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James Crotty,Kang-Kook Lee 한국사회경제학회 2007 사회경제평론 Vol.- No.29 (2)
As late as October 1997 the IMF declared that the Korean economy was experiencing a temporary liquidity squeeze, not a solvency problem. Yet in December 1997 Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer declared that Korea suffered from a systemic “breakdown of economic relations” so complete that only radical economic restructuring could restore prosperity. The IMF attached what it called “extreme structural conditionality” to its loan agreements with Korea, demanding a complete and rapid transition from Korea’s traditional East Asian economic model to a globally integrated neoliberal model. We subject the IMF’s assertion that the allocative efficiency of the Korean economy had collapsed by 1997 to a number of empirical tests. The evidence does not support the IMF’s systemic breakdown claim. We conclude that the IMF’s imposition of “extreme structural conditionality” on Korea is best understood as an illegitimate and antidemocratic exercise of power designed to meet the needs of the IMF’s key constituents rather than those of the majority of Korea’s people.
Was Korea’s Economy Structurally Dysfunctional in the Mid-1990s?
James Crotty,Kang-Kook Lee 한국사회경제학회 2007 사회경제평론 Vol.- No.29-1
As late as October 1997 the IMF declared that the Korean economy was experiencing a temporary liquidity squeeze, not a solvency problem. Yet in December 1997 Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer declared that Korea suffered from a systemic “breakdown of economic relations” so complete that only radical economic restructuring could restore prosperity. The IMF attached what it called “extreme structural conditionality” to its loan agreements with Korea, demanding a complete and rapid transition from Korea’s traditional East Asian economic model to a globally integrated neoliberal model. We subject the IMF’s assertion that the allocative efficiency of the Korean economy had collapsed by 1997 to a number of empirical tests. The evidence does not support the IMF’s systemic breakdown claim. We conclude that the IMF’s imposition of “extreme structural conditionality” on Korea is best understood as an illegitimate and antidemocratic exercise of power designed to meet the needs of the IMF’s key constituents rather than those of the majority of Korea’s people.
James Crotty,Gerald Epstein and Patricia Kelly 서울대학교 경제연구소 1997 Seoul journal of economics Vol.10 No.4
In this paper we analyze two related aspects of the current globalization process. The first is the relation between the activities of multinational corporations(MNCs) and the economic well being of workers in the North. In particular, we ask whether the increase in capital mobility associated with the world-wide movement of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization has contributed to the problems of high unemployment, wage stagnation and rising inequality. The second concern of the paper is the impact of the evolution of the Neo-liberal global regime(NLR) itself on economic well-being in the North and South. Here we make two basic arguments. First, Neo-liberal institute and practices tend to generate inadequate global aggregate demand growth and thus high global unemployment, unleash destructive competitive processes, and weaken government's ability to regulate business in the interest of the public. Second, the force of global Neo-liberalism is so powerful that it has become difficult if not impossible for countries to maintain non-Neo- liberal economic structure.
Economic Performance in Post-Crisis Korea: A Critical Perspective on Neoliberal Restructuring
James Crotty,Kang-Kook Lee 서울대학교 경제연구소 2001 Seoul journal of economics Vol.14 No.2
This paper evaluates the neoliberal economic restructuring process implemented in Korea following the 1997 Asian financial crisis. We first argue that the austerity macroeconomic policy of late 1997 and early 1998 was the main cause of the economic collapse in 1998, and that the decision of the IMF and President Kim Dae Jung to impose a radical neoliberal transformation of financial markets and large industrial firms in the depressed conditions of 1998, though defensible on political grounds, made the failure of these reforms Virtually inevitable. A detailed analysis of the macro economy, labor markets, financial markets, and nonfinancial firms in Korea in the past three and one-half years shows that neoliberal restructuring has created a vicious cycle in which a perpetually weak financial sector fails to provide the capital needed for real sector growth, investment and financial robustness, while real sector financial fragility continuously weakens financial firms. Neoliberal policies may have pushed Korea onto a low-investment, low-growth, development path, one with rising insecurity and inequality. Meanwhile, the removal of virtually all restrictions on cross-border capital flows has led to a dramatic increase in the influence of foreign capital in Korea's economy. The paper concludes by arguing that Korea should reject radical neoliberal restructuring and instead adopt reforms designed to democratize and modernize its traditional state-guided growth model.
James Crotty 서울대학교 경제연구소 2002 Seoul journal of economics Vol.15 No.2
This paper begins with a summary of arguments in support of the thesis that neoliberal policies have altered the competitive environment within which large nonfinancial corporations operate by slowing global aggregate demand growth and removing national barriers to trade and direct investment. These changes spawned destructive competition in key global industries, leading to low profits, high leverage and chronic excess capacity. It then argues that the evolution of financial markets in the last quarter century has strongly affected nonfinancial corporate structure and performance. Financial market changes led to shorter corporate planning horizons and weaker allegiance of key stakeholders to long-term corporate goals, and they dramatically altered management compensation criteria in ways that aligned top managers' interests with those of institutional investors concerned only with short-term stock price movements. Financial market pressures also led to an enormous increase in the percent of nonfinancial corporations' cash flow disgorged to financial market agents.