Pipe Surface Reconstruction Using Shrinking

이인권,Lee, In-Kwon Korea Computer Graphics Society 1999 컴퓨터그래픽스학회논문지 Vol.5 No.2

구조화되어있지 않은 점 집합으로부터 파이프 곡면을 복원해 내는 알고리즘을 기술한다. 파이프 곡면은 척추 곡선과 스위핑 구의 반지름으로 정의된다. 수축과 동적 최소자승법에 의해 점 집합은 얇은 곡선 형태로 변환된다. 이 얇은 곡선 형태의 점 집합은 쉽게 척추곡선으로 근사될 수 있다. 얇은 점 집합과 원래 주어진 점 집합의 대응하는 두 점간의 거리로 파이프 곡면을 정의하는 스위핑 구의 반지름을 구할 수 있다. We present an algorithm to reconstruct a pipe surface from a set of unorganized points. A pipe surface is defined by a spine curve and a radius of a swept sphere. In this paper, by using the shrinking and moving least-squares methods, a point cloud is reduced to a thin curve-like point set that can be easily approximated with a spine curve of a pipe surface. The distance between a point in the thin point cloud and a corresponding point in the original point set represents the radius of a swept sphere of a pipe surface.

수확 후 예건이 배추 저온 저장에 미치는 영향

이인권(In Kwon Lee),홍세진(Sae Jin Hong),용영록(Young Rog Yeoung),박세원(Se Won Park) 한국원예학회 2001 한국원예학회 학술발표요지 Vol.2001 No.5

캐널곡면의 복원

이인권(In-Kwon Lee),김구진(Ku-Jin Kim) 한국정보과학회 2005 정보과학회논문지 : 시스템 및 이론 Vol.32 No.7·8

본 논문에서는 입력으로 주어진 점집합 (point cloud)으로부터 캐널곡면을 복원 (reconstruction)하는 알고리즘을 제시한다. 캐널곡면은 반경이 변화하며 중심점이 기준곡선(spine curve)을 따라 이동하는 구(moving sphere)의 스웹트곡면(swept surface)이다. 이 논문에서는 수축기법(shrinking method)과 moving least-square 방법을 이용하여 주어진 점집합을 세곡선(thin-curve)형태의 점집합으로 수축시킴으로써 캐널곡면의 기준곡선을 근사한다. 근사된 기준곡선과 입력으로 주어진 점집합에 포함된 점들 사이의 거리를 이용하여, 캐널곡면을 구성하는 이동 구의 반경을 계산한다. We present a method to reconstruct a canal surface from a point cloud (a set of unorganized points). A canal surface is defined as a swept surface of a moving sphere with varying radii. By using the shrinking and moving least-squares methods, we reduce a point cloud to a thin curve-like point set which can be approximated to the spine curve of a canal surface. The distance between a point in the thin point cloud and a corresponding point in the original point set represents the radius of the canal surface.

카르텔 과징금 제도에 관한 연구 -판례 분석 및 실무 개선방안을 중심으로-

이인권 ( In Kwon Lee ) 한국응용경제학회 2010 응용경제 Vol.12 No.2

카르텔 과징금 부과 한도의 증대, 손해배상청구에 관해 시정조치의 확정을 전제요건으로 요구하는 법 규정의 삭제, 법원의 손해액 인정, 리니언시 프로그램의 활성화, 포상금 지급 확대, 부당공동행위 조사 및 형사적 제재의 강화는 부당공동행위에 대한 사전적 억제 및 사후적 제재의 강도에 큰 변화를 야기하고 있다. 이러한 환경변화를 고려하여 과징금 제도가 새롭게 재편될 필요가 있다. 기본적으로 부당공동행위의 일반적인 억제효과나 징벌효과는 과징금부과를 통한 행정적 제재와 사소를 통한 부당이득 환수 두 가지가 병행되어야 한다. 손해배상소송이 시장에서 충분히 활성화 된다면 과징금이 이러한 틀에서 재설정 되어야 하지만, 부당공동행위로 인하여 불특정한 다수에게 피해가 나타나는 경우 실질적으로 손해배상소송이 원활이루어지지 못하고 있는 상황을 동시에 고려할 필요가 있다. 부당공동행위로 인한 피해가 국가일 경우는 원칙적으로 공정위의 과징금은 행정적 제재에 국한하고, 부당이득 환수는 손해배상소송을 통하여 해결하는 것이 바람직하다. 부당공동행위로 인하여 발생하는 피해가 불특정 다수에게 발생하여 손해배상소송이 현실적으로 어려운 경우는 과도기적으로 공정위에서 부당이득환수와 행정적 제재의 과징금을 부과하는 것이 적절하다. 경제적인 제재의 핵심인 과징금 부과는 현행과 규정과 같이 관련매출액을 기준으로 하기보다는 손해액 혹은 피해액을 기준으로 산정하는 것이 법집행의 안정성과 예측가능성을 높일 수 있다. Korea Fair Trade Commission drastically changed Fair Trade Act, in particular, codes of regulation on unfair collusion in the end of 2004. This study investigates the effect of the regulation change on the formation of cartel, antitrust damage suit, and the imposition of administrative fine. And also, this research explores on the types of abuse in the levy of administrative fine through the deep analysis of the existing judicial precedent cases. This study suggest that the government agency should asses the basic fine on the basis of proper damage estimation, not on the basis of the certain percentage of gross sales. This legal approach may help the consistency, the stability, and predictability of legal enforcement. This study also suggest that at the stage of active antitrust damage suit, the financial remedy rely on damage suit and the fine focus on administrative regulation reflecting dead weight loss and enforcement cost due to the collusion in oligopoly market.

2D 애니메이션 기법을 도입한 3D 애니메이션 연구

이인권(In Kwon Lee) 한국정보과학회 2003 정보과학회지 Vol.21 No.7

부당공동행위에 대한 실증연구 고찰 - 입찰담합사례를 중심으로

이인권(In Kwon Lee) 한국경제연구원 2008 한국경제연구원 연구보고서 Vol.2008 No.2

  Bid rigging cases have traditionally involved a large share of criminal cases filed by the antitrust agencies across the countries. Bid riggings are naked restraints of trade and perse illegal in violation of section one of Sherman Act. There were many indictments of firms in construction industry, school milk industry, electrical equipment industry, real estate, antiques and other auction markets. In spite of this trend, the empirical literature on collusion in auctions is not fully developed. This study shows how to systematically and statistically detect the presence of collusive bidding behavior in auctions and properly estimate damages to consumers or taxpayers. The antitrust agency can not easily obtain the solid evidence of bid rigging such as wiretaps, witness of whistle blowers, and so forth. Therefore, the detection of bid rigging is not an easy task. The antitrust agency needs to distinguish between collusive behavior and noncooperative behavior, both of which lead to supra-competitive profits since some statistical indicators generally associated with collusion may arise in an equilibrium of non-cooperative game. The appropriate methods for the detection of explicit bid rigging and noncooperative tacit collusion require the detailed statistical analyses of strategic behaviors and market environments in addition to simple regression-based analysis. This paper illustrates the effects of limits of current legal enforcement in relation with collusion inference at the levels of Fair Trade Commission and Courts. This research strongly suggest that competition agency delete the unfair collusion inference code of Antitrust Law and adopt the actual inference based on solid circumstantial evidence. And Also, It provides that reasonable approach for the relevant refusal of collusion inference.<BR>  The accurate assessment of damages is a key issue in litigation involving a bid rigging. The assessment of damages is often a principal issue in litigation because the interests of plaintiff and defendant directly conflict. Primary objective of the plaintiff is usually to collect as much as possible and that of the dependant is to pay as little as possible. In order to recover antitrust damages, the plaintiff in a bid rigging case must be able to prove the amount of the price change suffered as a result of a conspiracy. Even if the proof of damages is obviously critical to plaintiffs and defendants alike, there are very few empirical studies on this subject. Three alternative techniques can be successfully used for preparing damage cases. The first is cost method approach looking at the relationship between winning bid and professional’s estimates of competitive bid on the basis of sketch cost data. The second is dummy variable approach estimating over the pooled sample of rigged and unrigged contracts with a dummy variable which is equal to one if the job is rigged and equal to zero if it is unrigged. The third is a forecasting approach using only unrigged bids as a control group to estimate the model and then plugging the data points for each rigged bid into estimated model. However, it should be noted that these estimates are poor substitutes for estimates based on reliable cost data. This study investigates the effect of the regulation change on the formation of cartel, antitrust damage suit, and the imposition of administrative fine. This study suggests that the government agency should asses the basic fine on the basis of proper damage estimation, not on the basis of the certain percentage of gross sales. This legal approach may help the consistency, the stability, and predictability of legal enforcement. This study also suggest that at the stage of active antitrust damage suit, the financial remedy rely on damage suit and the fine focus on administrative regulation reflecting dead weight loss and enforcement cost due to the collusion in oligopoly market. The punitive compensation system needs

“HCI”특집을 내면서

이인권(In-Kwon Lee),정순기(Soon-Ki Jung) 한국정보과학회 2011 정보과학회지 Vol.29 No.8

부당공동행위의 합리적 규제에 대한 일고

이인권(In Kwon Lee) 한국경제연구원 2007 규제연구 Vol.16 No.1

  본 연구에서는 부당공동행위에 대한 법의 집행과 관련하여 공정거래위원회의 과징금 관련 소송사례에서 나타난 재량권 남용과 일탈의 내용을 정리하고, 이러한 재량권 남용과 일탈을 줄이기 위한 적절한 방안을 모색하고자 하였다.<BR>  사업자들이 부당공동행위를 하는 가장 큰 이유는 경제적인 이득이 있기 때문이다, 따라서 부당공동행위에 대한 가장 효과적인 제재방법은 부당공동행위로 얻은 금전적 이득의 환수와 사전적인 억제력을 담보할 수 있는 정도의 추가적인 금전적인 제재를 추가적으로 부과하는 것이다. 금전적 이득의 박탈 수준은 부당공동행위의 적발확률과 부당공동행위로 인한 행위자들의 금전적 이득 및 사회적 손실을 종합적으로 고려하여 산정하여야 하는데, 제재가 효과적이기 위해서는 부당공동행위에 부과되는 금전적 제재의 규모가 작아도 부당공동행위로 인한 경제적 이득과 적발되지 않을 확률을 곱한 기대이익보다 더 커야 한다는 것이다. 금전적인 제재의 핵심인 과징금 부과는 현행 규정과 같이 관련 매출액을 기준으로 하기보다는 손해액 혹은 피해액을 기준으로 산정하는 것이 법집행의 일관성, 안정성과 예측가능성을 높일 수 있다. 향후 부당공동행위 관련 손해배상소송이 활성화되면 피해를 본 당사자가 직접 부소송을 통해 그 피해를 회복하고 과징금제도는 행정제재 성격만을 갖는 형태로 운영하는 것이 바람직하다. 이 경우 부당공동행위로 인해 발생하는 가격인상과 생산량 감축효과, 이른바 사장된 후생순손실 부분, 정부가 담합행위를 적발, 감시하고 집행하는 과정에서 발생하는 규제비용 등이 과징금 산정 시 고려되어야 할 것이다.   Korea Fair Trade Commission drastically changed Fair Trade Act, in particular, codes of regulation on unfair collusion in the end of 2004. This study investigates the effect of the regulation change on the formation of cartel, antitrust damage suit, and the imposition of administrative fine. And also, this research explores on the types of abuse in the levy of administrative fine through the deep analysis of the existing judicial precedent cases. This study suggest that the government agency should asses the basic fine on the basis of proper damage estimation, not on the basis of the certain percentage of gross sales. This legal approach may help the consistency, the stability, and predictability of legal enforcement. This study also suggest that at the stage of active antitrust damage suit, the financial remedy rely on damage suit and the fine focus on administrative regulation reflecting dead weight loss and enforcement cost due to the collusion in oligopoly market. The punitive compensation system needs to be introduced restrictively in hard-core cartels.

부당공동행위에 대한 합리적 규제의 틀과 대안 모색

이인권(Lee In Kwon) 한국경제연구원 2006 한국경제연구원 연구보고서 Vol.2006-05 No.-

  Korea Fair Trade Commission drastically changed Fair Trade Act, in particular, codes of regulation on unfair collusion in the end of 2004. This study investigates the effect of the regulation change on the formation of cartel, antitrust damage suit, and the imposition of administrative fine. And also, this research explores on the types of abuse in the levy of administrative fine through the deep analysis of the existing judicial precedent cases. This study suggest that the government agency should asses the basic fine on the basis of proper damage estimation, not on the basis of the certain percentage of gross sales. This legal approach may help the consistency, the stability, and predictability of legal enforcement. This study also suggest that at the stage of active antitrust damage suit, the financial remedy rely on damage suit and the fine focus on administrative regulation reflecting dead weight loss and enforcement cost due to the collusion in oligopoly market. The punitive compensation system needs to be introduced restrictively in hard-core cartels. This research also discusses the limit and the irrelevance of coercive investigation right of the agency. Finally, it also propose that the agency delete the code of the unfair collusion inference and adopt the actual inference based on solid circumstantial evidence.

한국기업의 성장동학에 관한 연구

이인권(In Kwon Lee) 한국경제연구원 2002 규제연구 Vol.11 No.2

This study examines the relationships between three aspects of industry dynamics - firm growth, probability of survival, variability of firm growth - and firm specific characters, based on an expanded model of Evans's (1987) growth model. This paper analyzes the effect of a proportional increase in firm age and size on firm growth, survival probability, variability of growth. Statistical results show that firm growth decreases as firm size and age increase. Therefore, Gibrat's law is not statistically accepted, and whereas Jovanovic's law is statistically accepted. Statistical analyses reveal that the survival probability of affiliated firms is not significantly different from that of non-affiliated firms. Thus, it can be inferred that inefficient affiliated firms have exited as many as incompetent nonfirms have been bankrupt in the process of dynamic market competition.