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      • KCI등재

        稅法上 加算稅에 관한 硏究 ―免除의 요건인 ‘正當한 事由’를 중심으로―

        김세현 한국세무사회 부설 한국조세연구소 2017 세무와 회계 연구 Vol.6 No.3

        납세자가 가산세 부과처분에 대해서 불복하는 경우에는 그 부과처분의 취소를 구하는 소송을 제기하게 된다. 실무에서는 본세만을 다투는 소송도 상당하고 실제 소송에서 가산세가 다투어지더라도 치열하게 다투어지지는 않는 경우도 상당하다. 오직 가산세 부과처분만을 다투는 가산세부과처분취소의 소 등도 있으나 이것이 실무상 많아 보이지는 않는다. 그리고 가산세의 종류가 많고 가산세를 면제해 주는 ‘정당한 사유’의 존재 인정에 소극적인 대법원 판례로 인하여 정당한 사유에 관하여 ‘고의’ 또는 ‘과실’이 필요하지 않다거나, ‘해석에서의 의의(疑意)’가 있는 경우가 아니라고 보아, 재판부가 청구를 기각하는 경우도 많이 있다. 그러나 재판정에서 가끔은 일부 사건에서 당사자의 입장에서는 신고를 제대로 하지 못하거나 납부를 제대로 못할 수도 있다고 보아 정당한 사유가 있다고 보아야 한다고 생각되는 경우도 있다. 이 글에서는 가산세에 관한 일반론과 가산세를 면제해 주는 ‘정당한 사유’에 관한 대법원 판결을 분석해 보았다. 대법원은 세법 해석에서의 의의(疑意)로 인한 견해의 대립이 있는 경우에는 정당한 사유가 있다고 보았지만, 단순한 법률의 부지나 오해가 있는 경우에는 가산세 면제의 정당한 사유를 인정하지 않았고, 납세자의 질의에 대하여 서면으로 회신하는 과세관청의 언동에 대하여는 가산세 면제의 정당한 사유를 일부는 인정하였으나 일부는 부인하였으며, 과세관청의 관련된 선행행위가 있는 경우에도 정당한 사유를 일부는 인정하였으나 일부는 부인하였고, 납세자가 과세관청의 잘못된 설명을 듣고 만연히 의무를 해태한 경우에는 정당한 사유가 없다고 보았다. 또한 대법원 판례를 분석해 보아도 일관된 경향은 없기 때문에, 현재는 사안에 따라 납세자의 정당한 사유 유무를 판단하여야 한다고 보인다. 가산세 부과시에는 자기책임의 원리 또는 비례의 원칙이 적용되어야 하는데, 납부불성실가산세는 그 한도가 없고 연 10.95%로 과도하다. 과태료와 같은 행정질서벌의 성격을 갖는 가산세에 관하여도 판례가 ‘고의․과실’을 요구하는 것으로 변경된다면 책임주의 원칙을 보다 철저히 관철될 수 있을 것으로 생각되고, 가산세 부과의 적법 요건으로 ‘고의․과실’을 요구하는 것으로 국세기본법에 명시적인 조문을 두는 것이 바람직한 것으로 생각된다. 또한 신고불성실가산세와 납부불성실가산세에 관한 정당한 사유 판단시에는 이들을 구분할 필요는 없을 것으로 보인다. 또한 정당한 사유를 구체화하여 국세기본법에 명확하게 규정하는 것이 필요한데, 구체적으로 일정한 경우에는 납세자에게 ‘정당한 사유’가 있는 것으로 추정하는 것으로 입법화하는 방안이 타당하다. 그리고 과세관청의 언동에 의한 세법상 착오와 관련하여 ‘세법 해석의 전제가 되는 사실관계가 같음에도 불구하고 과세관청이 세법해석에 관하여 의견을 변경한 적이 있는 경우’에는 세법 해석에서의 의의(疑意)로 인한 견해 대립이 있는 것으로 추정된다고 규정하고, ‘관련 판결의 변경으로 인하여 납세의무의 존부가 달라지는 경우’, ‘납세의무의 존부에 영향을 미치는 관련 민․형사 판결의 상․하급심 판결 간 결론이 일치하지 않은 경우’에도 세법 해석에서의 의의(疑意)로 인한 견해 대립이 있는 것으로 추정된다고 규정한다면 가산세를 면제하는 ‘정당... In case revocation suit against disposition of tax imposition, etc is handled in practice, it is often seen that ‘disposition of tax penalty imposition’ is included in ‘disposition of principal tax imposition.’ In practice, suits over principal tax only are considerable and quarrels over tax penalty in actual lawsuit are not so fierce in many cases. There are ‘revocation suit against disposition of tax penalty imposition’ quarreling over the disposition of tax penalty imposition only, etc, but such are not seen to have happened a lot in practice. And the Justice Department often rejected that claim, judging that ‘intention’ or ‘negligence’ is not necessary for justifiable cause or it isn’t the case of ‘controversy over the interpretation’ because there are many kinds of tax penalty and many precedents that Supreme Court was very stingy about the existence of ‘justifiable cause’ that exempted tax penalty. But sometimes, judges thought in taxpayer’s shoes that taxpayer could not be able to declare properly or pay properly in some cases and considered such cases as justifiable cause and thus thought sometimes that tax penalty must be exempted. This study analyzed common opinion on tax penalty and Supreme Court’s decision on ‘justifiable cause’ exempting tax penalty. Supreme Court saw confrontation of opinions due to controversy over the interpretation of tax law as justifiable cause, but did not acknowledge ignorance or misunderstanding of law as justifiable cause for exemption of tax penalty. The Court acknowledged taxing authorities’ speech and behavior that they replied in writing to the questions of taxpayer partially as justifiable cause for exemption of tax penalty, but denied partially. In case there were preceding acts by taxing authorities, the Court acknowledged partially as justifiable cause, but denied partially. The Court did not saw taxpayer’s listening to taxing authorities’ erroneous descriptions and aimless nonfulfillment of obligation as justifiable cause. Moreover, even after analyzing Supreme Court’s precedents, consistent tendency is not found. So for the present, taxpayer’s justifiable cause must be judged based on cases. In case of imposing tax penalty, principle of liability with fault or principle of proportionality must be applied, but underpayment tax penalty has no limits and 10.95% is taxed annually. If the precedents on tax penalty that is much like administrative order punishment including administrative fine for negligence are changed and require ‘intention or negligence,’ it is thought that the principle of liability with fault can be accomplished more thoroughly. This is to say, it requires ‘intention or negligence’ as legitimate requirement for imposition of tax penalty. So it is thought that it would be desirable to specify explicit provisions in the Framework Act on National Taxes. In addition, if it is judged that there are justifiable causes for ‘under-reporting tax penalty’ and ‘underpayment tax penalty’, it seems that there is no need to separate both. In addition, justifiable causes need to be concretized and defined clearly in the Framework Act on National Taxes. Specifically, it is reasonable to legalize the assumption that taxpayer has ‘justifiable causes’ for certain cases. Furthermore, in relation to misunderstand in tax law due to taxing authorities’ speech and behavior, it must be defined that it is assumed that there is confrontation of opinions due to controversy over the interpretation of tax law in case ‘taxing authorities have changed their opinions in interpretation of tax law despite the same fact relevance that underlies the tax law interpretation.’ So if it is defined that it is assumed that there is confrontation of opinions due to controversy over the interpretation of tax law ‘if the existence of tax obligation is changed due to change in relevant ruling’ and ‘if the conclusions betwe...

      • KCI우수등재SCOPUS

        고객의 손해배상청구가능성과 세무당국의 벌금부과가 세무대리인의 의사결정에 미치는 영향

        이학선 ( Hak Sun Lee ),심태섭 ( Tae Sup Shim ) 한국회계학회 2013 회계학연구 Vol.38 No.2

        Economic sanctions are among the major environmental factors that affect tax preparers` reporting decisions. The tax authority imposes a monetary penalty on tax preparers` aggressive reporting decisions. Also, tax preparers could get claimed for compensation from clients when the tax administration imposes a penalty on their clients that was induced by the tax preparer`s aggressive advice. Nevertheless, prior studies analyzed only the tax preparer penalty, without considering the client`s claims, in their investigation of the effect of economic sanctions on tax preparers` reporting decisions. This study was conducted to examine the effects of economic sanctions on tax preparers` reporting decisions by simultaneously considering their claim for compensation from their clients and their penalty from the tax authority. There are two independent variables in this study: the probability of the claim of tax preparers from their clients, and the tax preparer penalty from the tax authority. The dependent variable is the degree of aggressiveness of the tax preparers` tax reporting decisions, which refers to whether or not a tax preparer makes a decision that is advantageous for his/her clients. This study develops two hypotheses on two independent variables. The third hypothesis on the effect of the interaction of these two independent variables was tested, because the effects of the two variables may differ based on the tax reporting decisions of the tax preparers. This study used 2x2 subject groups for experiments. The first independent variable, the probability of the claim for the tax preparers, was manipulated by two levels: a high probability and no probability. The second independent variable, the tax preparer penalty, also had two levels: a 20% and no(0) of unreported incomes. The dependent variable, the aggressiveness of the tax preparer`s reporting decision, was measured using an 11 point scale. To verify the hypotheses, an experiment among tax preparers was performed by requiring them to answer a fictitious tax scenario on a highly complicated and ambiguous problem. The questionnaire was distributed by email to 1,360 tax preparers who were certified tax accountants or certified public accountants in Seoul, Korea. As a result of three periodic requests, 123 effective data were analyzed. According to the results of the data analysis, the claim for compensation significantly affected the tax reporting decision. On the other hand, the tax preparer penalty did not show a statistically significant impact on the tax reporting decision. Additionally, covariance analysis of the four groups was performed according to the order of the magnitudes of the sums of the two independent variables, because the two independent variables can be regarded as economic sanctions from the viewpoint of tax preparers. According to the results, the aggressiveness was lessened by imposing a tax preparer penalty, but the aggressiveness increased when the probability of the claim from clients increased. The aggressiveness did not change when the tax preparer penalty was added to the clients` claims. The result of this additional analysis means that tax preparers usually consider the clients` claim more serious than the tax preparer penalty. These results imply that imposing penalties on tax professionals for their tax reduction decisions in ambiguous cases does not always reduce the aggressiveness of the tax preparers. In this study, even when the tax authority imposed tax preparer penalty, the tax preparer did not react in accordance with the policy maker`s expectations if there was a possibility of reparation. Therefore, as the possibility of a claim had an impact on the tax preparer`s tax reporting decision, the tax authority should consider the juridical relationship of the reparation between the tax-payer and the tax professional when it deliberates on economic sanctions on the aggressive tax reporting decision of tax preparers.

      • KCI등재

        공익법인 가산세제도의 개선방안에 대한 연구

        이중교 한국법학원 2022 저스티스 Vol.- No.189

        Public service corporations originally perform public service in charge of the state, and tax benefits for public service corporations can be justified in that it can be more beneficial to society as a whole than the state directly performs public service. However, since it presupposes that public service corporations contribute to the public interest, an institutional mechanism is needed to correct it if the public service corporations enjoy only tax benefits and neglect the obligations imposed on them. According to the content and degree of violation of obligations by public service corporations, Korean government imposes gift tax on serious violations of obligations, and imposes penalty tax on lower levels of obligations. In this article, the current status and problems of the penalty tax regulations of public service corporations are examined, and the improvement measures are presented in four ways as follows. First, in order to strengthen the function of correcting penalty tax, a three-stage taxation system should be introduced, and if public service corporations intentionally repeat violations of obligations more than four times, tax benefits should be deprived. In the case of penalty tax on violation of the obligation to publicly announce statements of settlement of accounts, violation of the obligation to open and use exclusive accounts and violation of the obligation to submit reports, prior to imposing the first-stage penalty tax, a certain deadline is set to request correction, and the first-stage penalty should be imposed only if the correction is not implemented by the designated deadline. On the other hand, since the obligation to prohibit advertisement and promotion of related companies is due to the deviation of the representative of the public service corporations, penalty tax should be imposed on the representative as well as on the public service corporations. Second, if the penalty tax for violating the obligation to maintain the stock holding limit of affiliates overlaps with the penalty tax for violating the obligation to comply with the stock holding standards of the same corporation, the bigger penalty tax of the two should be imposed in order to optimize the burden of penalty tax. In the case of penalty tax on the violation of the inauguration ban of executives and employees related to the contributor, it should not be imposed if executives and employees actually work. In addition, in the case of penalty tax on violation of the obligation to publicly announce statements of settlement of accounts, violation of the obligation to undergo tax audit, violation of the obligation to open and use exclusive accounts, the upper limit on penalty tax by the Framework Act on National Taxes should be also applied to ensure transparency of public service corporations. Third, when applying the mandatory expenditure system, if it is a public service corporation's public interest project and is also subject to income tax or corporate tax, it should not be treated in principle as used directly for public interest projects. However, when they receive expenses at the level of actual expenses in the profitable business, it should be treated as used directly for public interest projects exceptionally. Fourth, in the case of penalty tax on the violation of the obligation to submit reports etc, the tax amount is determined by the imposition of the tax office, so the phrase “imposes” shoulde be used instead of “collects”. 공익법인은 본래 국가가 담당하는 공익업무를 대신 수행하며, 그것이 국가가 직접 공익업무를 수행하는 것보다 사회전체적으로 더 유익할 수 있다는 점에서 공익법인에 대한 세제혜택의 정당성을 찾을 수 있다. 그러나 이러한 세제혜택은 공익법인이 공익에 기여하는 것을 전제로 하므로 공익법인이 세제혜택만 누리고 공인법인에게 부과된 의무를 소홀히 하는 경우에는 이를 교정하는 제도적 장치가 필요하다. 우리나라는 공익법인의 의무위반의 내용과 정도에 따라 중대한 의무위반에 대하여는 증여세를 추징하고, 그보다 낮은 수준의 의무위반에 대하여는 가산세를 부과하고 있다. 그런데 우리나라의 공익법인 관련 가산세제도는 의무위반에 대한 교정효과가 미흡하고 가산세 수준이 과도하다는 등의 문제점이 있으므로 그에 대한 개선방안을 다음과 같이 4가지로 제시하였다. 첫째, 가산세의 교정기능을 강화하기 위하여 3단계의 단계별 과세체계를 도입하고, 공익법인이 고의로 4회 이상 의무위반행위를 반복하는 경우에는 세제혜택을 박탈한다. 결산서류 공시의무 위반, 전용계좌 개설·사용의무 위반, 보고서 제출의무 위반 가산세의 경우 1단계 가산세를 부과하기에 앞서 일정한 기한을 정하여 시정요구를 하고 지정기한까지 시정하지 않는 경우에 비로소 1단계 가산세를 부과하는 것으로 한다. 한편 특수관계기업 광고·홍보 금지의무는 공익법인 대표자의 일탈에 기인하는 것이므로 공익법인 이외에 그 대표자에게도 가산세를 부과한다. 둘째, 가산세의 부담을 적정화하기 위하여 계열기업 주식보유한도 유지의무 위반 가산세와 동일 내국법인 주식보유기준 준수의무 위반 가산세가 중복되는 경우에는 그 중 큰 금액의 가산세를 부과한다. 출연자와 그 특수관계자인 임직원의 취임금지 위반 가산세의 경우 임직원이 실제 근무한 경우까지 경비 전액을 가산세로 부과하는 것은 실질에 맞지 않으므로 가산세 부과에서 제외한다. 또한 결산서류 공시의무, 회계감사의무, 공익법인 전용계좌 사용의무 위반 가산세는 공익법인의 투명성을 확보하기 위한 것이므로 국세기본법상 한도를 적용한다. 셋째, 수익용 또는 수익사업용 재산 의무지출제도를 적용할 때 공익법인의 직접 공익목적사업이면서 동시에 소득세나 법인세의 과세대상이 되는 수익사업에 지출하는 경우 그 수익사업이 실비 수준의 비용을 받는 경우에는 예외적으로 직접 공익목적사업에 사용한 것으로 취급한다. 넷째, 상증세법 제78조 가산세 규정에서 “징수한다”는 문구를 사용하고 있는 보고서 등 제출의무 위반, 장부작성 비치의무 위반 등에 따른 가산세의 경우 다른 가산세와 마찬가지로 과세관청의 부과처분에 의하여 세액이 확정되므로 “징수한다”는 문구 대신 “부과한다”는 문구를 사용한다.

      • KCI우수등재SCOPUS

        세무조사 선정은 조세순응을 유도하는가? -소규모사업자의 전기세무조사에 따른 가산세를 중심으로-

        배수진 ( Su Jin Pae ),심태섭 ( Tae Sup Shim ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계학연구 Vol.40 No.1

        Tax audits and penalties are the most typical taxation policies to ensure tax compliance. The policies are to enhance the tax compliance of taxpayers on their own initiative by imposing psychological and financial burden on them. Also, the policies will act as precautions against any possible defaults on tax payments, as well as prevent their recurrence from happening in future. Accordingly, the continuous supervision on those who have ever turned out to be evaders is crucial, particularly when repetitive tax evasion happens. In the meantime, the Korean National Tax Service has recently announced that companies whose tax reports show a significant decline in taxable income will be subject to intensive scrutiny for the justification of the cause of the decline. As a result, some studies are required on taxpayers`` behavior with regard to the patterns of their tax reporting after they undergo tax audit. There exist some previous studies on the taxpayers`` behavior patterns, either experimentally, or empirically. However, there still needs to be more of such research to be done and moreover, because those previous studies have failed to achieve consistency among them. The previous studies used their own methods and analyzed different set of data. Therefore, further studies are required to find whether there are any other variables that have not been considered in previous studies but could possibly affect the tax reporting patterns. This study analyzed the taxpayers`` tendencies of behavior over the tax reporting, including one important variable, which has been overlooked or hardly ever been, given careful considerations in previous researches: the size of penalties. The current study is to examine how the tax audit (whether tax audit or non-tax audit) and the penalties influence the decision-making of taxpayers (tax compliance) when faced with filing their tax returns. This study conducted a web-based experiment to collect data. Company workers who are majoring in accounting in colleges have been recruited as participants of the online experiment. In the experiment, as fictitious business owners, the subjects are to file a tax return. By the rule of the tax authority, some subjects are selected for a tax audit, and the penalties will be charged to subjects for any under-reported amount of income. This study manipulated two independent variables: (1) tax audit selection (whether audit or non-audit) in prior period, (2) penalties in prior period by tax audit. Also, one dependent variable is measured (reported income rate = reported income/actual income x 100). The results of this study are as follows. First, the findings show that taxpayers who had undergone tax audit in the prior period are likely to report higher taxable income in the next period than those not. It is deemed that having been selected for the tax audit has heightened the vigilance against the detection risk and thus encouraged an honest tax reporting. Second, taxpayers who were charged and paid relatively high penalties in the prior tax audit tend to report lower taxable income than those otherwise. That is, it is shown that those who have high tendency of tax evasion remained still more prone to tax avoidance in the following period and onwards. It seems that the taxpayers who have paid higher penalties get easily tempted to make up for the financial loss from the results of tax audit by under-reporting taxable income in the next consecutive periods The results of our analysis suggest the need to examine previous conflicting research results. Some of existing empirical and experimental studies suggest that tax evasion increases after tax audits. When our results are considered, past findings were made from large companies with high tax audit penalties. In other words, companies that were charged and paid relatively high penalties reported relatively lower taxable income in the next tax reporting period to make up the loss of the prior period. In this way, this study verifies that tax avoidance after a tax audit is the result of loss recovery as well as the bomb crater effect, which has been supported in previous studies. Cuccia (1994) maintained that the increase of penalty rates increases not only economic costs but also psychological rewards, and causes a result contrary to the intention of taxation authorities (namely, the increase of penalty rates increases aggressive tax reports). Thus, it is necessary for taxation authorities to consider the psychological and economic effects of fines. The results of this study support Cuccia``s (1994) argument. In an analysis of tax avoidance after tax audits, previous researchers have not considered the effects of the tax evasion and penalty levels at the time of the tax audit. As a result, previous research has only reported the actual circumstances, excluding the effects of the tax evasion and penalty levels. This study is meaningful in that it suggests the cause of the existing inconsistent results. Given the above results, it could be inferred that it is required that the tax authorities first ferret out the habitual, serious tax evaders, and then carefully manage and supervise through ways of encouragement, training, and close observations be ensured.

      • KCI우수등재SCOPUS

        조세회피의 비조세비용 - 조세회피가 자본비용, 매출, 신용평가점수에 미치는 영향을 중심으로 -

        이광숙 ( Kwang Sook Lee ),기은선 ( Eun-sun Ki ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계학연구 Vol.41 No.4

        This study investigates whether non-tax costs of tax avoidance exists and how investors, creditors, credit analysts and customers perceive corporate tax avoidance. Korean listed companies are required to disclose tax audit penalties if tax audit penalties are above 5% of its equity. Even though tax avoidance can improve the firm’s after-tax cash flow, some companies appear to be engaged in little or no tax avoidance. The anecdotal evidence suggests that there is wide variation in tax avoidance across firms. In the prior literature, non-tax costs arising form tax avoidance are suggested as a possible reason for the variation in tax avoidance across firms. Hanlon and Slemrod(2009) show that market reacts negatively to the tax shelter involvement. However, Gallemore et al. (2014) cast doubts whether tax avoidance causes reputational costs. They do not find evidence that firms or their top executives bear reputational costs from tax shelter involvement. In spite of these mixed results, we know little about non-tax costs of tax avoidance. This study fills this gap. We analyze a sample of non-financial firms disclosing tax audit penalties over 2001-2013. Korea provides an ideal research setting for analyzing data on tax avoidance since for Korean listed companies the disclosure of tax audit penalties is mandatory. Prior studies including Gallemore et al. (2014) examine non-tax costs of tax avoidance by using the firms that tax shelter revelation occurred. However, tax shelter is only a kind of strategy that firms can choose to avoid tax. In this respect, our study has the merit in that it can cover all kinds of illegal tax avoidance strategies by using real tax audit results that listed firms mandatorily disclose in the market. We begin by examining non-tax costs of tax avoidance in terms of investors and creditors. The disclosure of tax avoidance may raise question on the firm’s honesty and business ethics. We conjecture that investors and creditors require a higher cost of capital for companies disclosing tax audit penalties, because illegal tax avoidance increases agency problems and decreases transparency. Next, we examine whether customers put tax avoidance firms to non-tax costs. Since societal demands on corporate social responsibility increase, disclosure of tax avoidance may damage the firm’s brand values and sales. Furthermore, we examine how credit analysts react to the disclosure of tax audit penalty. Prior studies suggest that credit analysts play a role as a sophiscated information intermediary and reflect tax risk on their credit ratings properly. It is interesting question worthy of study how credit analysts respond to disclosure of tax audit penalty. The empirical results are as follows. We do not find evidence of increased cost of capital following the tax audit penalty disclosure relative to the cost of capital for matched control firms. However, we find that the more tax audit penalties, the higher cost of capital. Similarly, We do not find evidence of decreased sales following the tax audit penalty disclosure relative to the sales for matched control firms. However, in the analyses using the amount of tax audit penalties, we find cost of capital increases with tax audit penalties and sales(or change in sales) decrease with tax audit penalties. Credit ratings also fall into decline with tax audit penalties, but this result is observed only in the regular tax audit sample. Furthermore, we investigate the differential effects of firm size on non-tax costs of tax avoidance. We find that the positive relation between tax audit penalties and cost of capital and the negative relation between tax audit penalties and sales(or change in sales) are more noticeable for small and medium sized firms than large firms. It seems that market reacts more negatively to the tax audit penalties of small firms because small firms have lower litigation capacity than large firms. Furthermore, we find that tax audit penalties do not significantly affect the firm’s effective tax rates following the tax audit penalty disclosure. Our study contributes to the tax avoidance literature in the following ways. We show that the disclosure of tax evasion itself dose not drive up reputational costs, but the amount of tax audit penalties has a positive relationship with the negative market reactions. As we know, our study is the first attempt to combine amount of tax audit penalty and market reaction to the tax evasion. Prior literature does not investigate the differential effects depending on the seriousness of tax avoidance. Even though a firm is imposed tax audit penalties, tax audit penalties might be canceled if the company appeals against a decision. However, if the penalties are substantial, tax risk arising from tax audit penalties is increasing. In this respect, our study extend prior literature by considering the size of cash outflow from tax avoidance detection. It will be able to shed light on the under-sheltering puzzle. Furthermore, we investigate the differential effects of the type of tax audit or firm size on the reputation costs of tax avoidance. Our study shows that market reacts more negatively to the routine tax audit results than special audit results, and small firms than large firms. It implies that the positive relation between non-tax costs and amount of tax audit penalty are conditional on the type of tax audit and firm size. This study has a contribution suggesting that non-tax costs are not driven simply by whether or not the firm engage in tax evasion, rather market imposes non-tax costs based on the seriousness of tax evasion.

      • KCI등재

        가산세 면제를 위한 정당한 사유에 대한 비교법적 고찰 ― 일본과의 비교를 중심으로 ―

        최정희 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2020 조세와 법 Vol.13 No.2

        The tax penalty in Framework Act on National Taxes is an administrative sanction which is imposed against the person who violates duties provided in a tax law. The sub-paragraph 2 of paragraph 1 of article 48 of Framework Act on National Taxes provides that a tax penalty shall not impose if there is a reasonable cause for a taxpayer not to perform his/her duty. Since the term, “a reasonable cause” is an amorphous concept, courts have decided whether a reasonable cause can justify a taxpayer’s breach of duty or not in each individual case by interpreting tax laws. It has been pointed that courts have taken passive attitude on upholding reasonable causes for exemption of tax penalties, however. In addition, it has been apprehended that a taxpayer’s predictability can be impaired since standards for deciding if a reasonable cause is upheld are not clear because courts have decided it case by case. This article aims to draw meaningful implications for the Korean tax penalty regime by comparing the Korean system with the Japanese system which is some what similar to Korea. Japan has four kinds of tax penalties in its General Tax Act. Japanese General Tax Act provides that a tax penalty is exempt if there is a reasonable cause to justify a taxpayer’s breach of duty, Operation Guidelines for Tax Issue issued by National Tax Service describes established facts that reasonable causes are upheld, and courts in Japan tend to admit reasonable causes in some parts more positively than courts in Korea do. As result of comparison the Japanese legal system and determinations of Japanese courts with those of Korea, three implications were drawn as follows: Firstly, it is necessary that the legal nature of a tax penalty should be identified from a new viewpoint. The existing dominant academic theory and courts’ determinations have considered the tax penalty as the administrative sanction, however, it is persuasive that a tax penalty is defined as a special economic burden against a taxpayer’s breach of duties which does not have a nature of a sanction. Secondly, courts in Korea should take more positive attitude in upholding reasonable causes for the exemption of a tax penalty. For instance, it is necessary to uphold a reasonable cause in case where there is no fault on the taxpayer’s trust on acts of a tax authority when it takes an action to the taxpayer, and a taxpayer trusts the third party tax professionals’ advice with due diligence and no fault. 국세기본법상 가산세란 세법에서 규정한 의무를 위반한 자에게 법에 따라 부과하는 조세형식의 행정상 제재이다. 국세기본법 제48조 제1항 제2호는 “납세자가 의무를 이행하지 아니한 데에 정당한 사유가 있는 경우”에는 가산세를 부과하지 아니한다고 규정하고 있는데, “정당한 사유”의 개념이 불확정 개념이기 때문에, 정당한 사유의 존재여부는 법원이 세법의 해석을 통하여 구체적 사안에 따라 판단하여왔다. 그러나 정당한 사유에 대한 판단이 판례를 통해 축적되다 보니, 그 기준이 명확하지 않아 납세자의 예측가능성을 침해할 수 있다는 우려와 함께, 판례 또한 가산세 면제를 위한 정당한 사유를 인정함에 매우 소극적이라는 문제가 제기되고 있다. 본 논문은 위의 문제점에 대한 시사점을 도출하고자 우리나라와 유사한 가산세 제도를 보유하고 있는 일본의 제도 및 판례와의 비교법적 고찰을 하였다. 일본은 국세통칙법에 네 가지 종류의 가산세를 두고 있고, 정당한 이유가 있을 경우 가산세를 면제한다고 규정하고 있으며, 국세청의 사무운영지침은 정당한 이유가 있다고 인정되는 사실을 예시하고 있다. 일본의 재판소는 정당한 사유의 인정여부에 대하여 일부의 경우 우리나라보다 그 범위를 더 확대하고 있다. 그래서 일본의 제도 및 재판소의 판단과 우리의 것을 비교・고찰한 결과 다음과 같은 시사점을 도출하였다. 첫째, 가산세의 법적 성격에 관하여 기존의 지배적인 학설과 판례의 견해는 행정벌적인 성격을 지니는 행정상 제재로 보고 있으나, 현대 행정의 변화에 따라 새로운 시각으로 볼 필요가 있으며, 가산세를 제재의 측면에서 파악하는 것보다 납세자의 신고・납부의무 등의 위반에 대한 특별한 경제적 부담으로 보는 견해도 설득력이 있다. 둘째, 법원이 가산세 면제의 정당한 사유를 인정함에 있어서 조금 더 그 사유를 확대할 필요가 있다. 예를 들어 과세관청의 지도가 있을 때 납세자가 과세관청의 지도를 신뢰한 것에 대하여 귀책사유가 없을 경우, 그리고 납세자가 제3자인 조세전문가의 조언을 신뢰한 데 대하여 주의의무를 다하고 귀책사유가 없을 경우에는 정당한 사유를 인정할 필요가 있다.

      • KCI등재

        세무조사추징세액 공시에 대한 주가반응에 재무분석가가 미치는 영향

        심준용,유승원,이만우 한국세무학회 2015 세무학 연구 Vol.32 No.1

        본 연구는 2000년부터 2013년까지 금융감독원 전자공시시스템에 세무조사추징세액을 공시한 상장기업을 대상으로 기업의 정보 환경에 따라 세무조사추징세액 공시에 대한 주가반응이 차별적으로 나타나는지 분석했다. 세무조사의 진행과정은 외부에서 정확히 확인할 수 없는 기업 내부정보이므로세무조사가 진행 중인 사실이 외부에 노출되는지 여부에 따라 세무조사추징세액의 공시가 시장에 미치는 영향은 달라질 수 있다. 재무분석가는 일반적으로 기업의 사적인 정보를 획득할 가능성이 높기때문에 대상 기업이 세무조사를 받고 있다는 사실을 미리 알고 분석에 반영할 가능성이 높다. 본 연구에서는 세무조사 진행정보의 외부노출 여부를 해당 기업에 대한 이익예측치를 제공하는 재무분석가가 존재하는 지 여부로 측정했다. 세무조사추징세액을 공시한 202개 기업에 대해 통제기업을 설정해 분석한 결과, 공시일 이후 +1거래일에 누적비정상수익률이 유의하게 낮게 나타나고 그 효과가 +5거래일까지 지속되는 것을 발견했다. 공시기업만을 대상으로 재무분석가의 이익예측 여부에 따라 세무조사추징세액의 공시에 대한주가반응이 달라지는지 분석한 결과, 유가증권시장에서는 재무분석가의 이익예측치가 있는 경우 세무조사추징세액 공시에 대한 부정적 반응이 약해지는 것으로 분석됐다. 이는 유가증권시장에서는 재무분석가의 분석을 통해 세무조사 정보가 노출됨에 따라 시장에 생성된 불확실성이 세무조사추징세액의 공시를 통해 해소되는 효과가 존재하는 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 코스닥시장에서는 오히려 재무분석가의 이익예측치가 있는 경우 세무조사추징세액 공시에 대해 더욱 부정적인 주가반응이 나타났다. 추가분석 결과 코스닥시장에서는 재무분석가의 분석이 존재하는 기업이라도 유가증권시장 상장기업에 비해 이익예측치를 제공하는 재무분석가의 수가 적었다. 이에 재무분석가의 수를 이용해 분석한 결과, 코스닥시장에서는 재무분석가의 수가 주가반응에 미치는 영향이 유의하지 않았으나, 유가증권시장에서는 재무분석가의 수가 많을수록 추징세액 공시에 대한 부정적 주가반응이 약해지는 것을 발견했다. 본 연구는 기업이 속한 정보 환경을 재무분석가의 이익예측 여부로 측정함으로써 기업 내부정보가실제로 시장에 노출되는 정도가 차별적이며, 부정적인 소식의 공시에 대한 시장반응이 정보 환경에따라 다르게 나타날 수 있음을 실증적으로 밝혔다. 특히 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에서 재무분석가의 이익예측 여부에 대한 시장투자자의 반응이 다르게 나타날 수 있음을 보였다는 점에서 주목받을가치가 있다. This paper investigates whether the market reaction to the bad news varies depending on theinformation environment by analyzing the stock price movement of firms listed in Korea Exchangethat disclosed tax penalty on DART from 2000 through 2013. National Tax Service(hereafter, NTS) audits the legality of tax treatment that the firm performedpreviously. Tax audit is an important event for firms which may cause the decrease in firm value dueto direct cash outflow imposed by NTS. However, the process of tax audit is firms’ private informationthat it is hard for outside investors to obtain. So, the market reaction to the disclosure of tax penaltymay vary depending on whether the information that a firm is under tax audit is known to outsideinvestors. Analysts generally obtains firms’ private information to analyse firms’ financial performance, so arelikely to know the information about firms being under tax audit. Therefore, this paper separates firmsby whether analysts follow the firm or not to judge whether the information of being under tax auditis exposes or not. We find that 202 firms that disclosed tax penalty recorded significantly lower CAR(cumulativeabnormal return) for five business days since disclosure date than the control firms that did notdisclose tax penalty. In the analysis for only disclosure firms, the KOSPI market shows relativelypositive price reaction to the firms with analysts’ following after the disclosure of tax penalty. Thisresult means that in the KOSPI market, the uncertainty of tax audit which analyst exposes is somewhatresolved by the disclosure of tax penalty which confirms the amount of cash outflow. In contrast,however, the KOSDAQ market shows more negative reaction to the firms with analysts’ followingafter the disclosure of tax penalty than those without analysts’ following. Additional analysis revealsfirms belong to KOSDAQ market are followed by fewer analysts. The analysis using the number ofanalyst following present that while in KOSDAQ market the number of analyst following does notaffect the market reaction, in KOSPI market increase in the number of analyst following mitigates the negative market reaction on the disclosure of tax penalty. This paper provides empirical evidence that firms’ private information are discriminatorily exposedto outside investors by measuring firms’ information environment as whether analysts follow the firm or not. Further this paper shows that the market reaction to the bad news varies depending on firms’information environment Finally, it is worth to be noted that this paper reports that investors in the KOSPI market and KOSDAQ market may react differently to the information analysts expose.

      • KCI등재

        조세 개념의 한계에 대한 소고(小考)

        류지민(RyuJimin) 한국세법학회 2017 조세법연구 Vol.23 No.2

        이 글에서는 조세의 개념의 한계와 관련하여 조세와 제재의 본질에 따른 구별의 문제에 대하여 살펴본다. ‘조세’와 ‘제재’의 공통점․차이점에 대한 고찰을 통해 조세의 개념을 정의함에 있어서 과연 한계는 존재하는가라는 근본적인 물음에 대한 답을 생각해 보고자 한다. 위의 물음에 대한 고찰을 위하여 오바마케어(Obamacare)사건으로 유명한 미국 연방 대법원의 2012년 National Federation of Independent Business(NFIB) v. Sebelius를 논의의 시작점으로 잡았다. 이 판결의 주요 쟁점은 부담적정보험법(ACA)상 개인이 건강보험에 가입하지 않는 경우 부과하는 ‘penalty’가 조세인지 아니면 금전벌(제재)인지의 문제에 관한 것이다. NFIB 사건에서 연방대법원은 문제의 조항을 기능적으로 해석하여 법문의 명칭에도 불구하고 실질과 적용 양상을 관찰할 때 해당 조항에서 규정하는 ‘penalty"는 금전벌이 아닌 조세로 해석된다고 하면서, 그것이 규제적 금전벌이기 때문에 국회의 과세 권한 범위 밖의 징수금으로서 위헌이라는 청구인의 주장을 받아들이지 않았다. 미국 판례법상 조세와 제재의 구별 논의는 우리나라의 법제도에도 의미 있는 시사점을 제공한다. 조세의 세입창출기능을 중시하는 전통적 관념에 따르면 조세는 제재와 비교하여 개념상 엄격하게 구별될 수밖에 없다. 그런데 오늘날 조세의 유도적․정책적 기능이 확대, 강화되면서 조세의 간접적 규제로서의 역할이 그 어느 때보다도 강조되고 있고, 이렇게 조세의 목적 및 기능이 다변화되는 과정에서 입법적으로 조세와 제재를 명확하게 구별하기가 어려워지는 상황이 발생하는 것은 우리나라의 경우도 크게 다르지 않다. 비재정적 목적이 주(主)인 조세는 몰수적 조세로 작용할 여지가 많을 뿐만 아니라 금전상 제재와 중복적으로 부과되는 경우 사실상 이중처벌의 효과를 가져와 납세의무자에게 필요 이상의 과잉부담을 지우게 되며, 이는 헌법상 재산권에 대한 중대한 제한의 문제로 이어질 수 있다.따라서 입법자는 규제 목적에 기초한 세제를 고안함에 있어 그 입법을 설계하는 데에 신중을 기해야 할 것인바, 여기서 조세와 제재의 구별 문제를 논하는 실익이 있다. 또한 조세와 제재의 구별 논의는 헌법재판소의 위헌심사기준 선택과 관련해서도 의미를 가진다. 제재적 조세의 위헌 여부에 대한 판단에서는 조세법률주의나 조세평등원칙뿐만 아니라 해당 조세의 제재적 성격을 고려하는 심사기준을 적용할 필요성이 크기 때문이다. In thi spaper, we will examine the issues concerning the distinction between a tax and penalty as away to explore the normative limit of tax concept. We will also consider an answer to the fundamental question of whether there is a limit in defining the concept of tax through examining the common points and differences between a tax and a penalty. The study of the National Federation of Independent Business(“NFIB”)v. Sebelius (2012) will be a good point of departure for discussion in this article. The major issue herein concerns the question of whether the individual mandate under the Patient Protection and Affordable CareAct (“ACA”) isa “tax”ora“penalty” The Supreme Court of United States in NFIB case took the functional approach in reviewing the provision at hand and observed that the penalty described in the Act shall be interpreted as a tax rather than a penalty, because Section 5000A of the ACA can be reasonably be read as a tax and the Federal Government does have the power to impose a tax on those without health insurance. The Court did not accept the plaintiffs’ claim that the shared responsibility payment under the ACA is unconstitutional as it is beyond the scope of taxing power. The debate of the distinction between a tax and a penalty in the U.S. case law provides meaningful legal implications for Korea"s legal system. According to the traditional notion that emphasizes the function of generating revenues of a tax, the concept of taxes is strictly distinguishable from that of penalties. However, as interventional taxes become popular, more than ever, the role of a tax as indirect regulations attracts significant attention. A tax with non-financial purpose is more likely to be subject to the risk of confiscatory taxation. Also, in case of a tax being levied together with other monetary penalties, it will likely to have de facto effects of double punishment on the taxpayer, which could lead to severe restrictions on the property rights. That means, legislators should be cautious in devising legislation on regulatory taxes. The discussion on the distinction between a tax and a penalty also has meaning for the Constitutional Court in considering the relevant principles of constitutional review. That is because, in reviewing the constitutionality of a tax which has strong characteristics as a penalty, it will be needed to apply the standard of judicial review, which is specifically tailored to the penalizing nature of that tax.

      • KCI등재후보

        거주자가 외국법인에 외국법인 주식을 명의신탁한 경우 거주자의 증여세 납세의무

        홍영표 서울시립대학교 서울시립대학교 법학연구소 2014 조세와 법 Vol.7 No.1

        According to Article 4(1) of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act, nominal trust of stocks issued by a foreign corporation by a resident to a foreign corporation creates the legal fiction as donation of title trust property and may be interpreted such that the real owner is liable for gift tax. However, the above law is based on the presumed application of Article 45-2 of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act, which provides regulation on the legal fiction as donation of title trust property. However, the provision on legal fiction as donation of title trust property apply only to stocks issued by a domestic corporation. Furthermore, real estate located outside of Korea are not subject to the regulation in accordance with the Act on the Registration of Real Estate under Actual Titleholder’s Name. As such, stocks issued by a foreign corporation are not subject to gift tax under the law on legal fiction as donation of title trust property. In addition, Article 4(1) of the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act, which serves as the basis for application of the legal fiction on donation of title trust property, is also not applicable. Therefore, gift tax should not apply to residents under the legal fiction as donation of title trust property provision. In addition, with respect to the question of whether the willful penalty tax for non-filing applies as opposed to the general penalty tax for non-filing in relation to gift taxes on legal fiction as donation of title trust property, the purpose of the legal fiction as donation of title trust property law is to prevent tax avoidance and as such, cannot be regarded as fraud or other unlawful activity under the Punishment of Tax Evaders Act. Given that the nature of the gift tax for the legal fiction as donation of title trust property law is a form of penalty as opposed to a tax, the gift tax associated with the legal fiction as donation of title trust property should not involve the imposition of willful penalty tax for non-filing as opposed to the general penalty tax for non-filing. 상속세 및 증여세법 제4조 제1항 단서에 의하면, 거주자가 외국법인에게 외국법인이 발행한 주식을 명의신탁한 경우 실제소유자인 거주자가 증여세 납세의무를 부담할 수 있는 것처럼 해석된다. 그러나 위 규정은 명의신탁 증여의제규정인 상증법 제45조의2 제1항의 적용을 전제로 하는데, 명의신탁 증여의제규정에서의 등기ㆍ등록ㆍ명의개서는 국내법에 근거한 등기ㆍ등록ㆍ명의개서만을 의미하고, 부동산 실권리자명의 등기에 관한 법률상 국외소재 부동산은 적용대상이 아니라는 점 등에 비추어 보면, 외국법인이 외국에서 발행한 주식은 명의신탁 증여의제규정에 따른 증여세 과세대상재산에 해당되지 않고, 명의신탁 증여의제규정의 적용을 전제로 하는 상증법 제4조 제1항 단서 규정 역시 적용된다고 볼 수 없는바, 단서 규정에 따라 거주자에게 명의신탁 증여세를 과세할 수는 없다고 생각한다. 그리고 명의신탁 증여의제규정에 따라 증여세를 부과하면서 일반무신고가산세가 아닌 부당무신고가산세를 부과할 수 있는지와 관련하여, 명의신탁 증여의제규정은 조세회피를 방지하기 위한 규정으로 명의신탁행위 그 자체를 조세범처벌법상 사기 기타 부정한 행위로 볼 수는 없고, 명의신탁 증여의제규정에 따른 증여세의 본질이 조세가 아닌 제재라는 점 등에 비추어 보면, 명의신탁 증여세 과세가 가능하다고 보더라도 일반무신고가산세가 아닌 부당무신고가산세를 부과할 수는 없다고 생각한다.

      • KCI등재

        신고·납부 관련 가산세 규정의 합리성 제고 방안 연구

        김경하 한국세법학회 2023 조세법연구 Vol.29 No.3

        가산세 규정을 통해서 궁극적으로 추구할 목적은 가산세를 부과함으로써 국가가 금전적인 이익을 얻는 것이 아니라 납세의무자의 납세 관련 협력의무 이행을 극대화하여 협력의무 미이행 시 부과되는 가산세가 발생하지 않도록 하는 것이라고 할 수 있다. 우리나라 세법상 가산세 제도는 국세기본법상의 가산세 총괄 규정과 개별세법상의 개별적가산세 규정의 이원적 입법체계를 이루고 있는 바, 가산세 규정의 이상적인 목적 실현을위해서는 국세에 공통적으로 적용되는 신고․납부 관련 가산세 규정의 합리성을 제고할수 있는 방안에 대하여 검토해 볼 필요가 있다. 납세의무자에게 직접적인 신고 의무가 부여되어 있다고 보기 어려운 정부부과방식의국세에 대하여 신고납세방식의 국세와 동일한 신고 관련 가산세를 부과하는 것은 합리적이지 않으므로 이에 대한 개정을 검토할 필요가 있다. 신고는 납부를 위한 사전적인절차인 것으로 납세의무자의 신고의무를 부여하는 것은 궁극적으로 적정한 납부를 위한것이다. 그런데 결과적으로 납세의무자의 납부하여야 할 세액이 없는 경우임에도 불구하고 신고 관련 가산세를 부과하는 규정은 그 정당성에 의문이 제기되므로 개선이 필요하다고 생각된다. 법정신고기한이 도과하였다고 하더라도 과세관청의 결정 등이 있기 전에 납세의무자가 스스로 신고를 한다면 과세 행정의 부담을 줄일 수 있다는 측면에서사회적 비용 또한 절감할 수 있으므로 신고를 하지 않는 행위보다 당연히 장려되어야 할것이다. 당초 법정신고기한 내에 신고하지 않았거나 신고를 잘못한 경우 자발적으로 시정을 할 수 있는 유인을 제공할 수 있도록 관련 규정을 개정할 필요가 있다. 예정신고나중간신고는 향후 확정신고를 위한 예비적인 단계의 신고로서, 그 단계의 신고가 다소 미흡하였다고 하더라도 최종 단계의 신고인 확정신고가 제대로 이루어졌다면 가산세를 부과하는 것이 합리적이지 않다고 생각한다. 다만, 신고의무를 성실히 이행한 납세의무자와의 형평성을 고려한다면, 최소한의 가산세를 부과하는 것이 바람직할 것이다. 제재 성격의 납부지연가산세와 지연이자 성격의 납부지연이자세를 구분 규정하여 운영하면서, 납세의무자에게 납부불이행에 대한 책임을 지우기 어려운 사유에 대하여는납부지연가산세를 감면할 수 있는 규정을 마련하는 것이 바람직할 것이다. 납부지연이자세를 산정하는 기초가 되는 이자율은 주기적으로 공표하도록 관련 규정을 보완할 필요가 있다고 생각된다. 신고 관련 의무를 이행하지 아니한 납세의무자는 납부 관련 의무를 이행하지 않는 경우가 대부분일 것인데, 신고․납부 관련 가산세가 중복 부과된다면행정벌로서의 부담이 과다하다고 판단되므로 신고 관련 가산세와 납부지연가산세는 중복하여 적용되지 않도록 할 필요가 있다. 수정신고와 기한후신고를 한 경우 신고 관련가산세만을 감면하여 주는 규정을 개정하여, 자발적인 수정신고 또는 기한후신고와 동시에 해당 세액을 납부하였다면 납부지연가산세를 감면하여 줌으로써 납세의무자가 자발적으로 시정신고를 하면서 해당 세액을 납부하는 것을 효과적으로 유도하는 것이 바람직할 것이다. The primary purpose of regulations governing additional taxes is not to generate government revenue through the imposition of extra taxes. Instead, it aims to prevent the public from incurring additional taxes due to noncompliance with their tax obligations and to maximize taxpayers' compliance with tax-related cooperation requirements. In Korea's tax law, these regulations on additional taxes are categorized into two legislative systems: general additional tax regulations under the Framework Act On National Taxes and separate additional tax regulations under the Individual Tax Act. To effectively achieve the intended objectives of these regulations, it is essential to review methods that enhance the rationality of additional tax regulations pertaining to tax filing and payment, which are commonly applied to all national taxes. First, there is a need to consider revising the regulation concerning the imposition of additional tax on tax filings, especially when the government imposes taxes and it is difficult to assume that taxpayers have direct obligation to file taxes. This regulation should be refined, especially in cases where the taxpayer does not owe any taxes. In addition, it is necessary to revise the regulations to provide an incentive for voluntary corrections even if the statutory filing deadline has passed so that taxpayers can submit filing or make revision filing for incorrect tax calculation before the tax office sends the payment notification. As for preliminary return and interim return, which serve as preparatory steps for future final return, it is reasonable not to impose additional taxes if the final return is accurately completed even if the preliminary or interim return was somewhat inadequate. However, for the sake of fairness with taxpayers who diligently fulfilled their filing obligation, it would be advisable to impose minimal additional taxes. While separately regulating and administering the delayed payment penalty tax and the delayed payment interest tax, which functions as deferred interest for late tax payment, it is essential to establish a regulation that reduces the delayed payment penalty tax for taxpayers who can hardly be held responsible for non-compliance with payment. Furthermore, the interest rates for delayed payment interest tax, which are used to calculate the delayed payment interest tax, should be periodically announced to the public. In most cases, additional taxes are imposed on those who fail to meet their obligations for tax filing and payment. However, if additional taxes related to filing and payment are duly imposed, the burden of administrative punishment becomes excessive. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that additional taxes related to tax filing and the delayed payment penalty are not imposed redundantly. Moreover, by revising the regulation of only reducing additional taxes for filing if the taxpayer filed the revised return and submitted it after the due date, the delayed payment penalty tax, which serves as a penalty for non-compliance with payment obligations, should also be reduced if the relevant tax is paid through voluntary revised return or by filing the return after the due date. This would be a desirable method to effectively encourage voluntary filing and payment.

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