한국전쟁기 유엔에 대한 일본의 협력활동

이종판 국방부군사편찬연구소 2003 군사 Vol.- No.48

한국전쟁과 일본 : 한국전쟁당시 일본의 대응과 협력내용을 중심으로

이종판 한일군사문화학회 2003 한일군사문화연구 Vol.1 No.-

6.25전쟁 당시 미국의 핵무기 정책-아이젠하워 정권을 중심으로-

이종판 국방부군사편찬연구소 2011 군사 Vol.- No.78

There some reasons why the nuclear weapons were not used in the Korean War(1950~1953). First, the nuclear strategy is not established in the situation of the limited war. Second, the atomic bomb was the weapon for strategic attack which aimed at industrial targets or traffic centers. There were not that kind of targets during the Korean War. In other words, Chinese Communist Forces whose attack exploits mountains was not the target of atomic bombing. In addition, after the atomic bomb dropping on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, using the nuclear weapon again on Asia itself was banned. Third, if the expected effect does not appear despite using the atomic bomb, it was concerned that the control function might disappear. The problems about nuclear weapon's control function were already unveiled. Bernard Brodie, one of the American nuclear strategy creator, mentioned the hardship of control in the nuclear world: “Today's weird paradox is that, though the nuclear must operate its control function, the concern about the malfunctioning of it is inherent." The nuclear threat tried by Eisenhower and Dulles was elementary but throws lots of meaning. In retrospect, Eisenhower and Dulles conceive new strategy during the presidential race in 1952, criticizing Truman's strategy. It was that American must prepare for exploiting nuclear weapons by using dominant position on nuclear when necessary. Here, the claim that psychological barrier between nuclear weapons and others should be overcome was brought forward. Eisenhower did not entirely agree on Dulles' viewpoint regarding the nuclear during the election campaign but after inauguration accepted his opinion to finish the Korean War and when faced the problem to maintain the Armistice Agreement. Nuclear threat for extracting the Armistice Agreement by American will, and nuclear threat in case of being unsolved as planned were more evident. And it is continued after the Armistice Agreement. Like this, Eisenhower and Dulles thought nuclear threat was success. Based on this, the cold war strategy under Eisenhower regime downsized old weapons and relied on nuclear weapon control. The perspective that the nuclear threat strategy was successful in terms of deriving the Armistice Agreement of the Korean War is based on misunderstanding of Eisenhower and Dulles. However, the nuclear policy formed from such misunderstanding is developed into the policy that decided the victory by nuclear weapons in a series of crisis in 1950's Asia.

한국전쟁 당시 중국개입의예측실패에 관한 연구 -미극동군사령부의 정보활동을 중심으로-

이종판,코야나기 준이치 국방부군사편찬연구소 2008 군사 Vol.- No.67

This study is to investigate the failure of prediction to the Chinese Communist Forces(CCF)’s intervention in the Korean War in 1950. For this study, I investigated the intelligence operations of the Far East Command(FEC) during the two months from the day of the 15th September 1950, when the Incheon Amphibious Landing Operations were held in Incheon. I have investigated the following two questions. The first question was the reason why the FEC did not understand the possibilities of the intervention even if they received many warning and signals that implicated the intervention. The second question was the reason why the US Government accepted the FEC’s misestimation about the possibilities of the CCF’s intervention without reestimation. As I reviewed these two questions, I could find the cause of failure. The reason why the FEC did not understand the signal of the CCF’s intervention in the Korean War was as follows. Firstly, many complications with respect to the CCF’s intervention in the Korean War have made the uncertainty of intelligence magnified. Second, as the signals about he CCF’s intervention was ambiguous, they were buried in the noise that implicated the possibilities of the CCF’s invasion against the Taiwan. Third, as estimations are activities human beings do not like, there exists possibilities of mistake during information processing. All these factors made the FEC underestimate the possibilities of CCF’s intervention in the Korean war. As centralized information systems did nor work properly, the US Government accepted the FEC’s misestimation about the possibilities of CCF’s intervention without reestimation. As a result of the Japanese Invasion against the Pearl Harbor during the Second World War, CIA were equipped with system to filter many diverse intelligence during the Korean War. But as intelligence about far-east area were preoccupied by the FEC, CIA did not work properly which should reestimate intelligence accurately. As shown, the US intelligence system during the Korean War was operated in distorted way. Misestimation of the FEC about the possibilities of CCF’s intervention which were received by CIA affected the US political decisions about the Korean War greatly. These results from the fact that the US Government during the Korean War depended two much on the intelligence received from the FEC, and the FEC involved US policies. As shown, distortions of intelligence system during the Korean War made failures in intelligence area, misinterpretation of the FEC(intelligence producer) and decision maker(intelligence consumer)’s misinterpretation were mingled. That is the reason why the US Government failed to predict the possibilities of CCF’s intervention in the Korean War. Even if we could say there were some distortions when centralized intelligence system which emerged after the Pacific War settled down, we could also say that these distortions of intelligence system was due to the FEC.

6 · 25전쟁과 한 · 미 · 일 공조(共助)의 형성에 관한 연구

李鍾判(Lee, Jong-pan) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2010 군사 Vol.- No.74

한국전쟁 당시 중국개입의 예측실패에 관한 연구

李鍾判(Lee, Jong-pan),小柳順一(Ko, Yanagi-Junichi) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2008 군사 Vol.- No.67

한국전쟁시 일본의 후방지원

이종판(번역자) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2002 군사 Vol.- No.46

일본의 6 · 25 전쟁에 관한 연구동향

李鍾判(Lee, Jong-pan) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2005 군사 Vol.- No.55

한국전쟁기 유엔에 대한 일본의 협력활동

李鍾判(Lee, Jong-Pan) 국방부 군사편찬연구소 2003 군사 Vol.- No.48

학술논문 8 : 미국의 극동 전쟁계획과 6,25전쟁 - 6,25전쟁 이전; 1945~1950년 -

이종판 ( Jong Pan Lee ) 한국군사학회 2015 군사논단 Vol.82 No.-

This paper is a sort of implication analysis of Korean War, and the study was conducted by investigating ``East-West Cold War Regime`` located upon Korean War, that is to say the conflict between USA and USSR. The result of investigation about the USA military policy and a series of war plan against USSR from 1945 to 1950 is as follows; Why did USA conduct the Korean War in accordance with the ``Far-East War`` and give up noninvolvement policy and also engage so rapidly in Korean War? We can understand the reason easily by looking at ``Acheson line`` from military doctrine point of view. During the Korean War, all operation orders including ``Incheon Landing Operation`` were issued by GHQ/FEC, not UNe. GHQ/FEC continued to issue the order even after establishing UNC, that means USA considered the Korean War in accordance with ``Far-East War``. The map-4[blockade line] shows the fact that USA engaged military forces in the Asian Continent at Korean War. It tells USA holds Japan of inner blockade line and less Hokaido and secure Okinawa. By the simple expression of the map, we may come to the conclusion that USA considered Okinawa the security zone of it`s survival. Although USA considered Japan the ``FEBA``, the fence of Pacific defense and could give up Japan. Also Korea looked alike ``GOP`` in military doctrine. Usually, the role of guard zone(GOP) is assuring the ``FEBA`` forces to have a plenty of time to prepare combat. We can understand easily the meaning of rapid commitment of USA through applying military doctrine. And also it may be because the opponent was not USSR, but North Korea.