이사회 특성과 배당정책: 중소기업과 대기업 비교

이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ) 한국중소기업학회 2013 기업가정신과 벤처연구 Vol.16 No.3

배당지급정책을 둘러싼 대리인 문제를 해소하기 이하여, 우수한 지배구조를 가진 기업은 미래 투자기회가 많지 않은 경우 주주에게 배댱을 지급함으로써 대리인 문제를 완화하려고 한다. 본 연구는 2001년부터 2010년까지 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 이사회 특성이 배당정책에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 분석결과, 사외이사로서의 경험이 있는 사외이사 혹은 회계전문가인 사외이사가 이사회에 많이 선임되어 이사회의 전문성이 높은 기업일수록 배당이 높다는 결과를 발견하였다. 그러나 이러한 이사회 전문성과 배당 사이에 양(+)의 관계는 중소기업에서는 대기업에 비하여 약해지는 것을 발견하였다. 그 밖에 이사회의 독립성과 사외이사의 법률적 전문성은 배당과 유의한 관계를 보이지 않았다. 본 연구의 결과는 이사회의 경영자 감시효과는 사외이사의 형식적인 선임 그 자체보다는 사외이사의 전문성을 통해 높아지며, 이 효과는 대기업에 비해 중소기업에서는 약하다는 시사점을 갖는다. In the face of agency problems surrounding dividends payous, strong corporate governance attempts to distribute excess cash flows to shareholders if attractive invest-ment opportunities are rare, Using the publicly traded firms from 2001 to 2010, this paper finds that dividends are positively associated with board expertise measured by experience as outside directors and accounting competency. However, the positive association between dividends and board characteristics such as board independence and legal expertise do not show positive associations with devidends. The results imply that the board effectiveness in monitoring management and distributing dividends is improved by outside directors` quality, rather than by the formal appointment of outside directors itself. Also, the results suggest that the board effectiveness is lower in SMEs than in large firms.

경영성과와 공시빈도: 코스닥 기업과 유가증권상장기업 비교

이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ) 한국중소기업학회 2013 기업가정신과 벤처연구 Vol.16 No.3

본 연구는 경영성과에 따른 기업의 공시빈도를 분석하였다. 공시빈도는 2003년부터 2008년까지 유가증권시장과 코스닥 시장에 상장된 기업들이 공정공시제도에 따라 정보를 제공한 횟수로 측정하였으며, 공시빈도 분석은 재무정보 공시와 홍보성 공시를 나누어 수행하였다. 연구결과, 재무공시 빈도는 경영성과와 양(+)의 관계를 갖는 반면 홍보공시 빈도는 경영성과와 음(-)의 관계를 갖는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 경영성과와 공시빈도의 관계는 유가증권상장기업 보다 코스닥 기업에서 더 강하게 나타났다. 한편, 지배구조가 우수한 코스닥 기업에서는 경영성과와 공시빈도의 관계가 상대적으로 약하게 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 경영자들이 경영성과가 양호하면 재무정보를 활발하게 공시하지만, 경영성과가 부진하면 재무정보 보다는 홍보성 공시를 제공함으로써 주가에 미치는 부정적인 영향을 만회하려는 동기가 있음을 시사한다. 또한 본 연구의 결과는 이러한 자의적인 공시행태는 유가증권상장기업보다는 코스닥기업에서 더 강하게 나타나지만, 지배구조가 우수하면 이러한 기회주으적인 공시행태가 억제되고 있음을 보여준다. This paper addresses disclosure practices in response to earnings performance. Specifically, this paper separately analyzes financial and promotional disclosures under Regulation Fair Disclosure using a sample of publicly traded firms on the KSE and KOSDAQ markets from 2003 to 2008. First, I find that financial discloures are positively associated with earnings performance while promotional disclosures are negatively associated with earnings performance. Secnd, the positive (negative) associa-tion between financial (promotional) disclosures and earnings performance is stronger in KOSDSAQ firms than KSE firms. Lastly, the strong sensitivity of disclosure frequency to earnings performance in KOSDAQ firms is weakened with good corporate governance. The results suggest that good performance motivates management to provide more disclosures regarding financial information whereas poor performance drives manage-ment to hold back financial information and instead activate promotional disclosures to justify or boost stock prices. This discretionary disclosure is stronger in KOSDAQ firms than KSE firms. However, strong corporate governance plays a role in limiting opportunistic disclosures in KOSDAQ firms.

대규모기업집단 소속기업의 투자효율성

임상균 ( Sang Giun Yim ),이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ),황인이 ( In Y Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2014 회계학연구 Vol.39 No.3

본 연구에서는 대규모기업집단 소속기업들의 투자효율성에 대해 분석하였다. 과거의 국내외 연구들은 대규모기업집단 소속기업들이 비효율적이고 많은 문제점을 가지고 있다고 보고한 경우가 많았다. 그러나 최근 수행된 다수의 연구들은 오히려 대규모기업집단 소속기업들이 기타 기업들에 비해 우수하다는 증거들을 다수 제시하고 있다. 본 연구에서 대규모기업집단 소속기업들을 기타 기업들과 비교한 결과 투자효율성이 높다는 증거를 발견하였다. 첫째, 대규모기업집단 소속기업들은 과소투자가 이루어질 가능성이 높은 상황에서 다른 기업들 보다 많은 투자를 하고 있었으며, 과대투자가 이루어질 가능성이 높은 상황에서는 다른 기업들보다 적은 투자를 수행하고 있었다. 둘째, 추가적으로 대규모기업집단 소속기업들만을 대상으로 분석해본 결과, 지배주주의 현금흐름 수취권리가 높은 기업이나 기업집단의 중핵기업이 과대투자가능성이 높은 상황에서 그렇지 않은 기업들보다 투자가 적어, 높은 투자효율성을 보였다. 그러나 지배주주의 소유지배괴리 수준, 피라미드식 혹은 순환출자 형태의 소유구조는 투자효율성과 유의한 관계를 보이지 않았다. 마지막으로, 대규모기업집단 소속기업들은 사외이사 비율이 높은 기업이 과대투자가능성이 높을 때 상대적으로 투자가 적어 투자효율성이 높았다. 그 밖에 사외이사의 전문성 혹은 활동성은 투자효율성과 유의한 관계가 없었다. 이런 발견들은 기업집단과 지배구조의 역할에 대해 여러 중요한 시사점들을 제시해 주고 있다. This paper investigates two issues related to investment efficiency: (1) How affiliation with family-controlled large business conglomerates in Korea (Chaebol) influences investment efficiency, and (2) among firms belonging to Chaebol groups, how the governance mechanisms at the conglomerate-level and firm-level influence investment efficiency. There has been a prolonged controversy on the role of business conglomerates. Familycontrolled large business conglomerates are found in many countries, including Asian and European countries. La Porta et al. (1999) report that these firms are mostly controlled by the concentrated ownership of families. Many prior studies criticize that firms belonging to business conglomerates engage in non-value maximizing activities to increase the influence of controlling shareholders. For example, in some cases, firms engage in tunneling activities to transfer wealth from a firm to another firm over which controlling shareholders have more cash flow rights. In other cases, several firms in the conglomerate help another firm that is in financial difficulties. This behavior is called propping. Controlling shareholders of business conglomerates build large empires and try to increase the assets under their control. For this purpose, controlling shareholders engage in tunneling or propping, which results in the sacrifice of the wealth of minority shareholders (Betrand et al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2006; Kim 2008; Jian and Wong 2010; Kwon et al. 2012). For these reasons, firms belonging to business conglomerates may make inefficient investments that result in inferior firm performance. Several studies using Korean data confirm this argument (Choi and Cowing 1999; Chang 2003; Joh 2003: Kim 2011). Studies in accounting also document evidence that confirms this argument. For example, Fan and Wong (2003) find that as the ownership divergence between cash flow rights and voting rights of business conglomerates increases, the earnings response coefficient decreases. In contrast to these criticisms of the business conglomerate, several recent studies have started to report on the beneficial roles of business conglomerates. Using Indian data, Siegel and Choudhury (2012) report that firms in business conglomerates engage in more long-term business strategy and research and development activities. Additionally, Khanna and Palepu (2000) report that business conglomerates more efficiently use internal cash and thus lower information asymmetry. These findings are consistent with those of Korean studies. Lee et al. (2010) document that Korean business conglomerates changed their behaviors after the 1997 financial crisis. Thus, they exhibit higher profitability and less volatility than other firms. Their leverage ratio has also dropped, suggesting that they are less likely to use external debt financing. Similarly, Kim (2012) reports that firms belonging to business conglomerates grow more rapidly, have a higher level of investment with higher profitability. Park and Jung (2011) argue that business conglomerates create synergy effect that help the survival and restructuring process. In summary, the findings of recent studies generally suggest that business conglomerates are not likely to engage in inefficient investments. In addition, prior studies on the issue mostly use naive and descriptive methods. They simply compare the level of investments and future ( ex post) profitability with benchmark firms. Although this analysis is suggestive, it does not control for other factors that may be related to the investment level. Using the sophisticated method developed by Biddle et al. (2009), this study investigates the investment efficiency issue related to business conglomerates. Biddle et al.`s (2009) method classifies firms into two subsamples: the situation in which over-investment is likely to occur and the opposite situation in which under-investment is likely to occur. The samples used in this study are Korean listed firms (excluding firms in the banking and finance industries) over the period from 2001 to 2009. Data on business conglomerates are collected from the website of the Korean Fair Trade Commission. The final sample size is 6,217 firm-year observations from 1,177 firms. Among them, 803 observations belong to firm in family-controlled business conglomerates. Our empirical results are summarized as follows. First, consistent with the findings in most of the recent studies, we find that firms belonging to business conglomerates engage in less over-investment (under-investment) than other firms when they are in situations in which over-investment (under-investment) is likely to occur. Second, among conglomerate-level governance mechanisms, we find that firms with high cash flow rights and firms that play a central role in the conglomerate, respectively, engage in less over-investment than other firms when over-investment is likely to occur. Ownership divergence, firms` position in pyramid-type structures, and circular shareholdings are not related to the investment efficiency. Third, among firm-level governance structures, we find that firms with a high ratio of independent outside directors are likely to engage in less over-investment than other firms when overinvestment is likely to occur. In contrast, the ratio of grey directors, board members with other directorships, existence of accounting experts among outside board members, and ratio of board meeting attendance by outside directors are not significantly related to investment efficiency. These findings, combined together, provide valuable implications to regulators, firms, and other interested parties. We hope future studies investigate related issues further to clarify the role of business conglomerates and their governance mechanisms.

지분율 괴리도와 공시 정보의 빈도 사이의 관계

심호식 ( Ho Shik Shim ),이문영 ( Moon Y. Lee ),최종학 ( Jong Hag Choi ) 한국회계학회 2010 회계학연구 Vol.35 No.4

본 연구는 지배주주의 의결권과 배당권의 차이인 지분율 괴리도로 측정한 기업의 지배구조 수준과 공정공시제도를 통해 공시되는 정보의 빈도 사이의 관련성을 조사하였다. 지분율 괴리도가 커지게 되면 지배주주가 소액주주의 권리를 침해하여 자신의 사적 이익을 추구할 가능성이 높아지게 된다. 따라서 기업은 이러한 사실을 외부 이해관계자들로부터 숨기기 위하여 정보를 덜 공개할 수 있다. 그러나 그 반대로 이런 기업들이 더 정보를 많이 공개할 수도 있다는 소수의 견해도 존재한다. 그 결과 지분율 괴리도에 따라 시장에 공개되는 공시정보의 빈도가 달라질 것이다. 본 연구는 이러한 가설을 실증자료를 이용하여 분석하였다. 분석 결과는 다음과 같이 요약된다. 첫째, 지분율 괴리도가 증가할수록 공시수준이 감소하였다. 둘째, 지분율 괴리도를 구성하는 배당권과 의결권을 별도의 변수로 나누어 분석해 본 결과, 배당권은 공시수준과 유의적인 관련성이 없었으나 의결권은 공시수준과 음(-)의 관련성을 가지고 있었다. 즉 지분율 괴리도를 사용한 결과는 의결권 때문에 발생한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 셋째, 공시를 하지 않은 기업과 괴리도 차이가 발생하지 않는 기업들을 제외하고 추가 분석을 실시하여 본 경우, 마찬가지로 지분율 괴리도가 높을수록 공시수준이 감소하였다. 본 연구의 이러한 발견은 우수한 기업지배구조의 확립의 효과와 관련하여 규제기관과 학계, 실무 종사자들과 투자자들에게 유용한 많은 시사점을 제공하고 있다. ownership divergence) and the frequency of information disclosed under fair disclosure system. The ownership wedge implies the difference in the voting right and cash flow right of the controlling shareholders. The ownership wedge is found in many countries, Asian as well as European countries where the legal protections for the minority shareholders are generally weak (Faccio and Lang 2002). Larger the ownership wedge, controlling shareholders have an incentive to pursue their private interests (Claessens et al. 2000, 2002) by transferring wealth from minority shareholders to themselves. Thus, the interests of minority shareholders are sacrificed. Prior research in accounting and finance show that these incentives caused by the ownership wedge influence the firm value, operating performance, investors` reaction in a negative way (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan and Wong 2002, 2005; Kim and Yi 2006). However, there has been no study which investigates the effect of ownership wedge on the amount of information disclosure. Prior study of Sonu et al. (2010) documents that the magnitude of the ownership wedge is positively associated with the error in analysts` earnings forecasts. They document that as the wedge increases the error in the forecasts increases. Sonu et al. (2010) interpret the findings that firms with greater wedge may be reluctant to provide useful information to analysts and investors who are afraid of revealing accurate information. It is because the information could reveal controlling shareholders` behavior to pursue private interest. The study of Sonu et al. (2010) provides a foundation for this study. In this study, we directly examine the link between ownership wedge and the amount of information disclosure. If controlling shareholders are reluctant to provide detailed information to the outsiders, the amount of information disclosed by the firm could decrease. However, although it is not popular view among researchers, Wang (2006) predicts that companies with problem in corporate governance may release more information to attract the investors` attention. In such a case, we may find positive association between ownership wedge and the frequency of firm disclosure. To measure the ownership wedge, we use the ownership data released by Korea Fair Trade Commission in each year. For the amount of information disclosed, we use the information released via the fair disclosure regulation of Korean Stock Exchange, which was introduced in November 2002. Prior study of Lee (2008) performs an extensive study on the nature and effect of information disclosed under fair disclosure rule. The study shows that investors strongly respond to the disclosed information. Thus, the information released under fair disclosure system is a good proxy for the amount of information disclosure by each firm. The sample period used in this study starts from 2003 and ends 2008. The fair disclosure data are collected from Korean Investor`s Network for Disclosure system (www.krx.co.kr). The sample size is 557 firm-year observations from 147 large conglomerates in Korea. Among 557 firm-year observations, 137 observations do not have any disclosure, whereas the remaining 420 observations made multiple disclosures. On average, sample firms made 4.59 disclosures per year. We divide full sample to 2 different categories of disclosures, disclosure on future forecasts and disclosure on strategic promotion, and report the statistics on the frequency of the disclosures separately. In addition, average cash flow right is 15 percent, whereas the voting right is 43 percent in our sample. Thus, the average ownership wedge is 28 percent, which is the difference between cash flow right and voting right (43- 15=28). The other financial variables used in the analyses are collected from KIS Value and DataGuide Pro databases. Empirical results reveal that there exists a negative association between the ownership wedge and the frequency of disclosure, after controlling other factors which are known to be correlated with the frequency of disclosures (the firm size, the number of days after the initial listing of the firm, Big 4 auditor choice indicator variable, foreign ownership percentage, leverage ratio, sales growth rate, book-to-market ratio, yearly return variability, and other governance-related variables). When we divide the ownership wedge to cash flow right and voting right, the results reveal that only the voting right is significantly associated with the frequency of information disclosures, whereas the cash flow right is insignificant although the sign of the coefficient is in the expected direction. These findings are consistent with those in Sonu et al. (2010) that only voting right is significantly associated with the error in analysts` earnings forecasts. When we further restrict the samples to observations that made at least 1 disclosure during the year and the ownership wedge is greater than zero (thus there is a difference between cash flow right and voting right of controlling shareholders), the results are also qualitatively the same. In summary, these empirical findings are all consistent with the prediction based on the theory presented in the paper. The findings in this study are expected to provide valuable insights to regulators, academics, practitioners, as well as investors. We expect future research should turn the attention to the quality of disclosure as well as the quantity.

사례논문 : 풋백옵션(주식매도선택권)의 가치평가 및 위험관리 -금호산업 사례를 중심으로

조형진 ( Hyung Jin Cho ),이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ),황이석 ( Lee Seok Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2011 회계저널 Vol.20 No.5

최근 국내 기업 인수합병 과정에서 풋백옵션(Put Back Option, 주식매도선택권)이 빈번하게 사용되고 있으며 파장도 적지 않다. 대표적으로 (주)금호산업이 2006년에 (주)대우건설을 인수하며 재무적 투자자들에게 발행한 풋백옵션은 파생상품의 효용과 위험을 잘 보여주는 사례이다. 금호산업은 풋백옵션을 제공하는 조건을 제시하여 재무적 투자자들을 효과적으로 모집할 수 있었고 대우건설 인수에 성공한다. 재무적 투자자들이 풋백옵션을 갖고 있으면 매입한 주식의 주가가 행사가액 이하로 떨어져도 해당 주식을 금호산업에게 행사가액으로 팔 수 있어 유리하기 때문이다. 반면 금호산업은 재무적 투자자들이 옵션을 행사하는 경우 주식을 행사가액으로 매입해야하는 위험을 부담하게 된다. 만일 금호산업이 이러한 계약을 이행할 자금이 충분하지 않으면 재무적 투자자들 역시 옵션을 행사하고자 하나 주식을 행사가액에 팔지 못하는 위험에 처한다. 본 연구는 금호산업의 사례를 바탕으로 풋백옵션의 효용과 위험, 공정가치평가, 회계처리 및 재무제표에 미치는 영향, 위험관리방안 등을 논의한다. 모든 논의는 풋백옵션 발행자(금호산업)와 보유자(재무적 투자자) 각각의 입장에서 설명하여 파생상품을 다각도로 이해할 수 있도록 하였다. 풋백옵션 공정가치평가는 머튼모형(Merton 1973)과 몬테카를로 시뮬레이션을 이용하였다. 풋백옵션 회계처리는 금호산업 입장에서는 파생상품회계의 일반원칙을 설명하고, 대우증권(재무적 투자자) 입장에서는 공정가치위험회피회계를 소개하였다. 풋백옵션 위험관리방안으로는 금융상품을 이용하여 풋백옵션을 헤지함으로서 발행자는 현금유출위험을 낮추고 보유자는 계약불이행위험을 줄일 수 있는 방법을 모색하였다. 특히 리먼브라더스(재무적 투자자)가 금호산업이 계약을 이행하지 못할 위험을 제3자에게 전가하기 위해 실행한 위험관리사례도 소개한다. 본 연구는 다양한 학습기회를 제공한다. 첫째, 풋백옵션 발행자와 보유자의 상반된 입장을 분석해 봄으로써 풋옵션에 대한 이해를 높일 수 있다. 둘째, 시장가격이 없는 파생상품의 공정가치평가방법을 학습할 수 있다. 본 연구가 주된 가치평가방법으로 이용한 머튼모형은 파생상품가격결정에서 대표적인 모형이므로 학습할 가치가 높다. 셋째, 파생상품회계의 일반원칙과 공정가치위험회피회계를 하나의 사례를 통해 학습할 수 있어 매우 효과적이다. 넷째, 금융상품을 이용하여 파생상품을 헤지할 수 있는 다양한 방법을 모색해 볼 수 있다. 마지막으로, 인수합병을 위해 풋백옵션 발행을 고려하는 경영진들에게 본 연구는 미래 부정적인 상황까지 염두에 두고 위험관리방안을 수립해야한다는 시사점을 줄 수 있다. 또한 본 연구에서 소개한 파생상품헤지방안을 토대로 풋백옵션 위험관리방안의 단초를 마련할 수 있기를 기대한다. Recently the put back options have been widely used in South Korea when firms have attempted to merge or acquire others. Afterwards the put-back options have given rise to serious scandals. The highlight among them may be the put back options which were issued to financial investors by Kumho Industrial (henceforth Kumho) in order to raise capital for the acquisition of the Daewoo Engineering and Construction (henceforth Daewoo E&C) in 2006. Kumho could invite financial investors to the joint acquisition of Daewoo E&C successfully because Kumho promised to provide financial investors for the put back options. With put back options, financial investors have an advantage that they can sell their stocks to Kumho at the exercise price if stock prices are below it. In contrast, Kumho is exposed to a risk of the obligation to buy financial investors` stocks at the exercise price even though they are not worthy of the amount. Financial investors also carry a risk: they may fail to sell their stocks to Kumho at the exercise price when Kumho does not have enough money to fulfil his obligations. Based on the put back option issued by Kumho, this study deals with the various aspects of the put back options including its benefits and risks, option pricing, accounting for derivatives and the effects on the financial statements, and risk management. This study discusses all those aspects from both the view of Kumho as a option issuer and the point of financial investors as option holders, aiming to help understand the put back option thoroughly. For the valuation of the put back option, this study use the Merton`s option pricing model (Merton 1973) and Monte Carlo simulation. This study also explain accounting for put back options, ranging from general principles for derivative instruments which are applied to Kumho, to fair value hedge accounting that is available to financial investors. Lastly, this study looks for risk managements using financial instruments, which can reduce the issuer`s cash outflow risk upon option exercises or decrease the holders` credit risk from the issuer. This study provides the brief introduction on the case of Lehman Brothers who succeeded in avoiding its credit risk. This study is expected to provide many good learning opportunities. First, this study helps to understand several characteristics of the put back option by analyzing two counterparties: option issuers and holders. Second, this study shows how to price options when their market prices are unavailable because they are not traded in markets. It is worth learning the Merton model because it is one of the most widely used models. Third, it is attractive to apply two accounting methods for two parties of a case. Forth, this study encourages to think about various ways to reduce risks using financial instruments. Finally, this study may impress managers who consider option issuances for the purpose of capital raising in M&A. One of potential lessons learned from this study is that managements should make risk management plans to be able to cope with the worst situation. Risk management plans in this study may provide the stepping stone toward better ones.

자산재평가 효과: 아시아나항공 사례

백복현 ( Bok Baik ),최선화 ( Sun Hwa Choi ),이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ),임상균 ( Sang Giun Yim ) 한국회계학회 2010 회계저널 Vol.19 No.3

지배회사 특성과 감사인의 전략적 반응

최연식 ( Youn Sik Choi ),김범준 ( Bum Joon Kim ),이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ) 한국회계학회 2014 會計學硏究 Vol.39 No.5

본 연구는 감사인에게 상반된 인센티브를 제공하는 지배회사의 독특한 특성에 주목하여 감사인이 감사보수를 전략적으로 활용하는지를 분석하였다. 실증분석 결과, 타감사인이 감사한 종속회사의 비중이 클수록 감사보수가 상대적으로 낮고, 대규모기업집단 내에서 결합재무제표를 작성하는 최상위지배회사 이거나 종속회사를 지배하는 지배력이 높은 회사일수록 상대적으로 감사보수가 높은 것을 발견하였다. 특히 결합재무제표를 작성하는 회사의 경우, 타감사인이 감사하는 종속회사의 비중과 감사보수 사이의 음(-)의 관계는 더욱 강화되는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 감사인이 기업집단 내에서 최상위에 위치한 상징적 고객을 감사위험 요소로 평가하는 반면, 잠재적 고객(즉 타감사인이 감사하는 종속회사)을 많이 보유한 지배회사는 경제적 요인으로 평가한다는 점에서 감사인이 지배회사의 특성에 전략적으로 행동한다는 시사점을 제공한다. Prior studies argue that auditors are willing to cut prices as a response to competition in the audit industry. It is alleged that auditors lower fees (i.e., ``loss-leader``) in the hope of getting a foot in the door to secure lucrative non-audit services (Antle et al. 2006). Auditors also tend to reduce fees on initial audit engagements (i.e., ``low balling``) expecting to recover any initial loss by raising fees in the future (Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2005). However, auditors` strategic discounting does not necessarily ensure high yields in the future. We examine auditors` strategic decision-making in pricing fees. Specifically, we look into auditors` charges to parent companies for consolidated financial statements because parent companies have distinguishable characteristics from stand-alone firms or subsidiaries. From an economic view, a parent company leads several subsidiaries that, in turn, will hopefully switch their auditors to their parent`s auditor, although audit on complex consolidation processes is burdensome with inefficient communication between auditors. In addition, from a political perspective, parent companies serve as a symbol of each business conglomerate while drawing social attention from media, regulators, etc. The auditing of such a symbolic client can help build good reputations (i.e., signaling effect). Alternatively, the symbolism of parent companies can cause auditors to bear political costs such as increased efforts to justify their opinion under high attention and scrutiny (Redmayne et al. 2010).

국제회계기준 채택이후 회계기준제정기구의 역할

곽수근 ( Su Keun Kwak ),박경호 ( Kyung Ho Park ),이문영 ( Moon Y Lee ),황이석 ( Lee Seok Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2010 회계저널 Vol.19 No.2