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Chung-Hua Shen,Kun-Li Lin 한국증권학회 2012 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.41 No.2
This study investigates the role of corporate governance in the relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payouts. The study sample is divided into strong and weak governance regimes to investigate outcome and substitute effects, where the former stresses the negative relationship between investment opportunity and dividend payouts in a strong governance regime while the latter emphasizes the positive relationship between the two in a weak governance regime. Using the endogenous switching model on a sample of Taiwan publicly listed firms from 2000 to 2009, this study concludes that the substitute model hypothesis is supported using different governance variables, but no outcome effect is identified.
Shen, Chung-Hua,Chen, Shyh-Wei 한국국제경제학회 2004 International Economic Journal Vol.18 No.2
This paper finds an asymmetric swing in Taiwan exchange rate. In contrast to the developed countries, whose exchange rates exhibit long swings in both appreciation and depreciation regimes, the long swing only exists in an appreciation regime for Taiwan. A short swing, however, is found during a depreciation regime in Taiwan. These results may reflect to some extent the central bank’s preference, which is to have a let-it-go policy during depreciation and a slowdown policy in appreciation. Also, it may simply reflect the Japanese yen’s influences.
The Political Interferences in Government Banks Do the Institutional Factors Matter?
Chung-Hua Shen,Iftekhar Hasan,Chih-Yung Lin 한국재무학회 2011 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2011 No.09
This study first re-investigates an old but still attractive issue: whether government-owned bank (GOB) performs inferior to the private-owned banks (POB) which is dubbed GOB effect in this study. Then, and more importantly, we explore why. Our government banks are classified into three types: GOBs that purchase distressed banks, GOBs that purchase normal banks, and GOBs that do not purchase any bank. We argue that not all three types of GOB are underperformer, that is, only GOBs purchase distressed banks are. Contrasting to the common belief, our results show that GOBs that purchase normal banks and GOBs that do not purchase any bank (after 2003) perform similar to POBs. That is, GOB effect significantly minimized when political interference is removed. Moreover, we found that POBs purchase distressed banks have similar performance to the benchmarked private banks. Thus, because both GOBs and POBs purchase distressed banks, the major difference is the presence of political factors in distressed-acquirer GOB. Accordingly, the reason of the worsened performance of GOBs is more likely a result of political intervention. Finally, we find these political interventions apparently exist in these countries no matter their country governance, corruption levels, and political rights.
Zhi Ma,Chung-Bang Yun,Yan-Bin Shen,Feng Yu,Hua-Ping Wan,Yao-Zhi Luo 국제구조공학회 2019 Smart Structures and Systems, An International Jou Vol.24 No.4
A Bayesian dynamic linear model (BDLM) is presented for a data-driven analysis for response prediction and load effect separation of a revolving auditorium structure, where the main loads are self-weight and dead loads, temperature load, and audience load. Analyses are carried out based on the long-term monitoring data for static strains on several key members of the structure. Three improvements are introduced to the ordinary regression BDLM, which are a classificatory regression term to address the temporary audience load effect, improved inference for the variance of observation noise to be updated continuously, and component discount factors for effective load effect separation. The effects of those improvements are evaluated regarding the root mean square errors, standard deviations, and 95% confidence intervals of the predictions. Bayes factors are used for evaluating the probability distributions of the predictions, which are essential to structural condition assessments, such as outlier identification and reliability analysis. The performance of the present BDLM has been successfully verified based on the simulated data and the real data obtained from the structural health monitoring system installed on the revolving structure.
Effect of External Support on Bank Default and Operating Risks: Does Country Strength Matter?
Yu-Li Huang,Chung-Hua Shen,Kun-Li Lin 한국증권학회 2018 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.47 No.4
This study investigates how two forms of external support, namely, government and foreign ownership, affect bank default and operating risks. The results show, first, that government ownership reduces default risk and increases operating risk, while foreign ownership reduces both default and operating risks. Second, government ownership decreases default risk especially for banks from advanced countries and countries with better national governance. Third, foreign ownership from countries with better sovereign ratings decreases both default and operating risks. Our results suggest that Asian countries should increase income or national governance for more effective government support and open the domestic bank market.
Why Are Crisis-Induced Devaluations Contractionary? Exploring Alternative Hypotheses
( Ramkishen S. Rajan ),( Chung Hua Shen ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 (구 세종대학교 국제경제연구소) 2006 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.21 No.3
Why are some currency crises followed by economic contractions while others are not? This paper is an attempt at answering this query. In particular, we investigate two closely related questions. First, we explore whether there is a difference in the output effects of a devaluation during “normal” periods versus crises ones; after all, during non-crisis periods, real exchange devaluation is seen as an important policy option for promoting exports and output growth. Yet, the literature has not made a distinction between crisis and non-crisis periods. To preview the main conclusion, we find that the contractionary effects tend to exist only during the crisis period. Building on this, we go on to explore the factors that cause a crisis-induced devaluation to be contractionary.