평등권과 차별금지법을 통해서 사회보장급부를 요구할 수 있다. 특히 정당한 편의제공은 장애인이 주관적인 생활수요에 의해서 또는 그것이 충족되지 않는 것을 피침해이익으로 하는 것에 의해서 요구할 수 있다. 현재 시행되고 있는 ‘장애인차별금지 및 권리구제 등에 관한 법률’은 그 가능성을 높인다고 생각된다. 장애인과 그 지원자는 장애인의 생활・ 경제수요가 충족되는 사회복지서비스를 이 법에 근거해 요구하는 것이 가능하게 되기를 기대하고 있다. 하지만, 장애인과 그 지원자가 생각하고 있는 수준의 사회복지서비스와 그에 필요한 비용에 대해서 공통의 인식이 있는 것은 아니어서 그와 같은 사회복지서비스를 지급하기로 동의가 이루어졌다고는 할 수 없다. 이와 같은 이익의 대립에 대해서 평등은 적당한 타협점을 제시할 수 있을 것인가를 검토・분석하는 것이 이 글의 목적이자 필요성이다. 평등은 그 온건한 표정의 뒷모습에 다른 얼굴(주관성, 임의성, 자의성)을 가지고 있다. 이러한 평등의 성격은 외국판례를 검토해 보면, 특정 수요에 대한 과대평가와 과소평가를 낳고 있고 더욱이 수요에 대한 평가를 다른 이익과 비교 형량하지 않고 보호하는 문제점이 있다. 현실에서 평등은 급부의 적정성을 담보하는 객관적 지표가 되지 않는다. 하지만 평등의 주관적인 성격은 개인의 선(善)의 추구라는 의미에서는 긍정적인 성질을 가지는 것이라고 평가할 수 있다. 평등이 이러한 성격에 근거한 분배를 정당화하기 위해서는 자원의 분배가 공정한 것이어야 한다. 이 글에서는 공정한 자원의 분배와 장애인의 주체적 생활 수요(needs)라는 2개의 요청을 충족하는 방법을 제시하고자 하는 데 목적이 있다. 이러한 시론은 각 지역사회의 재정능력과 사회적 자원의 범위 내에서 개인의 후생복지의 최대화를 목표로 하는 것이다. This study examines whether the concept of equality can be an objective indicator for measurement of the adequacy of benefits for disabled persons. Disabled persons can pursue the life they want and demand social security benefits through their rights to equality and anti-discrimination laws. In particular, rational consideration can be demanded by disabled persons by claiming that their needs for subjective life that have not been satisfied are infringed interests. The ‘Act on the Prohibition of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities, Remedy against Infringement of Their Rights, Etc.’, which is currently in operation, is thought to raise the possibility. For the state, local governments, and employers, this act provides that 「This act prohibits discrimination for the reason of disabilities in all living territories and effectively remedies for the rights and interests of those who have been discriminated for the reason of disabilities, thereby (Article 1), nobody should be discriminated for the reason of disabilities, past records of disabilities, or being suspected of having disabilities(Article 7)」 and disabled persons and their supporters expect that demanding social welfare services that satisfy the living and economic needs of disabled persons would become possible based on these provisions. However, since there is no common perception of the social welfare services at the level thought by disabled persons and their supporters, it cannot be said that it has been agreed to provide such social welfare services. The purpose and necessity of this study is to review and analyze whether equality can present an appropriate point of compromise for the conflict of interests as such. The question of this study was about whether the concept of equality could be an objective indicator to measure the adequacy of benefits for disabled persons. Equality has different faces (subjectivity, voluntariness, and arbitrariness) behind the moderate expression. The nature of equality as such leads to overestimation and underestimation of certain needs as far as precedents are concerned, and furthermore, there are cases where the needs are protected without considering the evaluation of needs in comparison with other interests. With regard to the present condition, it can be said that equality has not become an objective indicator that guarantees the adequacy of benefits. However, the subjective nature of equality can be evaluated as having a positive nature in the sense of pursuing personal goodness. In order for equality to justify distribution based on such a nature, it is thought that the distribution of resources should be fair. However, in the discussion of distributive justice in legal philosophy, the present condition cannot be said to be successful in simultaneously satisfying individuals' pursuit of goodness and fair distribution of resources. Therefore, in this study, as a contemporary opinion, a method to satisfy the two demands through discussion in community was presented. However, the above contemporary opinion aims to maximize the welfare of individuals within the range of the financial ability or social resources of each community. Although it might have become a different story from the discussion of equality before we know, it may be an approach to the original posture of equality.

이혼 재산분할 제도의 개선방안 ―분할대상과 분할비율에 관한 개정의견을 중심으로―

이선미 한국가족법학회 2022 가족법연구 Vol.36 No.2

The right to claim property division upon divorce was introduced by the revision of the Civil Act in 1990. The purpose of the property division upon divorce is to achieve substantial equality between the spouses not only during the marriage but also after dissolution of the marriage by distributing property appropriately and equitably when marriage is dis- solved. In the property division trial, a conclusion is drawn through the process of calculating the property subject to division and determining the division ratio, so the judgment on these two issues is decisive for the appropriate property division. Though the law should be able to provide legal principles for the two issues, the current statute does not provide predictable standards. Therefore, it is necessary to revise the Civil Act to clearly define the property to be divided and the ratio of division. According to the case law regarding the property subject to division, the court can order division of substantive common property, that is the property formed through the cooperation of both spouses, regardless of the name of the owner. Even the inherited property and gifts can be in- cluded in the property subject to division if the other spouse contributed to its maintenance or prevention of its reduction. The current proposed revision of the Civil Act stipulates that common property and the property based on the common property are subject to division. There may be many other ways to define property to be divided in a way that is consis- tent with the people’s legal opinion and provides clear standards. As such, I present two methods. First, for couples who have been married for more than a certain period of time or have several common children, all of their assets can be considered as property subject to division. Second, in principle, it is possible to consider the property set by the parties in the marital property agreement as the property subject to division, and if there is no such agreement, all of their assets may be considered as property subject to division. Currently, the law does not stipulate any division ratio, so the court sets the division ratio for each case. But considering the nature of the marriage system, it is reasonable for the law to declare equal division as a principle. However, exceptions need to be granted to doing equal divi- sion. Proposed revisions of the Civil Act both past and present stipulate that common property is divided equally, while each spouse’s own prop- erty acquired by inheritance or as such is not. We can also modify the principle of equal division in other ways. For example, we can choose a way that the residence for marriage cohabitation should be divided equally, while the rest can be divided differently. Alternatively, the law can require the spouses to set the division ratio by marital property agree- ment, and if there is no such agreement, to divide the property equally. If the law is revised to set a uniform standard about the property divi- sion in case there is no agreement, it will be necessary to improve the marital property agreement system more convenient and reliable for the spouses who want to form their marital lives according to their own will.

정의로운 분배를 위한 포괄적 원칙

김동일 한국법철학회 2021 법철학연구 Vol.24 No.3

이 글의 목적은 국가가 분배할 때 재화의 일반적 특성에 따라서 다원적 원칙을 적용하되 분배의 궁극적 목적에 맞게 분배할 때 정의로운 분배가 이루어질 수 있다고 주장하는 것이다. 이와 유사하게 왈저, 밀러, 그리고 호네스 등이 다원적 분배의 원칙을 주장하고 있다. 그러나 이 글은 특히 왈저와 밀러가 다원적 원칙을 제시하기 위해 각각 채택한 ‘정의의 영역’과 ‘인간관계’라는 기준을 건설적으로 재구성해서, 재화의 일반적 특성이라는 기준에 따라서 분배의 원칙을 달리하는 것이 적절하다고 주장한다. 그리고 분배의 원칙으로서 기존에 제시된 자유로운 교환, 필요, 평등, 공적 등이 분배의 궁극적 목적에 맞게 존엄, 평등, 그리고 책임의 원칙으로 재구성되어야 정의로운 분배를 위한 포괄적 원칙을 구성할 수 있다고 주장한다. The purpose of this paper is to argue that a just distribution can be achieved by applying pluralistic principles according to the characteristics of goods and for ultimate purpose of distribution when the state distributes them. Similarly, Walzer, Miller, and Honneth have already argued for the pluralistic principle of distribution. However, reconstructing ‘the spheres of justice’ and ‘human relations’ adopted respectively by Walzer and Miller to present the pluralistic principle, this paper argues that it is appropriate to differ the distribution principle according to general characteristics of the goods in question. And it is also argued that the comprehensive principles for a just distribution can be constituted when the existing distributive principles such as free exchange, need, equality, and merit are reconstructed into the principles of dignity, equality, and accountability in accordance with ultimate purposes of distribution.

상대적 평등론의 재검토 같은 것은 같게, 다른 것은 다르게?

오승철 ( Sung Chol Oh ) 민주주의법학연구회 2012 민주법학 Vol.0 No.48

This essay is to examine the utility and validity of the theory of relative equality. The author focuses on rebutting the argument that equality means treating like cases alike and unlike cases differently. Furthermore, the author argues that it is not necessary at all to discuss whether the equality means ``absolute equality`` or ``relative equality``, because every constitutional right is a relative right that can be restricted based on Article 37, Section II of Korean Constitution.