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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : ( Alexandre Y. Mansourov ) (검색결과 7 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
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Mercantilism and Neo-Imperialism in Russian Foreign Policy during President Putin`s 2nd Term
( Alexandre Y Mansourov ) 한국국방연구원 2005 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol.17 No.1
This article makes the argument that 2004 was a good year both for Russia and for President Putin. Russian national power was measurably enhanced, and the Kremlin`s grip on all aspects of Russian public and private life was further strengthened. Russia largely improved its strategic position in the global environment thanks to internal mobilization of economic resources and political restructuring, favorable external trade conditions, skillful alliance-making, and diplomatic bargaining. Moscow was keen to penetrate the Oriental halls of power and Asian markets in order to use them as a geopolitical and geo-economic leverage against its exposure to and pressure from the United States and Europe. In Asia, President Putin seems to have chosen to give up space in exchange for time and money needed to rebuild the Russian empire. In general, Moscow is adept at pursuing the "divide and rule" strategy and playing all against all. President Putin repositioned Russia in Asia in such a way that Moscow, with its neo-imperial ambitions, is again seen as a ruthless power-balancer and a legitimate and tough contender in its own right for political influence and economic benefits in any power vacuum situation left open by the United States. The author concludes that Putin`s Russia is stronger today than ever, but he questions whether it makes the world a better and safer place.
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North Korea Stressed: Life on the Hamster Wheel
Alexandre Y. Mansourov 통일연구원 2005 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.14 No.2
In the past decade, Kim Jong Il succeeded in achieving his foremost goal his regime survived, augmented its power capabilities, and is taken seriously by the international community. From the viewpoint of a traditional Korean frog that sees the world only from the bottom of a deep well (“umuranui kkaegurri”), North Korea’s position today may look much stronger both at home and abroad. Pyongyang has few incentives to cooperate or improve relations with the United States because the second Bush Administration is expected to continue to act as the “American empire of evil,” pursuing a “hostile” policy aimed at overthrowing the North Korean regime. The DPRK government publicly shifted its stance from a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to a policy of “strategic clarity” with respect to the country’s possession of nuclear weapons in order to cope with the perceived “threat of a US preemptive nuclear strike.” Kim Jong Il’s regime will never give up its newly obtained nuclear credentials and agree to “CVID” or “do a Kaddafi” with respect to its elusive nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang may have decided to turn the clock back to the pre-1991 situation in its relations with the United States, by refraining indefinitely from any substantive contacts with Washington, whipping up anti-American sentiment, and concentrating on enhancing its security through economic restructuring and mobilization of internal military deterrent capabilities, as well as improvement of bilateral relations with its traditional allies and new partners in the region. In the past decade, Kim Jong Il succeeded in achieving his foremost goal his regime survived, augmented its power capabilities, and is taken seriously by the international community. From the viewpoint of a traditional Korean frog that sees the world only from the bottom of a deep well (“umuranui kkaegurri”), North Korea’s position today may look much stronger both at home and abroad. Pyongyang has few incentives to cooperate or improve relations with the United States because the second Bush Administration is expected to continue to act as the “American empire of evil,” pursuing a “hostile” policy aimed at overthrowing the North Korean regime. The DPRK government publicly shifted its stance from a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to a policy of “strategic clarity” with respect to the country’s possession of nuclear weapons in order to cope with the perceived “threat of a US preemptive nuclear strike.” Kim Jong Il’s regime will never give up its newly obtained nuclear credentials and agree to “CVID” or “do a Kaddafi” with respect to its elusive nuclear weapons programs. Pyongyang may have decided to turn the clock back to the pre-1991 situation in its relations with the United States, by refraining indefinitely from any substantive contacts with Washington, whipping up anti-American sentiment, and concentrating on enhancing its security through economic restructuring and mobilization of internal military deterrent capabilities, as well as improvement of bilateral relations with its traditional allies and new partners in the region.
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