1308~1310년 고려내 “牧·府 신설”의 내용과 의미

이강한(Lee Kang Hahn) 한국사연구회 2012 한국사연구 Vol.158 No.-

Examined in this article, are the contents and meaning of Chungseon-wang’s decision to install New Mok/牧 units in 1308, and then his decision to turn them into new Bu/府 units in 1310. With Chungseon-wang’s efforts in 1308, the previous local system which was composed of “5 Do provinces, several Local Overseers(Gye’su-gwan, including only 8 or 9 Mok units) and other Ju, Bu, Gun & Hyeon units,” was modified to display “5 Do provinces, more than ‘22 or 23’ Mok units to assist the provinces, and other Ju, Gun & Hyeon units.” And then in 1310, 15 of the 1308’s Mok units became “new Bu” units. Before 1308, the exact nature of the relationship between the Do provinces and the Mok “Overseers” was unclear. Both entities were designed to oversee large areas. The reason there had been no jurisdictional problems between Do and Mok units before, was because the Do provinces had not yet been formally established. They had been in flux and their functions had been continuing to shift, ever since the end of the 10th century. But coming into the early 13th century, they were finally formalized with their number fixed as 5, and their functions came to overlap with those of the Mok units, which was (for both of them) to administratively oversee designated wide areas. So Chungseon-wang decided to designate the role of the existing 8 or 9 Mok units as ‘assisting’ the Do provinces, and at the same time additionally created total of 15 new Mok units as entities that would assist the Do provinces as well so that there would be no gaps within the Mok network, without which the Do provinces would not be able to govern the local society properly. And in 1310, to bring a hierarchy system to his newly invented local structure which would ensure efficient and effective ruling of the entire local society, he turned all 15 new Mok units into new “Bu” units, and placed them under Do provinces, as well as below the 8 or 9 Original Mok units. His decision to create 15 new Mok units was an attempt to use elements from Goryeo’s past local system, which was to create more ‘traditional’ Mok units. Yet his decision to turn them all into new Bu units was a result of adopting a rather foreign concept, the Bu concept from the Mongol Yuan empire. This interesting experiment of Chungseon-wang was successfully pulled off, and this new system he designed managed to survive until the end of the Goryeo dynasty.

고려 원종대 대원(對元) 교섭에서의 ‘송(宋)’의 의미

이강한(Lee, Kang-Hahn) 역사문화학회 2014 지방사와 지방문화 Vol.17 No.1

고려가 원측의 추궁을 피하려 일종의 핑계로 남송을 거론하곤 했던 점은 기왕의 연구에서 언급된 바 있다. 본고에서는 원종대 고려정부가 몽골 원조를 상대하는 과정에서 ‘남송’이라는 변수를 어떻게 활용하였는지를 살펴보고자 하였다. 원종은 몽골의 본격적인 압박과 간섭에 직면한 국왕으로서, 원의 여러 압박으로부터 고려를 지켜 내는 것에 주력하였다. 남송이라는 존재를 이용, 이미 존재하지 않았던 ‘고려와 남송간의 제휴’ 가능성을 제기하는 전략을 취한 것도 그 일환이었다고 할 수 있다. 남송선박의 한반도 방문에 대한 쿠빌라이의 추궁, 원종의 답변, 원제국 문인의 문집에 묘사된 원 관료들과 고려인 이장용의 대화 등을 통해 그를 확인할 수 있다. 고려의 국왕과 신료가 복수의 기회를 통해 ‘고려와 남송이 언제든 유대할 수 있다’는 가능성을 몇 년간 몽골조정에 지속적으로 주입시킴으로써, 고려에 대한 몽골의 압박을 새로운 각도에서 헤쳐 나가고자 했음이 흥미롭다. 이러한 모습들에 대한 주목을 통해, 고려-원제국 관계 형성기의 여러 모습들을 재평가해 볼 필요가 있다. King Wonjong of Goryeo inherited from his father Gojong a specific situation in which the Southern Sung was no longer a relevant entity as a potential ally or at least a counterpart to be expected in a diplomatic relationship. Merchants or naval vessels either sporadically visiting or passing by the Korean peninsula were mere objects of concern in the eyes of the Goryeo government, and the Chinese authorities in the harbor regions of the Jiangnan region were not so interested in maintaining exchanges with the Goryeo dynasty. The entire Southern Sung was put under heavy fire in its conflict with the Mongol Yuan empire, and was anything but a probable ally to Goryeo which was fighting with the Mongols itself. Economic trades with Southern Sung only meant more materials (that came from China) to be obfuscated by the Mongols. To Goryeo, Southern Sung was no longer an option to pursue in diplomatic terms. Under such circumstances, Wonjong came to face interference and intervention by the Mongol Yuan government. The highest priority of the Wonjong government became protecting the interests of Goryeo from such interference. There was nothing the leaders of the Goryeo dynasty would not consider in achieving such goal. So, Southern Sung suddenly became a leverage in Goryeo’s strategy dealing with the Mongols. The Mongol Yuan government was in desperate need of Goryeo’s cooperation in launching its campaign in China and Japan. And for that very reason it was also deeply concerned that Goryeo would try to break away from Yuan’s clutches and form a relationship with China, as it had done in the past. Noticing such concern and Yuan’s own busy timetable, Wonjong, while denying any possibility or intention of forming a relationship with the Southern Sung whenever Yuan would accuse it for scheming behind Yuan’s back, seemingly intentionally had one of his closest officials (in this case Yi Jang-yong) leak some official statements that would arouse Yuan’s suspicion, while himself excluding in a report a crucial incident that occurred between Goryeo and Sung that could have easily nullified Yuan’s suspicion of Goryeo. Such orchestrated efforts seem to have been a campaign of ‘disinformation’, designed to keep Yuan on its toes, force the Mongols to back off from making unilateral threats and demands, and most importantly, delay the Japanese campaign for several years.

고려 충렬~충정왕대의 밀직-재신 간 轉職 양상 검토

이강한(Lee Kang-Hahn) 고려사학회 2019 한국사학보 Vol.- No.76

충렬왕대 고려 첨의부가 강등되고 충선왕이 즉위 및 복위 당시 밀직사의 위상을 강화하면서, 재신과 밀직(추밀) 각기의 위상은 물론 양자 간의 관계까지도 변화하였고, 그러한 변화는 당시 밀직↔재신 간 전직 사례들에서 확인되는 바가 있다. 충렬왕대의 경우 제1밀직이 최하위(제5) 재신 등으로 이동하는, 즉 고려 전,중기에도 그리 많이 관찰되지 않는 극단적인 사례들이 다수 확인되며, 이전부터도 재신에 비해 열위였던 밀직의 위상이 더욱 낮아진 상황을 보여준다. 그러나 뒤이어 전개된 충선왕의 복위연간에는 이런 사례들이 사라지고, 2,3등급의 밀직이 역시 2,3등급의 재신으로 이동하는 사례 등이 현저하게 증가해 충숙왕대로 이어진다. 충숙왕대에 접어들어서는 드디어 ‘하위밀직이 고위 재신으로’ 이동하는, 즉 밀직의 재신대비 위상이 상대적으로 ‘제고’된 듯한 사례들이 급증하며, 이런 추세가 충혜왕대까지도 이어진다. 그러다가 충목왕 이후부터는 다시금 ‘고위밀직이 하위재신으로 가는’ 사례들이 많아지지만, ‘낮은 밀직이 높은 재신으로’ 가는 경우도 여전히 적지 않게 발견된다. 14세기전반 재추간 전직 사례들에서 관찰되는 이러한 변화는 13-14세기 고려정부의 운용양상과 관련해 주목할 만한 부분이다. 아울러 당시 재신・밀직의 6부・어사대・삼사 관직 겸임 관행에도 일정한 변모를 초래했을 가능성이 높아 보인다. The Cheom’ui-bu office was demoted with King Chung’ryeol’s enthronement, and later the Miljik-sa office was promoted by his son King Chungseon. The changes these two offices went through also changed the status of all the Jaeshin and Miljik ministers, as well as the dynamic between them. The true nature of such change is yet to be explored, and one avenue we could pursue is some old and new characteristics behind the Miljik-Jaeshin transfers. During Chung’ryeol’s reign, there were many cases -unlike earlier periodsin which the Miljik ministers had to reach the highest Miljik seat to occupy even the lowest Jaeshin seat as his next post. This signifies the Miljik’s rather handicapped status compared to that of the Jaeshin figures. Then during Chungseon’s reign, such cases vanished, and more leveled kinds of transfer cases surfaced. Later during king Chungsuk’s and Chung’hye’s reign such cases would increase and even feature new cases that would suggest the status of the Miljik figures were no longer disadvantageous compared to the Jaeshins’ at all. Although during the reigns of young kings like Chungmok and Chungjeong cases from the Chung’ryeol days returned, but the trend launched back in Chungseon’s days also remained intact. This new trend in the early half of the 14th century must have affected all corners of the Goryeo governmental operations, and must be adequately understood in the near future. This article is an effort to kickstart such discussion.

고려 공민왕대 정부 주도 교역의 여건 및 특징

이강한(Lee, Kang-hahn) 한국학중앙연구원 2011 한국학 Vol.34 No.4

고려후기 외관(外官)의 신설 · 승격 및 권위제고

이강한(Lee, Kang-Hahn) 한국사연구회 2015 한국사연구 Vol.- No.171

고려 충선왕의 직물생산 전략 연구

이강한(Lee, Kang-Hahn) 한국사연구회 2018 한국사연구 Vol.- No.180

정치도감(整治都監) 운영의 제양상에 대한 재검토

이강한(Lee Kang-hahn) 한국역사연구회 2008 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.67

In the early 1340s, Yuan dynasty requested a series of reforms to Goryeo, based upon its decades’ old policy which chose to condemn the Muslim ministers’ economic policies, employ a gentler taxation policy, and endeavored to restore order in official appointments while maintaining the government’s size and integrity. Although such policy had indeed gone through some changes over the years, a new Yuan minister named Tokto, particularly interested in reinforcing such policies, came to power in the early 1340s and condemned the ruling of Goryeo King Chunghae-wang, whose policies concentrated upon foreign trades and therefore inflicted considerable pain upon the Goryeo population. To him, Chunghae-wang’s policies were too much reminiscent of the Muslim ministers’. So, at the request of the Yuan emperor, the Jeongchi Dogam office was established in the mid-1340s. Despite the fact that Yuan urged them to install such office, Goryeo officials did not resent it and instead fully utilized it in their political and social reform efforts, which turned out to be quite similar to the efforts that had already been attempted by Kings Chungseon-wang and Chungsuk-wang. Jeongchi Dogam’s main target was Jeongdong Haengseong. It was originally established as an overseer for the Japanese campaign preparations, yet later Goryeo figures(like Gi Cheol) with intimate connections to Yuan gathered together there and joined forces. They were committing all kinds of economical crimes and abusing their political power. So Jeongchi Dogam tried to eliminate those crimes and abuses. Yet its efforts were blocked, when a relative of Gi Cheol was killed during an interrogation process conducted by the Dogam officers. And with the help of Queen Gi(Gi Cheol’s sister), the Gi family succeeded in neutralizing Jeongchi Dogam. But it should be noted that during all those events Yuan emperor and the government officials maintained its official position supporting Dogam’s reform efforts, and that they remained blatantly indifferent to Haengseong’s apparent plight of being investigated by Dogam. We can see that Yuan government at that point had essentially abandoned Jeongdong Haengseong as a political, administrative entity affiliated to the Yuan government, and the Goryeo office Jeongchi Dogam was in fact ‘authorized’ by Yuan as a legitimate entity to oversee reforms in Goryeo. This progress ultimately enabled King Gongmin-wang to dismantle Haengseong’s Imun-so office, and eliminate the Gi faction once and for all, in 1356.

고려 충숙왕의 전민변정 및 상인등용

이강한(Lee Kang-hahn) 한국역사연구회 2009 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.72

Goryeo King Chungsuk-wang displayed a couple of interesting policy initiatives, in the area of governmental finance during his reign, which lasted for more than 25 years. In the former half of his reign(1314~1325), he chose not to continue his father(King Chungseon-wang)'s policy of revising the tax system and increasing extraction upon several sources. Instead, he started to correct certain problems that cropped up during Chungseon-wang's governance, by rectifying powerful beings' malpractices of illegally taking custody of commoners or making them lowly persons, and by determining legitimate ownerships over land units. Then during the latter half of his reign(1325~1339), he and his vassals & cronies started enlisting merchant figures(and people who had working relationships with such merchants) into the political arena for governmental service. With the success of former king Chungseon-wang's financial policies, the monetary status of the Goryeo dynasty was significantly enhanced(in the eary 14th century), and Chungsuk-wang was initiating his financial policies (in 1318) in a very different climate. Benefitting from his father's accomplishments, quite naturally he tried to eliminate the problems caused by his father's policies instead of pointlessly rehashing it. With Chungsuk-wang's efforts, several things that went without being appropriately dealt with, were granted attention that they duly desired. Yet when Chungseon-wang was exiled to a remote location inside the Yuan empire in 1320, and Chungsuk-wang was held captive in the empire's capital and was forced to reside there for five years until 1325, short-term expenditure of the government skyrocketed, and the positive effects from Chungseon-wang's former financial reforms also started to disappear. Facing such crisis, Chungsuk-wang had to devise new plans to fight the recurrence of a financial dry-up that haunted the government for decades so he and his followers started to recruit merchants with relationships to commercial activities, in order to utilize them in the government's efforts and attempts of exploring new possible options that would enhance the revenue of the government. And it should also be noted that all these policy initiatives displayed by Chungsuk-wang indeed featured some probable influences from the contemporary governance of the Yuan imperial government as well. Emperor Jen-tsung was well known for his negation of his predecessor Wu-tsung and’s financial policies. He pursued a more tempered financial policy, and abandoned all kinds of artificial projects designed to raise the governmental income level, while trying to alleviate and mitigate several social problems that were left unattended by his predecessor's governance. Jen-tsung's stay in the reign almost overlapped with the early half of Chungsuk-wang's governance, so a probable relationship and a possible inspiration between the governance of those two leaders might have been in works. Then during the latter half of Chungsuk-wang's governance, the sitting emperor of the empire was Emperor T'aiting, who infamously supported Muslim merchants' activities in and out of the empire, and promoted the Yuan government's trade relationships with entities of financial and commercial potentials throughout both the inland and maritime silkroads. Chungsuk-wang's 5 year stay in Yuan during the early 1320s, and his later return visit to Yuan in the early 1330s when he was forced to temporarily relinquish the Goryeo reign to his son, overlapped with the period of T’aiting’s and his successor Wen-tsung's promotion of trade relationships, so he had the opportunity to observe all the proliferated investments and fierce retrieval of profits that were being conducted throughout the empire at the time. Acquired knowledge of the entire procedure involving inland and maritime trade and transactions with the West Asian Muslim world would have deeply inspired Chungsuk-wang, and must have been vastly inform

'친원'과 '반원'을 넘어서

이강한(Lee Kang hahn) 한국역사연구회 2010 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.78

A new perspective is now duly required, in attempting to understand the history of the Goryeo people in the 13th and 14th centuries. The time should be reviewed from an entirely new angle. Such perspective should be able to evaluate the lives of the Goryeo people, based upon not only the results of their actions, but also the ideas and intentions that were behind their acts. And at the same time such perspective should also be able to interpret the nature of existence and pattern of thinking that belonged to all those people, based upon the Goryeo people's own mentality and not ours. With such new perspective, we shall be able to examine the lives of the Goryeo people just exactly as they actually were, instead of concocting a derivative image from nowhere regarding their existence. They were just living, breathing people who adjusted to the situations as they saw fit, and we should not judge them for what they did not do or plan. Previous misunderstandings, like believing that the people would have exclusively maintained either a 'pro-Yuan' attitude or 'anti-Yuan' stance all the time, or they would have exclusively pursued either 'restoration of the past' or 'embracing foreign institutions' for the duration of their coexistence with the Mongols, should not be repeated in future studies. The people had both attitudes inside them, and the governments pursued both agendas at the same time.

고려시대사 연구의 새로운 가능성

이강한(Lee Kang-hahn) 한국역사연구회 2012 역사와 현실 Vol.- No.85