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노일석 한국보호관찰학회 2011 보호관찰 Vol.11 No.1
본 연구의 목적은 보호관찰소에서 청소년을 대상으로 실시된 인지행동치료 프로그램의 효과성 평가에 있다. 전국 36개 보호관찰소에서 2003년부터 2008년까지 인지행동치료를 받은 치료집단(N=272)과 대조집단(N=29)의 동질성과 생존함수를 SPSS 17.0 for Windows 프로그램의 카이제곱 검정, 독립표본 t검정, Kaplan-Meier 생존분석을 시행하여 비교분석하였다. 분석결과, 두 집단은 부모형태 변인을 제외한 모든 인구사 회학적, 범죄경력 관련, 본건 성범죄 관련, 피해자 관련 변인들에서 유의한 차이가 없는 것으로 나타나 두 집단의 결과변인인 재범률에 영향을 줄 것으로 예상되는 변인들이 간접적으로 통제된 것으로 나타났다. 또한, 위험노출 기간(평균 49.04개월) 동안 두집단의 생존함수 비교에서, 성폭력 재범률에는 두 집단 간 유의한 차이가 없었으나, 각각 폭력 재범률은 57.4%, 성폭력 또는 폭력 재범률은 56.0%, 일반 재범률은 46.1% 대조집단이 치료집단보다 높은 것으로 나타나, 성폭력 청소년 가해자에게 실시한 인지 행동치료가 폭력, 성폭력 또는 폭력, 일반 재범을 줄이는데 효과가 있었던 것으로 나타났다. 본 연구는 청소년 대상 성폭력 치료의 고유성이 인정되는 프로그램을 비교적장기간의 재범률을 추적하여 경험적인 연구방법을 사용하여 효과성을 확인하였다는 의의를 가지며, 보다 장기적인 후속 연구를 통하여 재범을 예측하는 요인을 확인할 필요가 있다. The purpose of the present study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the cognitive-behavioral treatment(CBT) for adolescent sex offenders which has been run in the Probation and Parole Service. The equality and survival functions of the treatment group(N=272) and the control group(N=29) were compared by conducting X2 test, independent sample t-test and Kaplan-Meier survival analysis. The study found that there were no signifiant differences between two groups in all the demographic, criminal history-related, index offence-related, and victim-related variables with the only exception of the parents structure variable, indicating that the variables which had been expected to affect recidivism were indirectly controlled. In the subsequent survival analysis with an average of 49.06 months follow-up period, it was found that the recidivism rate of the control group was 57.4% higher in terms of violent offending, 56.0% higher in terms of sexual or violent offending, and 46.1% higher in terms of general offending than each recidivism rate of the treatment group respectively whereas there was no difference in recidivism rate for sexual offending between two groups. The results of the study empirically demonstrated the long-term effectiveness of CBT for adolescent sex offenders, suggesting that there should be a need to explore factors associated with recidivism through further subsequent research with longer follow-up period.
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노일석 한국금융법학회 2005 金融法硏究 Vol.2 No.2
The insurance industry is, regardless of its product, is organized under two basic corporate structures. One is a stock company, the other is a mutual company. A stock insurance company is owned by its shareholders. A mutual insurance company has no shareholders and is instead owned by its policyholders. At the end of 1999, 1470 life insurance companies were in the United States. Although mutual companies account for only 106 of the 1470 life insurance companies(7% of the total), they accounted for 21% of the total insurance assets, 17% of premium income, and 36% of life insurance in force. Since 1996, some mutual life insurance companies have either completed or announced plans to reorganize into a different corporate structure. One might wonder why changing the corporate structure has become attractive to mutually owned companies in recent years. The answer to this question lies in the dynamics of the financial services industry in which the life insurance is a part. Demutualization and smaller firms’ competitive shortcomings ensure that the trend towards consolidation and convergence will continue in the coming years. Many mutual life insurance companies see themselves as significantly 182 金融法硏究제2권 제2호(2005) The Korean Journal of Financial Law, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2005) A Demutualization of American Mutual Insurance Company Noh Il Seok handicapped in competition against their larger and more diverse publicly-held stock competitors. Mutual life insurers have no authority to issue shares of capital stock and consequently have limited access to market sources of permanent equity capital. A mutual company can raise capital, primarily, only through generating and retaining earnings. There are sizeable risk-based capital requirements and other significant regulatory controls and restrictions for mutual insurance company to acquire a subsidiary company, depending on the size of the acquisition. At least five merits drive the trend toward the restructuring of the mutual life insurance companies: a need for increased access to capital and financial flexibility; enhanced corporate structure flexibility; ability to use stock as an acquisition currency; management recruitment and accountability; and tax savings. The conversion of a mutual life insurance company to a stock life insurance company is typically accomplished by one of two methods-a full demutualization or the formation of mutual life insurance holding company (MHC). Both of these options enable the mutual company to raise capital by issuing stock. In a full demutualization, the ownership interests in the mutual company are extinguished in exchange for cash or stock of the controlling entity. Thus the members receive an immediate, direct economic benefit. The controlling entity can be either the stock life insurance company into which the mutual life insurance company is converted or an existing or newly formed stock holding company that owns all of the stock of the converted mutual company. Generally, as an integral part of the process, the new stock holding company conducts an initial public offering (IPO) of its stock. Although most stock holding company is formed by the mutual company as a part of the demutualization process, there is no reason an affiliated company could not sponsor a mutual life insurance company’s demutualization and provide to the coverting mutual’s policyowners cash or stock consideration in exchange for the extinguishment of their membership interests. In an MHC reorganization the mutual insurance company restructures itself by organizing into two separate entities-an mutual holding company and a stock insurance company. The policyowners’ membership interests in the mutual life insurance company are exchanged for membership interests in the newly-formed MHC. As a result, the policyowners’ membership interests in the MHC will be similar to their membership interests in the mutual life insurance company prior to the reorgan...
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노일석 한국금융법학회 2010 金融法硏究 Vol.7 No.2
The Beneficiary of life insurance is the person the policyowner designates to receive the benefits payable when the insured dies. The right to designate the beneficiary is the most important right the policyowner has. The right to change the beneficiary is also an important right of the policyowner. A clear, current beneficiary designation is extremely important to the policyowner, the beneficiary, and the insurer. It is important to the policyowner, because she purchased the insurance primarily to benefit a certain person or persons. Most modern life insurance contracts of USA define the rights of a policyowner to change the beneficiary in a policy provision such as "Your change-of-the beneficiary request will not be effective until recorded by us at our Home Office". The Article 733(Right to designate or change beneficiary) of the Korean Commercial Code(KCC) provides as the following: "Article 733(Right to designate or change beneficiary)(1) The policyholder is entitled to designate or change the beneficiary (2) If the policyholder has died without exercising the right of designation mentioned in paragraph (1), the insured shall be the beneficiary, and in case where the policyholder has died without exercising the right of change mentioned in paragraph (1), the right of the beneficiary shall be settled: Provided, that this shall not apply where there is an agreement by which the policyholder's successor may exercise the right mentioned in paragraph (1) in the case of the policyholder's death. (3) If the beneficiary has died during the cover period, the policyholder may re-designate any other beneficiary. In such a case, if the policyholder has died without exercising the right if designation, the inheritor of the beneficiary shall be a beneficiary. (4) If the insured event occurs before the policyholder's exercises the right of designation as referred to in paragraphs (2) and (3), the inheritor or beneficiary shall be a beneficiary" Article 30 of the Korean Civil Code provides as the following: "Article 30(Simultaneous Death)In case two or more persons died of the same peril, it is presumed that they died at the same time" This Article deals with diverse and ambiguous problems concerning with the Article 733 of the KCC. We will review such problems as non- designation of beneficiary, designated beneficiary as a inheritor, the death of inheritor of the beneficiary, change of the beneficiary, simultaneous death and the beneficiary, and other diverse relevant problems.
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코포레이트 거버넌스 이론의 국내도입과 그 한계에 관한 연구 -미국의 Audit Committee를 중심으로-
노일석 경희대학교 법학연구소 2008 경희법학 Vol.43 No.3
The term 'corporate governance' is used in a narrow sense or in a broad sense. In a broad sense it is used somewhat prescriptively to refer to the process of supervision and control(of governing) intended to ensure that the company's management acts in accord with the interests of the shareholders. The central feature of corporate governance is how to control the executive powers. There are three models of controlling the executive powers. The first is a control through shareholder's democracy. The second is the nexus of contracts of the company. And the last is a monitoring the executive powers by the board(especially by the audit committee). It has been argued that the confidence of contract theorist in the effectiveness of market is exaggerated, both as a direct source of discipline and in contributing to the evolution of an efficient system of corporate governance. It also appears that a resurgence in the shareholder monitoring consequent on the re-concentration of ownership in the hands of the institution is unlikely to come about on a very significant scale. The most promising source of the monitoring may be the board, and the solution lies in the board reform. It is important to solve the problem of supervision by a body distinct from either the general meeting or the managing board. There are two models to solve monitoring problems by the board. Under the first companies have a supervisory board and a separate management board(two-tier system). Under the second there is a single board. It is made up of a majority 'supervisory' directors, with executive directors constituting the remainder. * Professor, Department of Law, Sungshin Women's University.The draft of revising the Korean Commercial Law is introducing the executive officer and strengthening the power of the audit committee. So we should study the American audit committee. As directed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, SEC are adopting a new rule to direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the audit committee requirements. These requirements relate to: the independence of audit committee members; the audit committee's responsibility to select and oversee the issuer's independent accountant; procedures for handling complaints regarding the issuer's accounting practices; the authority of the audit committee to engage advisors; and funding for independent auditor and outside advisors engaged by the audit committee. In conclusion I suggest that Three Committees System(the nominating committee, the compensation committee, the audit committee) connected with the executive officer may be efficient in controlling the executive powers. And we should study the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC rules and the listing standards relating to Audit Committee. The term 'corporate governance' is used in a narrow sense or in a broad sense. In a broad sense it is used somewhat prescriptively to refer to the process of supervision and control(of governing) intended to ensure that the company's management acts in accord with the interests of the shareholders. The central feature of corporate governance is how to control the executive powers. There are three models of controlling the executive powers. The first is a control through shareholder's democracy. The second is the nexus of contracts of the company. And the last is a monitoring the executive powers by the board(especially by the audit committee). It has been argued that the confidence of contract theorist in the effectiveness of market is exaggerated, both as a direct source of discipline and in contributing to the evolution of an efficient system of corporate governance. It also appears that a resurgence in the shareholder monitoring consequent on the re-concentration of ownership in the hands of the institution is unlikely to come about on a very significant scale. The most promising source of the monitoring may be the board, and the solution lies in the board reform. It is important to solve the problem of supervision by a body distinct from either the general meeting or the managing board. There are two models to solve monitoring problems by the board. Under the first companies have a supervisory board and a separate management board(two-tier system). Under the second there is a single board. It is made up of a majority 'supervisory' directors, with executive directors constituting the remainder. * Professor, Department of Law, Sungshin Women's University.The draft of revising the Korean Commercial Law is introducing the executive officer and strengthening the power of the audit committee. So we should study the American audit committee. As directed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, SEC are adopting a new rule to direct the national securities exchanges and national securities associations to prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the audit committee requirements. These requirements relate to: the independence of audit committee members; the audit committee's responsibility to select and oversee the issuer's independent accountant; procedures for handling complaints regarding the issuer's accounting practices; the authority of the audit committee to engage advisors; and funding for independent auditor and outside advisors engaged by the audit committee. In conclusion I suggest that Three Committees System(the nominating committee, the compensation committee, the audit committee) connected with the executive officer may be efficient in controlling the executive powers. And we should study the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC rules and the listing standards relating to Audit Committee.
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