Locating and Utilising Inherent Qualities in an Expanded Sound Palette for Solo Flute

Alice Bennett(알리스 베넷),Vincent Giles(빈센트 길레스) 한국전자음악협회 2015 에밀레 Vol.13 No.-

플루트 독주 특유의 즉흥적 음악언어를 추구하면서, 전통적이고 현대적인 연주기법의 범위를 넘어 컴퓨터를 이용한 악기의 확장이라는 영역으로 넘어가야 할 필요성을 종종 느낄 때가 있다. 이러한 이유로 알리스 베넷Alice Bennett의 창작 작품은 실용적인 사운드 팔레트를 확장시키는 새로운 전자음향적 기술을 탐색케 한다. 이 글은 빈센트 길레스Vincent Giles가 실시간으로 분광 영역 마이크로사운드 증폭 소프트웨어SDMAS(Spectral Domain Microsound Amplification Software)를 사용한 플루트 연주에 관하여 기술한다. 분광 영역 마이크로사운드 증폭 소프트웨어SDMAS는 실시간으로 입력된 소리가 특정 음량 기준점 주변 배음들의 음량을 변화시켜, 작은 소리를 상대적으로 큰 음량으로 증폭시킨다. 그 결과 들을 수 없었을 [작은] 배음들이 큰 음량의 배음들과 같이 커져, 기존의 악기 혹은 변형된 악기 음색과도 확연히 다른 음색을 얻게 된다. 이는 연주자/작곡가가 순전히 어쿠스틱 악기에서 얻을 수 있는 것과 다른 음색을 보여줄 뿐 아니라 보다 넓은 영역의 음색을 활용할 수 있게 해준다. 이는 초월적 악기의 확장형태instrument configuration에 기반한, 음향적으로 풍부하고 독특한 즉흥적 음악언어를 이끌어 낼 것이다. In the search for an idiosyncratic improvisatory language of solo flute performance, it is sometimes necessary to move beyond the scope of traditional and extended techniques into the world of instrument-extension through computers. To this end, Alice Bennett’s creative work leads to the exploration of new electroacoustic techniques, searching for ways to expand the available sonic palette. This paper documents an electronically-extended flute performance utilising Vincent Giles’ Spectral Domain Microsound Amplification Software (SDMAS) in real-time. The SDMAS amplifies soft sounds relative to loud, by real-time input, shifting the partials by amplitude around an amplitude-based pivot point. The result is that these otherwise-inaudible partials increased to audibility alongside the higher amplitude partials, drastically altering the perceived timbre of the instrument or instruments being treated. This allows the performer/composer to not only discover, but to exploit a greater range of timbres than are available to a purely acoustic instrument. These explorations lead to a sonically enriched and idiosyncratic improvisatory language based on this hyper-instrument configuration.

Neuromyelitis optica and multiple sclerosis: Seeing differences through optical coherence tomography

Bennett, JL,de Seze, J,Lana-Peixoto, M,Palace, J,Waldman, A,Schippling, S,Tenembaum, S,Banwell, B,Greenberg, B,Levy, M,Fujihara, K,Chan, KH,Kim, HJ,Asgari, N,Sato, DK,Saiz, A,Wuerfel, J,Zimmermann, H SAGE Publications 2015 Multiple sclerosis journal: clinical and laborator Vol.21 No.6

<P>Neuromyelitis optica (NMO) is an inflammatory autoimmune disease of the central nervous system that preferentially targets the optic nerves and spinal cord. The clinical presentation may suggest multiple sclerosis (MS), but a highly specific serum autoantibody against the astrocytic water channel aquaporin-4 present in up to 80% of NMO patients enables distinction from MS. Optic neuritis may occur in either condition resulting in neuro-anatomical retinal changes. Optical coherence tomography (OCT) has become a useful tool for analyzing retinal damage both in MS and NMO. Numerous studies showed that optic neuritis in NMO typically results in more severe retinal nerve fiber layer (RNFL) and ganglion cell layer thinning and more frequent development of microcystic macular edema than in MS. Furthermore, while patients’ RNFL thinning also occurs in the absence of optic neuritis in MS, subclinical damage seems to be rare in NMO. Thus, OCT might be useful in differentiating NMO from MS and serve as an outcome parameter in clinical studies.</P>

Four Principles of Memory Improvement: A Guide to Improving Learning Efficiency

Bennett L. Schwartz,Lisa K. Son,Nate Kornell,Bridgied Finn 대한사고개발학회 2011 The International Journal of Creativity & Problem Vol.21 No.1

Recent advances in memory research suggest methods that can be applied to enhance educational practices. We outline four principles of memory improvement that have emerged from research: 1) process material actively, 2) practice retrieval, 3) use distributed practice, and 4) use metamemory. Our discussion of each principle describes current experimental research underlying the principle and explains how people can take advantage of the principle to improve their learning. The techniques that we suggest are designed to increase efficiency—that is, to allow a person to learn more, in the same unit of study time, than someone using less efficient memory strategies. A common thread uniting all four principles is that people learn best when they are active participants in their own learning.

The First Planetary Microlensing Event with Two Microlensed Source Stars

Bennett, D. P.,Udalski, A.,Han, C.,Bond, I. A.,Beaulieu, J.-P.,Skowron, J.,Gaudi, B. S.,Koshimoto, N.,Abe, F.,Asakura, Y.,Barry, R. K.,Bhattacharya, A.,Donachie, M.,Evans, P.,Fukui, A.,Hirao, Y.,Itow, American Astronomical Society 2018 The Astronomical journal Vol.155 No.3

Wireless sensor networks for underground railway applications: case studies in Prague and London

Bennett, Peter J.,Soga, Kenichi,Wassell, Ian,Fidler, Paul,Abe, Keita,Kobayashi, Yusuke,Vanicek, Martin Techno-Press 2010 Smart Structures and Systems, An International Jou Vol.6 No.5

There is increasing interest in using structural monitoring as a cost effective way of managing risks once an area of concern has been identified. However, it is challenging to deploy an effective, reliable, large-scale, long-term and real-time monitoring system in an underground railway environment (subway / metro). The use of wireless sensor technology allows for rapid deployment of a monitoring scheme and thus has significant potential benefits as the time available for access is often severely limited. This paper identifies the critical factors that should be considered in the design of a wireless sensor network, including the availability of electrical power and communications networks. Various issues facing underground deployment of wireless sensor networks will also be discussed, in particular for two field case studies involving networks deployed for structural monitoring in the Prague Metro and the London Underground. The paper describes the network design, the radio propagation, the network topology as well as the practical issues involved in deploying a wireless sensor network in these two tunnels.

Application of computers to Cave Surveying

Bennett, A.J. The Speleological Society 1997 Journal of the speleological society of korea Vol.5 No.2

The reduction of cave survey data is an essentially straightforward but repetitive mathematical task which can be carried out to advantage using virtually any type of computer from a programmable calculator upwards. The obvious benefits are speed and accuracy in reducing and adjusting the raw data to obtain the x,y,z coordinates (eastings, northings and elevations) of the surveyed points. Additionally, depending on the functionality of the software (program) and power of the hardware (computer), the user may be able to build up a data base of surveys, plot out on paper scaled plans and elecations of the cave and possibly even see a three-dimensional model of the cave, in perspective or some other projection, as an aid to understanding the spatial relationships of cave passages.(omitted)

The Shamrock and the Maple Leaf : Yeats and Canadian Modernist Poetry

Bennett Yu-Hsiang Fu 한국예이츠학회 2016 한국예이츠 저널 Vol.51 No.-

캐나다 시의 정원에 뿌려진 씨앗 중에서 예이츠가 1차세계대전 이후의 캐나다의 대표적 시인들과 문학운동에 미친 직간접적 영향은 무시할 수 없다. 이 논문 은 아직 예이츠 연구분야에서 잘 다루어지지 않은 예이츠의 북미 강연여행(1903-4년)의 흔적 을 찾고자 한다. 그리고 캐나다 본연의 목소리를 내고자 하는 작가들에게 캐나 다의 몇몇 도시에서 행한 예이츠의 강연이 어떤 영감을 주는 지 연구할 것이다. G.D. 로버츠와 블리스 카먼의 작품에서처럼 예이츠와 그의 작품에 대한 수많은 비유와 비 교점은 캐나다의 시에 깊이 베어있다. 시의 요람으로서 캐나다 남부와 몬트리올의 맥 길대은 캐나다의 모더니스트 시인들을 생산하는데, 스미스를 대표로 하는 맥길그룹은 A.J.M 스미스와 F.R. 스콧이 편집하는 맥길 격주 리뷰 와 같은 군소 문예지를 통해 서 캐나다의 시에 체계적인 모더니즘 운동을 소개한다. 특히 스미스는 이전의 캐나다 의 시 기법에 아일랜드의 모더니스트적 기법을 녹여서 시의 혁신을 가져온다. 스미스 자신의 작품은 시작법과 강한 어조는 쉽게 예이츠의 시를 연상시킨다. 이 논문은 예이 츠와 아일랜드 문예부흥운동이 캐나다의 모더니스트 시 운동에 미친 가닥을 찾아서 문학의 직물을 짜고자 한다. Of all the seeds breeding Canadian poetry to the literary garden, Yeats’s direct and indirect influences on representative post-WWI poets and literary movements in Canada cannot be dismissed. This essay attempts to trace Yeats’s North American lecture tours (1903-4), still quite unremarked in Yeats Studies, and to examine how these lectures in some Canadian cities inspired the writers still striving to find a national, poetic voice. As in the works of G.D. Roberts and Bliss Carman, countless allusions and deliberate references to Yeats and his work pervade the Confederation verses. The literary cradle in Lower Canada, McGill University in Montreal, produced influential Canadian modernist poets, the McGill Group with Smith as a representative, with programmatic introductions of modernism into Canadian poetry in small magazines and literary journals such as McGill Fortnightly Review, edited by A.J.M. Smith and F. R. Scott. Smith particularly infuses the previous Confederation style with Irish modernist techniques into the poetic innovation. Smith’s own work is highly reminiscent of Yeats for the Yeatsian principle of versification and fervent speeches. This essay thus aims to pick up these threads and weave onto the literary fabric the Canadian modernist verse influenced by Yeats’s work and the Irish literary renaissance.

Sp(4) gauge theory on the lattice: towards SU(4)/Sp(4) composite Higgs (and beyond)

Bennett, Ed,Hong, Deog Ki,Lee, Jong-Wan,Lin, C.-J. David,Lucini, Biagio,Piai, Maurizio,Vadacchino, Davide Institute of Physics Pub 2018 The journal of high energy physics Vol.2018 No.3

미국의 시각에서 바라 본 한미동맹

Bennett, Bruce W. 한국전략문제연구소 2001 전략연구 Vol.8 No.3

한미동맹은 미국이 맺고 있는 동맹관계 가운데 가장 긴밀한 것의 하나이다. 현재 한국에는 독일과 일본 다음으로 많은 수의 미군 병력이 주둔하고 있으며,(주일미군은 주한미군보다 약간 더 많을 뿐이다) 미군전력은 한국군과 함께 북한의 침략을 억지하고 있다. 북한이 공격을 감행하는 사태가 발생 한다면 60만 명의 미국인이 한국과 함께 싸울 것이다. 하지만, 한국이 북한과 화해를 향하야 나아가고 있음에 따 라 한미동맹의 미래에 대한 궁금증이 생겨나고 있다. 한국의 김대중 대통령은 통일 이후에도 미군이 계속 주둔해야 한다고 항상 강조하야 왔지만, 미군 주둔의 필요성 또는 미군의 지속 적인 주둔이 미국에게 주는 이익 등을 명확히 설명하지는 않았다. 반면, 어떤 이들은 북한과의 화해가 이루어짐에 따라 북 한의 위협은 사라졌으며, 따라서 한반도에 미군은 더 이상 펼 요하지 않고 속히 철수되어야 하며 한미동맹은 종결되어야 한다고 말한다. 2000년 남북정상회담 이후로 한국어 N 는 민족주의와 자주성을 지향하는 분위기가 고조되고 있으며, 몇몇 한국인들이 미국 중심주의적인 동맹을 탈피하기를 바라고 있다. 본 보고서는 한미동맹의 미래에 대한 중요한 질 문틀 몇 가지를 답하고자 한다. 한반도에서 화해의 과정이 진행된다면 한미동맹은 어떠한 형태를 가지고 얼마나 지속되어야 하는 것인가? 동맹이 더 이상 필요없다는 주장은 옳은가? 만약 필요하다면 왜 그런가? 화해가 진전되는 과정에서 한미동맹이 지속 되어야 한다는 근거(reason)는 어떻게 변해갈 것인가? 이러한 근거는 한국에 전방전개된 마군전력의 규모와 종류에 대해 어떠한 의미를 지니는가? 이러한 질문에 답함에 있어서 저자는 미국정부가 아닌 개인적인 견해를 밝히는 것이다. The U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK) is one of the closest U.S. alliances. But the ROK appears to be on a path toward reconciliation with North Korea, leading many to wonder about the future of the alliance. ROK President Kim Dae-Jung has consistently argued that U.S. forces should remain in Korea even after Korean unification, but has not clearly identified the needs he sees for U.S. forces or why the United States should be interested in such a continued deployment. This paper will address some of the key questions about the future of the ROK/U.S. alliance. I. The ROK-U.S. Alliance, Past and Present The ROK-U.S. relationship began after World War II. The North Korean invasion of the ROK in 1950 solidified the alliance. Total U.S. military personnel stationed in Korea are about 36,000 today. The Bush Administration is still in the process of formulating its military strategy, and issues such as the U.S. desires for the ROK/U.S. alliance will emerge from the chosen military strategy. II. ROK and U.S. Interests in an Alliance The ROK/U.S. alliance reflects shared interests of the ROK and the United States for regional stability in Northeast Asia and security for the Republic of Korea. While the ROK is clearly most concerned about its own security, the United States focuses as much on regional stability and also values the ability to project military power from Korean bases. To achieve these interests, both the ROK and the United States pay certain prices. Clearly, both Koreans and Americans need a better vision for the purposes of the alliance and the benefits it provides to each side. III. Options for the ROK Military Post-Unification The character of Korea in the future and of the ROK military in particular will fundamentally affect Korean interest in and need for a future alliance with the United States. The current U.S.-dominated, counter-North Korean alliance would change to one with significant ROK control and a regional orientation. Post-unification, there is a wide range of force structures that could be adopted by Korea. It is important to compare these structures in terms of military functions and risks, and in terms of potential costs. Post-unification, the ROK will not want to identify one or more of its neighbors as an adversary against which to do military planning. Instead, Korea will likely want to size its forces in the future to achieve a regional military balance. In the broad aggregate, Korea would want sufficient force to balance its neighbor's forces near its borders while avoiding military forces that threaten its neighbors. We postulate, for example, that Korea should have about one-third of Chinese capabilities, one-quarter of Russian capabilities, and somewhat greater capabilities than the Japanese. IV. The Alliance in the Interim Regardless of Korea's potential long-term interest in a U.S. alliance, does Korea need to continue the alliance through the current reconciliation period? The answer to this question rests on one's assessment of the North Korean military threat and how it may change over time. The bottom-line is that regardless of the intentions of Kim long-Il, a failure to reduce North Korean military power will leave the ROK vulnerable to catastrophe in any of several forms, a condition that should be unacceptable to the ROK. While Korean unification by ROK absorption of the North makes great sense in the ROK, it must be viewed as totally unacceptable to those with power in North Korea. Kim long-II must be pursuing a different kind of unification. Clearly, the long-stated North Korean goal has been unification of the peninsula on North Korean terms, likely via North Korean conquest of the ROK, though perhaps through a sequence of coercions. To reach it, he would require a short-term objective to "muddle through" the current economic difficulties, and several medium-term objectives: 1) Break the ROK/U.S. alliance (leading to removal of U.S. forces from Korea and perhaps from the entire region), 2) Rebuild North Korean economic capabilities, 3) Build North Korean international recognition and support. If these are truly North Korea's objectives, then the implications for the ROK/U.S. alliance are clear. First, North Korea still poses a military threat to the ROK from both a capabilities and an intent perspective, and therefore a strong ROK/U.S. alliance is absolutely necessary to deter a North Korean attack or to defend against it should it occur. While it may eventually be possible to reduce U.S. forces in Korea to some extent, any major U.S. force reduction before unification could undermine deterrence. Second, in the short-term, North Korea would likely treat even a modest reduction of the U.S. forces in Korea or any other "reduction" of the alliance as proof that its current policies are working, and that it need not pursue arms control or military tension reductions to continue toward its objectives. Until North Korea agrees to and implements military tension reductions and then arms control, U.S. forces in Korea should not be reduced by even modest amounts. Finally, any reduction of U.S. forces in Korea is probably not reversible in the next several years. Therefore, the ROK and the United States need to determine roughly what U.S. forces would be required in the ROK post-unification and move toward such force levels through the reconciliation period. V. Alternative Unifications The actual character of the ROK military, and therefore the military assistance the ROK will need from its alliance with the United States, will be a function of the type and course of unification. We have assumed above a baseline future in which the ROK absorbs the North. But other paths to unification could also occur. Interestingly, most of these appear more plausible than a highly peaceful unification by ROK absorption of the North. But the political outcomes in several of the cases lead to a situation where the ROK/U.S. alliance may be dropped for at least some period of time, and as argued earlier it may never recover thereafter. VI. The Future of the Alliance In many ways, the future of the ROK/U.S. alliance is currently dominated by momentum. But it seems far more logical to plan the future based upon the anticipated interests, threats, plans, and needs of each side. After unification, the alliance will be essential in sustaining the security of the ROK and achieving a military balance in Northeast Asia. How large and what kind of U.S. force might be considered for Korea post-unification? This should be determined based upon potential Korean needs and circumstances. Other issues to be addressed would include the transition of the current forces to these proposed forces, the location of U.S. forces, the nature of the U.S./ROK command relationship, and the connection between U.S. forces in Korea and Japan. The transition to this future force structure should likely be completed well before unification, as neither country will likely be prepared to pay large costs for changes after unification(including the costs of displacing or inconveniencing Koreans).

비대칭적 전략과 한국의 군사기획

Bennett, Bruce Wm. 한국전략문제연구소 1999 전략연구 Vol.6 No.1

The recent U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) which reassessed U.S. military strategy in the post-Cold War era argued that adversary asymmetric strategies are a serious threat in the future. While the United States possesses dominant military power along many dimensions, there are also many vulnerabilities that the United States faces which could be used by an adversary to attack U.S. dominance. Asymmetric strategies attack vulnerabilities not appreciated by the victim" (the United States, in this case) or vulnerabilities for which only limited defenses have been organized. The victim's failure to recognize such possibilities leaves that nation largely unprepared to respond to the adversary's attack. Modem warfare demands preparation, from doctrine and force structure to operational concepts and training. In modern warfare with highly technical weapons, full preparations can take years to decades to achieve. Meanwhile, future conflicts may be so short (days or weeks) that countries will be forced to depend upon the military capabilities that they have prepared; even a largely dominant military like the United States could lose conflicts if its preparations do not meet the adversary's threat. The study of asymmetric strategies and their underlying asymmetric threats may thus be critical to the United States and its allies. Not recognizing asymmetric threats, many U.S. experts see few military threats to the United States any more, and thus feel that the U.S. military can continue its draw-down to much lower levels. Similarly, many in Korea believe that after the demise of North Korea, South Korea will no longer face significant military threats; thus, the South Korean military forces could down-size considerably, in part to generate a peace dividend to help cover the costs of reunification. But a more thorough examination of Korea's future suggests that Korean military requirements will almost certainly increase in the immediate aftermath of North Korea's demise, and Korea may face substantial threats even in the long-term. Many of these threats will be asymmetric in character, threats which would attack vulnerabilities not fully appreciated by Korea. A failure to appreciate and prepare for these threats could put Korea and the overall evolution of Northeast Asia at some risk. Korea and the United States must both understand the vulnerabilities that their societies and in particular their militaries have and how adversaries might attack them ; by doing so, these countries can better prepare for future crises and conflicts and hopefully reduce the means available to adversaries to seriously challenge them. The study of asymmetric strategies succeeds if it helps military and political leaders recognize the threats they could face in the future. Korea must still decide what threats it will respond to and hopefully deter and which ones it is prepared to accept. Thinking About the Future for Korea Korea's next several decades will not be just a continuation of the present. Instead, Korea will evolve through three periods: (1) the period of the North Korean threat (with either the current regime or a successor), (2) a transition period toward reunification, and (3) a period where Korea is reunified. The period of the North Korean threat could be far longer than many in the West perceive. Even a civil war or a collapse could lead to a successor regime rather than South Korean control of the North. Indeed, a North Korean attack an the South could also lead to a successor regime if North Korean NBC weapons stop or prevent a counteroffensive. Any successor regime would fundamentally depend upon the North Korean military for support, continuing the North Korean military threat. A transition period toward reunification could develop in ways largely unexpected today. The North Korean national leadership's disappearance or transfer of power to the South Korean government would still leave middle level North Korean leaders, such as corps commanders, with significant power and little incentive to give it up. The corps commanders would anticipate that if they yield authority over their forces to the South Korean government, that government might execute them, jail them, or simply leave them to starve. They may instead establish themselves as a regional warlords or Mafia bosses. North Korea could be divided into perhaps 5 to 10 fiefdoms who would war with each other over the scarce resources in the North. While anxious to conquer and control the warlords, South Korea might be restrained or deterred because the warlords would control tons of CBW and appropriate delivery means to threaten South Korea. North Korean military leaders who decided to become Mafia bosses could easily network into the criminal organizations already established in Northeast Asia, and then spread throughout the region and beyond. They could impose serious costs on any industry attempting to move into North Korea. As they spread into South Korea, they could cripple that economy, compelling the Korean central government to double their efforts to suppress the criminal organizations. China, anticipating these difficulties and anxious for a buffer zone and a say in the eventual Korean resolution, may decide to join CFC in attacking North Korea once the counteroffensive is launched, and occupy much of North Korea above Pyongyang. Korean reunification would occur when the Korean government controls essentially all territory on the Korean peninsula. Korea will not be a fully recovered, vibrant regional force at this time. Rather, Korea will be burdened with feeding the northern population and developing the North's economic infrastructure. Korea would face new challenges with its expanded borders and territory, and its new neighbors. At some point, Korea's neighbors could decide to occupy all or parts of Korea, especially if Korea falls to maintain an adequate military force. And because Korea depends fundamentally an free and Safe trade fur its economic development, an erosion of international law and order may cause an array of new threats to develop in and around Korea. Possible Future Korean Security Threats Across these three periods, Korea's military could face four types of challenges, as shown in <Table 1> : (1) Invasion and territorial control threats, (2) limited attack threats, (3) international efforts, and (4) internal security threats. <Table 1> Possible Future Threats to Korea For example, a North Korean CBW-based invasion threat would likely include several components such as : North Korean artillery would barrage CFC forward ground forces with CW. North Korea would launch CW Scuds against CFC airfields to suppress and destroy CFC combat air forces. and to cause casualties to CFC personnel CW attacks against the airfields and also ports would seriously disrupt U.S. force flow to Korea. North Korea apparently plans to focus CBW attacks an U.S. personnel and civilians, hoping thereby to split the U.S./ROK alliance and convince the United States to disengage from Korea. The bottom-line is that North Korea would hope to use its CBW to reverse the advantages of CFC, thereby allowing its conventional forces to capture South Korea. Even after the demise of North Korea, several of Korea's neighbors could pose similar threats. Implications for Korean Forces No one can say exactly what kinds of threats Korea will face, or when it will face them. Thus, Korea must decide which potential threats it will respond to and how it will respond. Korea will be tempted not to prepare for threats it views as improbable to develop. But the world has consistently shown that events which appear to be of low probability today can become a much higher probability in the future, especially if the event is "courted" by failing to prepare for it. Korea's choice not to prepare for some threats increases the probability that those threats will develop, since those threats will reflect the limited number of remaining Korean vulnerabilities upon which adversaries will focus. Should an adversary develop one of the threats that Korea has Chosen not to prepare for, Korea may not be able to respond to the developing threat in time unless its strategic and operational intelligence are exceptional, because it will take years if not decades to prepare to handle many such threats. Korea will thus find itself squeezed between being adequately prepared for future threats and keeping its military forces and budgets within Limits acceptable to the Korean society. It seems clear that the South Korean military will need to grow significantly during the early part of a transition period. To keep North Korean military personnel occupied until civilian jobs become available, Korea may need to have well over one million men in its military early in a transition period. These extra personnel could assist in securing North Korean territory and manning border control forces that would restrict unwanted refugee flow. The threats of the transition phase could also be reduced by taking actions now to build relationships and trust with North Korean military leaders, and preparing to pay those leaders not to become warlords or Mafia bosses. The Korean military may then decline in size as Korea approaches reunification, with the post-reunification Korean military likely adequate at about 80 percent of current manpower levels. Korea will need to enhance its military's future capabilities, facilitating such key concepts as information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, fall-dimensional protection, and focused logistics, the key concepts of the U.S. Joint Vision 2010. Nevertheless, it will also require allied assistance to support key capabilities such as continuous surveillance, achieving air control, missile defense, and dealing with NBC weapons.