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이웅현 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2023 한국과 국제정치 Vol.39 No.2
The Soviet Union has been involved in North Korea's nuclear program since the mid-1950s by supporting basic nuclear knowledge and technology to North Korea. However, considering the possibility of North Korea's possibility of adhesion of China and the leakage of nuclear weapons development technology, it has rejected North Korea’s requests for nuclear reactors and has been consistent with reluctant assistance. The Soviet Union was cynical and suspicious when North Korea began to express its interest in nuclear weapons in the 1960s. Furthermore, it strictly controlled the Eastern European countries to prevent nuclear weapons related technologies and materials from leaking to North Korea. In the early and mid-1980s, during the period of the drastic power succession of the Soviet Union and global detente, North Korea approached the Soviet Union again to secure a commitment to aid nuclear technology, reactors, and fuels. However, conventionally distrustful of North Korea's militant posture and default, the Soviet Union declared suspension of nuclear aid program. This paper argues that the Soviet Union has rejected the North Korea's requests for nuclear program for various reasons from the 1950s to 1990s, and emphasize that the USSR-North Korea relations of the nuclear issue have been conducted in the unique inter-relationships of both countries, not in the East-West confrontations of the Cold War era.
이웅현 경남대학교 극동문제연구소 2003 한국과 국제정치 Vol.19 No.1
The foreign policy of Russia traditionally unfolded in two distinct theaters, the European and the Asian. But the primary attention and effort were directed to Europe, the significance of the Asian theater being remained on the whole subordinate, the results of which was the failure at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth and the relative strengthening of the America's shadow during the Cold War. It was ironically after the demise of the Soviet Empire that Asia, which was seen as having its proper value and appreciated not from the comparative point of view with Europe, revived in Russian foreign policy. Though without success, Gorbachev promoted a series of policies for multilateral security cooperation toward Northeast Asia. And Yeltsin and Putin respectively took concrete forms of this sort of policies in the course of building their own military strategy and diplomatic doctrines. Recently Russia is making efforts to identify herself with a broker or a guarantor for the Northeast Asian multilateral security system, which is seen improbable to be established for the time being because of the poverty of historical experience, the uniqueness of the Northeast Asian regional international system and nonexistence of common or collective security issues. Hope is not policy, and Russian foreign policy makers knows this very well. Fore the predictable future, therefore, they will search for the bilateral security partnership with each Northeast Asian countries, at least until the completion of their military reformation policy.