『論語·學而』 기존 자구해석에 대한 검토(Ⅰ)

姜信碩 중국어문학연구회 2003 중국어문학논집 Vol.- No.22

〉『The Analects of Confucius』is edited by whom, published when? From Han till Qing dynasty period, and to the present, the reason Why there are so many interpretations for this book is? The problem on these themes have not researched totally and solved clearly. In this paper, a first step try to review on a third theme, and hope to give a key to the most suitable point of view on interpretation through analyzing especially by linguistic method. 『論語』에서 孔子가 오늘날 지금 우리(나)에게 말해줄 수 있는 것은 무엇인가? 상투적이긴 하지만 고전의 의의인 '溫故知新'은 아무리 강조해도 지나침이 없다. 역사의 흐름은 참으로 우리의 옷깃을 새롭게 여미게 만든다. 유구한 역사의 파고 속에서도 끊임없이 통치 관료계급의 비호를 받아 왔으나, 근세에 이르러서는 아이들을 구하라는 魯迅의 기치아래 그토록 배척해야할 대상으로 전락하기도 하였으며, 홍위병의 깃발아래 밟혀 일그러진 형상으로 묘사되기도 했던 공자의 모습. 이제 그와 다시 대면하게 되는 것이다. 21세기 중국대륙의 거창한 비상으로 표현되는 黃浦의 마천루와 테크노피아 속에서도, 그리고 세계를 향해 나아가자고(走進世界) 외치는 구호와 함성 속에서도 여전히 지울 수 없는 그의 잔영을 엿보게 되는 것은 왜일까?시선을 돌려, 우리의 역사와 문화 속에 오래 전부터 공자를 받아들였던 성균관의 수많은 大儒家를 일일이 열거하지 않더라도, 나의 모습 속에서 여전히 피로 녹아 흐르고 있는 혼혈적인 흔적을 발견하게 되는 것은 왜일까? 어쩌면 우리의 모습과 행동 속에서 더욱 교조적인 논어의 형상을 찾는 것이 더 쉬운 일인지도 모른다. 이러한 생각은 중국이라는 시간과 공간 속에서 그들 속에서 나를 바라볼 때, 더욱 확인될 수 있다. 『論語』는 바로 자신들을 소묘하는 단도직입의 문이요 열쇠라고 중국인들은 감히 말한다. 아울러 한문화라는 공동운명체 속에서 호흡을 같이 해온 우리의 정체성을 정확히 인식하는 데도 중요한 자료가 될 수 있다.『論語』는 항상 현재적 시점에서 읽혀져 왔으며 앞으로도 다시 읽기가 시도될 것이 확실하다. 다시 읽는 다는 것은 현재적 시점에서 생명력을 불어넣는 작업이 되어야 함을 의미하며, 동시에 어떻게 읽을 것인가라는 방법의 물음이 전제되어야 함을 의미하기도 한다. 이러한 작업의 궁극적 목적인 해석이 올바르게 수행되기 위해서는 두 가지의 기본 원칙이 세워져야 한다. 첫째로 논어는 창작이 아니고 편집이었으며, 각 시대마다 수많은 주석가들에 의해 철저히 '述而不作'의 태도로 정리되었을 가능성이 많으므로, 기존 주석을 가급적 충분히 다루어야 한다는 것이다. 둘째로 주석은 각 시대마다 현재적인 해석이 가능했을 것이므로 마찬가지로 현재의 의미로 다시 적용시켜봐야 한다는 것이다. 후자 해석의 적용의 문제는 역사,철학 등 방대한 영역에 대한 깊이 있는 이해가 전제되어야 하므로 제외하고, 본고에서는 『論語』 20章 가운데, 우선 學而 章(1)을 대상으로 하여 기존 자구의 해석들 가운데 이견이 도출되었던 것들만을 선별하여 그 근거와 타당성을 검토하고자 한다.

歸納推論의 正當性에 관한 연구(3)

姜信石 釜山水産大學校 1987 論文集 Vol.39 No.-

Within this paper I made critical evaluation of the attempts to justify induction and I concluded as follows: There is no genuine problem of justifying induction-if there appears to be a problem it is because of a misconception of the nature of induction or because of a similar kind of confusion. Those who attempt to justify induction assume that induction provides us with the facts or informations about nature and that induction secures its conclusion to be true. In other words they have the tendency to think induction as something on a par with specific methods of discovery or prediction. This is a mistake, and an important one. Induction is nothing but our natural and instinctive response to the regularities observed in the nature or our habitual expectations of the regularities to be continued into the future. Induction has nothing to do with its conclusion's being true or not. There are good and bad inductive arguments. Sometimes it is reasonable to hold a belief arrived at inductively and sometimes it is not. Either to hold a belief arrived at inductively is reasonable or not must be proved not by induction but by specific methods of discovery, prediction or conclusive evidence. In a word what I arrived at through the critical evaluation is that the word "induction" misleads them those who try to justify induction and I simply drew attention to the fact that the word "induction" must be redefined to resolve the problems of justifying induction. The problem of justifying is not a genuine problem but a pseudo-problem caused by the misuse of the word "induction". If the meaning of the word "induction" is clarified, the difficulties of induction will disappear. The question "Should we attempt to justify induction?" is without sense. Induction is, because of its nature, not a thing to be justified or not.

공백진의 佛學思想

姜信碩 中國語文硏究會 1996 中國語文論叢 Vol.10 No.-

歸納推論의 正當性에 관한 연구

姜信石 釜山水産大學校 1984 論文集 Vol.33 No.-

What reason have we to place reliance on inductive procedures? Why should we suppose that the accumulation of instances of As which are Bs, however various the conditions in which they are observed, gives any good reason for expecting the next A we encounter to be a B? In this paper I proceeded to consider the problem of induction. Through critical evaluation of "Rejection of Induction", "Deductive reconstruction", "Validation", "Pragmatic Justification", "Self-Supporting Inductive Arguments", "Justification as a pseudo-problem" dealt with in this paper, I have tried to show the defects in each of the attempts to solve the problem of induction and concluded as follows : I have argue that there is no genuine problem of justifying induction-if there appears to be the problem of justifying induction, it is because of a misconception of the nature of induction or justification, or because of a similar kind of confusion. There is no genuine problem but merely a pseudo-problem caused by misuse of ordinary language. According to P.L. Heath, incorrect use of ordinary language is responsible for philosophical problems, and these can be solved only by "pointing out the normal usage of the words employed and the normal grammatical form of the sentences in which they appear. Ordinary language is correct language". Anybody who claimed otherwise would not be extraordinarily and admirably scrupulous but would be abusing language by violating some of the implicit criteria for the use of "good evidence", "good reason", "justified" and "reasonable", to which he, like the interlocutor with whom he succeeds in communicating, is in fact committed. We have good reason to place reliance on inductive procedures.

心身問題에 관한 연구

姜信石 釜慶大學校 2001 釜慶大學校 論文集 Vol.6 No.-

To answer the mind-body problem, in this paper I made critical evaluation of all the interpretations of and solutions to the mind-body problem. At the end of critical evaluation of all the various theories I arrived at the conclution as follows: We have misguided and have gone astray by the lack of clarity in the forms of our language. The question is not about facts but about words through which man speak about the fact. Surveying those difficults found in each of the solutions to the mind-body problem, it is perfectly clear that a way out of this problem could only be found by turning away from the world of facts to a consideration of the words 'mind' or 'the mental' and 'body' or 'the physical'. The difficulty was precisely due to the fact that we regarded what is only a matter of definition as a matter of observation. The first step in resolving the problem lies in turning from the question "What is the relation between mind and body?" to the question "What do you mean by the words 'mind' and 'body‘?" The question can be answered only by "pointing out the normal usage of the words employed and the normal grammatical form of the sentences in which the words ’mind‘ and ’body‘ appears". In a word, the mind-body problem is a pseudoproblem.

論理實證主義의 檢證可能原理에 관한 考察

姜信石 釜山水産大學校 1983 論文集 Vol.31 No.-

Logical positivists have an extreme respect for science and mathematics on the one hand and an extreme distate for metaphysics on the other. Thus one of the maintasks of them was to devise a clear criterion of meaning by the use of which science and mathematics would be proved acceptable as cognitively meaningful, and metaphysics by contrast would be condemned as nonsensical. This criterion became known as the Verifiability Principle. This principle was to disallow as nonsense any putatively scientific statement which could not possibly be confirmed or disconfirmed by appearing to sensory experience, and to admit as cognitively meaningful those which could be. The whole tension set up in philosophy by the adoption of a verifiability principle may be thought of in terms of getting a criterion which would keep in all of what were thought of scientific statements, and rule out all the so-called metaphysical ones, without ruling out any scientific ones or allowing in any metaphysical ones. But, unfortunately, this principle did not work as they expected it to. Many important statements of science would be ruled out and not acceptable as meaningful. On the contrary, many metaphysical statements would be allowed in as cognitively meaningful. They vainly tried to get a proper formulation of this principle. This fact means that the abstract and complicated statements of science could not be translated into or reducible to simple combination of observation-statements. Because scientific theories and hypotheses are more than summaries of sensory findings; they apply to the unobserved events of the future-that is the whole point of prediction in science. And the impossibility of translation or reducibility implies, in fact, that pure empiricism is not a sufficient basis for science. There is another principle upon which science rests. If this one principle is admitted, everything else can proceed in accordance with the theory that all our scientific knowledge is based on experience. To admit this principle means a serious departure from pure empiricism. This principle is the induction which is an independent logical principle, incapable of being inferred either from experience of from other logical principles, and without which science is impossible. Science does not rest upon pure empiricism.

歸納推論의 正當性에 관한 연구(二)

姜信石 釜山水産大學校 1986 論文集 Vol.36 No.-

The fundamental doctrine which underlies all theories of induction is the doctrine of the primacy of regularities. In other words, all theories of induction assume that nature is uniform and that the future will be like the past, so if, for example, every horse that has ever been observed has had a heart, we conclude that the next horse to be observed will have a heart. This suggests that induction projects observed regularities into the future. In this paper I did critical evaluation of this suggestion and concluded as follows. Primarily, there are regularities found in the nature which should not be projected into the future. Of course, some regularities are highly projectible, some have a middling degree of projectibility, but some are quite unprojectible. Secondly, the primacy of regularities is inadequate for another reason. Viewing from different standpoints, too many regularities are to be found in any given set of data. In one set of data we can find regularities whose projection leads to conflicting predictions. In fact, for any prediction we choose, there will be a regularity whose projection licenses that prediction. Induction must select from the multitude of regularities present in any sequence of observations, for indiscriminate projection leads to paradox. Thus the fundamental problem in the justification of induction is to specify the rules used to determine which regularities we consider to be projectible into the future. This is the new riddle of induction.

논리실증주의 의 검증가능원리에 관한 고찰

강신석 釜山水産大學校 1983 論文集 Vol.31 No.-

2013년 중국 해양관리기구 조직개편의 함의

강신석 한국해양경찰학회 2013 한국해양경찰학회보 Vol.3 No.2

중국은 내부 종합개발(1990년대 초 중국 동남부연해의 개혁·개방을 시작으로, 중 서부 지역 발전을 견인한다는 목표를 세우고, 현재 중부개발, 서부대개발 프로젝트 진행중)의 진전, 정치적 안정화(소수민족, 양안문제, 정부비판 여론 수렴)를 도모함 으로써 국내역량을 결집하였다고 판단하고 있다. 이번 해양관리기구개편 시행은 다 음 단계의 “국제사회에 참여하는(走出去)” 전략을 시행하는 중요한 조치이며, 연안 지역의 사회경제발전/발전방식전환 촉진 및 “소강사회(小康社會)” 건설목표 달성, 국제사회 지위향상과 영향력 확대를 바탕으로, “해양강국 건설(走向海洋)”을 통한 “강대국 진입(大國崛起)”을 향한 첫 걸음이라는 총체적 의미를 갖는다. 우리는 대한민국이 항상 한반도라는 지정학적 위치로 그 운명이 결정되어져 왔던 역사를 읽어낼 수 있다. 이제 또 다시 전환기 동아시아라는 공유된 시공 속에서 운 명처럼 다가온 주변 강대국들, 특히 과거보다 상대적으로 막강해진 G2 중국과 두는 한 수 한 수의 대국에 직면해 있다. 최근 중국정부가 취하고 있는 해양에 대한 관심은 자원의 개발과 확보, 영토세력 의 확장이라는 경제, 정치사회적 측면에서 우리의 관심을 끌기에 충분하다. 일련의 중국측 공식 입장표명을 감안한다면, 한국 정부 및 해양관련 산하기관은 과거의 역 사적 교훈을 거울삼아 향후 전개될 동아시아 해양을 둘러싼 산적한 현안들을 면밀히 검토하고 신속히 중장기 대응책을 수립해야할 시점에 놓여 있다.

先秦 楚나라 竹書本에 나타난 人性論 ― <性情論> 23 - 28간에 대한 考釋

강신석 중국어문연구회 2011 中國語文論叢 Vol.0 No.51

The <XingQingLun(性情論)> as a form of wooden script is closely related to the Confucius's school Disciples. This work is a description on the human nature written by a original Confucian(儒家). The concept of 'Xing(性)' in this works(<XingQingLun(性情論)>) reveals in human nature. It is not really same to 'Xin(心)', doesn't totally decide that also. On the other hand 'Qing(情)' is all caused by 'Xin(心)'. and It is a 'Xinzhi(心志)' for human to get through studying by actual life. This article's author recognized that learning such as 'ShiShuLiYue(詩書禮樂)' is an essential to become a saint. Through this study, the <XingQingLun(性情論)> in ≪Shanghai museum Bamboo Manuscripts(上博楚書)≫ may be assumed that offers a bridge concept on human nature between Confucius(孔子), Mencius(孟子), 告子, 荀子 and Qin(秦) dynasty.