Foreign Innovator, Eco-technology Licensing and Privatization in a Polluting Mixed Duopoly

( Seung Leul Kim ),( Sang Ho Lee ) 한국산업조직학회 2015 한국산업조직학회 정책세미나 논문집 Vol.2015 No.1

This article investigates the strategic fixed-fee licensing contract in a mixed duopoly where public and private firms can purchase eco-technology from foreign innovator, and examines the welfare consequences of privatization. The followings are main findings: First, foreign innovator chooses exclusive or non-exclusive licensing contract according to the cost gap between the two firms and environmental damage of pollutants. In a mixed market, the innovator prefers exclusive contract when both cost gap and environmental damage are small or large while it prefers non-exclusive contract when those are intermediate. In a private market, irrespective of environmental damage, the innovator prefers non-exclusive contract when cost gap is small while it prefers exclusive contract when cost gap is large. Second, the welfare effect of privatization depends not only on cost gap but also on environmental damage: (i) when both cost gap and environmental damage are large, privatization can improve the social welfare. (ii) when both cost gap and environmental damage are small, exclusive contract without privatization might be better off. (iii) when both cost gap and damage level are intermediate, non-exclusive contract without privatization might be better off. Finally, when the government imposes a restriction of exclusive contract on foreign innovator, privatization mostly improves the social welfare except the case where both cost gap and environmental damage are small.

Eco-technology Licensing and Privatization in a Polluting Mixed Duopoly with Foreign Innovator

( Seung-leul Kim ),( Sang-ho Lee ) 한국환경경제학회·한국자원경제학회(구 한국환경경제학회) 2015 한국환경경제학회 학술발표논문집 Vol.2015 No.하계

This article investigates the strategic fixed-fee licensing contract in a mixed duopoly where public and private firms can purchase eco-technology from foreign innovator, and examines the welfare consequences of privatization. The followings are main findings: First, foreign innovator chooses exclusive or non-exclusive licensing contract according to the cost gap between the two firms and environmental damage of pollutants. In a mixed market, the innovator prefers exclusive contract when both cost gap and environmental damage are small or large while it prefers non-exclusive contract when those are intermediate. In a private market, irrespective of environmental damage, the innovator prefers non-exclusive contract when cost gap is small while it prefers exclusive contract when cost gap is large. Second, the welfare effect of privatization depends not only on cost gap but also on environmental damage: (i) when both cost gap and environmental damage are large, privatization can improve the social welfare. (ii) when both cost gap and environmental damage are small, exclusive contract without privatization might be better off. (iii) when both cost gap and damage level are intermediate, non-exclusive contract without privatization might be better off. Finally, when the government imposes a restriction of exclusive contract on foreign innovator, privatization mostly improves the social welfare except the case where both cost gap and environmental damage are small.

Licensing Strategies under Emission Tax : Auctioning versus Fixed-Fee

( Seung-leul Kim ),( Sang-ho Lee ) 한국환경경제학회·한국자원경제학회(구 한국환경경제학회) 2014 한국환경경제학회 학술발표논문집 Vol.2014 No.하계

This article investigates the licensing strategies by an outside eco-innovator toward polluting duopoly firms, which may purchase a license of pollution abatement technology under emission tax. We compare the two types of licensing strategies, auctioning and fixed-fee, and examine the optimal licensing choice of a patentee and its welfare consequences. We show that the innovator may exclude an inefficient licensee when two firms compete in purchasing licenses, which results in welfare-loss. When the production cost is symmetric, a patentee prefers auctioning to fixed-fee licensing irrespective of the level of emission tax. However, when the production cost is asymmetric, its incentive of licensing strategies depends on the level of emission tax. In particular, auctioning is preferred to fixed-fee only when the emission tax is low, however, fixedfee is the dominating strategy when the emission tax is high. Some policy discussions on the welfare analysis are also provided.

The Welfare Effect of Tariff and Licensing Strategies on Eco-technology

Seung-Leul Kim(김승렬) 한국산업경제학회 2018 한국산업경제학회 정기학술발표대회 논문집 Vol.2018 No.12

Eco-Technology Licensing under Emission Tax: Royalty vs. Fixed-Fee

( Seung Leul Kim ),( Sang Ho Lee ) 한국경제학회 2014 The Korean Economic Review Vol.30 No.2

This article considers the licensing strategies of eco-technology when an innovator provides pollution abatement goods to oligopolistic polluting firms that produce consumption goods and emit environmental pollutants. In the presence of emission tax, two types of licensing contracts, royalty and fixed-fee, are examined to analyze market equilibrium and to compare their welfare consequences. We show that an eco-innovator provides a non-exclusive license under a royalty contract while it might exclude polluting firms under the fixed-fee licensing contract. However, when mixed licensing contract where royalty and fixed-fee contracts are combined together is available, we show that ecoinnovator provides non-exclusive license. We also show that, compared to royalty licensing, exclusive fixed-fee contract will increase the welfare but its welfare effect depends on the level of emission tax. Finally, we derive the optimal emission tax and show that an appropriate emission tax combined with non-exclusion policy or profit-cap regulation can increase the welfare. JEL Classification: L13, D45, Q55, Q58

Licensing Strategies by an Eco-monopolist : Two-part Tariff Licensing

김승렬 ( Seung-leul Kim ),이상호 ( Sang-ho Lee ) 한국환경경제학회, 한국자원경제학회 ( 구 한국환경경제학회 ) 2013 한국환경경제학회 학술발표논문집 Vol.2013 No.하계

This article examines patent licensing strategies of eco-technology by an innovator. In the presence of emission tax, we consider a model of vertically related market between upstream monopolistic innovator and downstream polluting duopolistic firms where firms may purchase a license of pollution abatement technology from an upstream patentee. When the government imposes an emission tax on downstream polluting industry, we analyze two-part tariff licensing strategies and compare the incentives of innovator on other licensing strategies.The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, the innovator always prefers two-part tariff licensing to fixed-fee licensing. Second, the innovator always prefers to no exclusion licensing under two-part tariff licensing.Moreover, ecomonopolist improves social welfare with no exclusion licensees under two-part tariff licensing. Third, two-part tariff licensing can reduce welfare loss which is from exclusive licensing strategy under fixed-fee licensing. That is, two-part tariff licensing is superior to fixed-fee licensing in specific tax ranges. Finally, we suggest that the optimal emission tax without exclusive strategies can improve the welfare.

환경기술 특허권 양도전략과 재실시권의 후생효과

김승렬 ( Seung-leul Kim ),이상호 ( Sang-ho Lee ) 한국산업조직학회 2016 産業組織硏究 Vol.24 No.3

본 연구는 환경기술을 보유한 특허권자가 생산과정에서 오염을 배출하는 복점기업에게 사용하는 특허기술 양도전략에 대해 분석한다. 오염배출기업간에 생산비용의 차이가 있고 환경기술 특허권을 양도받은 기업이 경쟁기업에게 재실시권(sublicense)을 실시할 수 있는 경우에 시장균형과 사회후생에 대해 비교하였다. 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 생산비용의 차이가 작은 경우에 특허권자는 비효율적인 기업에게 특허권을 양도하는 반면, 비용차이가 큰 경우에는 효율적인 기업에게 특허권을 양도한다. 둘째, 환경기술 특허권을 양도받은 비효율적인 기업은 재실시권을 사용하는 반면, 효율적인 기업은 독점적으로 사용한다. 셋째, 비효율적인 기업의 재실시권 사용은 후생을 증진시키는 반면, 효율적인 기업의 독점적 사용권은 비용차이에 따라 후생효과가 다르다. 즉, 생산비용 차이가 큰 경우에는 독점적 사용권이 사회적으로 바람직하지만, 생산비용 차이가 작은 경우에는 재실시권의 사용이 사회적으로 더 바람직하다. 따라서 환경특허의 기술거래에 있어서 적절한 재실시권 지원정책이 필요하다. This study analyzes the eco-patent transfer strategy of the patentee when polluting duopoly firms have different production costs and emit pollutions in the production process. With allowing sublicensing strategy of licensee, we compare market equilibrium and social welfare of eco-patent transfer. The followings are the main findings. First, patentee transfers the eco-patent to an inefficient firm. when production cost gap is small, while to an inefficient firm when cost gap is large. Second, after obtaining of the eco-patent, inefficient firm operates sublicense to the efficient firm, while efficient firm uses it exclusively without sublicensing. Third, sublicensing strategy of inefficient firm improves social welfare but the welfare effect of the monopolistic use of patent by efficient firm depends on the cost gap. When cost gap is large, exclusive right of patent using is socially desirable, but when it is small, sublicensing is socially more desirable. Thus, the appropriate policy on the sublicensing in the eco-patent trading market is required.

NI-ELVIS를 활용한 센서계측공학의 실습교육 사례

이병렬 ( Byeung Leul Lee ),이용희 ( Yong Hee Lee ) 한국실천공학교육학회 2011 실천공학교육논문지 Vol.3 No.1

본 논문에서는 센서공학분야의 실습교육에 NI-ELVIS(National Instrument Educational Laboratory Virtual Instrumentation Suite)를 활용하는 방안을 제시하였다. ELVIS는 LabView 기반의 계측시스템 설계와 프로토타이핑 환경을 제공하는 개발 플랫폼을 지칭한다. ELVIS는 가상 계측장치와 다기능 데이터 수집 장치(DAQ) 및 벤치탑 워크스테이션, 프로토타이핑보드 등으로 구성되어 있기 때문에 사용자가 의도하는 다양한 형태의 계측시스템을 PC에서 소프트웨어적으로 구성할 수 있다. 따라서 고가의 계측 장비를 이용하지 않고도 전기전자 분야의 효과적인 실험 실습 교육을 진행할 수 있다는 장점이 있다. 특히 센서계측공학의 경우 센서 기술, 전기전자공학, 신호처리, 데이터 분석 등 다양한 분야가 혼합된 영역임에도 복잡한 실험 장치에 의존하지 않아도 실습교육에 활용이 가능하다. 본 논문에서 제시한 계측공학 실습교육에서의 적용 외에도 전기전자 실험이 필요한 다양한 교과목에 높은 학습효과를 기대할 수 있다. In this paper we suggest an effective teaching plan for measurement engineering by utilizing the NI-ELVIS(National Instrument Educational Laboratory Virtual Instrumentation Suite). ELVIS is a development platform for LabVIEW-based design and prototyping environment. It consists of LabVIEW-based virtual instruments, a multifunctional data acquisition device, and a custom-designed benchtop workstation and prototyping board. Therefore it can replace the expensive instruments for the effective education in the area of electrical engineering. This platform can be applicable for the sensor instrumentation engineering study, though it is a multidisciplinary learning including electrical engineering, sensor technology, signal processing and data analysis. We hope this approach can be used for the other educational area related the electrical experimental education.

상품차별화시장에서의 기업의 사회적 책임과 내생적 시간게임

김승렬 ( Seung-leul Kim ) 한국경제통상학회(구 한국경상학회,한국국민경제학회) 2019 경제연구 Vol.37 No.4

상품이 차별화된 복점시장에서 기업의 사회적 책임(Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR)활동을 수행하는 소비자 친화적인 CSR 기업과 이윤을 추구하는 사기업이 가격경쟁을 하는 경우 CSR 기업의 사회적 책임 정도가 시장균형과 사회후생에 미치는 효과를 분석한다. 본 연구의 주요 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 상품차별화 시장에서 CSR을 고려하는 기업과 사기업이 경쟁하는 경우, 사회적 책임 정도는 경쟁형태와 관계없이 균형에서의 가격을 하락 시킨다. 둘째, 내생적 시간게임의 균형에서 CSR 기업의 사회적 책임 정도는 기업 간의 경쟁전략에 영향을 미친다. 셋째, 사회후생의 관점에서 보면, 사기업으로 구성된 복점 가격경쟁시장에서 내생적 시간게임의 결과는 항상 사회적 후생손실을 발생시키지만, CSR 기업이 시장에 존재하면 사회후생을 증가시킬 수 있다. 마지막으로, 상품차별화 정도는 CSR 기업의 최적 사회적 책임정도에 영향을 미친다. 즉, 상품차별화 정도가 커질수록 CSR기업에게 더욱 높은 수준의 사회적 책임이 요구된다. This article considers a mixed duopoly market with differentiated products where a private firm competes with a consumer-friendly CSR firm. We examine the effect of Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR) on price competition market, and examines market equilibrium and its social welfare consequences. We also analyze an endogenous timing game to suggest the desirable role of CSR firm. The main results of this study are as follows. First, when CSR firm and private firm compete in the product differentiation market, the degree of CSR lowers the equilibrium price regardless of either simultaneous or sequential game. Second, under endogenous time game, the degree of CSR affects the strategic choices of both firms on the role of market such as price leader or price follower. In particular, when the degree of CSR is either low or very high, the both firms prefer to set price simultaneously. When it is moderately high, CSR firm plays the role of price follower and private firms play the role of price leader. Third, from the perspective of social welfare, the existence of CSR firm in price competition duopoly market can increase social welfare. Finally, the degree of product differentiation affects the optimal degree of CSR that maximize social welfare. In other words, the greater the level of product differentiation, the higher the level of CSR is required to CSR firm.

기업의 사회적 책임과 내생적 경쟁구조

김승렬 ( Seung Leul Kim ),이상호 ( Sang Ho Lee ) 한국산업조직학회 2015 産業組織硏究 Vol.23 No.1

본 논문은 기업의 사회적 책임(Corporate Social Responsibility: CSR)을 고려하는 CSR 기업과 이윤을 극대화하는 사기업이 경쟁하는 복점시장에서 CSR 기업의 사회적 책임 정도가 시장균형에 미치는 영향과 사회후생의 효과를 분석한다. 본 연구의 주요 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 시장에 CSR 기업이 존재하는 경우 경쟁구조와 무관하게 사회후생을 증진시킬 수 있으나, 사회적으로 항상 바람직한 것은 아니다. 특히, 사회적 책임이 지나치게 강조되면 오히려 사회후생을 감소시킬 수 있다. 둘째, 내생적으로 경쟁구조를 결정하는 내생적 시간게임(endogenous timing game)의 균형은 CSR 기업의 사회적 책임 정도에 따라 달라진다. 구체적으로, 사회적 책임의 정도가 낮은 경우는 꾸르노 경쟁을 하고, 적당히 높은 수준에서는CSR 기업이 시장에서 추종자 역할을 하며, 아주 높은 경우는 CSR 기업이 선도자 역할을 한다. 그러나, 사회후생의 관점에서 볼 때 CSR 기업이 시장에서 추종자 역할을 하는 것이 가장 바람직하며, 따라서 CSR 기업에게 사회적 책임을 지나치게 강조하지 않아야 한다. This paper considers a mixed duopoly market with homogeneous products where a private firm competes with a consumer-oriented CSR firm. We analyze the effect of Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR) on market structure between Cournot and Stackelberg competition models, and examine market equilibrium and its welfare consequences. We also investigate an endogenous timing game to address the desirable role of CSR firm. The followings are the main findings. First, irrespective of market structure, the existence of CSR firm in the duopoly market can increase social welfare but it is not always socially desirable since it deteriorates social welfare when the degree of CSR is too high. Second, under endogenous timing game, the degree of CSR affects the strategic choices of firms on the market role such as leader or follower in the market. In particular, (i) when the degree of CSR is low, both firms compete in Cournot fashion; (ii) when it is intermediate, CSR firm acts as follower; (iii) when it is very high, CSR firm leadership occurs at the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. Thus, the equilibrium of the endogenous timing game depends on the degree of CSR, which might result in welfare-loss. Therefore, the appropriate degree of CSR under private leadership will improve social welfare.