An Analysis of Feasible Cost for Pork Traceability System and Welfare Impact on Pork Consumers and Providers in Korea

송양훈,김성철,박지원,김관석 한국농업경제학회 2010 農業經濟硏究 Vol.51 No.4

The pork traceability system is expected to be enforced in near future in Korea, along with the beef traceability system that has been enforced since June 2009. To assess the cost feasibility and enforceability of pork traceability system, a welfare analysis is done, estimating the welfare change in consumer/producer surplus. To measure the shift in demand for pork with traceability, a survey result of Willingness-To-Pay for pork traceability is used. To reflect the cost increase in supply, a cost analysis for pork traceability is used. The result indicates that introduction of pork traceability will increase consumers' welfare by 850 billion KRW and providers' welfre by 425 bo;;opm LRW a year, assuming the unit cost of introducing the system is 183 KRW/500g. However, if the unit cost increases to 530 KRW/500g, the increase in providers' welfare become zero and the providers will no longer be interested in adopting the system unless there is government support, transferring consumers' welfare to them. If the cost reaches over 1,093 KW/500g, the decrease in providers' welfare nullifies the increase in consumers' welfare (the change in social welfare is zero). In this case, the market will lose incentives to adopt the system bacause there is not enough welfare increase in consumers' welfare. If the unit cost increases over 4,062 KRW/500g, not only the change in providers' welfare is negative but also consumers' welfare turns into negative. Thus both of the groups will act against introduction of pork traceability system. Using the estimated price transfer equations among farm gate price, wholesale price and retail price and number of businesses and consumers, it is found that consumers gains 4,987 KRW/month/household, pork farms gain 453,494 KRW/month/farm, wholesalers gain 628,675 KRW/month/firm, and retailers gain 79,151 KRW/month/store, assuming the unit cost of 183 KRW/500g.

부산 시설원예시험장 이전이 지역 원예농민의 접근성에 미치는 영향

송양훈 한국농업경제학회 2009 農業經濟硏究 Vol.50 No.5

Due to growth of Busan and demand for more extensive research on horticultural technology from the horticultural industry, Busan Protected Horticulture Research Station (BPHRS), a division of National Institute of Horticultural & Herbal Science of Korea (NIHHS), will be relocated to Ham-Ahn, Kyung-Sang-Nam-Do, Korea. The research question of this study is whether the relocation will improve the accessibility of horticultural farmers in the area, in terms of travel distance and time. To answer the question, LOGIT model (a Dummy Dependent Variable Model with Cumulative Logistic Distribution Function) is used to estimate the change in probability of farmers’ visit to BPHRS. Assuming unit travel cost of distance and time, change in visit cost (benefit of relocation) is estimated. As results, it is found that the cost of the farmers near the current location will increase and the cost of farmers near the candidate location will decrease, as expected. However, in total, the net benefit of relocation for accessibility is expected to be 12.2 million KRW a year, which justifies the relocation in the sense of improved accessibility.

[농산물 유통연구 시리즈 3] “친환경농산물” 시장, 어디에 문제가 있는가?

송양훈 GS&J 인스티튜트 2008 시선집중 GSnJ Vol.- No.54

○ 소비자의 90% 이상이 일반 농산물의 안전성에 대해 불안감을 가지고 있고 48%만이 안전성을 어느정도나마 신뢰하고 있으므로, 안전성을 상징하는 “친환경농산물” 소비가 연평균 69%나 증가하고 있고 성장 잠재력도 매우 크다. - 그러나 친환경농산물에 대한 신뢰도가 높다는 소비자는 32%에 지나지 않고 신뢰도를 100분위로 평가한 경우 64점에 그치고 있어 시장기반이 매우 취약하다. ○ 그런데 정부가 검사한 친환경농산물의 위반비율은 2~3%이므로 소비자가 사실 이상으로 불신감을 가지고 있다고 할 수 있으나, 이것은 다른 상품이나 상품 특성과 달리 안정성은 소비자가 구매하기 전은 물론 소비하고 난 후에도 진위를 알 수가 없다는 특성을 가지고 있기 때문이다. ○ 따라서 소비자는 가짜일 확률을 사실 이상으로 높게 고려하여 생산자가 요구하는 가격보다 낮은 값으로 구매하려하고, 제 값을 받지 못한 생산자는 가짜를 만들려는 유혹에 빠지게 되는 악순환이 이루어진다. ○ 결국 “친환경농산물” 시장의 운명은 소비자의 신뢰도가 결정하며, 따라서 정부는 생산지원, 시장개척 지원에 투입되었던 예산과 노력을 줄여 생산과 소비는 시장에서 결정되도록 하고 신뢰도를 높이는데 모든 역량을 집중하여야 한다. ○ 즉, 인증절차 및 유통되는 친환경농산물에 대한 감시 활동을 대폭 확대하고, 그 결과를 소비자들에게 충분히 전달하여 소비자들이 정확히 상황을 인식하도록 하여야 한다. ○ 또한 인증과 표시 제도의 모호성을 제거하여 소비자를 혼란시키고 선택을 어렵게 하지 않도록 한다. ○ 즉, 의미가 모호한 “친환경농산물” 대신 유기농산물, 무농약농산물 등으로 특성을 분명히 나타내 표시하고, GAP과 이력추적농산물 등이 안전성 인증으로 오인되지 않도록 하는 방안을 검토할 필요가 있다.

[한미 FTA 시리즈 7] 한미 FTA를 해부한다(7)

송양훈,김재훈,이정환,임병옥 GS&J 인스티튜트 2007 시선집중 GSnJ Vol.- No.41

A Pilot Study in Spatial-Dynamic Modeling of Foot-and-Mouth Diseases Outbreak for Livestock in Korea: A System Dynamics

송양훈 한국농업경제학회 2014 農業經濟硏究 Vol.55 No.4

The Foot-and-Mouth Disease is a major limiting factor in the livestockindustry of Korea. To cope with the outbreak of FMD. Korean governmentand industry has employed several counter-measures such as roadblockage-disinfection and stamping-out of infected animals. However, thesituation could not be contained effectively. To understand and to control the spread of the disease better, aspatial-dynamic model of the disease has been built, using the systemdynamics approach and the visualization technique with Spatial MapTM. Thesimulation result indicates that such a model can contribute to enhance theefficiency and effectiveness of the control measures. Several suggestions toimprove the practicality of the model have been made.

Stochastic Measure of PSE for Korea : the Reliability of Current PSE Measure

송양훈 한국농업경제학회 2004 農業經濟硏究 Vol.45 No.3

The Producer Support Estimate (PSE), developed by OECD, may not be a reliable measure of support for Korean farmers. The current reference price for Japonica rice, the Chinese c.i.f. price, is used to compute Korean PSE. However, current literature suggests that the world Japonica rice price will increase significantly under complete liberalization scenario, which implies that the current PSE for Korea is overestimated. Using @Risk, the distribution of possible reference prices is estimated and it is used to estimate the distribution of PSE measure. The result implies there is 3 to 10% estimation error, by changing the reference price for rice only, which may not be acceptable.

동북아지역 황사문제에 대한 비협조적 게임이론적 접근

송양훈 한국환경정책·평가연구원 2007 환경정책연구 Vol.6 No.3

The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm (DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki (2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADB pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria. Song and Nagaki(2007)에 나타나 있는 것과 같은 동북아지역의 황사(먼지모래폭풍:DSS) 저감을 위한 비용부담 공조체제는 참여국의 협정불이행으로 실행가능성에 문제가 제기된다. 만일 비협조적 전략이 각국에게 보다 현실적이라면, 내쉬균형이 실현가능한 비용분담 게임의 결과를 예측하게 하여줄 수 있다. 본 연구에 따르면, 연속전략게임의 경우, ADB의 황사저감사업의 비용이 각국 투자에 의해 조달된다는 가정 하에 무한한 내쉬균형이 발견된다. 또한, 비연속전략은 3각형 평면으로 나타나는 연속전략의 내쉬균형의 꼭짓점으로 나타나게 되며, 공조적 게임의 결과는 무한한 균형점들을 1개의 점으로 수렴하게 된다.

A Composite Approach of Information Theory and Bayesian Game Theory to Information Asymmetry in Korean Beef Market : Estimation of Information Entropy as a Measure of Information Asymmetry

송양훈 한국농업경제학회 2010 農業經濟硏究 Vol.51 No.4

Domestically produced and 'Han-woo' labeled beef in Korea can be regarded as a credence good because consumers 'believe' the beef is correctly labeled and they are willing to pay higher price. However, the price premium of Han-woo, about twice higher than imported beef, is strong incentive for marketers to cheat. Therefore, the issue of information asymmetry arises: sellers mat have superior information than buyers. To measure the level of information asymmetry, Shannon's Information Entropy, a measure of uncertainty (1 for most uncertain, 0 for certain), is standardized and used. To calculate the probability of cheating, that is used to calculate the Information Entropy, a Bayesian game model is constructed and solved using Gambit, a game model solver. Other than importers, three types of marketers of slaughters, packers and wholesalers are considered at wholesale stage. For resale stage, 6 types of retailers of direct chain stores, processors, caterers, meat stores, restaurants and discount/department stores are considered. Finally consumers are considered as players. The result indicates that when control agency's effort increase in terms of probability of disclosure, the information asymmetry will be imporved only up to 0.63 even when the control agency increase the probability of disclosure above 0.10, which should be the control agency's goal under the fixed level of fine. This implies that the very possibility that marketers can cheat influences consumers' choice and rejection to buy may be realized by consumers' observation or belief. The cheating possibility and its realization are an example of Schrodinger's cat. Domestically produced and 'Han-woo' labeled beef in Korea can be regarded as a credence good because consumers 'believe' the beef is correctly labeled and they are willing to pay higher price. However, the price premium of Han-woo, about twice higher than imported beef, is strong incentive for marketers to cheat. Therefore, the issue of information asymmetry arises: sellers mat have superior information than buyers. To measure the level of information asymmetry, Shannon's Information Entropy, a measure of uncertainty (1 for most uncertain, 0 for certain), is standardized and used. To calculate the probability of cheating, that is used to calculate the Information Entropy, a Bayesian game model is constructed and solved using Gambit, a game model solver. Other than importers, three types of marketers of slaughters, packers and wholesalers are considered at wholesale stage. For resale stage, 6 types of retailers of direct chain stores, processors, caterers, meat stores, restaurants and discount/department stores are considered. Finally consumers are considered as players. The result indicates that when control agency's effort increase in terms of probability of disclosure, the information asymmetry will be imporved only up to 0.63 even when the control agency increase the probability of disclosure above 0.10, which should be the control agency's goal under the fixed level of fine. This implies that the very possibility that marketers can cheat influences consumers' choice and rejection to buy may be realized by consumers' observation or belief. The cheating possibility and its realization are an example of Schrodinger's cat.

모잠비크 농업과 비료산업 진출기회

송양훈,( John Kyo-han Song ) 한국농촌경제연구원 2013 세계농업 Vol.153 No.-

돼지고기 원산지 표시 단속에 대한 게임이론적 접근

송양훈 한국농식품정책학회 2011 한국농식품정책학회 학술대회 논문집 Vol.2011 No.2