比較法硏究(비교법연구) : 미국 셔먼법상 배제적 행위의 위법성 판단 기준 -우리나라 및 일본과의 비교연구-

강상덕 ( Sang Duk Kang ) 법조협회 2013 法曹 Vol.62 No.12

배제적 행위를 정의하고 그 위법성을 판단하는 기준을 정립하기 어려운 이유는 배제적 행위는 경쟁촉진적 효과(낮은 가격과 새로운 제품)와 반경쟁적 효과를 모두 가지고 있기 때문이다. 셔먼법 제2조는 포괄적·추상적으로 규정되어 있어 배제적 행위의 위법성 판단이 경쟁당국이나 법원의 판결에 좌우될 수 있어, 경쟁촉진적 행위를 규제할 수 있는 과잉집행의 우려가 발생한다. 법원이나 경쟁당국이 반경쟁적 행위와 경쟁촉진적 행위를 제대로 구분할 수 있고, 과잉집행과 과소집행을 제대로 형량할 수 있으며, 시장의 결과를 예측하고, 기업의 시정조치 이행 여부를 제대로 감독할 수 있는지에 대하여 의문이 제기되고 있다. 배제적 행위의 위법성 판단 기준에 있어 중요한 점은 오류와 집행비용을 최소화 할수 있어야 하고, 반경쟁성과 소비자 후생이 주요 고려요소가 되어야 한다는 것이다. 배제적 행위의 위법성을 판단하는 기준에 대한 견해는 모든 배제적 행위에 적용될 수있는 단일 기준을 주장하는 견해, 다양한 행위 유형에 따른 개별행위 기준을 적용하는 견해로 구분할 수 있다. 개별행위 기준은 단일기준을 모든 배제적 행위의 위법성 판단에 적용하는 것은 과잉집행과 과소집행의 위험이 있을 수 있기 때문에 행위 유형에 따라 위법성 판단 기준이 달라야 한다는 것을 의미한다. 시장지배적 지위의 남용행위의 부당성 판단의 핵심은 반경쟁적 효과의 판단에 있다. 포스코 판결에 따른 부당성 판단에 있어서는 입증책임 전환 기준이 우리 공정거래법의 해석과 조화를 이룰 수 있고, 그 과정은 미국 셔먼법 제2조의 위법성 심사와 비슷하게 진행할 필요가 있다. 이 경우 반경쟁적 효과의 판단에 있어 유럽식의 요소, 즉 경쟁과정에 대한 중대한 침해도 포함될 필요가 있다. 경쟁자 없는 경쟁은 존재할 수 없고, 경쟁과 경쟁자 보호는 함께 촉진되는 가운데 소비자 후생 증진이 극대화 될 수 있기 때문이다. 시장지배적 지위 남용행위의 부당성 판단에는 주관적 요소로서 고의의 입증과 객관적 요소로서 반경쟁적효과가 발생하였거나 발생할 만한 우려의 입증이 필요하고, 사업자의 항변으로 사업상(경쟁촉진적) 정당화사유의 입증이 필요하며, 이후 반경쟁적 효과와 경쟁촉진적 효과사이의 이익형량이 필요하므로, 일응 미국식의 입증책임 전환기준을 적용하는 것이 타당하다. 그렇지만 이 기준은 경쟁자나 소비자 등에 미친 효과를 중시하는 정적인(static)인 성격을 내포하고 있어 이익형량 과정에서 동적인(dynamic) 측면이 제대로 반영되기 어렵기 때문에 혁신에 의한 행위나 효율성이 있는 행위와 같이 장기적으로 소비자 후생이 증진될 수 있는 경우에는 불균형 기준(disproportionality test)의 적용도 검토될 필요가 있다. Defining exclusionary conduct and establishing a standard of antitrust liability is difficult since exclusionary conduct has both sides of procompetitive effect(low price and new product) and anticompetitive effect. It causes concerns of false positives(overdeterrence) that could regulate procompetitive conduct since section 2 of the Sherman Act is ambiguous and the rule of antitrust liability Section 2 depends on a judicial tribunal to control. A question arises that a court and competition authorities can weigh between overdeterrence and underdeterrence, and can supervise whether corporates fulfill remedies. Liability standard of exclusionary conduct should minimize error and enforcement cost, focus on anticompetitiveness and consumer welfare. Liability standard of exclusionary conduct is classified into two standards, a single standard that could be applied on all exclusionary conduct and a conduct-specific test that could apply a specific standard by conduct type. Burden-sifting test could be in harmony with interpretation of our Monopoly Regulation And Fair Trade Act. Anticompetitive effect determination should include European element, a significant harm to competitve process. Conclusionally, unfairness of abuse of market-dominating position requires exclusionary conduct and intent, unfairness determination requires weighing procompetitive effect against anticompetitive effect. However, disproportionality test that could increase consumer welfare in the long term such as innovation could be considered, since burden-shifting test is static and considers existing effects on rivals or consumers.

미국 셔먼법상 독점화 행위인 단독의 거래거절의 위법성 판단기준 -의도기준의 유용성을 중심으로-

문정해 한국상사법학회 2011 商事法硏究 Vol.30 No.1

The antitrust laws are concerned with two anticompetitive conducts,collusion and exclusion. However, it has been difficult to decide how to determine whether exclusionary conducts are anticompetitive. Under Article 2of the Sherman Act of the U.S., unilateral refusals to deal are illegal only when they constitute monopolization or attempted monopolization. That is,the plaintiff must show that the defendant is a monopolist and that his refusal to deal is anticompetitive exclusionary conduct, as shown in unilateral-refusal-to-deal cases that quoted the Colgate dictum. Nevertheless,courts and scholars have long proposed colorful tests, because the Sherman Act’s requirements on monopolization and an attempt to monopolize give only vague answers for the standard of illegality on a unilateral refusal to deal. One of the tests is the intent test. In adopting the Colgate dictum to judge the illegality of a unilateral refusal to deal, courts have long showed interest in how to interpret a monopolist’s intent or purpose. However,influenced by the Chicago School and the post-Chicago School, which stress a strict economic approach to antitrust analysis, courts have generally dismissed intent as having minimal value in determining antitrust liability, in particular, in monopolization cases. Although the Supreme Court revived the role of the intent test in Aspen, at least in unilateral-refusal-to-deal cases, it narrowly circumscribed Aspen’s application in Trinko several years later. By examining the usefulness of the intent test by analyzing Aspen’s intent inquiry with a monopolist’s profit sacrifice being merely one indicator of a monopolist’s intent with Trinko’s rule, which treated a monopolist’s profit sacrifice simply as an element of exclusionary conducts, and by trying to find that the Chicago School and post-Chicago School’s economic theories are indeterminate, this article argues that the intent test can provide further guidance and serve as a proxy for anticompetitive effect, and that the Korean Supreme Court Decision 2002Du8626 used the intent test appropriately.

Strategic Alliance within the Sugar Industry of Pakistan: A Resource Dependence Perspective

AMAN, Rameesha,KHAN, Abdul Rehman Korea Distribution Science Association 2021 Asian journal of business environment Vol.11 No.4

Purpose: This paper uses the resource-dependency theory to present the case of the Pakistan sugar industry to highlight how the industry uses a strategic alliance to gain a powerful bargaining position over its critical dependencies. The case of the Pakistan sugar industry is well-known and it is common knowledge that the alliance or the cartel within it is responsible for frequent price hikes and sugar supply shortages in the country. Research design, data and methodology: We use a case study, qualitative document analysis design to trace how the alliance overcomes its various dependencies, and in doing so, how does it harm various stakeholder interests. Results: This paper finds that the sugar industry alliance maintains its bargaining power by manipulating sugar supply through horizontal alliances, political affiliations, underselling and under-reporting sugar stocks, purchasing sugarcane from the black market, and by gaining billions of rupees in export subsidies by hoarding stock and using its political connections. Conclusion: The paper concludes by providing a summary of the measures which the government has taken to curb this anticompetitive conduct; the most important of which is the removal of protectionist measures for sugar trade and allowing market forces to control the demand and supply of sugar in the local market.

Strategic Alliance within the Sugar Industry of Pakistan: A Resource Dependence Perspective

Rameesha AMAN,Abdul Rehman KHAN 한국유통과학회 2021 Asian Journal of Business Environment (AJBE) Vol.11 No.4

Purpose: This paper uses the resource-dependency theory to present the case of the Pakistan sugar industry to highlight how the industry uses a strategic alliance to gain a powerful bargaining position over its critical dependencies. The case of the Pakistan sugar industry is well-known and it is common knowledge that the alliance or the cartel within it is responsible for frequent price hikes and sugar supply shortages in the country. Research design, data and methodology: We use a case study, qualitative document analysis design to trace how the alliance overcomes its various dependencies, and in doing so, how does it harm various stakeholder interests. Results: This paper finds that the sugar industry alliance maintains its bargaining power by manipulating sugar supply through horizontal alliances, political affiliations, underselling and under-reporting sugar stocks, purchasing sugarcane from the black market, and by gaining billions of rupees in export subsidies by hoarding stock and using its political connections. Conclusion: The paper concludes by providing a summary of the measures which the government has taken to curb this anticompetitive conduct; the most important of which is the removal of protectionist measures for sugar trade and allowing market forces to control the demand and supply of sugar in the local market.

시장지배적 사업자의 끼워팔기의 위법성 판단기준: 최근 미국 제9연방항소법원의 해석을 중심으로

김남우 ( Nam Woo Kim ) 한국경쟁법학회 2012 競爭法硏究 Vol.25 No.-