우리나라 대기업에 대한 여론지도자의 태도에 관한 연구

서정우 ( Chung Woo Suh ) 연세대학교 사회과학연구소 1991 社會科學論集 Vol.22 No.-

매체 환경변화와 언론수용자 운동의 과제

서정우 ( Chung Woo Suh ) 연세대학교 사회과학연구소 1994 社會科學論集 Vol.25 No.-

국민의 알 권리에 관한 연구

서정우 ( Chung Woo Suh ) 연세대학교 사회과학연구소 1992 社會科學論集 Vol.23 No.-

90년도 출판문화의 발전방향

서정우 ( Chung Woo Suh ) 연세대학교 사회과학연구소 1990 社會科學論集 Vol.21 No.-

기업지배구조와 이익유연화에 관한 연구

서정우 ( Chung Woo Suh ),박종일 ( Jong Il Park ),신재용 ( Jae Yong Shin ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계학연구 Vol.38 No.3

본 연구는 지배구조와 경영자의 보고이익 전략 중 하나인 이익유연화 정도 간에 어떠한 관계가 있는지를 규명하는데 목적이 있다. 이전 지배구조 관련연구에서는 경영자의 기회주의적인 발생액에 기초한 이익조정이나 실제 이익조정행위는 투자자들의 미래 수익성에 대한 불확실성을 높이고, 정보위험을 증가시키기 때문에 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업일수록 이러한 이익조정을 보다 억제시킬 유인이 있다고 주장한다(최정호 2007; 김유찬 등 2011). 그러나 최근 이익유연화행위에 대한 자본시장 반응을 살펴본 연구들에서는 기업이 보고이익의 변동성을 줄이면 미래 수익성에 대한 경영자의 사적정보를 전달할 수 있어, 그 결과로 이익유연화 정도가 높은 기업일수록 주식수익률이 높고, 신용평가기관이 발행하는 신용등급은 상향조정되며, 또한 재무분석가의 이익예측오차를 줄여 이익예측 정확성은 높아질 뿐 아니라, 자본비용 역시 감소된다는 결과를 제시한 바 있다(Tucker and Zarowin 2006; Gu and Zhao 2006; Li and Richie 2009; Amiram and Owens 2011 등). 이와 같이 발생액이나 비정상적인 실물거래활동을 이용한 이익조정행위가 증가하면 영업현금흐름으로 연결되지 못할 가능성이 높아 미래 수익성을 보다 악화시킬 수 있지만, 보고이익의 변동성을 낮추는 이익유연화의 경우에는 투자자들에게 기업의 미래 이익정보력을 보다 개선시킬 수 있다는 점에서 자본시장에서는 보다 긍정적인 평가를 받을 수 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 볼 때 자본시장에서 보다 긍정적인 보상(rewards)을 받는 보고이익 전략이 존재한다면 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업일수록 이를 억제시키기 보다는 오히려 더 선호되고, 이러한 전략을 보다 효과적으로 수행할 유인이 존재할 것으로 예상된다. 이러한 검증가능한(testable) 실증적 의문사항을 알아보기 위해, 본 연구는 개별 지배구조 변수 대신 기업지배구조 평가에 전문성을 갖춘 한국기업지배구조원(KCGS) 자료를 이용해 기업지배구조 평가점수와 이들의 5개 부문 점수를 가지고 이익유연화와의 관계를 검증하였다. 이익유연화에 대한 측정치는 Leuz et al.(2003) 및 Tucker and Zarowin(2006)의 방법에 따라 두 가지 측정치를 비교목적상 병행하였다. 분석대상은 유가증권상장기업이고, 분석기간은 2004년부터 2009년까지 최종표본 2,726개 기업/연 자료가 이용되었다. 연구결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 이익유연화 측정치에 관계없이 이익유연화에 영향을 미치는 일정 변수를 통제한 후에도 기업지배구조 평가점수가 높은 기업일수록 기업의 이익유연화 정도는 보다 높아지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 이익유연화 정도가 클수록 시계열적 이익변동성을 줄여 미래 수익성에 관한 경영자의 사적정보를 시장에 신호(signaling)하는 수단으로 이용된다는 관점과 같이 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업이면 이익유연화를 보다 선호한다는 결과이다. 둘째, 지배구조의 개별 부문점수를 이용한 결과에 따르면 경영과실 배분의 지배구조 점수가 높은 기업일수록 이익유연화 정도에 가장 중요한 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났고, 한계적인 수준이지만, 주주의 권리보호 및 공시 부문도 이익유연화와 양(+)의 관계가 나타났다. 이는 보고이익의 질을 결정하는데 있어서는 지배구조 중에 이사회 특성 및 감사기구의 영향이 중요할 수 있지만, 이익유연화의 경우는 이러한 효과 보다는 시장과 관련한 외부효과들이 반영된 지배구조가 보다 중요한 영향을 미친다는 발견이다. 이상의 결과로 볼 때 공격적 이익조정 수단인 재량적 발생액이나 실제 이익조정과 달리 바람직한 지배구조를 갖춘 기업일수록 보고이익에 대한 유연화를 더 선호함을 본 연구는 보여주고 있다는 점에서 의의가 있다. 이전 서베이 조사결과에서는 경영자들이 이익유연화를 선호한다는 결과를 제시했고(Graham et al. 2005), 이익유연화 정보는 경영자의 사적정보를 전달하여 자본시장에서 호의적인 평가를 받는다는 다수의 연구가 존재하지만, 본 연구와 같이 이익유연화와 기업지배구조 간에 어떠한 체계적인 관계가 있는지를 직접 살펴본 연구는 전무했다. 따라서 본 연구의 결과는 지배구조뿐 아니라 이익유연화 관련연구에도 동시에 추가적인 공헌점을 제공한다. 이와 더불어 본 연구는 경영자들의 보고이익 전략을 지배구조 관점에서 살펴보았다는 점에서 경영자의 보고이익 행태를 이해하는데 있어서도 학계, 실무계, 회계기준 제정기관 및 규제기관에게 유익한 도움을 제공해 줄 것으로 기대된다. This study examines the effect of corporate governance on income smoothing. Prior literature classifies between accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management and generally argues that income smoothing is negatively associated with corporate governance quality. The reason is that earnings management increases investor uncertainty of reported earnings and information risk (Choi 2007, Kim et al. 2011). However, more recent studies show that managers can convey private information by reducing earnings volatility so that firms associated with more income smoothing tend to experience higher stock returns and improvements in debt ratings. Moreover, income smoothing has been shown to increase analysts` earnings forecast accuracy and decrease firms` cost of capital (Tucker and Zarowin 2006, Gu an Zhao 2006, Li and Richie 2009, Amiram and Owens 2011). As a result, prior literature shows that accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management are not only associated with negative consequences such as aggravating firms` profitability but can also have positive effects by improving earnings informativeness. These findings suggest that earnings reporting choices inducing positive effects in the capital market should be encouraged in firms with stronger corporate governance and that firms will be incentivized to choose earnings reporting strategies that elicit such favorable responses. To test the association between corporate governance and income smoothing, our study employs a corporate governance quality index issued by the KCGS including their subscores on five different corporate governance characteristics. We adopt two different income smoothing measures following Leuz et al.(2003) and Tucker and Zarowin (2006) to facilitate comparability. Our sample consists of listed companies from 2004 to 2009 with a total of 2,726 firm-year observations. The results of our analyses are as follows. First, we find that higher corporate governance quality scores are associated with more income smoothing regardless of the choice of different income smoothing measures and even after controlling for other factors that could affect the level of income smoothing. This finding is in line with the prediction that firms with stronger corporate governance tend to favor income smoothing since the management in such firms is likely to utilize income smoothing as a means to communicate or signal private information to the market thereby decreasing time-series-related earnings volatility. Second, from the analyses using the subcategorical corporate governance quality scores based on the five different corporate governance characteristics, we also show that high ratings on the category "distribution of earnings" exerts the greatest impact on the degree of income smoothing. In addition, our results reveal that firms which scored high on the category "protection of shareholder rights" (even though only marginally significant) are positively associated with the level of income smoothing. Our result suggests that board of director- and auditor-related attributes could affect the quality of reported earnings but that in the case of income smoothing the market-related external factors of corporate governance have a significant impact on firms` propensity to smooth earnings. We contribute to the existing literature on corporate governance and income smoothing in several ways. First, despite survey results that illustrate managers` preference for income smoothing (Graham et al. 2005) and a number of research portraying managers` ability to efficiently communicate private signals through income smoothing, we are the first to directly investigate the relation between income smoothing and corporate governance. Therefore, our study extends the prior literature not only related to corporate governance but also related to income smoothing. Second, prior literature has mostly shown that firms with strong corporate governance tend to refrain from adopting aggressive accounting practices such as accrual-based or real earnings management that may involve opportunistic intentions of managers. Contrary to these findings, however, we are able to provide empirical evidence that firms with stronger corporate governance are more likely to smooth their earnings and, thus, propose that income smoothing in firms with strong corporate governance can act as a means to communicate private signals to the market by decreasing time-series-related earnings volatility. Lastly, our study highlights the potential positive effects related to income smoothing whereas in prior literature income smoothing is largely associated with negative evaluations. In particular, prior works investigating how income smoothing is evaluated in the market have mostly pointed out some positive effects only related to external mechanisms. However, our study is the first to shed light on related internal mechanisms by directly investigating the association between income smoothing and corporate governance. Specifically we show how better corporate governance based on strong internal mechanisms affect managers` earnings reporting strategies and provide insights into what earnings reporting strategies are favored in firms with strong corporate governance. By examining managers` earnings reporting strategies emphasizing the role of corporate governance, our study should be of interest to academicians, practitioners and regulation setters.

기업경쟁력과 내부통제 시스템

서정우(Chung Woo Suh),홍창목(Chang Mok Hong),김은홍(Eun Hong Kim) 한국경영학회 1996 經營學硏究 Vol.25 No.1

The purpose of the study is to empirically investigate whether there are differences in the internal control systems among Korea, Japan, U. S. A firms. After analyzing the relationships among firms` value activities and internal control systems, we selected several performance measures. On these selected measures, the study examines the type and frequency of goals and feedback information provided to managers. Significantly more Japanese and U. S. A managers than Korean managers recieve goals and feedback information more frequently. While Japanese and U. S. A managers well recieve information both in physical units and in financial terms, Korean managers poorly receive information in financial terms. These findings imply that Korean firms inefficiently operate internal control systems, and may encounter difficulties in establishing competitive advantages.

중소기업의 정보화지원정책에 관한 연구

서정우(Chung Woo Suh),김은홍(Eun Hong Kim),안성만(Sung Mahn Ahn) 한국IT서비스학회 2004 한국IT서비스학회지 Vol.3 No.2

SME's(Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) have limited resources to build information systems on their own. They do not have effective information systems and not utilize e-business technology enough. The government thus have provided various support for SME's IT development. However, those support do not seem so effective that SME's can operate appropriate information systems and do e-business well. The objective of this study is to develop conceptual policies for the government. We suggest an integrated government support which consists of three core stratigies : one-stop service center, outsourcing of public service, and triggering strategy. In order for the government support to be effective, the government should serve SME's needs continuously and professionally.

국가발전과 홍보의 역할

서정우 ( Chung Woo Suh ) 연세대학교 사회과학연구소 1993 社會科學論集 Vol.24 No.-

전동차용 PMSM 추진제어장치 개발

정만규(Man-Kyu Jeong),서정우(Jung-Woo Suh),노애숙(Ae-Suk Kno),김동명(Dong-Myung Kim),정은성(Eun-Sung Chung) 전력전자학회 2020 전력전자학술대회 논문집 Vol.2020 No.8

기업지배구조가 이익과 신용등급간의 관련성에 미치는 효과

신재용(Jae Yong Shin),서정우(Chung Woo Suh),박종일(Jong Ii Park) 한국경영학회 2012 經營學硏究 Vol.41 No.6

This study examines whether better corporate governance is associated with higher credit ratings. Moreover, it investigates whether better corporate governance strengthens the positive association between earnings and credit ratings. This study makes use of the quantified corporate governance scores (CG score) as computed by the Korea Corporate Governance Service which provides separate CG scores based on five categories (shareholder rights, board of directors, disclosure, audit scheme and dividend policy) along with an overall total CG score. As for the credit ratings, corporate bond ratings were considered. After imposing the data requirement, the final sample used for this study results in 956 firm-year observations based on firms listed in the Korean Stock Exchange from 2003 to 2009. For analyses purposes, this study employs OLS and clustered-adjusted ordered probit regressions. Even after controlling for possible factors that might influence credit ratings, we find that higher corporate governance scores are associated with higher credit ratings. This result does not only apply to the overall total CG score, but also when the five corporate governance categories were considered individually which suggests that rating agencies award higher credit ratings to firms with better corporate governance. In examining the effect of corporate governance on the association between earnings and credit ratings, we find no evidence that a higher overall total CG score strengthens the positive association between earnings and credit ratings. However, when each of the five corporate governance categories were considered individually, we find that a higher CG score related to disclosure and audit scheme is associated with a stronger positive relation between earnings and credit ratings. This suggests that rating agencies perceive earnings reported by firms with better corporate governance related to disclosure and audit scheme to be of higher quality which are ultimately translated into higher credit ratings. The Korean Securities Law distinguishes between firms with total assets less than and more than 2 trillion KRW by imposing different requirements regarding the fraction of outside directors. Since this unique regulatory setting could result in significantly higher corporate scores for firms whose total assets exceed 2 trillion KRW than for firms whose total assets are below 2 trillion KRW, this study conducts additional analyses by dividing the total sample into firms with total assets less than and more than 2 trillion KRW. When considering the overall total CG score we are able to confirm our result that a higher CG score is associated with higher credit ratings for both subsamples. When the five corporate governance categories were considered individually, however, we find that some corporate governance categories affect credit ratings differently depending on the size of total assets. Specifically, the results show that rating agencies consider corporate governance related to disclosure and audit scheme as important for the subsample of firms with total assets less than 2 trillion, whereas corporate governance related to the board of directors is considered as important for the subsample of firms with total assets more than 2 trillion. Corporate governance related to shareholder rights and dividend policy appear to be evaluated in the same manner by rating agencies regardless of the size of total assets. Rating agencies may interpret earnings management through discretionary accruals as degrading the quality of a firm`s earnings. In other words, discretionary accruals might directly influence the quality of earnings. As a robustness test, this study, thus, also examines the effect of corporate governance on the association between earnings and credit ratings by dividing the total sample into firms with positive and negative discretionary accruals. We do not obtain significant results when considering the overall total CG score. Wh