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특허취득 및 디자인등록 공시에 따른 기업가치의 변화와 매출력 및 원가력의 매개효과
정무권(Moo Kwon Jung),김주영(Ju Young Kim) 한국경영학회 2008 經營學硏究 Vol.37 No.6
This study examines the effect of patent acquisition and design registration on firm value, sales, and costs. Especially, using a structural equation model(PLS), the paper investigates a mediating role of sales and costs on stock price of the firm. For empirical investigation, we use 544 sample of patent acquisitions and 599 sample of design registrations filed in DART(Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System) and KIPRIS(Korea Intellectual Property Rights Information Service) over the period of 2001-2005. We measure the change of firm value as cumulative abnormal return(CAR), and the changes of sales and costs as abnormal sales growth(ASG) and abnormal cost growth(ACG), respectively. In addition, our paper uses financial status variables such as intangible asset ratio, market-to-book ratio, company size, debt ratio, advertising expenses, R&D expenditure, ROA, and listed market. Empirical results show that stock price reactions to the announcement of patent acquisition and design registration are positive and significant, and the reactions are more positive in patent acquisition. This implies that the firm value increases from both patent acquisition and design registration. Furthermore, we search factors or conditions under which the firm value increases by using multiple linear regressions. The firm value in the case of patent acquisition increases as the firm has lower market-to-book ratio and is listed in KOSDAQ, while the firm value in the case of design registration increases as the firm has more intangible assets and higher profitability. In addition, we find that ASG is significantly positive and ACG is significantly negative for the firms that announce patent acquisition and design registration. The mediating role of ASG and ACG on firm value is investigated by PLS. The results show that the effect of patent acquisition on firm value is mediated by ASG, while the effect of cost reduction on firm value is not statistically significant. When we compare patent acquisition with design registration, patent acquisition makes a larger cost reduction. Also, the overall effect(including indirect effect) of patent acquisition compared to design registration on firm value is significantly larger, even though the direct effect on firm value is not significantly larger. This study is expected to help foster inter-disciplinary research in that we consider the mediating role of sales and costs in analyzing the effect of patent acquisition and design registration on firm value. Sales and costs play the role of bridge points between business strategy and firm value, in order to find out a path from business strategy to firm value. Another contribution of this paper is that we employ financial accounting data instead of judgment data that has been used in Marketing and Business Strategy research. However, this paper has limitations due to data unavailability. For example, we were unable to utilize more specific information on patent acquisition and design registration in the cross-sectional analysis of CARs. In the follow-up research, we will further examine whether the firm`s public relations associated with patent acquisition and design registration have any differential effect on firm value.
Managerial Entrenchment and Valuation Effects of Toehold Acquisitions
빈기범(Ki Beom Binh),정무권(Moo Kwon Jung),윤정선(Jeong Sun Yun) 한국증권학회 2011 한국증권학회지 Vol.40 No.2
이 논문은 한국 주식시장에서 발판매수에 대한 시장 반응을 분석하여, 해당 기업의 주가 반응이 그 기업의 우선주 발행 여부 또는 재벌 그룹 소속 여부와 어떻게 관련되는지를 밝힌다. 또한, 그간 잘 다루어지지 않았던 발판매수에 대한 의결권 프리미엄의 반응을 분석하였다. 실증 분석 결과, 우선주를 발행하지 않은 기업은 발판매수 사건 주변에서 재벌 소속 여부와 무관하게 양의 누적초과수익률을 나타냈다. 하지만, 우선주 발행 기업은 재벌 그룹에 속하지 않은 기업의 경우에만 양의 누적초과수익률을 나타냈다. 나아가, 우선주를 이용하여 의결권 프리미엄의 변화를 분석한 결과, 발판매수 주변에서 의결권 프리미엄이 상승하는 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구의 결과는 발판매수자에 의한 감시의 강화 또는 경영권 관련 사건의 발생이 예상되면서 기업의 본질가치가 상승하여 발판매수가 양의 초과수익률을 시현한다는 기존 연구와는 상반된다. 한편, 본 연구는 발판매수는 경영권 관련 사건 발생의 예상과는 무관하게 해당 기업주주 부에 기여하지만, 이러한 효과는 기존 경영진이 효과적으로 경영권 도전에 저항할 수 있을 때 상쇄된다는 실증적 증거를 제시한다. This paper examines stock market reactions to toehold acquisitions in the Korean stock market to determine whether they depend on factors related to the ownership structure of the target firms such as the issuance of the dual-class stock and the affiliation with chaebols. We also examine the voting premium responses to toehold acquisitions for targets with no-voting preferred stocks which has largely remained unexplored. We find that whereas single-class targets show positive cumulative abnormal returns regardless of chaebol affiliation, dual-class targets with no-voting shares exhibit positive cumulative abnormal returns only if they are not affiliated with chaebols. Furthermore, dual-class targets exhibit an increase in the voting premium. Our findings contrast with existing research emphasizing that the positive market reactions to toehold acquisitions reflect the anticipation of an increase in the fundamental value of the target firms as a consequence of monitoring or control- related events by toeholders. We argue that although anticipated control-related or noncontrol-related events contribute to the shareholder value of the target firms, these effects are countervailed when the incumbent management can effectively resist those challenges.
박기환(Kee Hwan Park),정무권(Moo Kwon Jung),김세권(Sae Kwon Kim) 한국경영학회 2008 經營學硏究 Vol.37 No.6
We value design and development (D & D) projects by applying option analysis and draw some important implications for the D & D strategies of the mobile phone producers in Korea. Assuming that the value follows a mixed jump-diffusion process, we show that the uncertainties associated with the D & D project and the development cost are the two key variables to the valuation. In a market where the future outcomes are more unpredictable, our model implies that an aggressive strategy returns more because it keeps more options (i.e., models in the development process) in the pipeline against the future uncertain states of the world.