북한의 장거리미사일 개발과 한국의 대응

김강녕 ( Kang-nyeong Kim ) 미래군사학회 2016 한국군사학논총 Vol.5 No.1

The aim of this paper is to analyze the development of North Korea``s long-range ballistic missiles and ROK``s countermeasures. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction, the concept of long-range ballistic missile and differences with space rocket, the current situation, intension, and capability of North Korea``s long-range ballistic missiles development, ROK``s countermeasures, and conclusion. North Korea has continuously developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles etc. North Korea continues to pose a serious threat to the ROK and the international community by developing WMD such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. North Korea test-launched a Taepodong-1 missile in 1998 and Taepodong-2 in 2006. It is estimated that North Korea has the ability to threaten the continental United States with its missiles as shown with six launches of long-range missiles, including the ones in 2009, in April and December 2012. and in February 2014. Despite chronic economic crisis and food shortage, North Korea is relentlessly pursuing nuclear and missile development while maintaining adversarial strategy towards the ROK. North Korea``s military have pursued national unification by use of armed forces as their top policy priority since North and South division. The Intension of North Korea``s long-range ballistic missiles development is not to go to nuclear war against the USA but eventually to pursue national unification under communism by use of armed forces. For over 60 years, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has been a firm foundation and driving force for the ROK to achieve a liberal democracy and economic prosperity in the face of persistent North Korean threats and provocations. The ROK military effectively should deter the use of nuclear weapons and missiles by North Korea based on the ROK-U.S. Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS), and prepare against North Korean nuclear and missile threats by developing the Kill Chain and Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system stage by stage. The our government``s countermeasures on North Korea``s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles must include diplomatic and military means. The ROK and the United States should reinforce their collective defense endeavors and cope jointly with transnational security threats such as development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles etc. based on the principles of the ROK -U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty, thereby contributing to world peace and stability

시진핑 시기 북중관계: 연구동향에서 엿보인 소용돌이와 전환의 갈림길

김흥규,궈슈씨엔 한국국방연구원 2017 국방정책연구 Vol.32 No.4

Debates on North Korea in China illustrate that Chinese views on North Korea hs been diversified. The trends are not necessarily favorable to North Korea but even in favor of South Korea. Such discourses reveals agonies of Chinese leadership and are likely to influence China`s future policies on North Korea. China`s North Korea policy making reflex other variables such as US-China relations, South Korea`s China policy, and North Korea`s behaviors. China`s Korea policies are in the adjustment. They havn`t yet had stable policies. China`s main North Korea policiy orientations under Xi have evolved from engagement, to pressure-focused, to combination of engagement and sanction policies. However, it is obvious that China won`t give up North Korea under current circumstances in spite of her oppostion to North Korea nuclear development. It is recommended that China`s North Korea policy be analyzed in a dynamic manner. Xi`s adjustments of North Korea policies provided South Korea with a window of opportunities to be close each other. However, it is unfortunate that recent THAAD issues drive South Korea-China into a lose-lose game instead of win-win game.

Why China Has Supported North Korea: An Asymmetrical Dependent Relationship between China and North Korea from 1995 to 2016

( Yongjae Lee ) 한국국방연구원 2021 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.33 No.4

North Korea has been China’s socialist ally since the Korean War. Although North Korea’s provocations like nuclear tests have damaged Chinese national interests, China has supported North Korea. This research project examines why China has supported North Korea by analyzing event data from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS). After China became integrated in the global economy, it has regarded stability and peace much more than the strategic factors of North Korea and has not viewed North Korea as a balanced ally to help China maintain the balance of power since the 1990s. This work also attempts to examine whether or not a strategic reason still plays a role in China’s approach toward North Korea. The empirical results demonstrate that when North Korea faced physical and nonphysical threats from the United States and its allies (South Korea and Japan) in Northeast Asia, China showed amicable behavior toward North Korea in order to save its buffer zone. However, China did not approach North Korea when it faced strategic disadvantages.

North Korea’s South Korea Policy: An Evaluation of Determining Variables and Prospects for 2012

한기범 통일연구원 2011 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.20 No.2

The focus of this article is twofold. First, it will review the variables that have critically impacted North Korea and its policies toward South Korea during the terms in office of several former South Korean presidents. Second, it will make some predictions about North Korean policy for 2012 based on an analysis of the characteristics and background of North Korea’s stance toward South Korea during the Lee Myung-bak government. Simply put, the two Koreas both tend to take relatively hard-line policies when North Korean regime is unstable,whereas soft-line policies emerge when the regime stablizes. North Korea’s policy toward South Korea is largely determined by U.S.-related variables; it is also affected, however, by whether South Korea takes a soft or hard stance toward North Korea. The North tends to approache the South at times when Seoul seeks to engage Pyongyang and Washington takes a tough stance. When Washington shows flexibility, Pyongyang does not take the initiative in the inter-Korean relationship but focuses on its relationship with Washington. In sum, variables related to the two Koreas tend to determine the larger direction of North Korea’s South Korea policy, while U.S.-related variables have more specific impact on the forcefulness of North Korea’s approach to South Korea. North Korea has generally taken a hard-line policy during the Lee government, but it has frequently and erratically shifted its tactics between highly provocative, threatening moves and sporadic, poorly-executed attempts at dialogue. It seems that Seoul’s consistent stance toward Pyongyang and the weakening of the inter-Korean dialogue system have forced the reclusive regime to make such erratic tactical changes. It is highly likely that North Korea will continue its unfriendly South Korea policy such as inflicting tensions and provocative acts as usual in 2012. Given that there are a number of factors contributing to the North’s negative strategies toward South Korea, North Korea will need to build tensions for internal consolidation,closing the door on the South’s North Korea policy. With upcoming presidential elections both in South Korea and the U.S. overlapping for the first time in 20 years, North Korea will also exert its utmost efforts to foment negative public sentiment in the South toward the existing policy and to replace the Lee administration with new government which is friendly to the North.

시진핑의 대북정책과 북중관계 변화

황태연 사단법인 한국평화연구학회 2018 평화학연구 Vol.19 No.4

North Korea's nuclear test has caused a change in the political situation on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea's declaration to halt the nuclear test is causing another change. Under these changes, Xi Jinping's perception of the Korean Peninsula and his North Korea policy are very important variables for the change in security order on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it is very important to understand and forecast Xi Jinping's North Korea policy and North Korea-China relations. There is still a special relationship between North Korea and China that is shared historically and ideologically with the geopolitical value of North Korea. However, North Korea's continued nuclear tests have turned China's perception toward North Korea into a strategic burden. Xi Jinping's North Korea relations changes according to changes in international politics, changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and changes in North Korea's strategic value. There is a practical approach to national interest and a balanced strategy to maintain stability. In the future, China is expected to use active economic support, participation, and even economic factors as strategic means if North Korea's military and security strategic value is reduced and its economic strategic value is increasing. 북한의 핵실험에서 시작된 한반도 정세변화는 북한의 핵실험 중단 선언과 함께 또 다른 변화를 일으키고 있다. 이러한 변화 속에서 중국 시진핑 지도부의 한반도 문제에 대한 인식과 대북정책은 향후 한반도 안보질서 변화에 있어 매우 중요한 변수다. 즉 종전선언 및 평화체제로의 전환 시기에 시진핑 지도부의 대북정책 및 북중관계를 이해하고 전망해보는 것은 매우 중요한 의미가 있다. 북중관계는 여전히 북한의 지정학적 가치와 역사적・이념적으로 공유되는 특수 관계가 존재한다. 그러나 계속된 북한의 핵실험으로 인해 북한에 대한 중국의 인식은 전략적 부담으로 바뀌었다. 시진핑 지도부의 대북관계는 미중관계에서 나타나는 국제정세 변화, 남북관계에 따른 한반도 정세변화, 북한의 전략가치 변화에 따라 자국이익을 추구하는 실용적 접근과 안정을 유지하려는 균형전략이 나타난다. 향후 중국은 북한의 군사안보적 전략가치의 축소로 인해 상대적으로 경제적 전략가치가 더욱 상승하게 되면 적극적 경제지원과 참여, 나아가 경제적 요소를 전략수단으로 활용할 것으로 전망된다.

북한지역 토지자산 추정에 관한 연구: 프레임워크 개발 및 탐색적 적용

임송 한국은행 2021 經濟分析 Vol.27 No.2

In this study, we present a methodology and model to estimate land prices and the value of land assets in North Korea in the absence of any data about land characteristics from North Korean authorities. Using this framework, we experimentally make market price-based estimates for land assets across the entire urban area of North Korea. First, we estimate the determinants of land prices in South Korea using data on market prices of land from the late 1970s, when it was estimated that the income level gap between South Korea and North Korea wasn’t relatively large, and from the early 1980s, when urbanization levels in both of them were similar. Second, we calculate land prices and their relative ratios for each city and urban area in North Korea around 2015 by substituting proxy variables of determinants of land prices derived through a geographic information analysis of North Korea into the function of land prices that we have already estimated. Finally, we estimate the value of land assets in urban areas across North Korea by combining the ratio of housing transaction prices surveyed in several cities in North Korea with the relative prices estimated in this research. As a result, land prices in urban areas in North Korea, looking at the relative ratio of price by city, are estimated to be the highest, at 100.00, in Tongdaewon district of Pyongyang, and to be the lowest, at 1.70, in Phungso county, Ryanggang Province. Meanwhile, the value of land assets in urbanized areas was estimated at $21.6 billion in 2015, which was 1.2 to 1.3 times the GDP of North Korea that year. This ratio is similar to South Korea's in the 1978-1980 period, when the South Korean economy grew at an average rate of 6%. Considering North Korea’s growth rate of about 1% in the 2013-2014 period, its ratio of land assets to GDP appears very high. 본 연구는 북한당국이 발표하는 지역별 토지가격이나 토지의 특성에 관한 자료들이 없는 조건에서 북한지역의 토지가격과 토지자산의 규모를 추정하는 방법론과 모형을 제시하고 이를 이용하여 북한 시가화지역 전체를 대상으로 시장가격 기준의 토지자산 규모를 실험적으로 추정하였다. 우선 관련 사회경제적 변수를 이용가능하면서 최근의 북한과 소득수준의 격차가 상대적으로 크지 않았던 것으로 평가되는 남한의 1970년대 중후반, 그리고 도시화 수준이 유사했던 1980년대 초반 남한의 시, 군, 구별 실거래가격을 기준으로 시가화지역 토지에 대한 지가결정함수를 도출하였다. 다음으로 북한지역에 대한 지리정보분석을 통해 도출되는 지가결정요인의 대리변수들을 대입하여 2015년경 북한 시가화지역 토지의 시, 군, 구역별 상대가격비율을 산출하였다. 더 나아가서 최근 북한지역 일부 도시들을 대상으로 조사된 주택거래가격과 본고에서 추정한 상대가격비율을 결합하여 북한전역을 대상으로 시가화지역의 토지자산 규모를 추정하였다. 추정결과 북한 시가화지역의 토지가격은 시, 군, 구역별 상대가격비율로 볼 때 평양시 동대원구역이 100으로 제일 높고 양강도 풍서군이 1.70으로 가장 낮은 것으로 평가되었다. 한편 시가화지역의 토지자산 규모는 2015년 기준 216억 달러로 추정되었는데, 이는 동년 북한GDP의 1.2~1.3배에 달하는 규모이다. 이 비율은 남한의 1978~1980년과 비슷한데, 해당시기의 남한의 경제성장률이 평균 6%인데 반해 북한은 1%대 수준인 것을 고려하면 상당히 높은 것으로 보인다.

An Exploratory Study on the Distribution and Marketing Changes Under the North Korean System

Won-Jun LEE 한국유통과학회 2020 The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business( Vol.11 No.5

Purpose: North Korea is a very close country geographically and culturally, but the nation has been one of the most secretive countries in the world. However, in recent years, North Korean society has been known to rapidly change its economic environment as well as its diplomatic and political environment. Since the gaining power of Jong-un, Kim in 2012, the North Korean government has implemented a new set of economic policies. North Korea has embraced limited market systems and mechanisms that have become a part of the formal planned economy. This study is concerned with the recent changes in the market and marketing activities of the communist country. It also seeks to gain an understanding of the changing market behavior of North Korean consumers. The purpose of this study is to enhance understanding of the market environments of North Korea and to provide appropriate implications for practitioners and researchers. Research design, data and methodology: Academic access to information that can understand North Korea's reality is minimal. Therefore, this study was conducted based on a qualitative analysis of secondary data. The existing literature on North Korea, related news and reports were the basis of the analysis. Analysis of secondary data related to North Korea was the main methodology of the study. Results: The official ideology of North Korea rejected most aspects of marketing, and yet there were marketing activities in North Korea. This article focuses on the development of market and marketing activities in North Korea during the recent years. This study indirectly confirmed that the market function is being activated in North Korea, and the basic functions of marketing such as advertisement, price, and distribution are being formed. In this process, the activation of the ‘Jangmadang(market)’ played a significant role. Conclusions: Research shows that North Korea is rapidly developing its own market function. In addition, marketing activities such as advertising and pricing strategies seem to be unprecedentedly active. However, due to changes in the political environment, the future development of North Korea's marketing is still in flux. Efforts to improve mutual understanding through continuous research are required.

The U.S. Financial Sanctions against North Korea

( Tae Hwan Kwak ),( Seung Ho Joo ) 인하대학교 국제관계연구소 2007 Pacific Focus Vol.22 No.1

In September 2005, the U.S. imposed financial restrictions on North Korea after blaming the North for illicit financial activities, including counterfeiting and money-laundering. The U.S. financial sanctions against the North had direct and immediate impact on the ongoing six-party negotiations on North Korea`s nuclear issue. North Korea insisted on the lifting of U.S. financial sanctions as the precondition for returning to the negotiating table and consequently the six-party talks on North Korea`s nuclear issue stalled. The third session of the fifth round of six-party talks in February 2007 produced an important accord on North Korea`s nuclear question. This agreement was made possible after the U.S. and the DPRK reached a compromise on the financial sanctions issue. This article discusses the U.S. financial sanctions against North Korea and their implications for North Korea`s nuclear question. It begins with an overview of the U.S. financial restrictions. This study then examines the nexus between the financial sanctions and the impasse at the six-party talks on North Korea`s nuclear issue. This is followed by a discussion of the breakthrough on the financial restrictions issue and the landmark agreement on North Korea`s nuclear issue in February 2007. In this study, the authors argue that a mutually satisfactory resolution of the BDA dispute holds the key to a peaceful settlement of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. With the BDA dispute behind, the six-party talks should gain momentum and prepare a road map for implementing the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Both the U.S. and North Korea should not miss this golden opportunity and make earnest efforts to build a firm foundation for peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

4월혁명과 북한 아동문학 - 『남녘땅에 기’발 날린다』를 중심으로 : 4월혁명과 북한 아동문학

이순욱(Lee Soon-Wook) 한국문학회 2007 韓國文學論叢 Vol.46 No.-

North Korea defines the April Revolution as ""the April People"s Uprising"", ""the April 19 People"s Uprising"" or ""the April 19 Uprising"" and recognizes it as a massive struggle against the Unites States and the Lee Seung-man administration of South Korea and a historic expression by South Koreans of their desire for a national reunification. This paper aims to explore how the April Revolution is described in children"s literature of North Korea by focusing on A Flag is Flying in the South(Children"s Books Publishing Company, September 15, 1960), a collection of children"s literature praising the April Revolution. First, the 1960s falls under the category of the Cheollima(Flying Horse) Movement in the history of North Korean literature. The main subject of the literary works during this time was to create an image of a leader, establish a system of socialism, reflect realistic aspects of the Cheollima Movement, embody people"s revolutionary struggle and seek ideologies for national reunification. Distinctively, many works to describe the April Revolution of South Korea were created. Various types of literature regarding the Revolution including poems, political discussions, essays, plays, critics, and children"s literature were produced as opposed to South Korea. Mass produced in North Korea through such official papers as Joseon Munhak and Munhak Sinmunor separate books, the literary works on the April Revolution focus on disclosing the anti-humanitarian aspect of the South Korean society and describing heroic behaviors and a fighting spirit of the public. In other words, the April Revolution was utilized by the North both as an opportunity to publicize the superiority of the North Korean regime and as an educational means to enhance revolutionary spirit of the residents, to criticize the United States and the Lee Seung-man administration. Second, it was effective for the North Korean regime to turn to children"s literature, which served as a vehicle of political propaganda, in developing and internalizing its ideologies. Children"s literature in North Korea faithfully followed these ideologies, so the antiimperialism sentiment, the criticism of South Korea"s Lee Seung-man administration and the laudation for socialism were prevalent in the literature during the first half of the 1960s. A case in point is A Flag is Flying in the South, which is North Korea"s the only revolutionary literature collection describing the April Revolution in the 1960. This children"s collection can be seen as a educational book meticulously prepared on the literary educational level unlike other literary works published in papers. Third, A Flag is Flying in the South contains eights poems for children, one ocherk, one play for children and one drama. These works mainly depict the tyranny and repression by the US imperialism, the exposure of the anti-humanitarian situation in South Korea and heroic struggles of the general public. It is consistent with the main subject of the Cheollima literature that the resistance and the anti-humanitarian aspects of the South Korean society should be revealed in contrast to North Korea"s socialism. The Cheollima Movement is a part of efforts to preempt the revolution against the powerful class in South Korea and the United Stated in a wide range of areas including ideologies, technologies, culture as well as economy. In this context, the characters of South Korean protests in this collection can be considered ""jockeys of Cheollima(Flying Horse)."" Therefore, A Flag is Flying in the South served as children"s literature textbook for political propaganda and was a result of meeting the demands of the North Korean literary circles to create literary works on the April Revolution of South Korea.

북한 경제특구법의 변천과 전망 : 라선경제무역지대법을 중심으로

유욱 법무부 통일법무과 2010 統一과 法律 Vol.- No.3

1990년대 이후 북한경제 회생의 방안으로 추진되어 온 북한 경제특구는 핵문제, 북미관계, 남북관계의 소용돌이 가운데에서 진행되고 있다. 김일성의 유훈사업으로서 북한 최초의 경제특구로서 북한 개방정책의 성패를 좌우할 정도의 비중으로 추진된 라선경제무역지대는 입지선정의 문제, 핵문제를 둘러싼 북미간의 갈등으로 실패하였다. 1998년 김정일 체제가 공식화하면서 라선경제무역지대는 자유경제무역지대에서 한발 물러선 퇴행적인 모습을 가지게 된다. 2000. 6. 15. 선언과 뒤 이은 북미관계와 북일관계 진전은 북한이 새로운 경제특구를 시도하는 기초가 되었다. 라선경제무역지대의 실패에서 교훈을 얻은 북한은 입지조건의 특성에 따라 신의주, 개성, 금강산을 상이한 특구로 지정하고 북한이 신뢰하는 특정외국인(양빈)과 회사(현대)에 특구개발을 전면적으로 위탁하는 방식으로 경제특구의 활로를 찾으려고 시도하였다. 그러나 이러한 움직임 역시 중국 정부에 의한 양빈 구속, 제2차 핵위기의 발생 등으로 인하여 다시 좌초되었고 개성공업지구와 금강산관광지구만이 겨우 명맥을 이어가고 있다. 북한은 경제회생을 위하여 어쩔 수 없이 경제특구개발을 추진하고 있고 이러한 정책은 1990년대 이후 현재까지 두 차례에 걸친 핵위기 가운데에도 변함없이 추진되고 있다는 점에서 북한의 정책기조라고 할 수 있다. 이는 북한이 최근 천안함 사태에도 불구하고 개성공단을 유지하고 있는 사실을 통하여 확인된다. 따라서 체제위기가 치명적인 상황으로 치닫지 않는 한 북한이 개성공단을 폐쇄하는 등 경제특구를 스스로 포기하는 정책을 선택할 가능성은 높지 않다. 그런데 북미관계, 남북관계, 북일관계라는 체제위기를 규정하는 국제정치는 경제특구 개발의 선행조건이자 제약요건으로 작용하고 있다. 아직 북미관계 정상화, 북일관계 정상화 등을 통한 체제안정성의 기반을 마련하지 못한 북한은 경제회생을 위하여 어쩔 수 없이 경제특구를 추진하면서도 그 부정적 영향을 차단하기 위한 통제장치를 강구하여 왔고 이는 개성공업지구와 신의주특별행정구에 경제특구를 북한사회와 단절시키는 모델로 나타났다. 중국심천경제특구로 대표되는 중국 경제특구가 창구·실험·확산의 장이었던 것과 비교하여 개성공업지구에는 북한 기업의 참여가 배제되고 북한 주민은 단지 임금 노동자로서만 참여하게 되어 북한 사회와 단절된 모습을 보이고 있는 것이다. 그럼에도 불구하고 개성공업지구법과 신의주특별행정구법은 라선경제무역지대법과 비교하여 진일보하였고 어떤 의미에서는 중국 경제특구와 비교하더라도 파격적인 측면을 가지고 있다. 이러한 양면성은 라선경제무역지대의 실패 이후 북한이 경제특구를 통한 경제회생의 의지를 보여주는 동시에 외부에 위탁하는 형식을 취하여 한편으로는 성공을 도모하고 다른 한편으로는 경제특구의 영향력을 최소화하려는 북한당국의 복잡한 의도를 보여준다. 따라서 이러한 양면성은 긍정적인 측면과 부정적인 측면을 동시에 가지고 있다. 부정적인 측면은 북한사회와 단절된 특구이기 때문에 북한이 개혁개방의 진정한 실험을 하지 않는다는 것이고, 긍정적인 면은 이러한 진전과 파격에 비추어 북한이 일정한 조건에 부합하는 경우 보다 더 진일보한 형태로 나올 수 있다는 가능성이 열려 있다는 점이다. 비록 이제까지 북한이 경제특구의 실험과 관련하여 혹여 체제안정을 해칠까 노심초사하고 주저하며 회의하고 이따금 퇴행적인 모습을 보이기도 했지만 나름대로 일정한 방향으로 더디게 움직이고 있으며 드물게 파격적인 진보의 모습을 드러내고 있으므로 북한의 경제특구가 성공적으로 자리 잡을 수 있도록 배려하는 지혜가 필요하다. North Korea Special Economic Zone, established in the early 1990’s in an effort to revitalize North’s economy has been struggling within sudden changes in nuclear problem, North Korea-U.S. Relations and North-South Relations. Rajin-Sonbong Economic Trade Zone, the first special Economic Zone(SEZ) in North Korea had been launched following the teachings left by Kim, Il Sung. The project was crucial to the success of the North Korea’s Open-Door Policy. Nevertheless, it did not make outstanding achievements due to site selecting problem and conflict on nuclear problem between North Korea and U.S.. Ra-Son Economic Trade Zone project has rather regressed from the first concept of Free Economic Trade Zone since Kim Jong-Il regime was recognized in 1998. 6.15. Inter-Korean Declaration followed by improvement in North Korea-U.S., North Korea-Japan relations led North Korea to make an attempt at new Special Economic Zone project. Through the lessons learned from failures, North Korea had tried to seek solutions to re-vitalize this project by designating Sinuiju, Gaeseong and Mt. Geumgang area as distinguishing special zones based on locational conditions of each area, and by fully entrusting particular foreign person (Yang Bin) and company (Hyundai) with development of such special zones. However, these attempts ended up falling through due to the second nuclear crisis and China’s imprisonment of Yang Bin. Currently, Gaesung Industrial Complex and Mt. Geumgang Tourism District barely keeps in existence. As for North Korea, Special Economic Zone development project seems to be a keynote of policy, because North Korea had no choice to avoid the project to revitalize its economy and the project has been running on since 1990’s in spite of two times of nuclear crises. It is ascertained through the fact that NK did not shut down Gaeseong Industrial Complex even after the incident of ‘Cheonan’. Thus, North Korea is not likely to abandon this project unless its economic crisis gets extreme. Meanwhile, International Politics including Inter-Korean, North Korea-U.S., North Korea-Japan relations rules regime crisis and performs as constraints and preconditions of Special Economic Zone development. On account of the fact that North Korea has not yet established the foundation through normalizing relations with Japan, U.S., and the South, it has been devising measures to control negative effects of the SEZ project. Thus, SEZ including Gaeseong Industrial Complex and Sinuiju Special Administrative District has severed from North Korean society. In the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, compared to China’s successful model of SEZ represented by Shenzhen district that provided a forum for experiment and proliferation, North Korean company is excluded from participating and North Korean residents can take part in it as a mere wageworker. Yet, Gaeseong Industrial Complex and Sinuiju Special Administrative District compared to Ra-Son Economic Trade Zone is a model that took a major step forward and shows drastic aspects compared even to SEZ in China. Such duality demonstrates strong will to revitalize North Korean economy through SEZ development and North Korea’s complicated intent to make the best of SEZ and to minimize the effect of SEZ at the same time by outsourcing development of SEZ. Therefore, there have to be a positive aspect and a negative aspect at the same time. The former is that in light of such progress and drastic attempts, North Korea will have a chance to bring much considerable progress when it meets particular conditions. The latter is that North Korea does not attempt genuine experiments on the Reform and Open-Door policy by reason that SEZ is severed from North Korea society. Despites North Korea's regressive attitude based on the idea that SEZ related experiments may harm its regime, North Korea has been moving on slowly but in a fixed direction and, at rare intervals, showing drastic changes. Now it is required for the South to be more considerate for North Korea to stabilize management and operation of SEZ successfully.