공정거래법상 시장지배력 남용 규제의 해석 및 집행 상의 문제점 - 불공정거래행위 규제와의 법적용 관계를 중심으로

황창식,Hwang, Chang-Sik 한국공정경쟁연합회 2008 경쟁저널 Vol.- No.139

대규모 기업집단 규제의 현황, 성과 및 개선방향

황창식,이수경 서울대학교 금융법센터 2016 BFL Vol.78 No.-

지급결제시스템의 정산수수료(interchange fees)에 대한 공정거래규제법리 -대법원 지로사건 판결을 중심으로-

황창식 ( Chang Sik Hwang ) 한국경쟁법학회 2012 競爭法硏究 Vol.26 No.-

Monetary transaction settlement networks recently have been scrutinized by the antitrust authorities worldwide. The main focus of antitrust and regulatory scrutiny has been on the interchange fees that are collectively determined by the member banks or by the network organization because the antitrust and regulatory authorities view that such collective determination of the interchange fees is likely to cause anticompetitive effects, such as increase in the merchant fees which is then passed on to consumers. Interchange fee was designed to strike a balance between the interests of the issuing side by whom most of the network costs are incurred and the interests of the acquiring side where most of the profits are created. It is a well-known feature of a two-sided market. Without interchange fees, the whole network could not be sustained due to the imbalance between the issuing side and the acquiring side. In a credit cardtransaction, the card-issuing bank in a payment transaction deducts the interchange fees from the amount it pays to the acquiring bank that handles the credit or debit card transaction for the merchant. The acquiring bank then pays the merchant the transaction amount minus the interchange fees. Similarly, in a giro payment transaction, the collecting bank deducts the interchange fees from the amount it pays to the paying bank that handles the collection request from the customers. Although the European Commission challenged the collective determination of the interchange fees, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (“KFTC”) has taken a more lenient stance on such collective determination. In 2005, the KFTC issued a decision which found the member banks of the giro network had colluded to increase the giro fees that are charged to the customers by the paying banks. The core base of this decision was that all paying banks had adopted the same amount of giro fee which amount was equal to the interchange fee amount, and this would not have taken place without collusion. The banks filed a lawsuit to overturn the KFTC`s decision, arguing that they had not agreed on the giro fee amount, but agreed on the interchange fee amount which has generally been exempted from antitrust claims by the KFTC, and that due to the special characteristics of the two-sided market and the unique cost structure of the giro settlement network - i.e., continuing loss on the collecting side, the phenomenon of giro fee amount being equal to interchange fee amount was economically sensible and reasonable. If the giro fees fall short of the actual costs incurred by the collecting banks when they conduct the collection activities vis-?-vis the giro payers, the paying bank has to deliver all such fees to the collecting banks as the interchange fee. Otherwise, the paying banks would enjoy profit, while the collecting banks incur losses on a continuing base, in which case the joint venture of giro settlement network could not be maintained due to a conflict of economic interest between the paying banks and the collecting banks. Two different panels of the High Court issued different judgments, one in favor of the KFTC and the other in favor of the banks. The High Court`s decision was appealed to the Supreme Court. In 2011, the Supreme Court issued the final decision in favor of the banks, although it had issued a decision in favor of the KFTC in a similar case in 2008 in which it was disputed whether or not the banks colluded on the merchant fees in a local card payment network when the merchant fees were equal to the interchange fees. The Supreme Court carried out a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the two-sided market, the function of the interchange fee in the giro settlement network, and its cost structure, and then the Supreme Court concluded that what the KFTC presented could not be a sufficient ground to prove the collusion on the giro fees among the banks, particularly given the economic incentives which would make it highly probable that the giro fees should become equal to the interchange fees. The Supreme Court`s decision is quite noteworthy in that the courts are now asked to give weight on the economic incentive analysis when they assess conflicting factual evidence in a cartel case.

시장지배적 사업자의 거래거절에 대한 공정거래법리: 대법원의 포스코 사건 판결

황창식 ( Chang Sik Hwang ),신광식 ( Kwang Shik Shin ) 한국경쟁법학회 2008 競爭法硏究 Vol.18 No.-

다면적 플랫폼 사업자에 대한 공정거래규제

황창식(Hwang Chang Sik) 한국정보법학회 2009 정보법학 Vol.13 No.2

Multi-sided platforms where a transaction takes place among many demand customer groups have become one of the most important business areas due to advancement in technology, including Internet-based technology. However, since the competitive characteristics of multi-sided platforms are quite different from those of traditional one-sided markets, a traditional analysis and approach might cause a serious error and mistake in the new multi-sided platform businesses. Market definition and market dominance determination based on market shares and price-margin analysis might lead to an erroneous conclusion without taking into account indirect network externalities which have greater impact on the utility of a demand group as the number of other demand groups becomes larger. In particular, a high market share in one side cannot give the multi-sided platforms market dominance because indirect network externalities may play a deterrent effect on their ability to increase the price by decreasing demand on one side, then decreasing demand on the other side and then decreasing demand again on the first side (i.e., feedback loop effect). This deterrent effect can become much stronger in case of multi-homing which is common in Internet-based platforms. Thus, these competitive characteristics of two-sided markets must be fully considered in applying competition law to multi-sided platform businesses. However, caution is required when applying the two-sided market theory which has been developed as an economic theory to the actual competition cases. First of all, if the two-sided market theory is so widely expanded that it is viewed that all the sides of the multi-sided platforms constitute a single relevant product market and that competitive analysis is conducted only in connection with similar multi-sided platforms, the likelihood of an erroneous conclusion becomes greater because multi-sided platforms have more sides and conduct various businesses in a complex manner. In order to significantly reduce the risk of an erroneous conclusion, competitive analysis should be conducted side by side, as long as their competitive condition and circumstances are different from each other. In this context, the Supreme Court decision in T-broad Gangseo Cable TV case is significant. The Supreme Court took the right approach in that it acknowledged that a cable TV operator is a multi-sided platform with the characteristics of a two-sided market; determined that there existed different markets between its side relating to the program providers and its side relating to the cable TV viewers based on their different competitive conditions and circumstances; and then conducted an analysis of whether T-broad Gangseo Cable TV has market dominance in the side relating to the program providers where the abusive acts took place. In addition, on the issue of monopoly leveraging doctrine, the Supreme Court held that a multi-sided platform which has market dominance in one side cannot be deemed to have market dominance in the other side merely based on the interaction of demands between two sides. This holding is correct not only from the perspective of the market definition and competitive analysis, as explained above, but also from the perspective of the application of monopoly leveraging doctrine. Monopoly leveraging means an exclusionary act, such as tying, by which a monopoly power in one market is transferred to a neighboring market. It is quite clear that unilateral change in the channel placement of a home shopping channel by the cable TV operator cannot be such exclusionary act. 인터넷기술을 비롯한 신기술의 발달로 다수의 고객집단을 연결해주는 거래장소로서의 다면적 플랫폼이 중요한 사업영역으로 각광을 받고 있다. 그러나 다면적 플랫폼에서는 종래 단면시장에서와는 다른 경쟁적인 특성이 작용하고 있어서 전통적인 경 쟁법 틀을 그대로 적용할 경우 중대한 오류를 초래할 수 있다. 즉, 고객집단간의 상호관계에 따라 각 고객집단의 효용이 달라지게 되는 소위 간접적 네트워크 효과에 의하여 단순한 시장점유율 및 마진 분석에 기초한 시장획정 및 시장지배력 분석은 잘못된 결론에 이를 수 있다. 특히, 다면적 플랫폼의 경우에는 이러한 간접적 네트워크 효과에 따라 한 측면에서 시장점유율이 높다고 하더라도 다른 측면에 미치는 영향으로 인하여 가격을 경쟁수준으로 인상할 수 있는 시장지배력을 갖기가 어려우며, 이는 멀티호밍의 경우에 더욱 뚜렷하여진다. 따라서 다면적 플랫폼 사업에 대한 경쟁법 적용에 있어서는 양면시장적 특성을 충분히 반영하여야 한다. 그러나 동시에 경제학 이론으로 발달해온 양면시장 이론은 실제 경쟁법 사례에 적용함에 있어서는 상당한 주의가 필요하다. 특히, 양면시장이론을 확대하여 다면적 플랫폼 자체를 하나의 별도 시장으로 획정하고 다른 동일 혹은 유사 플랫폼과의 경쟁만을 대상으로 경쟁분석을 할 경우에 다면적 플랫폼이 점점 더 여러 사업영역에서 다양한 기능과 역할을 복합적으로 수행하게 되면 될수록 경쟁분석의 오류를 초래할 가능성이 높아진다. 이러한 점에서 다면적 플랫폼의 각 면의 경쟁양상이 서로 상이한 경우 각 면의 수요집단별로 대체성을 기준으로 경쟁원천을 파악하는 방법으로 시장획정을 하고 그에 따라 경쟁분석을 하는 것이 오류 가능성을 줄이는 방법이 될 것이다. 이러한 점에서 대법원의 티브로드 강서 판결은 큰 의미가 있다. 대법원은 케이블 TV사업자가 다면적 플랫폼사업자로서 양면시장적 특성을 가지고 있으며, PP측면과 가입자측면의 경쟁양상이 상이하다는 점을 근거로 하여 별도 시장획정을 하고 당해 남용행위가 문제되고 있는 PP측면에서 티브로드 강서방송이 시장지배력을 보유하고 있는지를 분석하고 있다는 점에서 타당한 접근방법이다. 아울러, 대법원은 시장지배력의 전이이론과 관련하여서도 다면적 플랫폼 사업의 경우 각 측면의 수요가 상호의존성을 가지고 있다는 점만을 근거로 하여 당해 사업자가 한 측면에서 시장지배력을 가지고 있다고 하여 다른 측면으로 시장지배력이 전이되는 관계에 있는 것이 아님을 판시하고 있는 바, 이는 다면적 플랫폼 사업자에 대한 시장획정 및 시장지배력 판단의 관점에서도 타당하지만 시장지배력 전이이론의 관점에서도 타당하다. 시장지배력의 전이이론은 사업자가 어떤 시장에서의 시장지배력을 매개로 하여 다른 시장으로 시장지배력을 이전, 확대하기 위하여 끼워팔기와 같은 경쟁배제적 행위를 하는 것을 말하는데 티브로드 강서방송이 우리홈쇼핑에 대하여 방송채널을 하위채널로 변경하는 것이 그러한 전이행위에 해당할 수 없음은 명백하기 때문이다.

指定討論 要旨

黃昌植(Hwang Chang-Sik) 한국법학원 2003 저스티스 Vol.- No.74

Live Avatar를 이용한 원격 발표 시스템

황창식(Chang-Sik Hwang),김익재(Ig -Jae Kim),김형곤(Hyoung-Gon Kim),안상철(Sang Chul Ahn) 한국HCI학회 2004 한국HCI학회 학술대회 Vol.2004 No.2

환경규제와 국제거래

박상열,황창식 국제거래법학회 1993 國際去來法硏究 Vol.2 No.1

영상 특징들에 자동 가중치 부여를 이용한 검색 성능 개선

김강욱,박종호,황창식,Kim, Kang-Wook,Park, Jong-Ho,Hwang, Chang-Sik 대한전자공학회 2000 電子工學會論文誌-SP (Signal processing) Vol.37 No.6

Typical image features such as color, shape, and texture are used in content based image retrieved. Retrieval which uses only one image feature has little performance in case that the content of image is complex or database contains many images. So, many approaches for integrating these features have been studied. However, the problem of these approaches is how to appropriately weight the image features at query time. In this paper, we propose a new retrieval method using automatically weighted image features. We perform computer simulations in test database which consists of various kinds of images. The experimental results show that the proposed method has better performance than previous works, which use fixed weight for each feature mostly, in respect to several performance cvaluations such as precision vs recall, retrieval efficiency, and ranking measure. 내용기반 영상 검색에서는 컬러, 형태, 질감의 세 가지 대표적인 영상 특징들이 주로 사용된다. 한 가지 특징만을 사용하는 검색 방법은 영상의 내용이 복잡하거나 비교대상이 되는 영상의 수가 많아질수록 좋은 성능을 보이지 못한다. 그래서 여러 가지 영상 특징들을 결합한 방법들이 많이 연구되고 있다. 그러나 여러 특징들을 결합해서 사용하는 검색 시스템이라 할지라도 각 특징들에 대한 가중치가 적합하게 부여되지 않으면 검색되는 결과 영상들의 순위가 크게 변하여 검색 성능이 떨어지게 된다. 이러한 문제점을 해결하기 위해 본 논문에서는 여러 영상 특징들이 결합해서 사용될 때 각 특징에 대한 가중치를 자동적으로 부여해서 검색 성능을 개선하고자 한다. 제안한 방법을 992개의 테스트 영상들로 구성된 데이터 베이스에서 실험을 하고 다양한 성능평가 방법을 통해 그 타당성을 확인하였으며 제안한 방법을 고정가중치 부여를 이용한 방법과 비교하여 검색 성능이 개선됨을 볼 수 있었다.