미국법상 Poison Pill에 의한 경영권 방어의 적법성 판단 기준으로서의 "강화된 경영판단의 법칙"

정봉진 ( Bong Jin Chung ) 경상대학교 법학연구소 2011 法學硏究 Vol.19 No.1

Poison Pill에 의한 경영권 방어에 있어서는 현 경영진과 주주 간에 경영권 유지 문제를 둘러싸고 이해관계의 충돌이 발생한다. 이와 같은 문제는 미국에서와 같이 Poison Pill 부여 권한이 이사회에 있는 경우뿐 아니라 2010년 국회에 제출된 우리 상법 개정안에서와 같이 Poison Pill의 부여나 존속에 주주의 의사가 충분히 반영되도록 한 경우에도 마찬가지로 발생한다. 현재 미국에서는 1985년의 Moran 판결 이래 이사회의 Poison Pill 채택 권한이 확고하게 인정되고 있다. 이 판결에서 법원은 이사회 의사결정의 절차적 측면만 고려하는 전통적인 경영판단의 법칙 대신, 이사회 의사결정의 절차적 측면뿐 아니라 그 내용적 합리성까지 심사하는 소위 "강화된 경영판단의 법칙"에 의하여 Poison Pill의 적법성을 판단하고 있다. 현재 우리의 기업 환경도 크게 변화하여 우호적 기업인수 뿐 아니라 적대적 기업인수도 활발하게 전개될 상황에 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 우리는 미국이나 다른 선진국과 달리 적대적 기업인수에 관한 경험이 적기 때문에 기업인수 방어방법의 적법성 판단을 위한 명확한 기준을 가지고 있지 못하다. Poison Pill 제도가 우리나라에 도입될 경우 그 적법성을 둘러싸고 발생할 분쟁을 미리 예방하기 위해서는 미국에서와 같이 그 기준을 확고하게 수립해 둘 필요가 있다. 현재 국회에 제출되어 있는 상법 개정안을 보면 "신주인수선택권의 부여나 행사에 있어서 적대적 인수자와 다른 주주를 차별적으로 취급하기 위해서는 회사의 가치 및 주주일반의 이익을 유지 또는 증진시키기 위하여 그 필요성이 인정되어야 한다"고 하는 규정이 있다."(초안 제432조의 제4항 본문) 이 규정은 원래 주주평등의 원칙에 대한 예외를 허용하는 정당화 요건을 명시한 것이기는 하지만, 동시에 Poison Pill에 의한 경영권 방어의 적법성 판단 기준을 명시한 것이기도 하다. 그런데 우리 상법 개정안 제432조의 제4항 본문은 일본 경제산업성·법무성, "기업가치주주공동이익의 확보 및 향상을 위한 매수방어책에 관한 지침" (2005년 5월 27일) 제Ш장 제3호를, 그리고 다시 일본의 위 지침 제Ш장 제3호는 미국의 "강화된 경영판단의 법칙"을 각각 본받은 것이다. 그러므로, 우리가 Poison Pill 제도를 도입할 경우 그에 의한 경영권 방어의 적법성을 판단함에 있어서는 미국의 "강화된 경영판단의 법칙"이 실제 많은 참고가 될 것이다. 이 논문은 미국의 "강화된 경영판단의 법칙"을 자세히 살펴봄으로써 Poison Pill 제도가 우리나라에 도입될 경우에 그 적법성 판단 기준 수립에 도움이 되고자 하는 것이 그 목적이다. In the early 1980s, the U.S. courts began to question whether the business judgment rule was appropriate as a standard to determine the validity of a board`s defensive measures to a hostile takeover. In a series of cases involving the adoption of defensive measures, the U.S. courts applied an "enhanced scrutiny" standard (so-called "enhanced business judgment rule") to probe the decisional procedures and the information relied upon by the board, as well as the reasonableness of the director`s decision. Since the l980s, and the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v, Household International, Inc., it has been well-settled that boards of directors may adopt Poison Pills as defensive measures to a hostile takeover. Furthermore, the successful use of Poison Pills and a classified board to enforce the board of directors` determination to stay independent, demonstrated the ability of an incumbent board of directors to combat a hostile takeover under certain circumstances. Consequently, one of the developments in takeover tactics has been to circumvent Poison Pills by conducting a proxy contest to replace the target board of directors with directors who will redeem the Poison Pill. To combat this tactic, companies (especially those without staggered boards) have inserted in their Poison Pills so-called dead-hand provision or no-hand provision. However, two 1998 Delaware cases-Carmody v. Toll Brothers and Quickturn Design Systems v. Shapiro invalidated dead-hand as well as no-hand provisions. Last year, Korean government submitted to the Congress the Proposal for "Amendment to the Commercial Law to Adopt ``Poison Pill System`` in Korea." The purpose of this Article is to contribute to establishment of a standard to determine the validity of the Poison Pill in Korea by introducing the so-called "Enhanced Business Judgment Rule" under the U.S. laws.

신주인수선택권에 관한 상법개정안의 검토

김경일 한국상사법학회 2019 商事法硏究 Vol.38 No.2

포이즌 필은 대리인 비용(agency cost) 문제가 있고, 경영진이 지위를 보전할 수 있는 효과적인 수단이기 때문에 남용될 가능성이 있으나, 효율적으로 사용되면 주주의 이익이 증가될 수 있으므로, 포이즌 필의 남용을 억제할 수 있는 방법을 모색하는 것이 중요하다. 제20대 국회에 제출되어 있는 상법개정안 중에서 정갑윤 안, 권성동 안, 윤상직 안이 신주인수선택권 도입을 내용으로 담고 있으나, 신주인수선택권의 남용을 억제할 수 있는 방법을 충분히 갖추고 있는지 문제된다. 먼저, 상법개정안은 신주인수선택권의 행사조건, 소각조건, 판단권자가 불명확하여 문제된다. 우리나라에서도 일본의 신주예약권세칙과 같은 신주인수선택권세칙을 도입하여, 신주인수선택권 발행회사의 이사회에서 신주인수선택권 부여를 결의하면서 신주인수선택권세칙도 함께 결의하고 공표하는 방안을 고려할 필요가 있을 것이다. 신주인수선택권세칙에서 신주인수선택권의 구체적인 행사조건, 소각조건, 판단권자 등을 규정하도록 함으로써, 경영진이 지위 보전을 위해 신주인수선택권 행사를 남용하거나 소각을 거부하는 하는 것을 방지하고, 신주인수선택권의 행사조건, 소각조건이 사전에 명확하게 공표될 수 있을 것이다. 다음으로, 상법개정안의 ʻ회사의 가치ʼ에서 주주 이외의 이해관계자(stakeholder)의 이익도 고려하여, 일부 주주를 차별적으로 취급하는 신주인수선택권을 부여할 있는지 여부가 문제된다. 적대적 기업인수에 직면한 이사회가 주주 이외의 다른 이해관계자의 이익도 고려하여 일부 주주를 차별적으로 취급하는 신주인수선택권 부여를 결정할 수 있도록 해주면, 어느 이해관계자의, 어떠한 이익을, 얼마나 고려할 수 있는지 불명확하고, 이사회가 다른 이해관계자의 이익을 핑계 삼아 자기보신을 위해 신주인수선택권 부여를 남용할 우려가 있다. 결국 적대적 기업인수에 직면한 이사회가 신주인수선택권 부여를 결정함에 있어서는 주주의 이익만 고려할 수 있도록 하는 것이 타당하다 할 것이다. 마지막으로, ① 상법개정안의 신주인수선택권의 적법성 판단기준인 ʻ회사의 가치 및 주주 일반의 이익을 유지 또는 증진시키기 위하여 필요한 경우ʼ는 추상적이어서 그 실효성 확보를 위한 법원의 판단 방법이 문제되고, ② 그 내용이 불충분하여 신주인수선택권의 남용을 억제하기 위한 보완 방법이 문제된다. 상법개정안의 ʻ회사의 가치 및 주주 일반의 이익을 유지 또는 증진시키기 위하여 필요한 경우ʼ라는 적법성 판단기준의 실효성을 확보하기 위해, 법원의 구체적인 판단 방법으로서 대상회사의 이사회로 하여금 공개매수 제시 가격 보다 대상회사의 계속기업 가치가 더 크다는 사실을 입증하도록 요구하는 것과 같은 방안을 고려할 필요가 있을 것이다. 상법개정안은 ʻ회사의 가치 및 주주 일반의 이익을 유지 또는 증진시키기 위하여 필요한 경우ʼ만 규정하고, 상당성 요건을 규정하고 있지 않는바, 미국과 일본의 기준과 유사한 기준을 상법에 명시하여 신주인수선택권의 남용을 억제할 필요가 있으므로, 상법개정안에 상당성 요건을 규정하는 방안을 고려할 필요가 있다. The poison pill has the problem of 'agency costs'. The poison pill is open to abuse because it is an effective entrenchment tool. Nonetheless, the poison pill is an important tool for raising shareholder value. Thus finding ways to curb the abuse of the poison pill is of critical importance. Some member of the National Assembly submitted to the National Assembly three bills to amend the Commercial Act, to allow companies to issue call options for new shares as an anti-takeover measure(hereinafter 'Korean poison pill'). But the question arises as to whether or not bills have enough ways to curb the abuse of Korean poison pill. First, according to the above bills, it is unclear under which circumstances shareholder can exercise Korean poison pill, and the company can cancel it, and who will decide about the exercise or the cancellation of it. There would be a need to consider the way to introduce the detailed regulation of Korean poison pill like Japan. When the board of directors votes to grant Korean poison pill, the board also votes the detailed regulation of Korean poison pill and releases it. By providing specific conditions of the exercise and the cancellation, and the decision maker in the detailed regulation of Korean poison pill, the manager's abuse of the poison pill can be curbed and specific conditions of the exercise and the cancellation, and the decision maker can be made public clearly in advance. Second, when it comes to the bills' phrase of 'the value of the company', the question arises as to whether or not the board can consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies deciding to grant Korean poison pill. If the board is allowed to consider the interests of nonshareholder constituencies when it decides whether to grant Korean poison pill, then the problem of ambiguity will arise as to whose interests the board will consider, which interests the board will consider, and how much interests the board will consider. There will be a possibility that considering the interests of nonshareholder constituencies can be used as an excuse by the manager for abusing Korean poison pill to protect his tenure. Thus it would be desirable the board is allowed to consider only the interests of shareholders when it decides whether to grant Korean poison pill. Third, ① the bills' requirement of 'the case when it is necessary to maintain or increase the value of the company and the interests of its shareholders in general', which is the standard for judicial review, is abstract, so the question arises as to how the court will decide whether the requirement is being met. ② The above requirement is not sufficient, so the way how to curb the abuse of Korean poison pill matters. To secure the effectiveness of the standard for judicial review, that is 'the case when it is necessary to maintain or increase the value of the company and the interests of its shareholders in general', there would be a need to consider the specific judgement method such as requiring the board to prove that the company's going concern value is higher than the pending bid price. The bills prescribe only the requirement of 'the case when it is necessary to maintain or increase the value of the company and the interests of its shareholders in general', and they don't prescribe the requirement that the Korean poison pill is reasonable in relation to the threat posed(hereinafter 'the reasonableness requirement'). But the Commercial Act is required to prescribe the same reasonableness requirement as that of the US and Japan to curb the abuse of Korean poison pill. Thus there would be a need to consider the way to prescribe the reasonableness requirement in the bills.

신주인수선택권의 바람직한 운용방안

박준,송옥렬,최문희 한국상사법학회 2011 商事法硏究 Vol.30 No.2

In March 2010, the Korean Government submitted to the National Assembly a bill to amend the Commercial Code (“Draft Amendment”), which,if passed, would allow Korean companies to issue call options for new shares as an anti-takeover measure (“Korean poison pill”). The bill is still pending. In light of the current position of the Commercial Code, which does not allow the issuance of warrants for new shares on a stand-alone basis, the introduction of a Korean poison pill would be a very significant change to Korean corporate law. This article identified the potential issues which may arise in applying the provisions in the Draft Amendment and proposed solutions to such issues. (1) The basic structure of the Korean poison pill was reviewed. It is not clear whether the Draft Amendment contemplates the granting of a poison pill before or after a potential acquirer emerges. However, the Draft Amendment provides that a poison pill may be granted only if it is necessary to maintain or increase the value of the company and further the interests of its shareholders in general (“Corporate Value Requirement”). In order to provide predictability to investors, including potential acquirers, and satisfy the Corporate Value Requirement, it would be desirable to grant the poison pill only after a shareholder acquires a substantial amount of shares (e.g., 5%) or takes an action which leads to the board of directors of the company to reasonably believe that the shareholder is attempting to interfere with, or take over, the management of the company. Once a poison pill is so granted, the board of directors needs to review whether to allow the shareholders to exercise the poison pill or cancel it at the time the acquirer acquires shares in excess of certain threshold provided in the company's articles of incorporation. (2) Various issues may arise at the time of the adoption of the poison pill plan in the articles of incorporation of the company. This article made proposals on the issues such as the threshold shareholding ratio which would trigger the exercise of the poison pill, the scope of related parties whose shareholding should be aggregated, and the types of securities of which should be treated as equivalent to holding shares. Adequate information needs to be provided to shareholders before they decide whether to adopt the poison pill plan. This article also proposed that a poison pill plan have a sunset clause so that the plan will be effective only for a limited time period. (3) To justify the granting of a poison pill, it is procedurally desirable for it to be approved by a committee consisting solely or mostly of outside directors. Substantively, it should satisfy the Corporate Value Requirement. The Corporate Value Requirement is so abstract that there may be a split of opinion. Court precedents and theoretical discussions in the U.S. and in Japan would serve as helpful references to this issue. (4) The Draft Amendment provides for the repurchase as well as cancellation of a poison pill. This article argued that the company’s repurchase of a poison pill (e.g., by issuing new shares to the poison pill holders other than the acquirer and making payment to the acquirer) would raise a number of legal problems and proposed that in order to remove a poison pill, the company should cancel it entirely for no consideration.

反행동주의 포이즌 필(anti-activist poison pills)에 관한 연구

김경일 대한변호사협회 2020 人權과 正義 : 大韓辯護士協會誌 Vol. No.

These days, activism is at all-time high around the world, especially in the United States. Tactics that are used by activists to make the campaign succeed have been evolving, and there is a concern that activists tend to induce managers to pursue short-term financial goals at the expense of building long-term value. So anti-activist poison pills came up to defend against activism. This article analyzes anti-activist poison pills that were developed in the US, and tries to find its implications for Korea. Many investors take the long position through ‘total return swap’(“TRS”). Because TRS allows an investor to create the economic equivalent of ownership of an equity security, but TRS does not confer beneficial ownership of the underlying equity security to the long party, the long position is not required to be disclosed under the Securities Exchange Act and would not trigger traditional poison pills. Many investors use the strategy of the ‘wolf pack’. The members of the wolf pack can cooperate without disclosing under the Securities Exchange Act or causing aggregation under traditional poison pills. A two-tier pill was developed to ensure managers to respond to activists properly in the US. A two-tier pill sets the different trigger threshold according to the nature of shareholders, thus it provides for a 10 percent trigger threshold for shareholders filing a Schedule 13D(available to activist investors) and a 20 percent trigger threshold for shareholders filing a Schedule 13G(available to passive investors). Activists can accumulate stock under the radar through swaps or other derivative instruments without acquiring stock in its own name. To prevent activists from sneaking past the threshold through the use of derivative positions, boards of directors of public corporations altered the traditional definition of beneficial ownership in poison pills to include derivative securities in the calculation of the beneficial ownership threshold that triggers poison pills. There have been several recent examples of activists engaging in wolf pack activity that stops short of meeting the group definition for purposes of triggering poison pills or disclosure requirements. In response to this, boards included language that applied the pill threshold more broadly to ‘shareholders acting in concert’. It would be necessary to differentiate between poison pills and anti-activist poison pills in our country. In Korea, it has been said that there was the need to adopt poison pills to fend off hostile takeover, but recently there are more needs to adopt poison pills for the use of anti-activist poison pills against activists due to their vivid activities and new tactics. In the end, the need to adopt poison pills for the use of anti-activist poison pills must be considered in the debate over whether poison pills should be adopted. And there is the need to be cautious about designing anti-activist poison pills to make it meet the standard for judicial review. 최근 미국을 비롯한 세계 각국에서 행동주의자의 활동이 활발하게 일어나고 있다. 행동주의자가 캠페인을 성공시키기 위해 구사하는 전략이 진화하고 있고, 행동주의자가 중장기적인 기업가치의 향상보다 단기적인 수익의 극대화에 중점을 두는 단기실적주의(short termism) 추구 경향이 있다는 우려가 제기되고 있다. 이에 행동주의에 대응하기 위하여 反행동주의 포이즌 필(anti-activist poison pills)이 고안되었다. 이 글은 미국에서 고안된 反행동주의 포이즌 필을 고찰하고, 우리나라 법제에 주는 시사점을 모색하고자 한다. 많은 행동주의자들이 총수익스왑을 이용하여 롱포지션(long position)을 보유하고 있다. 롱포지션 당사자(long position party)는 주식을 보유하고 있는 것과 마찬가지의 경제적 지위를 갖게 되지만, 주식의 실질적인 소유(beneficial ownership)를 하지 않기 때문에, 대량보유보고규제를 피할 수 있고, 포이즌 필을 발동시키지 않을 수 있기 때문이다. 많은 행동주의자들이 이리 떼(wolf pack) 전략을 이용하고 있다. 이리 떼 참가자들은 대량보유보고규제와 기존의 포이즌 필에서의 지분 합산을 피해서 협력행동을 할 수 있기 때문이다. 미국에서 대상회사 경영진이 행동주의자에게 적절하게 대응할 수 있게 하기 위해 2단 포이즌 필(two-tier pill)이 고안되었다. 2단 포이즌 필은 발동비율을 대상으로 되는 주주의 특성에 따라 다르게 설정하여, 대량보유보고규제에서 간이 양식인 Schedule 13G에 따라 주식보유를 보고하는 자(수동적인 투자자 등)에게는 20% 발동비율을 적용하고, Schedule 13D에 따라 주식보유를 보고하는 자를 포함한 그 밖의 자(행동주의자 등)에게는 10% 발동비율을 적용한다. 행동주의자가 파생상품을 이용하여 대량보유보고규제를 피하면서, 실질적으로 은밀하게 대상회사 주식을 대량으로 매입하는 것에 대응하여, 미국에서 발동비율의 산정 시 투자자가 보유하는 주식 파생상품의 포지션을 ‘보유’ 주식 수에 산입 할 수 있도록 하는 포이즌 필이 고안되었다. 행동주의자가 이리 떼 전략을 구사하여 증권거래법상의 ‘그룹’ 형성을 피하면서 다른 행동주의자와 느슨하게 협력행동을 하여, 대량보유보고규제를 피하면서 실질적으로 은밀하게 공동으로 대상회사 주식을 매입하여 경영에 개입하는 것에 대응하여, 미국에서 발동비율의 산정 시 실질적으로 ‘공동하여 행동하고 있다’고 볼 수 있는 주주가 보유하는 주식 수를 ‘공동하여 보유하는’ 주식 수에 산입 할 수 있도록 하는 포이즌 필이 고안되었다. 우리나라에서 적대적 기업인수를 방어하기 위한 포이즌 필과 행동주의에 대응하기 위한 反행동주의 포이즌 필을 구분할 필요성이 있다할 것이다. 그간 우리나라에서 포이즌 필 도입의 주된 논거는 적대적 기업인수를 방어하기 위하여 포이즌 필을 도입할 필요성이 있다는 것이었으나, 최근에는 행동주의자의 활동이 활발해지고 행동주의자가 파생상품 이용이나 이리 떼 전략과 같은 최신 전략을 구사함으로써 이에 대응하기 위한 反행동주의 포이즌 필을 이용하기 위해서 포이즌 필을 도입할 필요성이 더 커졌다고 할 수 있다. 결국 우리나라 포이즌 필 도입 논의에서 행동주의에 대응하기 위한 反행동주의 포이즌 필을 이용하기 위하여 포이즌 필을 도입할 필요성이 고려되어야 할 것이고, 反행동주의 포이즌 필 설계에서는 反행동주의 포이즌 필이 적법성 판단기준에 부합되게 설...

포이즌 필에 대한 再논의

임수민(Soo Min Lim) 한국기업법학회 2021 企業法硏究 Vol.35 No.1

포이즌 필 도입론이 꾸준히 제기되고 있다. 이에 포이즌 필을 고안해서 상당 기간 운용해 온 미국의 사례를 최신 동향 위주로 살펴보고 우리법상 시사점을 찾고자 하였다. 포이즌 필이 1980년대에 미국에서 처음으로 고안된 것은 경영권 분쟁 상황에서 경영권 방어수단으로 이용하기 위해서였다. 실제로 그 후 업계에서는 경영권 방어라는 목적을 달성하기 위해 이용되었고, 경영권 방어 수단으로서의 포이즌 필이 미국법상 적법한 것으로 인정되는지에 대한 법원의 판단이 이루어졌었다. 그러나 근래에는 포이즌 필이 적대적 경영권 방어 목적을 위해서만 이용되는 것은 아니다. 회사에 중대한 순영업손실이 발행한 경우 회사의 과세자산을 보호하기 위해서 진화된 형태의 포이즌 필(예컨대, ‘NOL poison pill’)이 이용되고 있다. 또, 적대적 경영권 인수상황이 발생한 경우에만 이용되지 않고, 우호적 합병계약이 체결된 이후의 거래보호수단으로 이용되기도 한다. 그러므로 미국의 포이즌 필을 신주인수선택권으로 번역하고 이를 어떠한 제도라고 정의함에 있어서는, 개념의 범위 및 이용 목적을 어느 범주에서 설정할 것인지에 대한 고민이 필요하다고 생각된다. 심지어 최근 미국에서는 포이즌 필은 미국 연방증권법에 위반되어 무효이며 종래 미국 법원도 포이즌 필을 허용하는 주법이 연방증권법에 위반되지 않는다고 일률적으로 판시했던 것은 아니라는 주장이 제기되었고, 이에 대한 법적 논쟁이 치열하게 전개되었다. 이 논쟁은 미국에서도 포이즌 필의 적법성이 확실히 규명되지 않았다는 것을 보여준다. 2010년 이후 미국 회사들은 포이즌 필을 거의 활용하지 않았고, 여기에는 행동주의 투자자와 기관투자자 및 의결권 자문기구의 입김이 작용한 것으로 나타났다. 그러나 2020년 초 코로나 사태로 인해 포이즌 필이 시장으로 귀환했고, 포이즌 필 도입을 공시한 회사 중 많은 회사의 주가가 반등했다. 이러한 현상은 시차임기제를 채택하지 않은 회사에서 두드러졌다. 포이즌 필이 귀환하자 실증적 연구가 부활했고, 곧 법적 논의도 활발해 질 것으로 예상된다. 우리의 경우, 상법 개정으로 포이즌 필을 도입해야 할 것인지 여부, 도입한다면 경영권 방어수단으로서의 포이즌 필만을 도입할 것인지 아니면 자금조달 목적의 포이즌 필도 도입할 것인지 여부, 기관 투자자와 행동주의 투자자를 달리 취급하는 주주불평등적인 포이즌 필도 도입할 것인지 여부 및 포이즌 필을 특수한 위기상황에서만 작동되는 것으로 디자인할 것인지 여부는 국내 기업들의 지배구조의 특수성을 고려하여 신중하게 연구하고 논의하여 사회적인 합의를 도출해나가야 할 문제이다. 포이즌 필 제도 자체가 미국에서 고안되어 35년 동안 운용되어 온 것인 만큼, 미국의 제도 운용 현황, 다양한 목적의 포이즌 필 운용사례, 포이즌 필의 적법성과 합헌성에 대한 근래의 법적 논쟁, 코로나 위기로 인한 제도 활성화 추세 및 그에 관한 법적 논의를 꾸준히 추적하면서 연구해나가는 작업은 우리의 상사 법제 정비에 도움이 될 것이다. Arguments in favor of the introduction of poison pill have been raised steadily. This paper tried to examine the latest cases in the US and to find implications under Korean law. Poison Pill was first devised in the US in the 1980s to be used to defend management rights in situations of hostile M&A disputes. After that, it was used in the industry to achieve the purpose of defending management rights, and the court judged whether poison pill as a means of defense of management rights was recognized as legal under US law. However, these days, the poison pill is not only used to defend hostile M&A. In the event of a significant net operating loss issued to a company, an evolved form of poison pill (e.g., "NOL poison pill") is also used to protect the company"s taxable assets. Besides, it is not used only when a hostile takeover of management rights occurs but is also used as a means of transaction protection after a friendly merger contract is concluded. Therefore, in translating the poison pill in the US as a new stock option and defining it as a system, it is necessary to consider which category the scope of the concept and purpose of use will be set. Recently, in the United States, it has been argued that poison pill is invalid because it violates the US Federal Securities Law, and the previous US court did not uniformly rule that the state law allowing poison pill was not in violation of the Federal Securities Law. The legal debate on this was fiercely raised. This debate shows that even in the United States, the legality of the poison pill has not been clearly established. Since 2010, US companies have rarely used poison pill, and it has been shown that activist investors, institutional investors, and voting advisory bodies have acted on it. However, due to the corona crisis in early 2020, the poison pill returned to the market and the stock prices of many of the companies that announced the introduction of the poison pill rebounded. This phenomenon was noticeable in companies that did not adopt the Staggered Board. When the Poison Pill returned, empirical research revived, and legal discussions are expected to become active soon. In Korea, we should reach a consensus discussing whether or not to introduce a poison pill through the amendment of the commercial law, whether to introduce only the poison pill as a means of defense of management rights, whether to introduce a non-equal poison pill that treats institutional investors and activist investors differently, and whether the design will work only in particular crises. We should also consider the peculiarity of the governance structure of domestic companies. As the poison pill system itself was devised and operated in the US for 35 years, keeping track of the trend and legal discussions about it could help to improve our legal system.

정부의 포이즌 필 관련 법안에 대한 보완방안

강택신 ( Teck Shin Kang ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 글로벌비즈니스와 법센터 2011 연세 글로벌 비즈니스 법학연구 Vol.3 No.1

The so-called poison pill is one of the defensive tactics that makes hostile takeover by a corporate raider prohibitively expensive or nattractive. A poison pill generally is drafted to grant directors discretion to redeem the rights by purchasing stocks at a nominal price until a person or group becomes the beneficial owner of a specified percentage of the corporation`s shares. This poison pill is evaluated as a defensive tactic that is highly economical and effective compared to golden parachutes and the restriction of director qualifications, other tactics currently used in Korea. On the other hand, detractors claim that the introduction of poison pills in Korea would be premature, as they are highly likely to be abused by directors and controlling shareholders, given Korea`s situation of poor corporate governance. On December 1st 2009, the Ministry of Justice announced the draft of the amendment to the Commercial Act to grantee fair competition of defense and attack for M&A, and to force business money used for defense against M&A to be concentrated on productive investment. This draft was submitted to the National Assembly on March 10th 2010 as a government bill, which is intended to establish a new right to introduce the poison pill as a defensive tactic against hostile M&A`s. This draft adopts a new right only for a defensive tactic, and includes several strategies to increase the rationality of defensive tactics and to ensure that the poison pill is not abused. For example, under the draft a poison pill must be adopted by all shareholders by revising the company articles, thus requiring a special resolution at a general shareholders meeting, and can be exercised by shareholders except for the unwanted acquirers or redeemed by the company only under conditions sufficient to maintain or enhance the corporate value and general shareholders` common interests. This point makes the Korean-styled poison pill different from the U.S.-styled poison pill, which adopts ``warrant`` as a tactic for raising funds, and the Japanese-styled poison pill, which may be used only by the directors. Despite these strong points, there are several aspects of the draft that require improvement. First, ``corporate value and general shareholders`` common interests` in the draft is too ambiguous, and the description of whether the right can be used and under what triggering event is too ambiguous also. So this should be articulated. Secondly, there is the possibility of the interests of general shareholders other than the raiders being damaged in the process of the right`s ``exercise and redemption`` under the draft. Accordingly, the question of who the holders of the right are should be clarified. Thirdly, a sunset should be adopted, for regular screening to prevent abuse by the company during the introduction of this poison pill. Finally, it should be regulated that listed companies can use the right reasonably and properly by revising the current takeover bid under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, provisions of listing stocks to Korea Exchange and the listing regulations of the stock exchange.

포이즌필의 導入에 따른 法政策的 爭點

송옥렬 한국상사법학회 2008 商事法硏究 Vol.27 No.2

The rights plans, or conventionally poison pills, have been widely and successfully used in the U.S. corporate control market, and now Korean business circle is strongly arguing for the implantation of the pills. This paper analyzed several dimensions of this argument. First of all, there is no urgent need for such implantation. Unlike the U.S. or England, where companies are dispersedly owned and thus management is separated from the owners, Korean companies, including chaebol firms in particular, are owned by controlling shareholders. Several advantages that the defenses against hostile takeovers can achieve, such as enhancing the target company's bargaining power, overcoming managerial myopia, encouraging firm-specific investment, and so forth, are less likely under the controlling shareholder ownership. Given the lack of adequate monitoring system over the controlling shareholders, arguably, they are likely to abuse the pills to get rid of the threat from outside, with increasing private benefits. If, however, granting more defensive measures are socially agreed, poison pill would be regarded as one of the most efficient defenses, in terms of minimizing social costs associated with defensive tactics. Among several costs, this paper highlights the effect of defensive tactics to distort the other corporate decisions, and in this regard poison pill seems to be socially desirable. It should be noted, however, that the specific features of poison pill be designed to be harmonized with current Korean corporate law, most notably with the doctrine of equal treatment of shareholders. Interestingly, recent Japanese supreme court held that companies are not obliged to treat acquiror company equally with other shareholders, if the acquiror is higly likely to hurt corporate value by busting-up the company. Although it is not clear whether we have to abandon such legal doctrine, it seems that more close examination should be carried out. The rights plans, or conventionally poison pills, have been widely and successfully used in the U.S. corporate control market, and now Korean business circle is strongly arguing for the implantation of the pills. This paper analyzed several dimensions of this argument. First of all, there is no urgent need for such implantation. Unlike the U.S. or England, where companies are dispersedly owned and thus management is separated from the owners, Korean companies, including chaebol firms in particular, are owned by controlling shareholders. Several advantages that the defenses against hostile takeovers can achieve, such as enhancing the target company's bargaining power, overcoming managerial myopia, encouraging firm-specific investment, and so forth, are less likely under the controlling shareholder ownership. Given the lack of adequate monitoring system over the controlling shareholders, arguably, they are likely to abuse the pills to get rid of the threat from outside, with increasing private benefits. If, however, granting more defensive measures are socially agreed, poison pill would be regarded as one of the most efficient defenses, in terms of minimizing social costs associated with defensive tactics. Among several costs, this paper highlights the effect of defensive tactics to distort the other corporate decisions, and in this regard poison pill seems to be socially desirable. It should be noted, however, that the specific features of poison pill be designed to be harmonized with current Korean corporate law, most notably with the doctrine of equal treatment of shareholders. Interestingly, recent Japanese supreme court held that companies are not obliged to treat acquiror company equally with other shareholders, if the acquiror is higly likely to hurt corporate value by busting-up the company. Although it is not clear whether we have to abandon such legal doctrine, it seems that more close examination should be carried out.

외국기업의 적대적 M&A에 대한 위기관리 방어수단에 관한 고찰 - poison pill을 중심으로

정진국 충북대학교 국가위기관리연구소 2011 국가위기관리연구 Vol.5 No.1

외환위기 이후에 우리나라는 여러 가지 법적 규제를 완화하여 외국자본의 유치를 허용하였다. 그 결과 외국자본의 국내 유입을 통한 투자의 확대와 시장기능의 활성화 가 이루어진 반면 외국기업에 의한 적대적 M&A가 발생하였다. 경영권 방어수단이 미비한 상황에서 국내기업뿐만이 아닌 투자자의 손실 또한 큰 사회적 문제로 대두되 게 되었다. 이에 2009년 상법개정에 따른 신주인수선택권은 적대적 M&A에 대한 방 어수단으로 도입되었다. 그로인하여 warrant 부여의 근거를 마련하였다. warrant를 활용한 경영권 방어수단으로서 Poison Pill 제도는 다른 방어수단보다 경제적이고 강 력한 힘을 발휘한다. 미국에서 발달한 제도로서 주 회사법에 근거하여 이사회에 광범 위한 권한을 부여하며, 기업들 사이에 가장 널리 쓰이는 방안이다. 또한 일본에서는 상법개정을 통한 신주예약권제도를 도입하여 Poison Pill의 활용을 가능하게 하였다. 한국형 Poison Pill은 이사회와 주주총회의 이원적 구조의 형태를 기본으로 여러 가지 특징과 한계점을 가지고 있다. 이에 본 논문에서는 Poison Pill 에 대한 각국의 입법 례와 상법개정안을 통하여 한국형 Poison Pill의 특징과 한계에 대하여 기존에 가지고 있던 논의를 중점으로 살펴보았다. With more than 40% increase of foreign shares on listed enterprises after financial shock, the possibility of hostile corporate acception by foreign company has increased. The interest over corporate’s defense mechanism against hostile M&A has risen as hostile M&A has come to actuality partially through attempts to accept SK, KT&G. For this reason, The Ministry of Justice constituted a “Committee for Improvement of Corporate Control Defense Legal Framework” in April 2008. This Committee designed a commercial Code revising draft in November 2008, introducing a stock purchase right so called a ‘Poison Pill’. This article describes that introduction of poison pill is under examination in response to controversy over introduction or expansion of de defense mechanism to defend management right against hostile M&A. and analyzes some legislative problems on the introduction of the poison pills in Korean Commercial Act.

Pills or Poison? Introduction of Poison Pill in Korea

( Hae Sun Park ) 고려대학교 법학연구원 2010 Korea University Law Review Vol.7 No.-

The Committee for Improvement of the Corporate Control Defense Legal Framework, instituted by the Ministry of Justice in April 2008, designed a revised draft of the Commercial Code in November 2008, which introduced a stock purchase right known as poison pill. Public hearing for Commercial Code draft was held a, at March 2010. The Draft gained approval in subsequent cabinet meeting. However, some people are concerned about introducing poison pill in Korea. Although introduction of poison pill has significant positive effect at little cost, the worry of abuse cannot completely be ruled out. Moreover, effectiveness of poison pill within the Korean business structure is also questioned, Compared to that of U.S. This paper will attempt to review the controversy over introduction of poison pill in Korea, with the cases of the U.S. and Japan, based upon the draft Commercial Code.

상법개정안상의 신주인수선택권 도입에 대한 고찰

박정구(Park, JeongKu) 한양법학회 2010 漢陽法學 Vol.29 No.-

Poison pill plans are most practical and typical method to protect target from the hostile takeovers in the USA. They are adopted to protect minority shareholders from inadequate takeovers and to increase the power of a company's board of directors to negotiate with potential acquirers. The universal type of poison pill in the USA is flip-in/flip-over right plan. This plan is to endow ‘the rights’ to common shareholders with the type of dividends excepting bidders. Poison pill was introduced after the precontract right for share was enacted in Japan. By the enactment new Corporate Law of 2005, Japan has defensive system to those of American states against hostile takeover. In Korea, under current legal system, poison pill can be used as a defensive tactic, and Korean corporation are vulnerable to hostile treat by foreign funds. So Korean business circle is strongly arguing for the introduction of the poison pills. Poison pill is regarded as one of the most efficient defenses, in terms of minimizing social costs associated with defensive tactics. In order to put forward long-time stability of management and to protect the corporation and its shareholders’ interests from hostile takeover bid, Korean Commercial Act is going to introduce the poison pills to the target corporations. This article describes on the poison pills rights of USA and Japan, and analyzes some legislative problems on the introduction of the poison pills in Korean Commercial Act.