동북아의 새로운 핵질서와 비핵지대화 가능성

전성훈 ( Cheon Seong Whun ) 제주평화연구원 2017 Jpi정책포럼 Vol.2017 No.12

NPT가 범세계적인 핵확산을 막는 데 기여했음에도 불구하고, 북한의 핵무장이 국제 핵 비확산 체제와 이에 순응해 온 동북아의 기존 핵 질서를 위협하는 도전으로 부상하였다. 한국은 북한 비핵화에 기대를 걸고 지속해왔던 협상에 의한 북 핵 폐기, 즉 비핵화 정책이 북한의 核 독점으로 실패했음을 자각하고, 우리가 핵옵션을 행사해서 한반도에서 ‘핵 對 핵’의 균형을 맞춤으로써 새로운 核 균형 시대를 열어야 한다. 구체적으로, 한-미 동맹과 미국의 핵 비확산 정책 및 관련 국제규범을 존중하여 우선 전술핵 재배치를 추진하되 미국이 거부하면 국가생존을 위한 마지막 수단으로 자체 핵무장의 길로 나설 수밖에 없다. 북한의 핵보유 도전에 한국이 전술핵 재배치 혹은 자체 핵무장 카드로 대응해야 하는 동북아의 여건은 비핵지대를 논의하기에 적합하지 않다. 동북아 비핵지대는 북한 핵 문제의 해결과 연계하여 장기적인 관점에서 추진하는 것이 바람직하다. 전술핵 재배치는 동북아 비핵지대라는 2보 전진을 위한 1보 후퇴라고 할 수 있으며, 전술핵 재배치의 궁극적인 목적은 재배치 후 남북한 핵군축협상을 제의해서 양측이 보유한 핵 자산을 동시에 폐기하는 것이다. 한국은 남북한 쌍방 핵군축을 통한 북한 핵 문제 해결을 계기로 동북아 내지는 세계적 차원의 핵군축 선도국으로서 이니셔티브를 행사할 수 있을 것이다. 중국이 전술핵을 보유하지 않고 있고 일본도 비핵국인 점을 감안하여, 한반도 비핵화를 ‘동북아전술핵제한지대’로 발전시키는 것은 물론, 우랄산맥 서쪽의 러시아와 유럽을 포괄하는 전 세계의 전술핵을 폐기하는 ‘전술핵폐기조약’으로 확대하는 방안도 제시할 수 있다. Despite the NPT’s contribution to preventing global nuclear proliferation, North Korea’s nuclear armament has emerged as a threat to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and the existing nuclear order in Northeast Asia that has complied with it. South Korea should realize that North Korea’s nuclear disarmament through negotiations that have been pursued with the expectation of denuclearizing North Korea, or its denuclearization policy, has failed owing to a nuclear monopoly by North Korea, and should move forward to a new era of nuclear balance on the Korean peninsula by exercising the nuclear option. Specifically, out of respect for the ROK-US alliance, the US nuclear nonproliferation policy and related international norms, the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapon redeployment should be pursued first. If the US refuses to do so, South Korea should move forward to its own nuclear armament as a last resort for survival. The situation in Northeast Asia, where South Korea must respond to North Korea’s nuclear challenges with tactical nuclear weapon redeployment or its own nuclear armament card, is not suitable for discussing the denuclearization zone. Nevertheless, it is still desirable to promote the Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone from a long-term perspective in connection with the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Tactical nuclear weapon redeployment is a one-step back for two-step forward, i.e. the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and the ultimate goal of tactical nuclear weapon redeployment is to simultaneously discard both countries’nuclear arsenals by proposing nuclear disarmament negotiations between the two Koreas after redeployment. South Korea will be able to exercise its initiative as a nuclear disarmament leader in Northeast Asia or on the global level by resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through mutual disarmament. Considering that China does not possess tactical nuclear weapons and Japan is a non-nuclear nation, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could develop into a ‘Northeast Asia Tactical Nuclear Restrictive Zone,’ as well as expanding into ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement Treaty’ discarding tactical nuclear weaponsaround the world, including Russia and the EU to the west of the Ural Mountains.

북핵문제의 성격

전성훈(Cheon Seong-whun) 한반도선진화재단 2012 한반도선진화재단 기타 단행본 Vol.- No.-

A complicated problem with no distinct origins, the nuclear program in North Korea is a multi-dimensional issue that mainly involves the unification agenda, various foreign policies and international security concerns. This has essentially validated a labyrinth of anxieties worldwide. Firstly, North Korea’s nuclear threat has been hindering any progress with regards to the unification of the peninsula. Not only that, it also gravely endangers the security architecture of the Northeast Asia region. On the international stage, the North’s possession of nuclear warfare capability directly violates the non-proliferation treaty(NPT) and the international community’s unanimous stand against nuclear proliferation. This, at the same time, also poses a severe challenge against the United States administration, which has always stressed anti-nuclear proliferation in its foreign policies. Of course, efforts had been made to solve the crisis: relevant international organizations such as the UN and IAEA did try to step in. However, instead of achieving success, bilateral and multilateral relations between North Korea and involved parties were compromised. And even though the Nuclear Control Commission was set up in North Korea, attempts to resolve the issue fell flat when facility inspections and mutual talks were abruptly halted. North Korea has become the foremost representative country for weapons of mass destruction(WMD). Over the past 40 years where NPT’s nuclear non-proliferation policies have been rigorously maintained, even though there were episodes of nuclear threats along the way, none could compare with the one posed by North Korea. Apart from the DPRK, no other country has been so organized and persistent in all levels in the pursuit of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear warfare capabilities aside, North Korea has also been putting in much effort in accumulating missiles, chemical warfare weapons and related technologies. So intense are these threats that ever since the nuclear crisis in October 2002, the international community came up with a term called ‘The North Korean Contradiction’. This term encompasses all challenges that North Korea has been posing to the world, such as possessing WMD, violation of human rights; drug trafficking; money laundering; counterfeiting money bills and manufacturing missiles etc. It shows global society’s ever increasing awareness of North Korean threats and yet, amidst expanding concerns, sanctions and calls for reconciliation, the isolated country has been violating international rules and insisted on walking its own path. Looking its development trajectory, it was initially subtly assumed that North Korea’s nuclear crisis was solely an affair within the Korean peninsula, not involving any other countries. However, as the issue became increasingly publicized in the beginning of 1990s, its sphere of influence expanded and started involving the United States, followed by other countries along the way. Hence, given the magnitude of the problem, the entire international community must come together to tackle the crisis. South Korea cannot do it alone.

오바마 행정부에서의 미ㆍ북 대화 : 분석과 전망

전성훈(Cheon Seong-Whun) 한국전략문제연구소 2010 전략연구 Vol.- No.48

본 논문은 오바마 행정부 출범과 더불어 새롭게 형성된 전략적 환경 속에서 북한과 미국의 정책을 살펴보고, 미ㆍ북 양자 대화의 가능성을 전망했다. 먼저 미국 신행정부의 외교정책을 판단하는 데 있어서 과거의 타성에서 탈피해야 한다는 점을 제시했다. 즉 오바마 행정부의 대북정책이 과거 민주당 클린턴 행정부의 대북정책과 대동소이할 것이라는 예측은 부시 행정부 8년간의 변화된 상황을 무시하는 잘못을 범할 수 있다는 점을 밝혔다. 다음으로 오바마 행정부의 북한에 대한 기본입장과 전략을 분석했고, 북한의 대미전략을 ‘핵군축 전략’으로 요약해서 설명했다. 마지막으로, 미ㆍ북 대화를 촉진할 수 있는 요인과 방해할 수 있는 요인을 살펴본 후, 미ㆍ북이 한국의 이익을 배제한 타협안을 도출할 가능성을 경계해야 한다는 점도 강조했다. In the new strategic context made by the Obama Administration, this paper addresses strategies of the United States and North Korea, and analyzes the possibilities of the bilateral dialogues between Washington and Pyongyang. First, the paper points out that in order to forecast the Obama Administration's North Korea policy in proper manner, we need be free from the force of habit. That is, the simple assumption that President Obama's North Korean policy would be more or less same as that of President Clinton would be misleading by failing to take the changes made during the Bush era into account. Next, the paper analyzes Washington's basic attitudes and strategy toward Pyongyang, and summarizes Pyongyang's U.S. strategy as "nuclear disarmament strategy." Finally, it investigates those factors to promote or hinder the bilateral relations and warns that North Korea and the United States might reach a compromise against the interests of South Korea.

21세기 강대국 경쟁시대에 북한 핵문제의 진로

전성훈(Seong Whun Cheon) 북한학회 2018 북한학보 Vol.43 No.1

미국 주도의 세계질서를 자국 중심의 지역질서로 대체하려는 주요국 들과 이에 저항하는미국이 경쟁하는 21세기 강대국 경쟁시대는 북한 핵문제의 해결을 어렵게 만드는 구조적 요인이다. 미국은 탈냉전시대의 낙관적인 세계관을 버리고 강대국 경쟁시대의 부활을 현실로 받아 들이면서 안보전략을 뒷받침하는 3대 문건에서 구체적인 대응전략과 정책을 제시했다.이들 문건이 현상변경 세력인 중국, 러시아와 더불어 북한을 기존질서에 도전하는 경쟁자로 규정한 것은 북한 핵문제가 더이상 한반도 지역에 국한된 문제가 아님을 뜻한다.북한 핵문제를 對美 강대국 경쟁의 대리전으로 간주하는 중국과 러시아는 북한을 이용해서 동북아에서 미국의 영향력을 약화시키는 전략을 구사하고 있다. 핵문제가 시작된 1991년 이후 북한이 주한미군 철수와 한미동맹 와해를 목표로 일관되게 추진한 비핵화 국가전략과 중·러의 동아시아전략은 미국의 영향력 약화라는 목표를 공유한다. 북한의 핵독점에 놓인 한반 도는 중·러가 북한을 활용해서 미국의 영향력 약화와 지역안보질서 재편을 노리는 중장기 전략게임을 벌이는 경쟁의 마당이 되었다. 한반 도가 강대국 경쟁의 장이 된 만큼 북한의 핵보유는 장기화될 수밖에 없을 것이다. 한국은 한미동맹을 근간으로 중장기 국익을 수호하기 위한 국가전략을 수립해야 한다. 동시에 당면한 북핵위협에 대처하기 위해 미국의 전술핵 재배치와 한미 핵공유체제 구축을 통한 강력한 거부억 지태세를 구축해야 한다. The emerginggreat power competition between the revisionist powers taking on the existing liberal international order and the United States defending the order is a structural stumbling block to hinder the complete resolution of North Korea’s nuclear problem. To counter the challenges by the competingpowers, Trump administration formulated concrete strategies in the three major security-related strategic documents. They defined North Korea, in addition to China and Russia, as a major competitor challenging the existing international order, indicating that North Korea’s nuclear problem has become a major issue beyond the Korean peninsula. China and Russia capitalize onthe nuclear dispute in Koreaas proxy war to weaken American influence in East Asia. North Korea’s denuclearization strategy to kick American forces off South Korea and undermine the ROK-U.S. alliance is in harmony with the East Asia strategy of China and Russia. The Korean peninsula is an epicenter of great power competition in Asia where China and Russia wage a long-term strategic game by challenging the regional order upheld by the United States and supported by Japan. As long as the competition persists, complete de-nuclearization of North Korea will not be attained. South Korea should develop a long-term grand strategy to manage nuclear-armed North Korea peacefully and beef up its nuclear deterrence by reintroducing American tactical nuclear weapons and establishing a nuclear sharing mechanism to counter the present nuclear threat from North Korea.

Panel Ⅴ ; The Search for a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula and ROK - U . S . Security Cooperation : 한반도 평화체제 구축의 쟁점들

전성훈 ( Seong Whun Cheon ) 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 1996 THE SEARCH FOR PEACE Vol.- No.-

NPT에 반영된 주요 강대국의 입장

전성훈(Cheon Seong-whun) 한국외교협회 2020 계간 외교 Vol.- No.133

한반도, 독일의 냉전구조해체방안 비교연구와 정책적 함의

김학성,황병덕,박종철,전성훈 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2002 한국과 국제정치 Vol.18 No.1

A Cold War structure, underlined an international order pivoting Washington and Moscow for the latter half of the 20th century, was dismantled with the demise of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe. A remnant of the Cold War era, division of the Korean peninsula, unfortunately remains without resolution at the beginning of the 21 century. So freeing the peninsula and its people from the custody of the outmoded ideological confrontation must be an important task of the contemporaries for the benefit of peace and stability of the international community in the new century. One way to attain this is to learn practical lessons for application of the other parts of the globe that experienced some similarities in the past. In particular, West Germany's Ostpolitik and Germany policy are worthy of pursuing a serious investigation. West German policy toward East Germany and South Korea's sunshine policy toward North Korea are overlapping in the following two points: (1) the two policies try to overcome the limits of existing unification policies and to propose new visions for their people and (2) they focus on fostering auspicious environments for unification through peaceful management of division in the first place rather than hastily justifying the virtues and necessities of unification. Noting these commonalities, this paper attempts to draw valuable lessons from the German experiences and apply them in the Korean case with due consideration of the strains of the Korean peninsula. The paper first performs an analysis about West Germany's Ostpolitik. Its background, basic policy thinking and the result of policy implementations are thoroughly reviewed. West German s efforts for dismantling Cold War structure are explained in two dimensions: inter-German and European. A similar analytic framework is used to analyze the sunshine policy in the case of Korea. South Korea's efforts for getting rid of a Cold War remnant are also detailed in two dimensions: inter-Korean and Northeast Asian. Based on the analyses, the two policies are compared and policy implications are drawn for the peaceful management of Korean division and for ultimate unification in the end.