The Role of Managerial Ability on the Relation between SG&A Cost and Future Profitability

Sera Choi(최세라),Jiwon Hyeon(현지원),Sewon Kwon(권세원) 한국경영학회 2018 經營學硏究 Vol.47 No.5

We examine whether managerial ability affects the relation between selling, general, and administrative costs (hereafter, SG&A costs) and future profitability. To operationalize our research question, we employ Baumgarten, Bonenkamp, and Homburg (2010)’s approach in differentiating an increase in the SG&A ratio as managers’ deficient cost control (SG&A cost inefficient firms) versus deliberate investment on input resource (SG&A cost efficient firms), which is intended by the management to improve future performance. Using Korean listed firms from 2000 to 2014, we find that the positive association between changes in SG&A ratio and future operating performance appears only in SG&A cost efficient firms. More importantly, we find that the positive association between changes in SG&A ratio and future operating performance among SG&A-efficient firms is mainly driven by high ability managers. Our findings fill the void in Baumgarten et al. (2010) by providing the evidence that the positive association between an intentional increase in the SG&A ratio and future profitability can be partially explained by high managerial ability.

ATM-PON System 환경에서 매체접근제어 프로토콜의 설계

최세라(Sera Choi),장종욱(Jong-Wook Jang) 한국멀티미디어학회 1998 한국멀티미디어학회 학술발표논문집 Vol.1998 No.2

공익법인의 회계정보가 기부자의 기부의사결정에 미치는 영향 : 예산집행 정보와 회계품질을 중심으로

한승엽 ( Seung-youb Han ),최세라 ( Sera Choi ),양승희 ( Seunghee Yang ),윤소은 ( So-eun Yoon ) 한국회계학회 2019 회계학연구 Vol.44 No.3

본 연구는 공익법인의 예산집행 정보와 회계품질을 중심으로 공익법인의 회계정보가 기부자의 기부의사결정에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 2014년부터 2017년까지 사회복지사업을 영위하는 공익법인을 대상으로 분석한 결과, 전체 비용에서 고유목적사업에 지출된 비용의 비중(즉, 고유목적사업비율)이 높을수록 기부자가 예산집행 적정성을 보다 긍정적으로 평가해 차기 기부금이 유의하게 늘어나는 것으로 확인된다. 다만 회계품질이 낮은 경우 이러한 고유목적사업비율과 차기 기부금 간의 양(+)의 관계가 약화되는 것으로 관측되는 바, 동일한 회계정보라 하더라도 해당 정보의 신뢰성 수준에 따라 기부자의 정보의존도에 편차가 발생하는 것으로 나타난다. 본 연구의 결과는 국내 공익법인의 회계투명성 수준에 대한 그간의 우려에도 불구하고 공익법인의 회계정보가 기부자의 기부의사결정에 유용하게 활용됨으로써 효율적 자원배분을 촉진하는 정보체계로서 효과적으로 기능하고 있음을 시사한다. This study investigates whether accounting information of Korean nonprofit organizations (hereinafter NPO) influences donors’ subsequent-period donation decisions. Analyzing NPOs running social-welfare businesses which account for the largest portion of total donation revenues in Korea for the period 2014-2017, we find that donors perceive NPOs reporting higher program ratios (i.e., the ratio of program expenses to total expenses) as more efficient in budget usage and thus, increase the amount of subsequent-period donation. However, the positive association between program ratio and subsequent-period donation is attenuated for NPOs with low accounting quality, suggesting that donors’ reliance on NPOs’ accounting information varies with the credibility of the information contents. Collectively, our findings indicate that despite the increasing concerns on accounting transparency of Korean NPOs, donors incorporate the two attributes of accounting information - contents and quality - in their decision-making and that the accounting information system functions effectively, contributing to the efficient resource allocation in the nonprofit sector.

기업 경영전략이 신용등급에 미치는 영향

현지원 ( Jiwon Hyeon ),최세라 ( Sera Choi ),안태식 ( Tae-sik Ahn ),권대현 ( Dae-hyun Kwon ) 한국회계학회 2021 회계저널 Vol.30 No.6

본 연구는 기업의 경영전략이 채권신용등급에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 선도형 전략을 취하는 기업은 전략의 특성상 대규모의 자원을 투입해야 하는데, 이는 미래 성과의 높은 불확실성으로 이어진다. 채권투자자들은 고정된 원리금에 대한 청구권만을 갖고 있기에, 전략 성공으로 창출되는 대규모의 이익은 누리지 못하는 반면, 전략 실패로 대규모 손실이 발생할 경우 원리금을 상환 받지 못할 수도 있다. 따라서 선도형 기업의 미래성과 불확실성은 신용위험 예측시에 불리한 요소로 작동될 수 있다. 본 연구는 2000년부터 2016년까지 국내 유가증권시장에 상장된 기업 중 사채 발행 기업을 대상으로 경영전락과 신용등급의 관계를 분석하였다. 먼저 선도형 경영전략을 택한 기업일수록 미래성과의 변동성이 높은지 검증하였는데, 실제로 미래이익 변동성이 방어형 기업보다 선도형 기업에서 더 높았다. 가설 검증 결과, 선도형 경영전략을 택하는 기업일수록 낮은 신용등급을, 방어형 경영전략을 택하는 기업일수록 높은 신용등급을 부여 받았다. 이는 신용평가기관이 선도형 전략이 신용위험을 높이는 것으로 판단한다고 해석될 수 있다. 본 연구는 신용평가기관이 기업의 경영전략 정보를 어떻게 해석하고, 해당 정보를 실제로 신용평가 계산에 고려하는지를 실증적으로 보였다는 점에서 공헌점이 있다. 또한 신용등급의 비재무적·질적 요인에 대한 실증분석을 경영전략으로 확장하였다는 점에서도 의의가 있다. This study investigates the effect of business strategy on credit rating. Defender firms in terms of business strategy focus on efficiency in production and maintain narrow and stable product lines, which results in limited new product development and technology. On the contrary, prospector firms pursue being market innovative leaders and so develop new products and technology, which consequently leads to large investment and so greater uncertainty in future performance. Creditors only receive principal payment and promised interest even when firms generate sufficient cash flows, while they can lose the entire amount when firms cannot generate sufficient cash flows. So, creditors have more concerns about firms’ downside risk than upside potential. Therefore, prospector strategy which are likely to have both downside risk and upside potential is a credit-harming factor. We conduct empirical analysis, using Korean listed firms from 2000 to 2016. First, we examine whether prospector firms have more volatile future performance which underlies our hypothesis development, and find prospector firms having greater uncertainty of future performance. In our main analysis, we provide evidence that prospector firms have lower credit rating than defender firms, consistent with our prediction. This study contributes to prior literature in showing whether and how business strategy affects credit ratings and suggesting business strategy as one of nonfinancial factors which affect credit ratings.

A full Copper foam heat pipe for a higher heat absorbing capacity

Chengqin Yu(유청천),Sera Choi(최세라),Tongbeum Kim(김동범),Kiju Kang(강기주) 대한기계학회 2021 대한기계학회 춘추학술대회 Vol.2021 No.06

구리 폼을 이용한 열흡수체 제조 방법

이용주(Yong Joo Lee),최세라(Sera Choi),강기주(Kiju Kang) 대한기계학회 2021 대한기계학회 춘추학술대회 Vol.2021 No.06

재벌의 소유구조와 원가 하방탄력성: 중핵기업을 중심으로

황이석 ( Lee-seok Hwang ),이문영 ( Moony Lee ),최세라 ( Sera Choi ) 한국회계학회 2018 회계학연구 Vol.43 No.4

선행연구에서는 재벌기업이 비재벌기업에 비해 원가 하방경직성이 완화됨을 보인 바 있다. 본 연구는 재벌기업의 소유구조를 중심으로 어떤 속성이 원가 하방탄력성을 유도하는지 분석한다. 우선 재벌 소유구조에서 계열사 지분을 많이 보유하고 있어 중심에 위치한 중핵기업은 해당 기업의 경제적 이익과는 무관한 그룹총괄 역할도 수행하므로 원가 하방경직성이 커질 수 있다. 그러나 중핵기업은 그룹지배에 핵심적인 역할을 하므로 지배주주가 경영권을 안정적으로 확보할 목적으로 재무구조를 건전하게 유지하여 원가 하방경직성이 완화될 수도 있다. 또한 소유지배괴리가 큰 기업은 제국건설과 같은 기회주의적 행위로 하방 경직성이 심화될 수 있으나, 재무정보를 오도하려는 이익조정 결과로 하방 탄력적일 수 있다. 반면 지배주주의 소유권이 높으면 대리인문제가 해소되어 원가 하방경직성이 완화될 수 있으나, 장기적 관점의 투자의사결정으로 인해 원가 하방경직성이 강화될 수도 있다. 본 연구는 2001년부터 2014년까지 한국 재벌 상장기업을 표본으로 소유구조와 원가 비대칭성을 분석하였다. 소유구조는 그룹 전체 소유구조에서 중심에 위치하는 정도인 중핵도와 소유지배괴리 그리고 지배주주의 소유권을 측정하였다. 원가는 총원가, 매출원가, 판매관리비, 인건비, 광고선전비, 연구개발비로 세분하였다. 분석결과, 전반적으로 중핵도가 높을수록 원가는 하방탄력적이었으나, 소유지배괴리와 소유권은 원가 비대칭성과 유의한 관계가 없었다. 추가로 중핵도와 원가 하방탄력성이 이익조정 결과인지 확인하기 위해 중핵도와 이익조정의 관계를 분석하였으나 유의한 관계를 발견하지 못하였다. 따라서 재벌기업의 원가 하방경직성 완화 현상은 중핵기업에서 비롯된 것이며, 중핵도가 높으면 재무건전성을 높이기 위하여 수요하락 시 자원을 유연하게 조정하기 때문인 것으로 볼 수 있다. 본 연구는 선행연구를 재벌의 소유구조와 원가행태에 대한 이해를 높였다는 공헌점이 있다. Prior research finds that chaebol firms are less cost-sticky than non-chaebol firms. This paper further investigates the association between chaebol’s ownership structure and cost asymmetry. In particular, central firms of a business group may retain resources which are not related to their own performance but necessary to control the group, leading to sticky cost behavior. In contrast, as central firms are critical for controlling shareholders to keep control over the group, they may need to decrease financial risk, resulting in cost downward elasticity. Using the sample of listed chaebol firms in Korea for 2001 to 2014, we examine ownership structure and cost asymmetry. Ownership structure is measured by centrality, ownership and ownership-control disparity. Costs are divided into cost of goods sold, selling, general and administrative (SG&A) cost, labor cost, advertising cost, and research and development (R&D) cost. We find that, overall, as centrality increases, costs exhibit downward elasticity. However, neither ownership-control disparity nor ownership are associated with cost asymmetry. In addition, we find that centrality is not associated with earnings management, ruling out the possibility that the relation between centrality and cost elasticity is driven by income manipulation. Therefore, we conclude that central firms drive anti-cost stickiness of chaebol firms as they manage resources in a flexible way to improve financial stability. This paper contributes to the literature by enhancing the understanding of chaebol’ ownership structure and cost behavior.

재벌기업의 비대칭적 원가행태에 대한 연구

신재용(Jae Yong Shin),황인이(Iny Hwang),권세원(Sewon Kwon),최세라(Sera Choi) 한국경영학회 2016 經營學硏究 Vol.45 No.6

This paper investigates whether and how the degree of SG&A cost stickiness differs between chaebol and non-chaebol firms in Korea. The unique feature among Korean firms is the prevalence of large business groups called chaebols and, the differential natures between chaebol and non-chaebol firms drive cost behavior to diverge between two groups. The ownership structure of chaebol firms is characterized by the dominance of single largest shareholder and his family members who typically participate in the management of the firm directly or indirectly and influence most of the importance management decisions. Moreover, the dominant owner plays an influential role in deciding whether to promote the managers or how much to reward based upon the performance of managers. Thus, such monitoring mechanism brought out by unique ownership structure of chaebol system suppresses managers’empirebuilding incentives, a particular Type Ⅰ agency problem, which are known to drive sticky cost behavior as in Chen, Lu and Sougiannis(2012). Under this agency perspective, chaebol firms may have lower degree of cost stickiness compared to non-chaebol firms. To further extent, the agency problems for chaebol firms are not merely on the conflicts of interests between shareholders and managers (Type Ⅰ agency problems) but, also concentrated on the conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders (Type Ⅱ agency problems). Therefore, the differential agency problem among chaebol firms may result in different cost behavior, relative to non-chaebol firms. Although a few literature attempt to examine the cost behavior of chaebol firms, the empirical results have been mixed. We revisit the link between chaebol and cost stickiness in order to resolve inconclusive findings. Based on a comprehensive dataset of Korean firms listed in KOSPI market from 2001 to 2013, we empirically find that the degree of cost stickiness is on average, lower in chaebol firms than in non-chaebol firms, even exhibiting anti-sticky behavior. We further conduct several cross-sectional analyses to examine the effect of firm size and corporate governance (e.g. board independence, the existence of controlling owner as a board member) on chaebol firms’ cost behavior. First, the anti-stickiness in chaebol firms is more prevalent when the firm size is small. Large chaebol firms must bear political costs induced by high media attention making them difficult to divest the resources in response to sales changes whereas, small chaebol firms can have more flexibility in resource adjustments, resulting in a lower degree of cost stickiness. Second, in terms of corporate governance, the anti-stickiness in chaebol firms is more prevalent when the firm has a higher degree of corporate board independence or a controlling owner as a board member. Because good corporate governance measured by board independence effectively monitors managers’ perverse incentives (i.e. empire-building incentives) in addition to controlling owners monitoring managers, less sticky behavior is presented among firms with an independent board. Apart from board independence, the existence of a controlling owner as a board member also reduces the agency problems between shareholders and managers thus, results in a lower degree of cost stickiness. Our study makes several important contributions to the accounting literature. First, we increase the understanding of chaebol firms, in particular how chaebols adjust the resources committed to activities. We contrast the cost stickiness of chaebol versus non-chaebol firms to articulate the differential cost management of chabols compared to non-chaebols. Second, cross-sectional analyses provide further implications on the effects of firm size and corporate governance on differential cost stickiness between chaebol and non-chaebol firms. Lastly, we converge cost behavior studies, which is the primary stream of research in manag