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Startup Financing with Patent Signaling under Ambiguity
권준엽,한광석,김관호 한국증권학회 2017 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.46 No.1
One of the most important challenges for startup companies is securing financing. Indeed, it is crucial for startups to demonstrate their projects’ profitability to potential investors. We develop a model of single-stage startup financing with signaling under ambiguity. Nature determines the ability of a technology entrepreneur (startup), who strategically chooses a costly patent level to signal his ability to potential investors. Because the project undertaken by a startup may involve highly innovative technology and may not be well known to agents, they might face ambiguity about the value of the project. To examine ambiguity effects on startup financing, we provide three different financing models in view of the degree of ambiguity: (i) no ambiguity; (ii) only investors face ambiguity; (iii) all agents face ambiguity. In each model, we derive perfect Bayesian equilibria and refine them into a unique equilibrium by imposing the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 1987, 179) or its extension. We analyze the refined equilibria from the perspectives of agents’ equity shares and expected profits, and equilibrium patent levels.
Arbitrator’s Reputation and PR Cost: A Signaling Approach
권준엽,김성룡 한국중재학회 2023 중재연구 Vol.33 No.3
We construct a signaling game model between the arbitrator and claimants, in which the arbitrator’s marketing amount is adopted as the signaling device. Assuming that the parties to the dispute select an arbitrator, and if there is a difference in the arbitrator's fee depending on the arbitrator's reputation, the arbitrator will pay to further enhance his reputation. We would like to analyze the cost differences between arbitrators who already have a high reputation and arbitrators who strive to further enhance their reputation using the signal model. From the Analysis of our study, We derive perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game and refine the equilibrium into a unique equilibrium by invoking the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). Further, we characterize the refined equilibrium.