법의 규범적 성격에 관한 연구

권경휘(Kyung-Hwi Kwon) 중앙대학교 법학연구원 2012 法學論文集 Vol.36 No.1

Legal philosophers who assume the standpoint of sanction thesis maintain that methods of law to guide actions include only duty-imposing method. In such standpoint, law guides actions of people only in a way to force people to select particular action that law requires. If so, norms that guides actions within legal system are only duty-imposing norms. On the other hand, other legal philosophers like H. L. A. Hart and J. Raz maintain that power-conferring norm proposes reason for action independently though it differs from duty-imposing norm in type. As a result of reviewing the standpoint of recognizing only duty-imposing method critically, it was concluded that such claim distorts the normative function of law severely. Power-conferring law assigns actors with power to modify the legal position of him/herself or others. Such conferring of power affects the decision of actor. At this time, the influence of power-conferring law on actor’s decision is not simply coincident. In other words, power-conferring law combines legal results to the action of actor so that actor may ground his/her action on the legal results that law combines in deciding his/her action. Thus power-conferring also is a method of normative guiding of action. Therefore, I argue that power-conferring method also should be covered as well as duty-imposing method when legal philosopher explains the method in which law guides people’s action. Only in such case, legal philosophers will be able to explain properly without distorting the normative function of law.

법 이론에 있어서 비트겐슈타인의 규칙-따르기 고찰의 적용(그리고 잘못된 적용)

권경휘(역) ( Kyung Hwi Kwon ),( Brian Bix ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2005 法學硏究 Vol.15 No.3

법치주의와 민주주의의 관계: 하버마스의 관점에 대한 비판적 고찰

권경휘 ( Kyung Hwi Kwon ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2014 法學硏究 Vol.24 No.1

At a glance, we seem to be facing a paradoxical situation as follows. On one hand, both Rechtsstaat and democracy are perceived as principles that cannot be given up. However on the other hand, unless one of the two principles is given up, the other cannot be fully achieved. In 『Between Facts and Norms』, J. Habermas attempted to provide a solution to such paradoxical situation. By restructuring Rechtsstaat and democracy based on the discourse theory, he tried to show that they have complementary relationship instead of conflicting with each other. The aim of this paper was to review the argument made by Habermas. The following strategy was used for the review. First, the discussion of Habermas was revealed to be aiming at a notorious German jurist named C. Schmitt. The discussion of Habermas was restructured and reviewed based on this fact. In order to do so, the theory of Schmitt was first reviewed with detail in Chapter 2. He found the conflict between Rechtsstaat and democracy from the difference in the conception of equality, and argued that such conflict cannot be cured. Based on this argument, he draws a conclusion on retreat of Rechtsstaat from priority of democracy. Also, Chapter 3 showed how the discussion of Habermas criticizes and overcomes the theory of Schmitt. While arguing that the human rights guaranteed by Rechtsstaat are legal rights instead of moral rights, Habermas speaks that in democracy, democratic decision making must be understood as something that is justified when the structure of discourse and rules of demonstration resulting from the communicative structure are followed. Rechtsstaat and democracy understood in this way do not conflict but premise one another. Lastly in Chapter 4, such work of Habermas was evaluated to determine how successful it was. The argument of Habermas does not create problems when explaining Rechtsstaat and democracy in countries with system of Western rights. However, hidden problems begin to get revealed when the discussion is not limited to domestic laws.

최종적인 근거 지움의 문제에 관하여: 선험화용론의 관점에서

권경휘 ( Kyung Hwi Kwon ),김정수 ( Jeong Soo Kim ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2007 法學硏究 Vol.17 No.4

Law philosophy is the field of study that deals with the value judgement. So then, is it ever possible to set up reasonable ultimate foundation for such value judgement? Ultimate foundation issue is the discussion on such question, and it comprehends important meaning regarding particularly rationalization of regulations and standards. However, the loss of authority of the tradition or religion and collision among various culture lead us astray onto relativism and historicism, which tendency is not exceptional in academic arena as well, so that critical rationalists claim that no ultimate foundation is possible in academic arena. Also in meta-ethics, there rises a claim that any attempts to deduce oughtness from facts are in violation of naturalistic fallacy. Thus all the attempts to verify ultimate foundation are burdened to demolish such verifications. However, their claims come with too strong a premise, so that direct contradiction of them may be very hard task. This article intends to try out the possibility of ultimate foundation in the viewpoint of transcendental pragmatics by K.-O. Apel. To that end, first off in Chapter 2, the article examines two of the main topics that verify the impossibility of ultimate foundation, that is, critical rationalism verification and meta ethics verification. Through such analysis, we intend to understand the meaning involved in such verifications on the impossibility of ultimate foundation, and deduce the possibility of ultimate foundation on that basis. Also, Chapter 3 intends to review methods to realize the possibility of ultimate foundation in western philosophy history as a way of preliminary study on the conclusion of this article. Chapter 4, which may be the conclusion of this article, proves the ultimate possibility of regulations, and on that basis, seeks the possibility we can move away from ethical nihilism or relativism. Based on such discussion, Chapter 4 also intends to propose new interpretation on law and ethics.

홉스의 자연상태 이론에 대한 비판적 고찰: 공공선택이론과 행동경제학의 관점에서

권경휘(Kwon, Kyung-Hwi) 동아대학교 법학연구소 2021 東亞法學 Vol.- No.93

홉스(T. Hobbes)의 『리바이어던』의 제1부 “인간에 대하여”의 후반부, 즉 제13장부터 제16장까지에 나타난 자연상태와 자연법에 대한 논의를 분석하고자 한다. 텍스트에 대한 다양한 해석방법들은 크게 두 가지의 방법으로 구분될 수 있을 것이다. 하나는 텍스트 자체를 충실하게 해석하는 것이고, 다른 하나는 텍스트가 저술하게 된 맥락을 중심으로 텍스트를 바라보는 것이다. 이 글은 텍스트 자체를 충실하게 해석하는 데 집중하고자 한다. 왜냐하면 제1부의 논의는 이어지는 제2부, 제3부, 제4부에 비하여 역사적 맥락의 영향을 덜 받는 내용을 담고 있을 뿐만 아니라, 이 글의 목적은 그 텍스트의 내용이 가지는 의의와 같은 것을 밝혀내는 것이 아니기 때문이다. 자연상태에 대한 홉스의 논의는 이론적인 측면에서 볼 때 논리적인 장치로 사용되고 있는 평등의 의미가 모호하다는 문제점을 가진다. 또한 실천적인 측면에서 보자면, 홉스는 자연상태에서 명예심이 존재하고 이것이 갈등의 원인이 된다고 보지만 실제로 자연상태에서는 명예심이 존재할 수 없고 만약 그것이 존재한다고 한다면 전쟁상태가 성립하지 않을 수 있다는 비판이 가능하다. T. Hobbes" Leviathan contains concepts and arguments that inspire many later scholars. Many ideas have been interpreted and reproduced in various ways, such as social contract, sovereignty and civil law. Among them, this article intends to analyze the discussion of the state of nature and natural law in the later part of the Part I “Of Man”. There may be various ways to read Leviathan. In fact, as the times passed, a new method of interpretation was presented and a debate arose about it. Various interpretations can be divided into two main methods. One is to faithfully interpret the text itself, and the other is to look at the text based on the context in which it was written. This article focuses on faithfully interpreting the text itself. Because the discussion in Part 1 contains content that is less influenced by the historical context compared to Part 2, 3, and 4 that follows. This article tries to focus on analyzing the argument itself in the text in detail rather than revealing the intention that Hobbes was trying to assert to the intellectuals of his time.

법에 있어서 책임의 개념과 그 전제조건

권경휘(Kyung-Hwi Kwon) 가톨릭대학교(성심교정) 인간학연구소 2017 인간연구 Vol.0 No.33

이 글은 법에 있어서 책임의 개념과 그 전제조건을 검토하고자 하였다. 우리는 큰 어려움 없이 법적 책임이라는 용어를 사용할 수 있지만, 그 개념을 사용하는 기준 내지는 규칙에 관해서는 쉽게 대답하지 못한다. 이러한 문제가 발생하는 이유는 그것이 일종의 해석적 개념이기 때문이다. 그러므로 법적 책임을 이해하기 위해서는 우리가 공유하고 있는 문화 내지 전통으로부터 핵심적인 것을 뽑아내어 그것을 정교하게 만드는 작업을 거쳐야만 한다. 그러므로 이 글에서는 두 단계의 해석적인 과정을 통하여 법적 책임의 의미를 밝혀내고자 하였다. 제2장과 제3장에서는 첫 번째 해석적인 단계를 수행하였다. 먼저 제2장에서는 일상언어에서 우리가 법적 책임이라는 단어를 어떻게 사용하는지 검토하였다. 이후 제3장에서는 이러한 용법과 관련된 법학에서의 논의를 검토하였다. 이러한 논의를 토대로 제4장에서는 두 번째 해석적인 단계를 수행하였다. 즉, 법적 책임의 의미와 사용법 중 전체적인 의미에 맞지 않는 것을 밝혀내어 수정하는 작업을 수행하였다. 그 결과 우리는 법적 책임의 개념과 그 전제조건을 명확히 밝혀낼 수 있었다. 끝으로 제5장에서는 이러한 논의를 보다 확장하여 인공지능에게 법적 책임을 인정할 수 있는 전제조건으로 튜링의 테스트를 수정 및 보완할 것을 제안하였다. While it is easy to use the term “legal responsibility”, we cannot often answer the criteria or the rules for using it. This problem occurs, because it is an interpretative concept. To understand legal responsibility, we must go through a process of accurately crafting after extracting the key items from the culture or traditions that we share. Therefore, I tried to discover the meaning of legal responsibility through two steps of interpretative processes. In chapter 2 and 3, we performed the first step of interpretation process. In Chapter 2, I reviewed how we use the term “legal responsibility” in ordinary language. In Chapter 3, I considered the uses of this term in legal science. In Chapter 4, I performed the second step of the interpretative process. In other words, among the meanings and the usages of “legal responsibility”, I performed a corrective process by discovering those that do not fit the entire dimension. Thus, we can identify the concept and premises of “legal responsibility”. Lastly, I tried to correct and adjust A. M. Turing’s test regarding the ascriptive condition of AI’s legal responsibility.

환경의 개념에 관한 법철학적 고찰

권경휘 ( Kyung Hwi Kwon ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2012 法學硏究 Vol.22 No.2

This paper aims to focus on finding an appropriate way for lawyers to deal with issues rather than directly dealing with them in legal discourses about environmental issues. The second part of the paper discusses issues related with defining the concept of the environment. It furthers to connect defining of the concept of the environment with issues related with how to make an approach to environmental issues. The third part of the paper investigates the approach about environmental issues in a critical way. The paper finds the following results. First, the paper finds that the concept of the environment can not be explained neither by using the term of the environment nor by scientific discovery of components of the environment. Second, the paper finds that defining the concept of the environment is a way of discovering the most attractive conception that well explains why we should protect the environment. Last, the paper concludes that there are theoretical problems in sharing same status between humans and animals that Utilitarianism and Kantism support in understanding environmental issues.

헌법이 보장하는 혼인과 가족제도의 내용 ― 전통, 제도적 보장과 가족제도? ―

권경휘 ( Kyung-hwi Kwon ) 연세대학교 법학연구원 2019 法學硏究 Vol.29 No.3

It is the family system that the most important unit in human society is. Though the most common form is based on monogamy, various family systems have existed. By protecting the family system adopted by their society, each country secures its own legitimacy and ensures that the state itself is maintained. For example, Korea guarantees for marriage and family system, from the first Constitution to the current Constitution. But our Constitution does not explicitly state what type of marriage and family system is guaranteed. For example, Article 36 (1) of the Constitution does not provide a detailed picture of the family system, including marriage. Therefore, it is necessary to theoretically consider what is the content of the family system guaranteed by the Constitution. The concept to be considered in relation to this discussion is institutional guarantee, ie “institutionelle Garantie” in German. I believe that the following four themes on institutional guarantee developed by C. Schmitt should be taken to a lesser extent, even if the Constitution guarantees a particular system in terms of institutional guarantee. (1) Institutional guarantees are distinct from liberal fundamental rights. (2) There is a distinction between institutional guarantee protecting public institutions and institutional security protecting private institutions. (3) Institutional guarantees protect existing institutions and their main features. (4) Institutional guarantees impose the obligation on legislators to legislate specific systems. Only thesis of (4) can be accepted as it is. The fact that the Constitution adopts the family system as an institutional guarantee imposes the duty on the legislators to legislate the family system. The contents of such a family system should be regarded as determined by the constitution itself, not a family system as factual order. And it is the character of the objective order of basic rights to be realized through the family system that establishes the contents of the family system in the Constitution.

제2의 뤼쿠르고스로서의 플라톤: 이상국가의 해석론

권경휘(Kyung-Hwi Kwon) 한국법철학회 2021 법철학연구 Vol.24 No.2

플라톤이 이상국가를 제시했다는 것은 널리 알려져 있는 사실이지만, 그 이상국가를 둘러싼 많은 의심과 오해가 존재한다. 이상국가를 둘러싼 의심과 오해의 근본적인 이유는 서구식 자유주의와 인권 개념에 익숙한 현대인의 눈에서 보면 그것은 기괴하기 그지없다는 사실이다. 그래서 플라톤이라는 위대한 철학자가 주장했기 때문에 그것은 좋은 국가이겠지라는 막연한 생각을 넘어서 도대체 이러한 이상국가를 어떻게 이해하고 해석하여야 하는가라는 의문이 들수밖에 없다. 이 글에서는 플라톤이 뤼쿠르고스가 추진한 개혁을 염두에 두고 이상국가를 그렸다는 것을 보여주고자 하였다. 그래서 이상국가는 뤼쿠르고스가 이루지 못한 부분들과 실패한 부분들을 극복하고자 한 것임을 보여주고자 하였다. It is widely known that Plato proposed the ideal state, but there are many doubts and misconceptions regarding it. The fundamental reason for the suspicion and misunderstanding is that it is bizarre in the eyes of modern people who are familiar with Liberalism and human rights. Therefore, the question arises as to how one should understand and interpret this ideal state of Plato. In this article, I tried to show that Plato proposed the ideal state with the reforms promoted by Lycurgus in mind. So, I tried to show that the ideal state was trying to overcome the parts that Lycurgus failed to achieve and the parts that failed.

순수법학에 있어서 법과학의 개념

권경휘 ( Kyung Hwi Kwon ) 한양대학교 법학연구소 2012 법학논총 Vol.29 No.3

H. Kelsen, the representative theorist of contemporary legal positivism, uses as his fundamental premises notions that are not easily comprehensible to those trained in the British legal positivism. Perhaps the most notorious of such notions for indefiniteness would be “basic norm”. Paradoxically, due to such notoriety, it is fair to say that there has been much research on the basic norm. On the other hand, there is relatively little research on “norm”, “science of law”, and “normativity”. Among such, especially the study on “science of law” is almost nonexistent. In pure theory of law, however, science of law is one of the core concepts. This is because science of law is an important theoretical device that allows pure theory of law to secure that “purity”. Therefore, this essay intends to explain the concept of “science of law”. As the result, the conclusion was drawn that the explanations by Kelsen on the science of law had the following problems. First, if the matter is strictly distinguishable by the dichotomy of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and irreconcilable, there is the problem of how to explain the fact that human activities can be explained either by causality or imputation. Second, the claim that the science of law must define the legal concepts based only on legal norms also appears problematic. Third, in the process where the science of law represents the law, the claim that the law must be represented in the form of “given condition C, compulsory act A must be executed” is wrong.