한국기업금융시장에서 기업간신용의 이론적 분석

정병욱(Byung Uk Chong) 한국경영학회 2009 經營學硏究 Vol.38 No.1

Trade credit is a non-bank financing offered by a supplier to finance the purchase of its product. Trade credit is one of the important sources of debt financing which can substitute bank loan. Trade credit is prevailing among riskier borrowers, competing with bank loan in corporate loan market. The prevalence of trade credit implies that there exist mutual economic benefits for both suppliers and buyers from transacting trade credits even though the default rate of trade credits is much higher than that of bank loans. This paper models the economic incentive for product suppliers to offer trade credits to riskier borrowing firms which might not be able to obtain financing from conventional and specialized financial institutions such as banks. When the product market is imperfect, a product supplier can obtain additional price-cost margin by increasing the sale of products. That is, there is a gain to offering trade credits to facilitate the purchase of inputs to riskier borrowing firms who cannot obtain bank financing. Therefore, trade credits service riskier borrowing firms than bank loans in the corporate loan market. Trade credit model is mainly based on the imperfect structure of product market in that suppliers would otherwise have no incentive to sell its product on trade credit. Borrowing firms would be indifferent between different financing sources if there exist perfect substitutes in the corporate loan market. In such an economy, the suppliers achieve no benefits by offering trade credits while firms can borrow at competitive interest rates from conventional financial institutions (banks) in the corporate loan market. Thus, the economic investigation of trade credits needs to be based on the imperfectness either in the financial market or in the product market or both. Incorporating the analytical and empirical outcomes of the previous studies, this paper provides a unique theoretical model where trade credits service riskier borrowers than bank loans in the corporate loan market. This paper models the equilibrium in the monopolistically competitive market where firms need to buy inputs to conduct business projects. Then, the model in this paper links the monopolistically competitive input market and the perfectly competitive loan market to characterize the prominence and features of trade credit when a firm’s purchase of input requires financing. Further, this paper applies the model to corporate loan market in Korea to investigate the effect of trade credit and internal transfer price on tunneling in Korean business groups(chaebols). This paper shows that the internal transaction between the firms within a chaebol can transfer the value of a firm to another firm through the high interest rate on trade credit combined with high transfer price of the product. In this tunneling, the firm on which owner-managers and/or controlling shareholders have dominant cash flow rights exploits the value of minority shareholders of the firm which purchases the product at high internal transfer price on trade credit with high interest rate. As a consequence, the controlling shareholders of chaebols in Korea can obtain private benefits through internal transactions on trade credits. This theoretical prediction is appropriate to explain possible agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders of chaebol firms in Korea. The model in this paper provides a simple tool that can be used to investigate a unique corporate governance arrangements and resulting tunneling in Korean chaebols. As another extension for corporate finance practice in Korea, this paper models that the introduction of credit insurance increases the availability of trade credits for small businesses while improving profitability of product suppliers. It is widely known that financial markets in Korea are not developed enough to allocate funds efficiently to small businesses, which can easily be caught into financial distress and resulting

여신전문금융의 경제적 특성과 금융시장의 특화구조

정병욱 ( Byung Uk Chong ) 한국금융학회 2009 금융연구 Vol.23 No.1

본 연구는 여신전문금융 생성의 경제적 유인과 금융시장의 특화구조를 설명하는 이론적 모형을 제시한다. 생산물 시장의 독점적 구조로 존재하는 양(+)의 마크업이 제품과 금융의 結合販賣의 요인이 되며 여신전문금융을 통한 제품의 추가판매와 이윤확대를 위하여 생산기업의 계열사인 여신전문금융회사는 채무불이행위험이 높은 제품 구매자에게 신용을 제공할 경제적 유인을 갖는다. 제품판매와 여신의 結合利潤의 극대화 과정에서 여신전문금융의 낮은 여신심사기준이 설명되며 여신전문금융이 은행금융에 비해 평균적으로 채무불이행위험이 높은 차입자들에게 제공된다는 정형화된 사실을 이론화한다. 또한, 여신전문금융에 부과되는 추가금리를 이론화하여 庶民金融으로서 여신전문금융에 가산되는 위험프리미엄을 분석하고 금융기관과 차입자 간의 자기유인적 선택메카니즘의 구조를 이론화한다. Credit-specialized financial companies in Korea are non-deposit-taking/non-bank lending institutions specializing in high default-risk segment in financial market. The credit-specialized financial companies in Korea are equivalent to finance companies in USA, which are affiliated to manufacturers, such as General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Ford Credit, and Toyota Financial Services. The examples of credit-specialized financial companies in Korea are Hyundai Capital, Daewoo Capital, and RCI Korea. This paper analyzes specialization structure of financial market by modeling the differential lending policy of credit-specialized financial companies competing with banks. The theoretical model in this paper focuses on the lending behavior of credit-specialized financial companies which are affiliated to manufacturing companies. In doing so, this paper theorizes the stylized fact in lending practices that credit-specialized financial companies set lower credit standard than commercial banks to increase the sales and profits of their affiliated manufacturers by offering loans to high default-risk borrowers who cannot obtain loans from commercial banks. For theoretical modeling, this paper applies the concept of adverse selection and screening under asymmetric information in financial market. To explain the specialization structure with credit-specialized financing when bank financing is already available in competitive financial market, this paper models the combination of sale of products by manufacturer and financing by credit-specialized financial company, which are affiliated to each other. Since a monopolistic manufacturer can generate positive marginal mark-up by additional sale of its product, the producer and its credit-specialized financial company can expand the sale of products by offering credits to borrowers who have high default-risk and hence cannot obtain loans from commercial banks. Due to the positive marginal mark-up, it is possible that the monopolistic producer and its credit-specialized financial company increase joint profits of selling products and offering loans while the positive incremental profits from selling more products subsidizes the losses from offering loans. Further, this paper extends the basic setup of the model by incorporating risk premium into credit-specialized financing, which separates the financial market into two segments-bank financing and credit-specialized financing. The lower credit standard and the higher loan rate of credit-specialized financing establish the self-selection mechanism in financial market. While high default-risk borrowers paying higher cost of debt, they will select credit specialized financing because of higher chance of obtaining credits. The resulting outcome is specialization structure of financial market by bank financing and credit-specialized financing based on the riskiness of borrowers and their incentive compatible selection of financing instruments. Credit-specialized financial company specializes in high default-risk segment while commercial banks do in low default-risk segment in competitive financial market. This paper presents a unique theoretical model which investigates economic features of credit-specialized financing and successfully analyzes the risk-based specialization structure of financial market with two different types of financial institutions-commercial bank and credit-specialized financial company.

한국 경제에서 신용등급이 차입기업의 영업부채 활용에 미치는 영향

정병욱(Byung-Uk Chong),황인덕(In-Deok Hwang) 한국경제연구학회 2014 한국경제연구 Vol.32 No.1

본 연구는 기업의 내재가치와 위험을 지표하는 신용등급이 차업기업의 영업부채 활용에 미치는 영향을 실증적으로 분석한다. 실증결과는 한국 경제에서 영업부채가 저신용등급 중소기업과 고신용등급 대기업이 모두 활용하는 자금조달원임을 제시한다. 또한 기업의 영업부채 활용도는 기업규모, 지배구조(재벌기업 여부), 재무특성, 영업특성 등의 다양한 요인에 의하여 결정됨을 분석한다. 특히, 판매되는 제품ㆍ서비스의 특성에 의하여 형성되는 경쟁환경 하에서 업종별로 영업부채의 활용이 상이하게 결정됨을 분석한다. 본 연구의 실증결과는 정보비대칭하의 금융계약에서 차입기업은 자신의 위험유형을 신호하고 자금공급자는 차입기업을 선별ㆍ분리하는 도구로서 신용등급을 활용함을 제시한다. 이와 같은 결과는 신용등급이 기업의 자금조달에 있어서 정보비대칭 문제를 완화함을 보여주는 것이며, 신용평가는 시장기능에 기초한 자금의 배분효율성을 강화할 수 있는 제도적 장치가 될 수 있음을 함의한다. This paper investigates how credit rating affects the determination of trade credit usage in short-term debt market of Korean economy. This paper shows that trade credit is prevailing among riskier borrowing firms while also providing evidence that, among sample firms with high credit ratings, as credit rating increases, the usage of trade credit increases. This paper also finds that various aspects of a firm such as size, governance, financial structure, and product characteristics are key determinants of trade credit usage. Empirical results of this paper imply that, under information asymmetry in the short-term debt market, credit rating plays the key role both for screening device of lender and signaling device of borrower. Hence, credit rating system can mitigate information asymmetry problem resulting in the improvement of efficiency in allocation of funds in short-term debt market of Korean economy.

금융시장의 신용할당하에서 캐피탈금융의 계약이론적 분석

정병욱(Byung-Uk Chong),강명주(Myung-Ju Kang) 한국경제연구학회 2009 한국경제연구 Vol.25 No.-

본 논문은 금융중개 연구에 있어서 정보비대칭하의 계약이론모형을 확장하여 상업은행과 캐피탈회사가 차입자의 채무불이행 위험에 따라서 여신시장을 세분화함을 이론적으로 분석한다. 정보비대칭하의 경쟁적인 금융시장에서 독립적인 상업은행과 제조업계열 비예금수취 여신전문금융기관인 캐피탈회사가 각각 분리여신계약과 공동여신계약을 제공하여 경쟁하고 채무불이행 위험이 차별적인 차입자군에 특화하여 금융시장의 위험분할을 구조화함을 역선택모형을 확장하여 분석한다. 특히, 높은 여신이자율과 여신허용률의 캐피탈금융 공동계약은 채무불이행 위험이 높은 차입자들을 주요 대상으로 하는 금융수단임을 분석한다. 본 연구는 캐피탈회사의 구조적 특성이 제조업부문의 시장불완전성으로 인하여 발생하는 가격할증을 경제적 유인으로 하여 제품판매와 여신의 결합이윤을 극대화하는 것임을 분석한다. 제조업계열 캐피탈회사는 높은 허용률의 여신계약을 제공하여 잠재적 제품구매자의 신용제약을 완화해 줌으로써 결합이윤을 증가시키며 상업은행과 경쟁하고 채무불이행 위험이 높은 부문에 특화하여 높은 여신금리를 부과하고 금융시장을 세분화한다. 따라서 본 연구의 이론모형은 캐피탈회사가 금융시장에서 채무불이행 위험이 상대적으로 높은 부문에 특화하여 영업한다는 금융실무의 정형화된 사실과 기존 실증연구의 결과를 잘 설명한다. This paper extends a screening model in financial intermediation and provides a model for the choice of financing sources between bank financing and capital financing in Korean financial market. This paper incorporates the positive price-cost margin of a seller in monopolistic product market into the equilibrium loan contracts in competitive loan market and examines borrower's choice of different financing sources. When the additional sale of product extracts positive price-cost margin due to monopolistic structure of product market, a credit specialized financial company (capital company) offers a pooling loan contract with higher loan rate and approval rate to expand profits while packaging the sale of product and financing. Commercial banks offer separating low-and high-risk loan contracts. A low-risk borrower is indifferent between bank separating low-risk loan contract and capital pooling loan contract while a high-risk borrower strictly prefers capital pooling loan contract to bank separating high-risk loan contract. Hence, this paper successfully explains the prevailing wisdom in lending practices that capital companies service a riskier pool of borrowers, offering more lenient loan approval rates and higher loan rates, than banks do.

기업자금조달에 관한 한국과 호주 기업의 국제비교연구

정병욱(Byung-Uk Chong) 한국무역학회 2010 貿易學會誌 Vol.35 No.4

재무제약이 기업의 단기자금 조달수단 조정에 미치는 영향

정병욱(Byung Uk Chong),황인덕(In Deok Hwang) 한국경영학회 2014 한국경영학회 통합학술발표논문집 Vol.2014 No.8

본 연구는 재무제약이 기업의 단기자금 조달방식 선택에 미치는 영향을 실증적으로 분석한다. 기업의 단기자금 조달방식은 단기은행차입, 기업어음, 기업간신용 등으로 분류된다. 본 연구는 이들 단기자금 조달수단 중 기업의 재무제약이 기업간신용 선택에 미치는 영향을 추정하여 기업간신용이 단기은행차입 및 기업어음에 대하여 대체성 또는 보완성을 갖는지 실증한다. 본 연구에서 기업의 재무제약 지표로 레버리지, 배당여부, 배당성향, 현금보유비율, K-Z 지수, 이자보상배율 등의 변수가 추정에 포함되었다. 실증결과는 대부분의 제무제약 지표에 있어서 기업간신용 조달비중의 증가가 추정되어 기업간신용이 재무제약 기업의 금융시장 접근성 제약을 완화할 수 있으며 단기은행차입과 기업어음에 대하여 대체성을 가짐을 제시한다. This paper investigates how various aspects of firm-level financial distress affect the adjustment of trade credit usage in short-term debt financing in Korea. There is a generalnotion that trade credit is considerably more expensive than short-term bank financing (revolving line) and commercial paper, as trade credit is preferred by the firms facing obstacles to obtain financing from banks and capital market. In corporate debt financing, it is prevailing wisdom that the reliance on trade credit increases with the degree of financial distress. This paper confirms this and shows that bilateral trade credit debt contract is substitute for bank revolving line and commercial paper, which are all market-based financing instrument. This paper also provides finding that trade credit is pro-cyclical in Korea.

재무제약이 기업의 단기자금 조달방식에 미치는 영향

정병욱(Byung Uk Chong),황인덕(In Deok Hwang) 한국경영학회 2014 한국경영학회 통합학술발표논문집 Vol.2014 No.8

본 연구는 재무제약이 기업의 단기자금 조달방식 선택에 미치는 영향을 실증적으로 분석한다. 기업의 단기자금 조달방식은 단기은행차입, 기업어음, 기업간신용 등으로 분류된다. 본 연구는 이들 단기자금 조달수단 중 기업의 재무제약이 기업간신용 선택에 미치는 영향을 실증하여 기업간신용이 단기은행차입 및 기업어음에 대하여 대체성 또는 보완성을 갖는지 실증한다. 본 연구에서 기업의 재무제약 지표로 레버리지, 배당여부, 배당성향, 현금보유비율, K-Z 지수, 이자보상배율 등의 변수가 추정에 포함되었다. 실증결과는 대부분의 제무제약 지표에있어서 기업간신용 활용도가 더 높은 것으로 나타나 기업간신용이 재무제약 기업의 금융시장 접근성 제약을 완화할 수 있으며 단기은행차입과 기업어음에 대하여 대체성을 가짐을 제시한다. This paper investigates how firm-level financial distress affects the adjustment of trade credit usage in short-term debt financing in Korean. There is a general notion that trade credit is considerably more expensive than short-term bank financing(revolving line) and commercial paper, as trade credit is preferred by the firms facing obstacles to obtain financing from banks and capital market. In corporate debt financing, it is prevailing wisdom that the reliance on trade credit increases with the degree of financial distress. This paper confirms this and shows that bilateral trade credit debt contract is substitute for bank revolving line and commercial paper, which are all market-based financing instrument. This paper also provides finding that trade credit is pro-cyclical in Korea.

신디케이트 기업금융의 구조와 위험프리미엄의 결정에 관한 연구

정병욱(Byung-Uk Chong),장유식(Yoo-Shik Jang) 한국무역학회 2011 貿易學會誌 Vol.36 No.1

독점적 경쟁 생산물 시장에서 기업의 생산물 및 금융의 결합판매에 관한 연구: 이론모형 및 시뮬레이션 분석

정병욱(Chong, Byung-Uk) 한국산업경제학회 2021 산업경제연구 Vol.34 No.6

본 연구는 독점적 경쟁 생산물 시장에서 존재하는 양(+)의 한계이윤으로 기업이 생산물의 판매확대를 위하여 생산물과 금융을 결합판매 하는 행태를 이론적으로 모형화 한다. 생산물의 구매를 위하여 구매자는 자금의 차입을 필요로 하며 독립적인 금융기관 여신 또는 생산물을 생산 · 판매하는 기업이 제공하는 생산자금융을 통하여 자금을 차입하는 모형을 분석한다. 또한 본 연구는 생산자금융이 생산물 판매와 결합될 때 독점적 경쟁 생산물 시장의 균형을 분석하며 생산자가 제공하는 금융이 제품차별화와 경제적 후생에 미치는 영향을 모형화하고 시뮬레이션을 통하여 모형의 정합성을 검증한다. 시장전반의 후생분석에 있어서 생산자금융은 독점적 경쟁 산업 내에서 경쟁 및 후생 수준 결정에 내생적으로 영향을 미치는 요인으로 작동함을 보여준다. 생산자금융 도입으로 생산기업수와 구매자수가 증가되는 것은 차별화된 상품 및 서비스가 생산 · 판매되는 독점적 경쟁시장에서 경제적 후생 증가의 유효한 척도가 된다. This paper models the bundle sales of differentiated product and vendor financing by monopolistically competitive firm. In monopolistically competitive product market, there exists positive marginal profits due to imperfect market structure, which may incentivize the bundle sales of product and financing to expand sales amounts of products for more profits. When monopolistically competitive firm offers the bundle sale of product and vendor financing, the equilibrium in the product market is affected by such a provision of vendor financing. Particularly, the price of differentiated product decreases, the number of product firms increases, and the number of buyers increases in the product market equilibrium with the bundle sales of product and vendor financing. The bundle sales of product and financing enable the firms to exercise price discrimination while they may extract additional surplus. In aggregate, the effects of bundle sales result in the increase in the economic welfare as shown in the simulations.

신용평가정보와 기업의 단기자금 조달방식 선택

황인덕(In-Deok Hwang),정병욱(Byung-Uk Chong) 대한경영학회 2014 大韓經營學會誌 Vol.27 No.3