두 가지 거래형태에서의 수직적 결합에 대한 분석

고동희(Dong Hee Koh) 한국마케팅학회 2013 마케팅연구 Vol.28 No.1

제조업체가 수직적으로 차별화되어 있고, 유통업체가 수평적으로 차별화되어 있는 시장에서 수직적 결합여부에 대하여 분석한다. 한 개의 유통업체에게 공급하는 경우에는 두 제조업체가 모두 수직적으로 결합하지 않거나, 수직적으로 결합하는 두 개의 균형이 존재한다. 제조업체가 두 유통업체에게 공급하는 경우에는 두 제조업체 모두 수직적으로 결합한다. McGuire and Staelin는 수직적 결합여부가 제품간 대체성 및 전략적 보완재 여부에 의존함을 보여준다. 이 논문에서는 결합여부가 거래 유통업체 수에 의해서도 결정됨을 보여준다. There have been many literatures which analyze the effect of vertical integration in the market with vertical structure. Vertical integration has two effects: efficiency effect and strategic effect. First, vertical integration allows a firm not only to reduce transaction cost but also to experience on-time production and makes quality control or product differentiation easier. Firms may be less flexible, however, as the size of the firm gets bigger, and less efficient due to the secure demand or supply. There are two kinds of strategic effect double marginalization and externality effect. When transaction occurs between independent firms, each firm will impose a mark-up, thus a price will be higher, which is called double marginalization. There are two types of externality effects: vertical and horizontal. Externality effect arises when a firm`s behavior affects the other firm, but the former does not take this into consideration when it makes a decision. If this happens between a upstream and downstream firm, it is vertical externality effect, and double marginalizaion is one example. Horizontal externality effects which arise between either upstream or downstream firms affect prices, quality and promotion level. To solve these externality problems, not only vertical integration but also vertical restraints such as resale price maintenance, exclusive territory or exclusive dealings can be used. McGuire and Staelin analyze the effect of vertical integration when the upstream firm supplies its product through one exclusive downstream firm. They find that product substitutability affects the equilibrium distribution structure in a market with two differentiated upstream firms and two identical downstream firms. For low degrees of substitutability, each upstream firm will integrate vertically. For high degrees of substitutability, they will be more likely not to integrate. Moorthy claims that McGuire and Staelin`s finding depends on the following two factors: the degree of subtitutability between product and strategic complements. First, decentralization cannot be a Nash equlibrium unless unilateral decentralization raises the other upstream firm`s equilibrium retail price when the upstream finns` products are substitutes. Second, unilateral decentralization always raises his own equilibrium consumer price, but whether it raises or lowers the rival`s consumer price depends on whether there are strategic complements or not. He finds that the decentralized downstream firm`s consumer price increases because of a higher marginal cost due to double marginalization. Further, with decentralization, the rival downstream firm`s price also increases in case of strategic complements. With high degree of substitutability, the second effect dominates, thus firms are not integrated. In this paper, I analyze the effect of vertical integration in a successive duopoly market where upstream firms are vertically and downstream firms are horizontally differentiated. As in McGuire and Staelin, I found that there are two symmetric Nash equilibria where upstream firms can be either vertically integrated or separated, and the latter is dominant in that profits are higher. This results comes from two countervailing effects of vertical integration. First, a firm`s price gets lower because of lack of double marginalization. But, this price cut makes the rival`s price lower with strategic complementarity. In fact, the price cut for the integrated firm is higher than for the rival. When the rival firm is not vertically integrated, the price cut of the integrated firm is not large enough for it to make sufficiently more sales, thus a higher profit. Meanwhile, when the rival firm is vertically integrated, the price cut is so large that it can earn a higher profit. I also deal with the case where both upstream firms can supply to both downstream firms. When the self-selection condition is satisfied, consumers with high preference buy high-quality goods and thos

수직결합의 결정요인

강동관 ( Dong Kwan Kang ) 한국산업조직학회 2008 産業組織硏究 Vol.16 No.4

수직결합의 결정적요인은 주로 거래비용이론에 초점이 맞추어져 왔으며, 기업구조, 특히 기업그룹구조 형성과 많은 관련이 있다. 이러한 측면에서 보면, 해방이후에 발생, 성장해온 한국의 재벌그룹은 거래비용과 관련된 수직결합의 결정적 요인을 연구하는데 중요한 대상이 된다. 따라서 본고 연구는 수직결합의 주요 결정적 요인인 기업자산의 특이성(asset specificity), 기업과 관련된 시장의 불확실성(uncertainty)외에도 그룹의 조직구조를 하나의 결정적 요인으로 보고 이를 실증적으로 분석을 시도하였다. 수직결합의 정도는 일반적으로 사용해온 수정된 수직결합의 측정방법이 산업 간에 다르게 존재하는 공정 단계를 고려하지 못하고 있어, 표준화한 개별기업의 수직결합정도(VS)를 이용하였으며, 그 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 개별기업의 수직결합 정도는 자산의 특이성에 의해 정(+)의 영향을 받는다. 둘째, 기업환경의 불안전성은 기업의 수직결합정과 관련이 없다. 셋째, 기업의 자기자본 규모가 커질수록 기업은 기업 내의 수직결합보다는 분리 혹은 다각화를 통하여 그룹차원에서의 수직결합을 추구한다. 이러한 연구 결과는 재벌 형성을 자금의 풀링(capital pooling)관점에서 이해하려고 노력했던 기존의 연구에서 벗어나 거래비용관점에서 재벌의 형성, 특히 수직결합의 형성을 설명하고 있다는데 의의가 있다. The study of business groups in developing economies has focused on market failure explanations. Much of the empirical works have compared financial performance of the firms that belong to or do not belong to a business group. Less attention has been paid to organizational architecture issues, i.e. reasons for vertical integration. The Korean economy in the latter part of the 20th century presents an interesting and unique laboratory setting for studying the evolution of organizational architecture. A business entity may adopt a vertical integration strategy to mitigate the effects of asset specificity or uncertainty. Alternatively, it may span more than one industry rather than formal integration. I propose to test whether forming a chaebol serves as a substitute for formal vertical integration when facing a situation where arm`s length spot market transactions are less fully satisfactory, therefore. That is, if membership in a chaebol solves the same organizational problems as formal vertical integration, then we should see whether these firms (affiliated firms) are less likely to be vertically integrated than non-chaebol firms. The result shows that `asset specificity` affects vertical integration in the expected way and that the affiliated firms in a chaebol are less likely to be vertically integrated than non-chaebol firms. However, `uncertainty` doesn`t as expected. From these results I can conclude that some vertical integration is dictated by market realities.

Trade Openness and Vertical Integration : Evidence from Korean Firm-Level Data

Hea-Jung Hyun,Jung Hur 한국무역학회 2009 한국무역학회 국제학술대회 Vol.2009 No.12

Using firm-level data on vertical integration of Korean manufacturers, the paper tests whether trade liberalization is an important determinant of firm's decision on vertical integration. We develop an empirical framework incorporating trade openness into industrial organization models; transaction costs theory and theory of internal costs of management. The empirical results of the paper suggest that trade openness is negatively related with vertical integration. A further analysis on firm's decision among four types of organizational forms in international contexts, however, reveals that trade liberalization has positive impact on cross-border vertical integration while it is negatively correlated with domestic vertical integration.

Trade Openness and Vertical Integration : Evidence from Korean Firm-Level Data

Hea-Jung Hyun,Jung Hur 한국무역학회 2009 國際學術大會 論文集 Vol.2009 No.12

Using firm-level data on vertical integration of Korean manufacturers, the paper tests whether trade liberalization is an important determinant of firm's decision on vertical integration. We develop an empirical framework incorporating trade openness into industrial organization models; transaction costs theory and theory of internal costs of management. The empirical results of the paper suggest that trade openness is negatively related with vertical integration. A further analysis on firm's decision among four types of organizational forms in international contexts, however, reveals that trade liberalization has positive impact on cross-border vertical integration while it is negatively correlated with domestic vertical integration.

한국기업의 수직결합 요인과 결과

임응순,강동관 한국산업경제학회 2012 산업경제연구 Vol.25 No.2

수직결합의 결정요인은 주로 거래비용이론에 초점이 맞추어져 왔다. 이에 본 연구에서는 한국거래소 상장기업(KOSPI)을 대상으로 1999년부터 2009년까지의 자료를 이용하여 한국기업의 수직결합 요인을 분석하였다. 수직결합의 요인으로는 기업자산의 특이성, 시장의 불확실성 그리고 그룹의 조직구조를 사용하였다. 또한 이러한 수직결합의 정도와 기업성과간의 관계에 대해서도 살펴보았다. 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 개별기업의 수직결합 정도는 자산의 특이성에 의해 정(+)의 영향을 받는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 자산의 특이성이 높을수록 수직결합의 정도가 높다는 것을 의미한다. 둘째, 기업 환경의 불안전성도 수직결합 정도에 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. STDS(불안정성의 대리변수)는 수직결합에 정(+)의 영향을 받는 것으로 나타나 일반적인 실증분석과 그 결과를 같이하고 있다. 셋째, 수직결합이 높을수록 기업의 성과(ROE와 ROA)에 정(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 즉 수직결합이 높을수록 기업의 거래비용을 감소되는 것으로 나타났다. We test whether or not asset specificity and uncertainty are primary determinants of vertical integration in the Korea case using KOSPI data from 1990-2009. The result shows that asset specificity and uncertainty affects vertical integration as predicted by theory. The estimates of this paper provide further evidence of the role of asset-specificity and uncertainty on vertical integration, which is consistent with earlier findings. Also we propose to test whether forming a chaebol serves as a substitute for formal vertical integration when facing a situation where arm’s length spot market transactions are not satisfactory. It stems from chaebols’ organizational form, which is vertically integrated at the group-level and is operated under a single common administration and finance control. Therefore, the group-level integration substitutes for the firm-level integration. In addition, the estimates for backward and/or forward integration strongly confirm this result; the coefficients of 'backward' and 'forward and backward' integration are statistically significant. The results suggest that firms with backward and forwardly integrated among the affiliated firms are less willing to integrate at the firm or plant level, and back ward integrated firms also are less willing to integrate at the firm or plant level

Transaction Cost in a Dual Channel and Vertical Integration

조수미,이상호 에스케이텔레콤 (주) 2010 Telecommunications Review Vol.20 No.4

This paper considers a vertical structure model where a monopolistic manufacturer and two competitive retailers face a dual channel with online sales, and examines the efficiency of vertical integration. We explain the economic insights on the fundamental trade-off in a dual channel from the viewpoint of transaction cost and investigate social cost in offline and online transactions. Comparing vertical competition models with and without online sales, we show that vertical integration reduces the social cost only when the online cost is sufficiently large. We also show that vertical integration with online channel will reduce channel conflict since integrated firm can share the profits with competitive retailer. However, vertical integration may be inefficient compared to pure online sales when online cost is small. We conclude that an appropriate public policy on vertical integration with online sales should evaluate the efficiency of dual channel based not only on cost replacement effect and web-fit effect, but also on the integration pattern of vertical structure.

Cross-border Vertical Integration and Technology: New Evidence for Property Rights Theory

( Byun Bae Chun ),( Jung Hur ),( Do Young Kim ),( Nyeong Eon On ) 한국국제경제학회 2015 한국국제경제학회 동계학술대회 Vol.2015 No.-

We empirically test the property rights theory for multinational firms`` decision on cross-border vertical integration. To examine its unique predictions that alternative theories, such as the transaction cost economics, do not imply, we investigate not only the impact of the importance of producers`` relationship-specific investment on vertical integration decision but also that of suppliers`` relationship-specific investment. Using data on Korean multinational firms in the producing industries and their foreign affiliates in the supplying industries, we find that cross-border backward vertical integration is positively related to the R&D intensity of domestic producing industries, and negatively related to that of foreign supplying industries. In the growing literature on the boundaries of multinational firms, we provide novel test results that the property rights theory can explain multinational firms`` decision on cross-border vertical integration.

Cross-Border Vertical Integration and Technology New Evidence for Property Rights Theory

( Hyunbae Chun ),( Jung Hur ),( Doyoung Kim ),( Nyeong Seon Son ) 한국산업조직학회 2016 한국산업조직학회 정책세미나 논문집 Vol.2016 No.1

We empirically test the property rights theory for multinational firms’ decision on cross-border Vertical integration. To examine its unique predictions that alternative theories, such as the transaction cost economics, do not imply, we investigate not only the impact of the importance of producers’ relationship-specific investment on vertical integration decision but also that of suppliers’ relationship-specific investment. Using data on Korean multinational firms in the producing industries and their foreign affiliates in the supplying industries, we find that cross-border backward vertical integration is positively related to the R & D intensity of domestic producing industries, and negatively related to that of foreign supplying industries. In the growing literature on the boundaries of multinational firms, we provide novel test results using a firm-level dataset that the property rights theory can explain multinational firms’ decision on cross-border integration.

한국영화의 생존력 제고를 위한 연구

김은영(Kim Eun Young) 한국영화학회 2004 영화연구 Vol.0 No.24

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the Hollywood film industry is the vertically integrated nature of the major studios. Expanding into different levels of the same industry is called vertical integration. It involves the consolidation of processes occurring at different levels of an industry, covering the whole filming process, from production and distribution to the actual screening. It has characterized the Hollywood film industry for many years. Still, the Korean film industry is one of the most competitive industries, ruled by public opinion. Market is driven by hit in nature. Despite Korean films have recently gained the confidence of cinema-going audiences, most film production companies are subscale and undercapitalized. Traditionally, Korean film is fairly commercial, but not competitive on an international level. Despite viewer's taste shift to Korean films, US films still plays a dominant role in the Korean market, through the distinctive style and the market share remains high. Now, the Korean film industry needs a larger and more diverse audience for film in general. The industry expects there will be partnership agreements between broadcasters, telecommunications and the film industry for broadening contents business area. Therefore, the biggest issue revolves around the possibility for the further industrialization. Attracting valuable inward investment is one of the most important objectives for strengthening the industry. Fortunately, Korean distribution companies, such as CJ Entertainment, Cinema Service and Showbox, have constructed nation-wide direct distribution systems like Hollywood studios' vertical integration, holding real power. Vertical integration will provide one of the most crucial ways of improving its market competitiveness and give an opportunity to establish an effective management system based on an industrial approach. In addition, it will allow us to take further steps in order to establish a stabilized production environment for producing high quality contents and fundamentals for global competitiveness. Hollywood experience shows that certain vertical integration schemes has fulfilled its function as lifelines. This study investigates which vertical integration mechanism could stimulate a stronger film industry and make a teal contribution to further growth in Korea.

Can the Property Rights Theory Explain Cross-border Vertical Integration of Multinational Firms? Firm-level Evidence in Korea

Hyunbae Chun,Jung Hur,Doyoung Kim,Nyeong Seon Son 서울대학교 경제연구소 2015 서울대학교 경제연구소 학술대회 논문집 Vol.2015 No.1

We empirically test the property rights theory for multinational firms’ decision on cross-border vertical integration. To examine its unique predictions that alternative theories, such as the transaction cost economics, do not imply, we investigate not only the impact of the importance of producers’ relationship-specific investment on vertical integration decision but also that of suppliers’ relationship-specific investment. Using data on Korean multinational firms in the producing industries and their foreign affiliates in the supplying industries, we find that cross-border backward vertical integration is positively related to the R&D intensity of domestic producing industries, and negatively related to that of foreign supplying industries. In the growing literature on the boundaries of multinational firms, we provide novel test results that the property rights theory can explain multinational firms’ decision on cross-border vertical integration.