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Multiple Large Shareholders and Firm Performance: Evidence from China
Juan Li,Caiyu Yan,Xuefei He,Hongqu He,Tianping Ao 한국증권학회 2023 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.52 No.3
Agency theory has shown that multiple large shareholders have competing monitoring and entrenchment governance effects. Therefore, this paper studies the governance effects of multiple large shareholders to determine the dominant effect in the Chinese setting. A panel data model and F-test demonstrate that a significant positive relationship exists between multiple large shareholders and firm performance, but the positive relationship between multiple large shareholders and firm performance will be weakened by state-owned enterprises and politically connected enterprises. Furthermore, our findings suggest that multiple large shareholders can enhance firm performance by mitigating the agent–principal problem and the principal–principal problem. Additionally, a threshold model is introduced to explore the impact of other governance mechanisms on multiple large shareholders’ governance, and our findings show that enhancing controlling shareholder governance and board size significantly weakens multiple large shareholders governance, but increasing the proportion of independent directors strengthens the positive relationship between multiple large shareholders and Tobin’s Q and weakens the positive relationship between multiple large shareholders and ROA.
기업지배구조와 이익조정: 주요대주주와 지배권경쟁가능성을 중심으로
안홍복 ( Hong Bok Ahn ),서란주 ( Ran Ju Seo ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계학연구 Vol.38 No.1
Recent empirical works show that ownership is typically concentrated in a small number of large shareholders. This evidences shift the focus from the traditional conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholder to an equally important agency conflict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A few large shareholders can have positive side and negative side in control. The main risk is that the large shareholders can pursue their own goals against firm`s profit maximization. Some of these goals can come at the expense of minority shareholders. But, in most studies, they have assumption there is one largest shareholder in firms. So in this paper, we address a different question: Do the multiple large shareholders have an advantage or disadvantage for minority shareholders? And we examine the role of the multiple large shareholders and the relationship contestability among them and earning management. For these purpose we derive the condition equation including multiple large shareholders contestability. In a model, multiple blockholders can have two different roles in the firms. Blockholders have the power and the incentives to monitor the largest shareholder by holding a substantial voting block, therefore they have the ability to reduce profit diversion. On the other hand, the blockholder can form a controlling coalition with other blockholders and share the diverted profit. The presenting and analyzing condition equation about earning management under circumstance with multiple blockholders and with a single blockholder is the key contribution of this paper. So we develop the hypothesis that the contestability between major shareholders has relationship with earning management and verify this by using the condition equation. To test these hypotheses, we analyse the relative voting power and the type of multiple blockholders. The sample covers non-financial Korean companies that have at least one large shareholder (with more than 5% of the votes) over the period 2005-2007. Total 758 firm-year observations are used in the regression analysis. We measure the contestability of major shareholders by using three different way(based on the Herfindahl index). First of all, we measure the sum of squares of the difference between the percentage of first major shareholder`s holdings and the second plus the sum of squares of the difference between the percentage of second major shareholder`s holdings and the third as the Hi_difference variables, the sum of squares of each holdings of the first, the second and the third major shareholder as Hi_concentrate variables. The higher these two variables are, the lower the contestability are. The Third variables is measured if the percentage of the first and the second shareholders` holdings is less than 20%, there are at least one more major shareholders then 1, else 0 as the Hi-D variables. There are advantages because the prior two variables are continuous variables, but there could be the problems of measurement errors. So we select the third dummy variables. And we measure the discretionary accruals to examine the earning management. To do this, we adopt revised Jones model(Dechow et, al., 1995)) that is generally known as the better measurement than Jones model(1991). As a result of the empirical research, we find that the contestability of the largest shareholders has a positive effect on firm earnings management that is measured by accruals. The higher the contestability, the less earning management there is. Namely, blockholders have a role to monitor the largest shareholder and protect small shareholders` wealth. We conduct additional analysis for verifying the robustness and sensitivity of the results. We reexamine the relationship of the earning management and contestability by using the earning section around “0”. We reconsider the type of blockholders (Family, Bank, Institute, Group), other earning management through real activities manipulation and the relationship with persons with a special relationship. We conduct the sensitivity analysis according to the other accruals variables, holding rate of the blockholders and the study method relating to the data. Also, we examine the endogeneity analysis to investigate a casual relationship between the earning management and the contestability. As a result of additional analysis considering the different situations and measurement problem about the variables, we can get the same conclusion at the results of the main analysis. This paper investigate the corporate governance reflecting the real and practical environment that there are blockholders over one and present mathematical model as well as the theoretical model based on the prior study. We propose the explanation of process about the relationship between the corporate governance and firms` value. This means that the accounting information is the link between the corporate governance and firms` value. So, It need to consider the contestability as well as the existence, the type, the holding rates of the blockholders in future study relating to the corporate governance.
복수 대주주가 기업가치에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구: 중국 상장기업을 중심으로
정진호 ( Jinho Jeong ),박위련 ( Weilian Piao ),이지선 ( Geesun Lee ) 국제지역학회 2021 국제지역연구 Vol.25 No.1
This paper investigates the effect of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on the value of the firm in China. We find that there is a significant inverse(-) relationship between the existence of MLS and the firm value. In China, where most of the firms are state-owned, the concentrated ownership by a single controlling shareholder has a positive(+) effect on its firm value by providing a favorable operational environment and securing the managerial efficiency. In addition, we also find that the relation between the degree of competition among large shareholders on its firm value is not uniformly distributed and has a nonlinear “L-shaped” relationship. For firms with weak competition between large shareholders, the increased ownership by non-controlling shareholders has a positive(+) effect on the value of the firm. On the contrary, for the firms with strong competition between large shareholders, it has a negative(-) or insignificant effect on the value of the firm. Overall, our empirical evidence implies that the ownership increase by non-controlling large shareholders has both positive(+) functions such as reduced information asymmetry and negative(-) functions of increased agency conflicts.
기업지배구조에서 대주주간 경쟁가능성과 기업가치의 관련성 분석
안홍복(Ahn Hong-Bok) 한국국제회계학회 2009 국제회계연구 Vol.0 No.25
본 연구는 선행연구에서 보편적으로 사용하는 대주주1인 또는 1인 지배주주의 가정에 따른 기업지배구조의 문제점을 분석하기 위해 복수의 주요대주주 존재와 그에 따른 기업가치 관련성을 실증분석 하였다. 특히 본 연구는 복수의 주요대주주 존재와 이들이 기업에서 수행하는 2가지 상이한 역할에 그 연구적 초점을 둔다. 즉, 한편으로 보면 주요대주주는 상당한 투표권을 보유함으로써 경영자를 감시할 의지 및 능력을 가지고 있어 경영자의 이익약탈을 용이하게 막을 수 있는 능력을 갖고 있다. 그러나 다른 한편으로는 주요대주주는 다른 주요대주주와 연합을 형성하여 약탈한 이익을 공유할 수 있다. 주요대주주의 첫 번째 역할과 관련하여 기업가치는 주요대주주 사이의 상호 견제능력 즉, 지배권의 경쟁가능성(contestability)의 감소와 음(-)의 관련성을 갖는다는 가설을 검증하고자 한다. 자료를 분석한 결과는 복수의 주요대주주 존재와 기업가치 사이에 통계적으로 유의한 관련성이 존재한다는 실증증거를 제시하였다. 즉, 본 연구는 기업지배구조에서 주요대주주 사이의 지분율 차이가 클수록 기업가치는 감소한다는 결과를 제시하였다. I present a model of the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using a sample of Korean listed firms over the period from 1998 to 2002, Ie show, consistent with the model, that a more equal distribution of the votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value significantly depends on the identity of these blockholders.