Cournot duopoly and tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocal preferences

Doruk ˙Iris 한국계량경제학회 2017 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS Vol.28 No.4

This paper studies the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion between firms competing in quantities in infinitely repeated games. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The paper shows that when firms are reciprocal, collusive quantity profiles are easier to sustain for reasonable perceptions of fair quantities of rivals. However, if only very low quantities deemed as fair, then sustaining collusion could be more difficult when the firms have fairness concerns.

Economic Targets and Loss Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

Doruk İ,riş, 한국유통과학회 2015 KODISA ICBE (International Conference on Business Vol.2015 No.-

Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements

( Doruk Iris ),( Alessandro Tavoni ) 한국환경경제학회·한국자원경제학회(구 한국환경경제학회) 2018 자원·환경경제연구 Vol.27 No.2

We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of critical damages from insufficient pollutant abatement, which we jointly call threshold concerns, on the outcome of international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether concerns for a critical level of damages induce cooperation among countries faced with the well-known free-riding problem, and yield sufficient emission reductions to avoid exceeding the threshold. Specifically, we focus on loss-averse countries negotiating under the threat of either high or low environmental damages. Under symmetry, when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we show that such beliefs have a positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories to the treaty and non-signatories, leading to weakly larger coalitions of signatories than in the absence of reference dependence. We then introduce asymmetry, by allowing countries to differ in the degree of concern about the damages. We show that stable coalitions are mostly formed by the countries with higher threshold concerns. When enough countries exhibit standard preferences, the coalition size may diminish, regardless of the degree of concern by the others.

Manipulation via Endowments in University-Admission Problem: Exogenously and Endogenously Determined Scholarships

( Doruk Iris ),( ?pek Ozkal Sanver ) 한국응용경제학회 2014 응용경제 Vol.16 No.1

We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying and predonating endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. We also show that the student- and university-optimal matching rules are non-manipulable under the class of scholarship rule, where the universities give some of their endowments only to their most preferred student as scholarship. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint. We also show that there exists a stable allocation which is manipulable by a university via destroying as well as via predonating endowments whenever the scholarships are determined endogenously in the model.

Tacit Collusion under Fair Price Perceptions and Reciprocal Preferences : The Role of Expectations from Rivals

Doruk İriş 한국응용경제학회 2018 응용경제 Vol.20 No.3

이 논문은 경영자의 행동이 존경심이나 적개심 등, 경쟁자에 대한 개인적인 감정에 영향을 받는다고 가정함으로써 표준적인 기업의 이윤극대화 모형과 차별화된다. 호혜적인 경영자는 경쟁자들의 나쁜 행동에 대해서는 동일하게 나쁜 행동으로 반응(부정적 상호작용)하고, 좋은 행동에 대해서도 동일하게 좋은 행동으로 반응(긍정적 상호작용)한다. 우리는 경영자들이 서로에게 적당한 선에서 요구를 한다면, 호혜적 경영자들이 기업 경영을 하고 있는 경우 담합 가격을 더 수월하게 유지할 수 있음을 발견했다. 하지만, 만약 경영자들이 서로에게 무리한 요구를 한다면 공정성과 호혜성은 담합을 방해할 수 있다. 공정 가격에 대한 인식이 내생적일 때 이러한 결과들이 어떻게 바뀌는지 또한 제시했다. This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that managers are motivated in part by personal animosity–or respect–towards their rivals. A reciprocal manager responds to rivals’ unkind behavior with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), rivals’ kind behavior with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that if the managers are moderately demanding from each other, then collusive price profiles are easier to sustain when firms have reciprocal managers. However, fairness and reciprocity might impede collusion if the managers are highly demanding from each other. How these results would change when fair price perceptions endogenously is also discussed.

위험 감수 상황에서의 대표행위와 사회적 후회

( Doruk Iris ) 한국산업조직학회 2018 産業組織硏究 Vol.26 No.3

타인을 대표할 때는 책임감과 남들을 실망시킬 수 있다는 두려움(사회적 후회)이 뒤따른다. 이 논문에서는 이론적 모형을 이용하여 위험을 감수하는 행동에서의 개인과 집단 간의 불연속성을 설명하는 심리학적 관점을 제시한다. 대표자는 자신의 결정에 따른 결과와 집단 구성원으로부터 얻은 비선택적 조언을 각 상황별로 비교한다. 사회적 후회회피 성향은 극단적인 효용 차이를 두드러지게 함으로써 모험적 이행과 보수적 이행이 모두 가능하도록 만든다. Representing others brings responsibility and fear of letting others down (social regret). We incorporate these phenomena in a theoretical model and provide a psychological perspective to explain the individual-group discontinuity in risk-taking activities. A representative makes a state-wise comparison of the consequences of her decision and an unchosen advice given by a group member. Social regret-aversion renders extreme utility differences salient and allows both risky and cautious shifts.

Loss Aversion in International Environmental Agreements

Iris, Doruk,Tavoni, Alessandro Korean Resource Economics Association 2018 자원·환경경제연구 Vol.27 No.2

We study the impact of loss-aversion and the threat of critical damages from insufficient pollutant abatement, which we jointly call threshold concerns, on the outcome of international environmental agreements. We aim to understand whether concerns for a critical level of damages induce cooperation among countries faced with the well-known free-riding problem, and yield sufficient emission reductions to avoid exceeding the threshold. Specifically, we focus on loss-averse countries negotiating under the threat of either high or low environmental damages. Under symmetry, when countries display identical degrees of threshold concern, we show that such beliefs have a positive effect on reducing the emission levels of both signatories to the treaty and non-signatories, leading to weakly larger coalitions of signatories than in the absence of reference dependence. We then introduce asymmetry, by allowing countries to differ in the degree of concern about the damages. We show that stable coalitions are mostly formed by the countries with higher threshold concerns. When enough countries exhibit standard preferences, the coalition size may diminish, regardless of the degree of concern by the others.

Steel processing effects on crash performance of vehicle safety related applications

Emre Doruk 국제구조공학회 2017 Steel and Composite Structures, An International J Vol.24 No.3

Due to the increasing competition, automotive manufacturers have to manufacture highly safe and light vehicles. The parts which make up the body of the vehicle and absorb the energy in case of a crash, are usually manufactured with sheet metal forming methods such as deep drawing, bending, trimming and spinning. The part may get thinner, thicker, folded, teared, wrinkled and spring back based on the manufacturing conditions during manufacturing and the type of application methods. Transferring these effects which originate from the forming process to the crash simulations that are performed for vehicle safety simulations, makes accurate and reliable results possible. As a part of this study, firstly, the one-step and incremental sheet metal forming analysis (deep drawing + trimming + spring back) of vehicle front bumper beam and crash boxes were conducted. Then, crash performances for cases with and without the effects of sheet metal forming were assessed in the crash analysis of vehicle front bumper beam and crash box. It was detected that the parts absorbed 12.89% more energy in total in cases where the effect of the forming process was included. It was revealed that forming history has a significant effect on the crash performance of the vehicle parts.

Cournot duopoly and tacit collusion under fairness and reciprocal preferences

Iris Haydar Doruk 한국계량경제학회 2017 계량경제학보 Vol.28 No.4

This paper studies the impact of fairness and reciprocity on collusion between firms competing in quantities in infinitely repeated games. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (destructive reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (constructive reciprocity). The paper shows that when firms are reciprocal, collusive quantity profiles are easier to sustain for reasonable perceptions of fair quantities of rivals. However, if only very low quantities deemed as fair, then sustaining collusion could be more difficult when the firms have fairness concerns.

Artificial Heliotropism and Nyctinasty Based on Optomechanical Feedback and No Electronics

Baytekin, Bilge,Cezan, S. Doruk,Baytekin, H. Tarık,Grzybowski, Bartosz A. Mary Ann Liebert 2017 Soft robotics Vol.2017 No.-